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The Eden of Mind in Contemporary Fiction 
Patricia Bishop
The Eden of mind means in the context of this 
examination the self-conscious efforts of contemporary 
writers to seek freedom in the pattern of words and to 
find it by articulating aesthetic consciousness as a 
supreme reality. The term tiid-le is introduced as
a useful unifying concept for the lexical playground of 
Nabokov, Barth, Fowles, Borges, Coover, and Pynchon. It 
postulates the re-creation of an Edenic world in the 
games and play of language. Chapter One offers a synopsis 
of the literary, philosophical, and linguistic movements 
directly important for ludic fiction. Chapter Two traces 
the origins and use of the Edenic myth and its application 
in the contemporary instance as a source of play and 
freedom. An attempt is made critically to examine and 
evaluate the weaknesses of play fiction, its tendency 
toward triviality and solipsism, and to scrutinize the 
opposing criticism. With a detailed textual examination 
of game, garden, and nature motifs, this study shows the 
transference of a geographic Eden to the fertility of 
the creative mind. Through a close analysis of Lot^ta,
Ada, "Lost in the Funhouse," Tko, Sot~Wde,d Factor, Tke 
Magu4, the fictions of Borges, Tko. UnZv2.A,6 at Ba.-&e,ba.tZ 
Aé^oclatZoyif J. Htnn.y Waugk, ?Aop,, and The, CKylng oi 
Lot 49, this thesis notes both the success and failure of 
ludic fiction in offering postlapsarian man the free play 
of mind, the force with which to transcend entropy for 
the aesthetic instant. The dissertation concludes that the 
play of ludic fiction becomes finally not hermetic but 
social as it adumbrates the potential for unalienated 
existence.
CHAPTER ONE: A SYNOPTIC OVERVIEW
Language Portraying the World as Mind
Born as men are into a world of toil and decay, they 
have always attempted to transcend the base limitations 
oi; their temporal existence by the creation of myths, 
religions, and art. The aesthetic impulse serves as a 
manifestation of man's power to project himself into 
another, imagined realm, and to capture a moment of 
experience for eternity, or at least for a time well 
beyond the immediacy of composition. Drama, fiction, 
and poetry obviously deal with a realm discrete from and 
independent of reality. Yet it is clear that this 
distinction makes itself felt more in some works than in 
others, more, for example, in the extended conceits of 
metaphysical poetry than in the earnest verisimilitude 
of Victorian fiction.
The contemporary novel explodes the illusion of 
fiction as reality, and the particular works examined in 
this study do so in a dramatic, dynamic exposition of the 
creative mind. The conscious self becomes the centre and 
the goal of the artistic quest. A pervasive solipsism and 
sense of triviality may result, or the work may be 
engaging and compelling so as to transcend the rebuJces of 
artifice and to confront the reader with indubitable 
artistry and triumphant lyricism. Whatever its merits, 
the journey we take brings us to a scrutiny of literary art
as mind and as language. The reification or hypostatiziticn 
of the external world comes as a secondary aspect.
The act of artistic creation implies a freedom of 
mind and emphasizes the aibility of consciousness to pattern 
a universe. This is implicit in all fiction, but what 
the present study seeks to examine are those works in which 
this idea becomes explicit as a controlling concept. Here 
the union of freedom with' beauty takes place through the 
metaphors of a paradise lost in the primal garden but 
retrievable as the fictive consciousness of a literary 
Eden.
The quest for a new world, nullified in reality, is 
thus transmuted into art. This dynamic can be seen 
operating in the medieval romances of courtly love, in 
Renaissance drama, in nineteenth-century American novels, 
and most intensely and particularly in what this study 
calls contemporary "ludic fiction," Contemporary ludic 
fiction may be defined as fiction in which the search 
for a new world centres on the play element of words and 
language, and in which a primary focus develops around 
the creation of images and verbal games which evoke an 
essential freedom otherwise denied in the postlapsarian 
world. In ludic fiction, author and audience play in a 
garden of verbal delights and the greenness never fades. 
Man's capacity for creative action takes him to an ever 
renewable Eden, existing in the» mind, out of Time. The 
contemporary fictive myth of Adamic fulfillment sets
forw^ard images which articulate a primal play world, and 
the use of the word adumbrates a poetic game.
This study deals for the most part with contemporary 
American fiction and if we include the South American 
'Borqes in this category as a new world writer, then 
John Fowles remains the only European author to be 
considered. The concentration on American fiction 
parallels the relative importance of the Edenic myth 
for literary art in the United States, and it also 
relates directly to the production of the rich, innovative, 
and dynamic fiction which characterizes contemporary 
American literature. A useful starting point, the 
framework of a national cultural experience cannot 
contain the impulse of ludic fiction. The works in this 
study were chosen since they are broadly representative 
of one main current of contemporary literature, Barth's 
The, Sot-(iJe.e,d factor, Coover's The, Untve,A.6aZ BcuebaZZ 
A^éocZatZon, Inc,, J. Hcn^y Waugh, PAop,, and Pynchon*s 
The, C/LijZng oi Lot 49 go beyond the limits of a national 
experience as they express universal concerns about the 
freedom of mind to realize itself.
John Fowles and Jorge Luis Borges immediately surface 
as authors for whom play and games and the verbal tricks 
of the magus are of dominant value. Except for the fictions 
of Borges, all the works in this study were written 
originally in English; this restriction formed a 
selective guide. Because of his| eminence as a maister
literary gamesman, it was felt Borges must be included 
in a study of ludic fiction. Although as fully a 
Slavonic writer as an American one, Vladimir Nabokov 
is central to this study and it would be unthinkable 
to view Lottta and Ada as separate from the mainstream 
of Americ;-m ludic fiction, as they, indeed, along witl: 
are the prototypes for it.
At the outset of this study it is necessary to 
examine the main currents of literature and philosophy 
in Europe and America since the late seventeenth 
century, particularly as such developments relate to 
future ludic fiction. We must probe epistemology and try 
to scrutinize changes in the way man perceived himself 
and the universe. The treatment will be brief relative 
to the complexity of its subject. The goal is an 
intelligent and critical synopsis, a framework of some 
clarity in which to consider the originality, faults or 
merits of contemporary ludic fiction. For our purpose 
we must begin with the great wave of British empiricism, 
with the rise of the novel, and with the prototypical 
gamesmanship of TAtit^am Shandy,
The development of poetry and the novel in English 
has led ineluctably to the abstraction of meaning in 
mind even as a parallel path has emerged in Western 
philosophy since Locke and Hume, Kant and Hegel. From 
a world in which all referents redounded to God" as Prime 
Mover, with nature as an exclusively external force
sepcrato from ana uncontrolled by man, society has 
v,hanged into a realm in which man perceived himself as 
increasingly active and powerful in moulding his own 
destiny. The individual qua. individual progressed with 
the rise of capitalism and the beginnings of the industrial 
state. No longer was he a pawn in divine play. Since 
the individual began to see himself as a discrete entity, 
he turned gradually inward toward the newly realized self. 
The 'I' asserted itself, never to diminish.
The Lockean sensibility and Hartleian psychology 
which permeate Shandy tell us much about man's
perception of himself and the human condition in the 
late seventeenth and in the eighteenth century. Walter 
Shandy is a man who individually tries to control his 
environment^ as for instance, he anxiously attempts to 
arrange optimum conditions for Tristram's birth. He 
believes, as postulated by KaJ^^ey, that the infant 
human being comes into existence as a tabuta Aa^a, that 
nature and society forge character through sensation, 
reflection, and experience. The Shandean man arrives at 
knowledge through his senses , not by means of pure 
metaphysical speculation. What Locke bequeathed to the 
eighteenth century was the dominant importance not of 
God, but of man creating his own universe. While 
maintaining belief in God (through the category of 
demonstration), Locke urged his fellow men to reject 
received or innate ideas, whatever their supposed divine
origin. Willey has noted that /'the whole force of 
Locke's polemic against ’innate' ideas and principles 
springs from his presupposition that we must each one of 
as build up our own being for ourselves out of our own 
dealings with the universe, not relying upon 'common 
notions’ which are said to be from God, but are really 
the received opinions of country or party, or the 
sacrosanct dogmas of t r a d i t i o n . I n  TAÂétAam Shandy 
Sterna follows this dictate to seek a new relationship 
with the universe, as Emerson would later phrase it, and 
to do so he allows full indulgence in the spirit of 
individuality and in the relations between individuals.
Royce notes, "I think I am not wrong in attributing the 
novel largely to that interest in analysis for which 
Locke stood."2
The precedents of the eighteenth-century novel lie 
clearly in the rise of the concept of individualism. 
Macpherson points out that "in the political theory and 
practice of the English seventeenth century," "an essential 
ingredient, both of the practical struggle and of the 
theoretical justifications, .was a new belief in the value
1 Basil Willey, The Seventeenth-CentuAy BaekgAoand: 
Stadte^ tn the Thought oi the Age tn ReZatton to PoetAy and 
ReZtgton (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1953), p. 272.
2 Josiah Royce, The SptAtt oi HodeAn Phltg^ophy: An
€^6ay tn The FoAm oi. LectuAe^, intro. Ralph Bal'con Perry 
(New York: George Braziller, 1^55), p. 81.
7and the rights of the i n d i v i d u a l . T h i s  belief begins 
at least as far back as Hobbes and continues in unified 
form, according to Macpherson, into the nineteenth century, 
hs far as fiction is concerned, we may see that the central 
value and preoccupation with the individual, whether in 
relation or in opposition to society, has continued to 
occupy a forceful role to the present. Ian Watt identifies 
the rise of the novel as a pursuit of truth conceived as a 
wholly individual matter. He argues that "the novel is the 
form of literature which most fully reflects this 
individualist and innovating reorientation,"^ Subjective 
reality based on sensory perceptions, on the individual's 
awareness of "things themselves," as Locke explained it, 
rose to the forefront of any consideration of human 
experience. Watt concludes that "literary traditionalism 
was first and most fully challenged by the novel, whose 
primary criterion was truth to individual e x p e r i e n c e . "5 
Individual experience was an inexhaustibly fertile area 
to be explored and examined in detail. No longer was the 
model of the universal, generic human being able to 
captivate the imagination, ,In the novel the individual
3 C.B. Macpherson, The Pot-lt-lcat JkeoAy oi 
1 ndtvtduaZX^i,m: Hobbes to Locke (London: Oxford
University Press, 1962), p. 1.
4 Ian Watt, The Rt^e oi the hloveZ: Studte^ ii tn Veioe,
RtchaAd4>on and FteZdtng (Berkeley, California: University
of California Press, 1957) , p. 13.
5 Ibtd,, p .  1 3 .
asserted his importance.
Contemporary ludic fiction shares with TAt^tAam Shandy 
and Lockean psychology a dominant interest in the 
possibilities of human consciousness. Sterne and the 
writers discussed at length in the following chapters 
delineate a fictive universe populated by concepts, 
fantasies, and playthings of the mind. Shklovsky argues 
that in TAt^tAam Shandy, "The awareness of form constitutes 
the subject matter of the novel." "Sterne conceived of 
and fused the arbitrariness of literary time as material 
for a g a m e . .."6 Contemporary novelists recall Sterne in 
■Lhezr solipsism and in the preoccupation with character 
(as opposed to action), and with epistemology. One critic 
has remarked that ”TA,l6tAam Shandy is a mutation. ..of a 
genre more remote from the novel as readers in the 
nineteenth centu;ry came to understand it. Hence it 
would be quite futile to trace any direct lineage from 
Sterne's novel of 1759-6 7. Moreover, the parson 
Laurence Sterne, while confining himself to the Shandy 
household and the epistemology of his protagonists, does
6 Victor Shklovsky, "Sterne's Tristram Shandy: 
Stylistic Commentary," Ru66tan FoAmaZtét CAtttctém: ¥ouA
trans. and intro, Lee T. Lemon and Marion J, Reis 
(Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), .
pp. 35,37.
7 John Butt, The Mtd-Btghteenth CentuAy, ed, and 
completed by Geoffrey Carnall, Volume VIII of Jhe Ox^oAd 
HtétoAy oi Bngttth LtteAotuAe, ed. John Buxton^and Norman 
Davis (to be completed in 13 vols.; Oxford; Clarendon Press, 
19 45-79, p. 432. (This section was actually written by 
Geoffrey Carnall).
not exclude the larger world, although in this .instance 
we are talking of "a small circle described upon the 
circle of the great world, of four English miles di<ameter, 
or thereabouts..."8
What is crucially different between Shandeanism and 
lucre fiction is the intrusion of the authorial voice in 
ch.e latrer at the expense of a larger vision, for in ludic 
fiction it is not characters like Uncle Toby who are 
continually astride their hobby-horses, it is, indeed, the 
authors themselves, Sterne, for all his obvious delight 
in toying with the reader and with diverse concepts, never 
approaches self-parody and never obtrudes in the manner of 
Nabokov in Ada or of Barth in his entire oeuvAc, The very 
youthfulness of the form itself militated against 
authorial solipsism; its newness was such that parody and 
self-parody could hardly have exceeded rather narrow 
limits, particularly since the reader was simply a 
in his experience with the genre. The general lack of 
fictional sophistication and slickness predicates a 
freshness and freedom from self-consciousness. Yet 
Sterne's work partakes with ludic fiction of a fundamental 
concentration on the display of arcane facts, educated 
opinions, and literary play. As Pynchon discusses entropy.
8 Laurence Sterne, The Lt^e and Optntoné oi TAtétAam 
Skandy, Gentteman (New York: Dell, 196 4), Volume One,
Chapter Seven, p. 15. Future references are'Tcî" this 
edition and will appear in parentheses.
i.O
physics, munitions plants, and rocketry in GAavtty’é 
Rix.i»ibo:,‘j^ in the manner of a conceptual sub-plot, so also 
doe-: Sterne develop Lockean psychology as an integral 
while simultaneously independent aspect of ÏAtétAam Skandy, 
Nutcall adumbrates the extensive parody of Lockean thought. 
Ht: argues, "it is the ratiocinative intelligence which, 
escaping from the control of instinct and sentiment,is 
the true principle of chaos in TAtétAam Skandy, Sterne 
has here triumphed over Locke merely by exaggerating an 
absurdity already latent in the Bééay."^ Sterne is also 
treating us to his own display of intellectual fireworks 
and in this context what Sterne generates is closely akin 
to Schiller's concept of "Schein" or semblance as a 
disengagement of belief, a conscious delight in the 
strangeness of art as a symbolic f o r m . S t e r n e  is an 
active gamesman, juggling ideas as a literary magus. 
Sterne's capacity for gamesmanship and his virtuoso 
performance as a Rabelaisian entertainer generate an 
epistemological comedy:
9 A.D. Nuttall, A Common Sky: PhtZoéopky and the
ItteAaAiy Î magtnatton (London: Chatto and Windus for
Sussex University Press, 1974), p. 53.
10 Susanne K. Langer, feeZtng and foam: A TkeoAy
oi Att developed from Phttoé opky tn a Meu) Key (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 50. See also,
Bernard Bosanquet, HtétoAy oi Aeéthette (London: George
Allen and Unwin Ltd., Second Edition, 1904; rpfî. 1956), 
pp. 28-29. Bosanquet traces aesthetic semblance to Plato
11
Rabelais's Ga.Agantaa and Pantag/Lu.el and Swift's 
Tate oi a Tub represent a fiction subordinated to the 
extravagant display of learned wit, in ’'flim-flam 
stories and pleasant fooleries," as Urquhart puts it.
The vivacity of spirit that Pantagruel displayed 
amidst his iDOoks— "like a great fire amongst dry wood, 
so. active it was, vigorous and indefatigable"--^? an 
essential element in Swift's genius, and the same 
quality .is admirably caught by Sterne. 1 no virtuoso 
e xp loitation of Lockean psycholog y i n T A -t 3 X. K a m Shandy, 
ihc adroit conjuring with recondite teio. s and names, 
the exuberant rhetoric and keen, indiscriminate 
appetite for projects of all kinds, marks it as an 
accomplished performance in the same tradition.il
The engagement in games for the sake of their ludic
value thus is an old tradition in the history of the English
novel and indeed in literature, but it takes on an added
dimension when merged with the.concept of possessive
individualism. The mastership of self stands as a central
idea in ludic fiction since it exalts the full possibilities
of man as creator of his own unique universe. The definition
and reflection of man through his sensuous and ratiocinative
being provides much of the framework for TAtétAam Shandy,
Sterne is explicit that his is a novel framed in the mind
of its narrator and a mental odyssey imbued with clear though
often sardonic Lockean perspectives. In Volume Two, Chapter
Two, Tristram remarks on the Béé ay upon the Human
UndeAétandtng: "It is a history book. Sir, of what passes
in a man's own mind" (p. 70). Sterne is as much commenting
on his own endeavour as he is on Locke's Béé ay since it is
wholly through the mind of Tristram that the novel unfolds.
This is, technically, a brilliant method, much^^like the
11 Butt, op,ctt,, p. 432
mental baseball game of Robert .Coover, for it admits the 
possibility, indeed almost the necessity, of presenting 
discursive philosophical dilations, innumerable non 
seqiiiturs, amorphous ideations, and bawdy thematic 
occupations, all legitimately in the process of revealing 
what has happened to Tristram Shandy. In ostensible 
reversal of Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding, plot is 
secondary. Action gives way to individuality, subjectivity, 
and .interrelationships of meaning. We see Sterne's 
"subtler revelation of character than previous novelists 
had reached" and realize that Walter Shandy and Uncle Toby 
affect each other much more than previous characters in 
English n o v e l s . 12 Tristram has inherited his father's 
thirst for intellectual excitement and his wit presents 
itself as a conscious aestheticism in a way similar to that 
of Van Veen in Ada,
As with the exploration of the Eden of mind, what is 
fundamental is the author's presentation of the subjective 
essence of human existence through the-"digressive but 
progressive" musings of Tristram. With the assumption 
that words signify a large part of objective reality,
Sterne deftly demonstrates the folly of words to define 
experience and the inability of philosophical and scientific 
hypotheses to encompass or explain the nyriad variations 
of personal reality. As with the Trystero system in
1 2  ibtd, p .  4 4 4 .
The CJiijtng oi Lot 49, words and symbols are only valid 
within a particular set of accepted ideas and reference 
points. A bridge and a curtain mean one thing to Uncle 
Toby, quite another to Dr. Slop. Words suggest armements 
and fortifications to Toby, regardless of their obvious 
(but to whom?) or more common purport, and anything can 
form the basis of a philosophical treatise from Walter 
Shandy because fortifications and philosophy are their 
respective orientations. In other words, objective meaning 
is distorted, even negated, by the idea in the mind of 
the individual, who with words launches alternative worlds. 
For Sterne, as for the later Wittgenstein, ordinary 
language generates epistemological complications through 
the individuality of use, yet neither sanctions a private 
language.
That there is little objective reality and no ultimate, 
universal meaning, except for words, ideas, and the worlds 
they transiently create, is a clear and essential tenet 
of Sterne's moral system. Humbert Humbert has only words 
to play with and Sterne's commentary on life's comic 
absurdity looks to Tristram as jester or magus and Shandeisra 
as modiU vtvendt (merrymaking tempered by Eugenius' discreet 
moderation). For Sterne as for the authors of ludic 
fiction, life is not a sublime progression of achievement 
and fulfillment, nor an attainment of august goals and 
dreams through hard work and trying application^ It is 
simply and supremely a pleasurable experience to be thought
14
about; little or reflected on ad -tnitnttum but always 
enjoyed thoroughly. Shandeism and ludic fiction may be 
decried for speaking to nothing in the history of universal 
struggle, suffering, and sacrifice, for telling us very 
little about caAÂltaé, equality, or what it means fully to 
be human. Ludic fiction often reduces man to laughter 
and at times the role of jester supplies the human 
condition only with an underpinning of emptiness. For the 
writers of play fiction, however, literary art justifies 
itself as the solace of a supreme fiction, a poetic universe 
created by mind and endlessly available and renewable in 
the realm of human consciousness. We are reminded of 
mortality, trans^ience, and the irresolvable unimportance 
of being hiaman.
As we have seen, the human individual qua 
individual was asserted by the rise of the novel and the 
philosophical movement away from a God-centred universe 
to a world with a human axis. Whereas Spinoza, for example, 
saw God as absolute truth and consciousness, the unity of 
being and substance could be located identically in the 
world, nature, and man, for the totality of God was a 
unity expressed as an immanence in the human individual. 
Although Spinoza expressed this oneness of God with the 
world in abstract terms, clearly with Spinoza and later 
with Locke, a philosophical leap occurred, and the funda­
mental progress in thought concerns the ability of the human 
individual to create being and substance for himself. The
individual had power to reach toward freedom tiirough his 
own efforts; he was thus endowed with some power over his 
own destiny; God gradually receded to an auxiliary position.
Willey had discussed "the decline of religion which 
was undoubtedly taking place in the latter half of the 
(seventeenth] century."13 in art by the late eighteenth 
century due to philosophical achievements of the rationalists 
and early empiricists and to changes in the state, in trade, 
and economy, man had seized an active, self-centred role, 
and ha had become identified with his creations and 
achievements. We can readily discern the heightened sense 
of self, the full absorption in one's own being, the quest 
for self-expression, self-knowledge, and freedom that 
marked European Romanticism. Such conceptions distinguish 
contemporary ludic fiction nearly as deeply as they did 
the poetry of Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, and Shelley. 
Hartman notes that "Wordsworth is the first English poet 
to consider and use personal experience as his sublime 
argument."14
The identification of God with nature, as an 
immanence, and the unity of fian with nature posit a 
Spinozistic point of view pervasive even in the early poems 
of Wordsworth. The pantheistic realm of nature provides
13 Willey, op,ctt,, p. 2 77.
14 Geoffrey H. Hartman, The Unmedtated At?
lntQjLpAe.ta.tton oi WoAcUuJoAtk, Hopfztnt, RtZke, and i/atzAy 
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1954), p. 6.
T f"
& harmony which can only uplift man's spirit. God 
pal sonified in nature mediates directly with the hiraan 
J ■ Q.j.'u‘.dual and his woes. The poem "Written in very early 
..oio,.r;. describes man as sensuous being assuaged by the
a.niiuence of the natural world. The Hartleian 
perception is already articulated. As he reconciles himself 
with nature through sensory association, man can dwell in 
repose and tranquility: "Now, in this blank of things, a
harmony, / Home-felt, and home-created, comes to heal / That 
grief for which the senses still supply / Fresh food; for 
only then, when memory / Is hushed, am I at rest..."15 
Wordsworth locates human freedom in the "exquisite fit" of 
mind with Nature and the creation which their fusion might 
achieve. Since the poet is "a man...of more than usual 
organic sensibility,”15 he may assert his own individualism 
for all men through the creative process. Wordsworth came 
to see this creative impulse heightened by the inherent 
design and pattern of nature. Paradise for Wordsworth is 
actual and is to be found in the natural world. In The. 
Realuée Wordsworth's view becomes explicit:
I, long before the blessed hour arrives.
Would sing in solitude the spousal verse
/ I
15 William Wordsworth, "Written in very early Youth" in 
Tfit Poettaat WoAké oi Wttttam WoAdéixoAtk, ed. E. de Selincourt, 
Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940; rpt. 1952), p. 3,
lines 7-11.
16 William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge,
Ly/û.c.aZ BaZZadé, ed. and intro. R.L. Brett and A.R. Jones 
(London: Methuen and Company Ltd., 196 3), Preface of the
1800 text, p. 240.
1?
Of this great consummation, would proclaim 
Speaking of nothing more than what we are 
How exquisitely the individual Mind,
And the progressive powers perhaps no less 
Of the whole species to the external world 
Is fitted, and how exquisitely too.
Theme this but little heard of among men.
The external world is fitted to the mind
And the creation, (by no lower name
Can it be call'd), which they with blended might
Accomplish: this is my great a r g u m e n t ^ ?
Harold Bloom calls "Tintern Abbey" "a history in
little of Wordsworth's imagination," and he discusses the
parallel and the "principle of reciprocity between the
external world and his [Wordsworth's] own mind."18
Wordsworth finds a sense of Edenic fulfillment through the
aesthetic conjunction of his imagination with nature. The
poetic recollection turns man away from the toils of the
postlapsarian world, back to the charms and solace of a
primal natural order. Man's power and freedom lie in the
capacity of his imagination to recapture Adamic experience
in the Unity with nature:
If this
Be but a vain belief, yet, ohI how oft.
In darkness, and amid the many shapes 
Of joyless daylight; when the fretful stir 
Unprofitable, and the fever of the world.
17 William Wordsworth, The Rectuée in The PoetteaZ 
WoAki ûi WtZZtam WoAdéuJOAth, ed, E . de Selincourt and 
Helen Darbishire, Vol. V (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949;
rpt. 1959), Appendix A, MS. B'4 version of fragment past 
line 754, p. 339,
IG Harold Bloom, The {/tétonaAy Company: A Reactliig
oi BngZték Romanttc PoetAy, Revised and Enlargpçl 
Edition (Ithaca, N.Y. : , Cornell University Pr'ê#%, 1971), 
pp. 131-32.
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Have hung upon the beatings of my heart.
How oft, in spirit, have 1 turned to thee 
0 sylvan Wye! thou wanderer thro' the woods.
How often has my spirit turned to thee!19
Schenk notes that Jean Paul called recollection "'the
only paradise from which we cannot be expelled.'" Schenk
points out, however, the nature of a regressive absorption
in the past which such expression m a y  g e n e r a t e . 20 Through
poetry the individual is reunited with his youth and vigour,
though at the same time man is refined by the wisdom and
learning of the intervening years, so that the poetic
experience transcends mere physical oneness in the natural
setting. This is no mere recollection of an idyllic
trip; it is an assertion of the strength of mind and of
poetry. The poet recalls that he is a lover of "all that
we behold / From this green earth; of all the mighty
world / Of eye, and ear, both what they half create / And
what perceive..." (105-108). The poet gives form and
design to the synthesis of man's senses and the natural
universe. He carefully recollects and preserves the Edenic
content of this relationship and he comes to know universal
expedience through his individuality and sensory awareness.
Yet nature clearly is a separate entity accessible to all
19 Wordsworth, "Lines written a few miles above 
Tintern Abbey" in LyAtcaZ BaZZadé, op,cZt,, lines 50-58, 
p. 113.
20 H.G. Schenk, The Mtnd o jj BuAopean.yHpmccntZaé : An
Béé ay tn CuZtuAaZ HtétoAy, with a Preface by Isaiah Berlin 
(New York: Ungar, 1966), p. 45„
men outside the aesthetic realm and artifice never is
acclaimed for its own sake. Indeed, the full arousal of
the imagination is something powerful which the poet
recognizes and fears. In The PAeZude this is evident in
the sections on "Crossing the Alps" (Book VI) and
"Snowdon" (Book XIV, 1850). For Wordsworth art is a means
to achievement but it is not actually the goal. Bloom
has supplied some insight to the lines quoted above:
But why "half create"? Though the boundaries between 
man and Nature have wavered, Wordsworth wishes to 
avoid the suggestion of a total absorption of Mature 
into man. Man is almost totally absorbed in Nature 
in his childhood, and again in extreme old age... But 
for the mat;ure man, outward Nature must be recognized 
as external. That is his freedom and his grief.
His consolation is that he half creates as well as 
perceives "outward" Nature, for what is outward comes 
to him only through the gates of his own perception... 
Eyes and ears, the gates of perception, are not 
passive but selective. He cannot create the phenomena 
that present themselves to him; they are given. But 
his choice is guided by memory. Memory is the mother 
of poetry for Wordsworth because the poem's half of 
the act of creation cannot proceed without the 
catalyst of recollecting the poet's response to an 
earlier version of the outward presence of Nature...21
Through the application of memory and desire Wordsworth
recalls the Edenic past of his childhood and youth,
Wordsworth the poet becomes introspective but it is impossible
to say he is self-absorbed in any sense similar to the
contemporary writers of ludic fiction. As Bloom indicates,
Wordsworth always demarcated self and nature as discrete
entities. Nowhere does he merge the world of mind with
external reality, reaching a stage of mind as the pre-
21 Bloom, op,cZt,, pp. 136-7.
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pondérant, the only, reality worth consideration. 
Imagination generates feàr as the poet discerns it may 
sever him from the solace conferred by the actual, external 
world. Significantly in terms of Edenic literature, the 
poet established a framework wherein the sensory Hartleian 
perspective took root as the search for mind through a re­
collected synthesis of individual experience with the 
natural world. The voyagé of Tkd VKttmdo. explicitly 
delineates the mind's journey to self-knowledge. Willey 
concludes that Wordsworth built his positive beliefs from 
’'his own poetic experiences, and it is this which makes 
him representative of the modern situation— the situation 
in which beliefs are made out of poetry rather than poetry 
out of beliefs."22
Echoing Milton's cry of the Adamic quest— "The world 
was all before them"— Wordsworth opens Tkd ?^e,tud2. with 
a forceful sense of the individual poet's freedom: "The
earth was all before me" (line 14, 1850). He proceeds 
dialectically from childhood to the mature intellect. The 
vigour and happiness of youth are secured once again in 
adulthood by means of the transforming power of mind. The 
postlapsarian world of the mature poet achieves sublimity 
by destroying time through art. Onorato has commented that 
"in The ?n,ztiid(L we observe how the poet who recollects 
the child in his experiences of solitude presents at the
22 Willey, op, dit,, p- 295-
21
sarac cime the artist's heroic determination to pursue his 
recollections and imaginings in solitude in order to 
find again the 'special' sense of himself in his experience, 
and perhaps to determine its m e a n i n g , "23 Consciousness 
becomes the controlling feature of Wordsworth's quest, 
hartman points oi;t that the poet's "theme, his focus on the 
Individual mind, is already a sign of a 'general and 
gregarious advance' in human s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . "24 The 
spirit is that of the new Adam restoring himself through 
spots of time.25 Bloom postulates that "imagination, 
working through memory, appropriates the visionary power 
and purges the dreariness originally attached to it in this 
instance. The power is therefore an intimation of the 
indestructible."26
For Wordsworth the poet must restrict himself to 
supplying "endless combinations of forms and imagery" for 
"the great and universal passions of men, the most general 
and interesting of their occupations, and the entire world 
of nature before me."^? Nature is the surest touchstone.
2 3 Richard J. Onorato, The ChaxacteA, the ?ûtt: 
Wo/id6(À)o i^tk The F/ietude oh. G^oooth oX a P o e t '6 MTnd 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971) ,
p. 93.
24 Geoffrey H. Hartman, Wo Jtd^ ifJO^ th'6 Poetxy : 1 7 87-1 SI 4
(New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, fourth
printing with a new essay "Retrospect 1971," 1971), p. 50.
25 Bloom, Company, p. 14 2.
25 Ibid., p. 161.
2 7 Wordsworth, LyJLCcaZ Sattadé, p. 256.
and unlike other Romantic poets- and the composers of
India fiction, Wordsworth never seeks to transcend and to
escape nature in the freedom of imagination. It is visions
of the earth, water, and heavens which lead the poet to "a
mind sustained / By recognitions of transcendent power, / In
sense conducting to ideal form / In soul of more thcin
mortal privilege" (PAeZude, XII/, 74-9, 1850). Imagination
is almost always expressed in Edenic terms of earth and
nature images, particularly water motifs, as in the famous
passage in Book VI, 1850 version. Here Wordsworth links
imagination to "the mighty flood of Nile / Poured from his
fount of Abyssinian clouds / To fertilise the whole
Egyptian plain" (VI, 614-16). The process is circular
and devolves back to earth, to life in nature, the sensory
experiences upon which the poet places his visions of
infinity, and "the sustaining thought / Of human Being,
Eternity, and God" (XIV, 204-05). Bloom writes persuasively
when he speaks of Wordsworth's confinement and solace in
nature and the dialectical process through which the mind
reaches full consciousness as the senses abide in nature,
attain imaginative transcendence, and return to earthly
reality enriched with spiritual progression.
The hidden tragedy running through The PAeZude is 
Wordsworth's resistance to his own imaginative 
emancipation.... He diffuses the secret strength of 
things over the widest possible landscape, in contrast 
to his disciple Shelley, who stands before Mont 
Blanc and cries, "The power is there...." ,
For Blake, and finally for Shelley, Éhe 
Imagination”s freedom from Nature is a triumph. It 
makes Wordsworth profoundly uneasy; he does not, believe
:>3
that time and space ought to be abandoned quite so 
prematurely. For Blake, the matter of common perspective, 
the world of Primary Imagination, is hindrance, not 
action, but for Wordsworth it is something better 
than action; it is contemplation, and to see something 
clearly is already to have made some sense out of the 
diffuse and chaotic world of sensation. To mold a few 
of these clear things into a simple and still clearer 
unity is to have made imaginative sense out of 
sensation.2 8
Shelley and Keats were bolder in their outright, 
iimnediate elevation of mind and art and in cultivation of 
sensuous experience for its own sake, which Modernist and 
ludlc fiction more fully explore. De Quincey, Crabbe,
Francis Thompson, and Coleridge sought the drug-induced 
world of prelapsarian freedom. Such Romantic quests find 
a certain parallel in the search of ludic fiction for the 
Edenic fulfillment of a self-created world of mind. In
Kubta Coleridge's pleasure-dome is delineated by
Edenic motifs of water and sun, garden and greenery. This 
natural refuge reflects the subjectivity of the author's 
vision and clearly indicates to the reader an invented 
paradise explicable solely in relation to the mind's 
capacity for self-evolved fictions. An image such as 
"Caverns measureless to man" demonstrates the infinite 
aspect of the poet's vision. Indeed Coleridge, like the 
writers of ludic fiction, posits a new world of Edenic, 
sensuous gratification. Abrams defines the drug-generated 
quest in terms which explain much of ludic art as well:
28 Bloom, l/Z^ yioyiaAy Company, p. 146.
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The great gift of opium to these men wus access 
to a new world as different from this as Mars may 
be; and one which ordinary mortals, hindered by 
terrestrial conceptions, can never, from mere 
description, quite comprehend. It xs a world of 
twisted, exquisite experience, sensuous and in­
tellectual; of "music like a perfume," and "sweet 
light golden with audible odors exquisite," where 
color is a symphony, and one can hear the walk of an 
insect on the ground, the bruising of a flower. Above 
all, in this enchanted land man is freed at last from 
those petty bonds upon which Kant insists: space and
time. Space is amplified to such proportions that, 
to writer after writer, "infinity" is the only word 
adequate to compass £t. More striking still, man 
escapes at last from the life of a transiency lamented 
by poets since time immemorial, and approaches 
immortality as closely as he ever can in the world; 
for he experiences, almost literally, eternity. This 
is not the abstract "eternity" of the mystic, not 
Vaughan's vision of "a great ring of pure and endless 
light," but the duration of an actual, continuous 
experience so long that De Quincey throws up his 
hands in an attempt to measure it by mundane standards.29
De Quincey concentrates on his reveries under the
influence of the poppy. He notes a transcendence of temporal
and spatial reality, a new world of mind, "for an opium-
eater is too happy to observe the notion of time." He
sounds like the runner in a Borgesian labyrinth: "And
sometimes, in my attempts to steer homewards,...I came
suddenly upon such knotty problems of alleys, alleys
without soundings, such enigmatical entries, and such
sphinx's riddles of streets without obvious outlets or
thoroughfares, as must baffle the audacity of porters, and
29 M.H. Abrams, The MZZk PaAadZée- The E^^ect 
oi OpTum on the WoAké o^ Ve Q^utneey,
VAancU.^ Thomp-éon, and CoZeAtdge (New York: Haifper and Row,
Perennial Library Edition, 1970), pp. 4-5.
ccnround the intellects of hackney coachmen." Wliai'. xw 
true for the addict rings true for the Romantic hero and 
for contemporary ludic fiction: "I could almost nave
believed, at times, that I must be the first discoverer 
of some of these teAAae Zncognttae, and doubted 'fiother 
t.hey had yet been laid down in the modern chart,.- of 
Thta sensuous, physical, and psychological expar.^er. : 
transposes itself into a fealm of thought^ embeev.:.. ,j; the 
antinomies Coleridge laid out for the poet. In oh- c cher- 
worldlinass of drug-induced dreams, visions of it'mori-.c-.tcty 
ttntc upoo the embers of a transient, delusive^ and 
dost tact ;r’'e ;monent. From the subjective vision errergc 
aliy appealing and applicable .Lmep-s of an 
j.dttz.' £den„. for the vleions ox Coleridge and ho .pu.rnoey
he L OT:r tnr lu ai o writers '‘the secret of durable pigmeni/ir, 
"cr; raxrge f orp. "a si unny pleasure--doyue wit a - -..f
r.: •' arh li. r'ks in the corner of this vision  ^ it ta 
c; .1 / ;c .xc.,i, language, which retrieve men from the 
i' . à-AUV' vords alone cannot cover the abyss, a.tà t: die 
ficttor. .is simply the exchange of one emptinesc foi er;ether 
trivialized barrenness.
2y.ron, Keats, and Shelley cultivated an aesthetioism 
which transposed individual experience through language
:'0 -’homas De Quincey, The Con^e^^ton^ an 
tpiIdiiieA, intro. John F. Jordan (Londoni . ton, 
x;vt...:pman ^ s Librarvd 1972), p. 192.
into what Coleridge after his German mentors called 
organic unity. The intensity of poetry directly augments 
man's life in the world; the world is not dismissed in 
art, it is integrated with it. If for Coleridge "poet" 
and "poetry" are nearly synonymous, the poetic quest offers 
man a rare opportunity for holistic fulfillment, for the 
complete integration of all his faculties. The poetic 
expression "sustains and modifies the images, thoughts, and 
emocions of the poet's own mind," so that a universality is 
approached by means of the individuality of one artist. The 
poet's art transcends his own uniqueness as well as his own 
limitations: "The poet, described in an ZdeaZ perfection,
brings the whole soul of man into activity... He diffuses 
a tone and spirit of unity, that blends, and (as it were) 
u^6iiyS, each [faculty] into each, by that synthetic and 
magical power, to which we have exclusively appropriated 
the name of imagination.... This power... reveals itself 
in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant 
qualities..." 51
Unlike the writers of contemporary ludic fiction, and 
many other lesser but conventional writers as well,
Coleridge, Byron, and Shelley identified poetic perfection
31 S.T. Coleridge, BtogAapkta LtteAaAta, ed. with 
his Aesthetical Essays by J. Shawcross, Vol. 2 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1907; rpt. 1969), Chapter XIV, 
lines 9-19.
and aesthetic achievement with man in the world and with 
hope.; for moral, political, and social change. For 
Shelley, "poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the 
world." "They are the institutors of laws, and the founders 
of civil society."52 poetry involves the search for human 
f. cecom.. In his Veieyiet VoetAy, Shelley posits not 
:> j ic.-.cit;: câi but the integration of art in society. Holmes 
bas argued that "the heart of his DctJence turns on the 
role of poetry as a force for freedom in society."53 
Shelley is explicit in his insistence that "the most un­
failing herald, companion and follower of the awakening of 
a great people to work a beneficial change in opinion or 
institution, is Poetry." While maintaining the "un­
acknowledged" role of the poet as a creator of a better 
future reality, Shelley also delineates the Edenic function 
of art and of course for him these roles operate in perfect 
tandem:
But poetry defeats the curse which binds us to be 
subjected to the accident of surrounding impressions. 
And whether it spreads its own figured curtain, or 
withdraws life's dark veil from before the scene of 
things, it equally creates for us a being within our 
being. It makes us the inhabitants of a world to 
which the familiar world is a chaos. It reproduces 
the common Universe of which we are portions and 
percipients, and it purges from our inward sight the
32 Percy Bysshe Shelley, "A Defence of Poetry," in 
Engtt^k Romantta PoetAy and PAoée, ed, Russell Noyes (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 1098.
33 Richard Holmes, SketZeyi The Pu.A^■■ (London: 
Quartet Books, 1976), p. 645.
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film of familiarity which obscures from us the wonder 
of our being. It compells us to feel that which we 
perceive, and to imagine that which we know. It 
creates anew the universe, after it has been 
annihilated in our minds by the recurrence of im­
pressions blunted by reiteration. It justifies [the] /
bold and true word of Tasso: Non mérita none di
oreatore, se non Iddio il Poeta [None merits the <2)
name of creator but God' and the poet].54 >
Keats sees the poetic quest as Adamic and in his 
Letters proceeds to aver that "the imagination may be 
compared to Adam's dream— he awoke and found it truth."
For him, "Men of Genius are great as certain ethereal 
Chemicals operating on the Mass of neutral intellect--but 
they have not any individuality, any determined Character."55 
For him the poet is an intuitive force conveying language, 
an impersonal agent of the word. That the poet communicates 
something of the prelapsarian world, of man brought to a 
sublime, self-created state is confirmed by Keats's notion 
that poetry impels man to a higher, transcendent level of 
mind, in essence a newly created cosmos: "Adam's dream
will do here and seems to be a conviction that Imagination 
and its empyreal reflection is [sic] the same as human Life 
and its Spiritual repetition. But as I was saying— the 
simple imaginative Mind may have its rewards in the re­
petition of its own silent Working coming continually on
34 Shelley, op.oXt., pp. 1112, 1110.
35 John Keats, "Letter to Benjamin Bailey, November 
22, 1817," in BngLLék RomantZc VoetAy and ed.
Russell Noyes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956),
p. 1210.
the Spirit with a fine Suddenness."^6 Memory reproduces
sensuous experience and with this faculty the poet transfers
.images and speculation into a formal medium of art. The
poet knows the freedom of consciousness as it posits a
new worId. Keats hailed the mutability of the creative
process and he saw the artist as a protean vehicle
creating form through experience and language. We discern
in Keats's aesthetic credo a movement away from the
strong individuality of Wordsworth to an impersonal
changeability in which the poet functions as conveyor of
new relationships with the universe. As in Borges's tale
"The Aleph," the freedom of the artistic self is to
postulate many new worlds. To Richard Woodhouse Keats
wrote in 1818:
As to the poetic Character itself (I mean that sort 
of which, if I am any thing, I am a member; that 
sort distinguished from the Wordsworthian or ego­
tistical sublime; which is a thing per se and stands 
alone) it is not itself— it has no self— it is 
everything and nothing— it has no character,.. It 
has as much delight in conceiving an lago as an Imogen. 
What shocks the virtuous philosopher, delights the 
chameleon Poet. It does no harm from its relish of 
the dark side of things any more than from its taste 
for the bright one; because both end in speculation.
A Poet is the most unpoetical of anything in existence; 
because he has no Identity--he is continually in­
forming and fulfilling some other Body— the Sun, the 
Moon, the Sea and Men and Women who are creatures of 
impulse are poetical and have about them an un­
changeable attribute— the Poet has none; no identity—
 ^  ^^ ^     ^^ ^ _______________M B — ■■■ J— .Um .■l|>i.L._,L__________
36 IbZd., p. 1210.
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he is certainly the most unpoetical of all God's 
Creatures.-'’7
Keats moves away from the expression of self in 
poetry to the concept of the poet as a social medium 
who filters experience and creates new levels of reality. 
Stuart Sperry has demonstrated that "the literature of the 
Romantic age is, above most things, a literature involved 
with the conception of process, and among nineteenth- 
century poets one can account... for the centrality of 
Wordsworth as well as the eccentricity of Blake by the 
degree to which each attempted to assimilate his 
generation's understanding of .the complexity of the mind 
and its operations."58 Thus if for Wordsworth the self 
in poetry is sensation coupled with experience, memory, 
and reflection, for Keats the self is realized as an 
immanence in the poetic process of creation.
Walter Jackson Bate has called The faZZ HypeA^ion 
fundamentally different from the first HypeAZon because 
"the interest that takes precedence over every other is 
the self as it tries to come to terms with reality."59
37 John Keats, "Letter to Richard Woodhouse,
October 27, 1818," in EngZZ^h RomanZZc VoetAy and PA0 6 e,
ed. Russell Noyes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956),
p. 1221.
38 Stuart M. Sperry, Keaté the Poet (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 7-8.
39 Walter Jackson Bate, John Keat6 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1963), p. 587.
Here Keats explicitly explores the Eden of mind, "A 
power within me of enormous ken, / To see as a god s e e s . "40 
Bate cites the reàlm of Moneta as "a garden in and of the 
m i n d . "41 As with Shelley, however, the conflict for Keats 
arises between the hermetic self-absorbed concentration of 
the poet and his larger role as an individual in society. 
Fogle points out that "The TaZt HypeAZon portrays most 
searchingly the conflict between the poet and life, the 
demands of art and of humanitarianism, without being able 
entirely to resolve it."42 Bate cites images in this 
fragment which he believes "anticipate much that we 
asEîOciate with existentialism. "43 The Romantic challenge 
and contribution commit not just the individual self to 
poetic analysis but also examine the self in the context 
of society. The Eden of mind adumbrated especially in 
Keats and Shelley does not cease with a solipsistic 
epistemology of the poet as a god creating self and 
microcosm. The poet is not merely "a nightingale who sits 
in darkness and sings to cheer its own solitude." He is
40 John Keats, The TaZt HypeAZon - A VAQ,am, in 
The ^oeZZeaZ oi John Keat-6, ed. H.W. Garrod
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, Second Edition, 195 8), Canto I,
lines 303-04, p, 517.
41 Bate, op.eZt,, p. 589.
42 Richard Harter Fogle, The ImageAy oi K.eaZ6 ayid 
SheZZey, A CompaAatZve Study (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1949), p. 202.
43 Bate, John Keat^, p. 591.
and must be the creator of artistic consciousness and of 
a freedom of mind to be realized in the social world, for 
poets are "the mirrors of the gigantic shadows which 
fucurity casts upon the present."44 For Shelley and for 
Keats, art contributes a changed man to a renewed social 
order and in this sense for them the Eden of mind touches 
ground as the rebirth of personality within the social 
progress and betterment of mankind.
We have seen that Romanticism was not a cult of 
personality divorced from larger considerations of society. 
The poet was conceived as part of nature, of the real 
world, of a larger community of individual men and women.
The Realist movement more soberly surveyed the individual 
in response to the larger social order. The wave of 
Modernism which began in Europe in the late nineteenth 
century broke forever the sense of social order and unit^ 
of connection and continuity, the universality of value, 
the congruence, of mind and image. In Modernism the 
emphasis on process continually is reified in the thing 
itself, the aesthetic medium which becomes the obsessional 
centre of the artistic quest. Moreover, vagueness, mystery, 
and confusion are deliberately projected onto words and 
images as had not previously been attempted. The rational 
order of the artistic creation shattered too.
The focus on nature and on process had been
44 Shelley, "Defence of Poetry," pp. 1100, 1112.
amplified by the exponents of Naturalism and Realxsm, 
and the emphasis on self'became entrenched in scientific 
dogmatism.. Naturalism challenged the rational order not, 
as did Symbolism, through enignia, nuance, immediacy, and 
peuLonal response, but rather through a system of 
mechanistic postulates that eschewed man's rational control.
contrived devices, though with dissimilar 
...natality, pervade many predictable tableaux of ludic fiction 
If Naturalism saw its fundamental principles in 
neradity, anvrronment, evolution, and human biology, the 
vcyüimt also owed much to the philosophical positivism of 
i j'uta a.ni Mill. Zola and others applied scientific and 
V.:,chaid.sric models to the novel, ever mindful of Comte's 
'''thiaia that ali knowledge consists in a description of the 
coexisten<;e and succession of phenomena."45 In such a 
System t.here is no. room for a Byronic hero who confronts 
ihc world and triumphs. The self-involved rebel makec 
try for the scientific functioning of character.
Gradgrind becomes representative of such literary models.
As c language, it explores an explicitly empiric..il 
rang:., of hypotheses and proofs and the process oi naming.
In the positivistic and utilitarian ideology of Naturalism 
in its crude form the individual is lost in a Benthamite
John Passmore, A HundAed yecLA6 o£ ŸkZZpé opky 
(Harmoii'.i.swcrth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 196 8),
'C'., .16'.,,
reckoning of the greatest good for the greatest number..
We can readily \perceive the antinomies between Naturalism 
and Romanticism for as Edmund Wilson argues, "Chateaubriand, 
Musset, Byron and Wordsworth ask us to be interested in 
themselves by virtue of the intrinsic value of the 
individual against the claims of society as a whole— against 
government., morals, conventions, academy or church. "46 
Wilson elucidates th"e reaction against Romanticism 
moer cogently in his discussion of the French "Parnassian 
poetzt who make their first appearance in the 
ii 11res— Gaut 1 er, Leconte de Lisle, Here"dia."47 in 
.l;;o uiing and Tennyson he discerns, respectively, a tendency 
tew .-.r J historical reconstruction and a preoccupation vith 
a . . I tionary doctrines characteristic more of Real ism than 
R o m a n cism. It is not until such late Romantics ate 
taudr..i.aire and Mallarmé move so definitely beyonc; the 
boundaries of Romanticism and Realism that the epistemology 
c.': .43dernism arises. Wilson avers that "the literazy?
h.lscory of our time is to a great extent that of the 
development of Symbolism and of its fusion or conflict, with 
N a t u r a l i s m . "48 He cites Flaubert and Ibsen as synthesizers 
of Romanticism and Realism. Flaubert combines the sensuous
46 Edmund Wilson, Ca^tZe: A Study in the
i.xgodjJ lije LtteAatuAe oi 1S7Q to 19 30 (New York: Charles
; or ibne r s Sons, 19 31), p. 2.
4.7 'itiZd.,, p. 7.
48 IbZd. , . 35 .
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images of Romanticism with a strict authorial impersonality 
and an almost scientific exploration of character. 
'‘Flaubert's prose has learned to hear,^  see and feel with 
the. delicate senses of Romanticism at the same time that 
Flaubert is disciplining and criticizing the Romantic 
t e m p e r a m e n t c "49 Flaubert conceived Madame Sovaay as a 
precise and rationally ordered world and he dissects 
character with a scientific objectivity. Bree argues that 
Flaubert is an organicist: "In his novel no word, no
sentence, no paragraph, no single effect of style but must 
flow into the whole."50 The writer himself insisted on the 
impersonality and god-like role of the author. Flaubert 
declared, "Reality, as I see it, should only be a spring­
board." In another letter he expatiates:
...Madame BovaAy contains nothing from life. It is 
a comptetety Znvented story. I have put into it 
nothing of my feelings or of my experience. The 
illusion (if there is one) comes, on the contrary, 
from the ZmpeA6onaZZXy of the work. It is one of 
my principles that you must not WAZte yoaA^eti. The 
artist ought to be in his work like God in creation, 
invisible and omnipotent. He should be felt every­
where but not be seen.
Art ought, moreover, to rise qbove personal 
feelings and nervous: susceptibilities I It is time 
to give it the precision of the physical sciences, 
by means of a pitiless method! Nonetheless for me 
the major difficulty continues tg be style, form, the 
indefinable Beautiful Ae7> attZng {Aom the coneeptZon
49 ïbZd., p. 11.
50 Germaine Bree, "Introduction," in Gi^ j^ .ave Flaubert, 
Mad.ame BovaAy, trans, Merloyd Lawrence (Boston^: Houghton
Mifflin Company, Riverside Editions, 1969), p. xv.
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ÀXTitZ-i) this is the splendor of truth, as Plato s a i d . 51 
Flaubert wished to emphasize the fictionality of 
fiction, its conscious artifice, and the role of author as 
sole creator and manipulator. This modern view of fiction 
contrasts sharply with the Wordsworthian ideal of powerful
personal emotions merging in poetry with a tranquil re-
,1 '
collection of man in the natural world. In Flaubert's 
works the artist has disappeared in the preponderance of 
words and images standing on their own. In Madame BovaAy 
such technique is used superbly, as in the famous scene 
in which Emma and Rodolphe sit on the second floor of the 
town hall discussing their love while each sentence is 
counterposed against the loud announcements of the 
agricultural prizes— "Manure," "Flemish fertilizer— flax 
culture— drainage— long-term leases— domestic s e r v i c e . "52 
The Symbolists rejected the scientific detachment 
conjured by such a scene. With acute self-consciousness 
they explored personal sense perceptions. Disavowing the 
scientific, positivistic rigidities of the Parnassians, 
the Symbolists searched their subconscious for evocations 
of musical rhythms, Rimbaud viewed the poet as a seer with 
a certain mystical, spiritual insight. He suggested that
51 Gustave Flaubert, "On Realism," in Vocument^i oi 
Modenn LZteAaAy ReatZi,m, ed. George J. Becker (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 94-95.
52 Gustave Flaubert, Madame BovaAy, tran's.’ Merloyd 
Lawrence, intro. Germaine Bree (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, Riverside Editions, 1969), pp. 124-25.
"Inventions of the unknown call for new forms."53 This
could be expressed with fequal validity by the writers of
contemporary ludic fiction, in which the Eden of mind
calls for the play of words. Mallarmé" stressed the musical,
expressive aspects of art to reveal the poet's inner soul.
Valéry merged the poet's sensuous attributes with the
dialectics of Being and Non-being while at the same time
holding to a classical, almost Racinian orthodoxy of form.
Common ground for all the French Symbolists revolved
around what Rimbaud called the notion of the unknown:
The poet makes himself a 6eeA by a long, gigantic and 
rational derangement of all the senses. All forms of 
love, suffering, and madness. He searches himself.
He exhausts all poisons in himself and keeps only 
their quintessence. Unspeakable torture where he needs 
all his faith, all his super-human strength, where he 
becomes among all men the great patient, the great 
criminal, the one accursed— and the supreme Scholar!—  
Because he reaches the unknown! Since he cultivated 
his soul, rich already, more than any man I He reaches 
the unknown, and when, bewildered, he ends by losing 
the intelligence of his visions, he has seen them.
Let him die, as he leaps through unheard of and unnamable 
things: other horrible workers will come, they will
begin from the horizons where the other one c o l l a p s e d l 5 4
The Symbolists retrieved cind expanded the Romantic
concept of poet as central actor in his art. Unlike
Flaubert who wishes to disappear from his story, Riimbaud
wants to augment inner feelings, dreams, and fantasies
through the sensuous images of his verse. The contrast
5 3 Arthur Rimbaud, Comptete WoAk^, Selected LetteA6, 
trans. and intro. Wallace Fowlie (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1966), p. 3ïi.
54 ïbtd,, p. 307.
between Re-cilism and Symbolism is great. The former seeks 
to refine and elucidate human emotions in terms of the 
external world and the latter shatters the outside world 
for total absorption in self and soul. The concentration 
on raptures of self and on hermetic escape through art 
reminds us of contemporary ludic fiction. Nabokov's debt 
to Rinbaud is made explicit in Ada, and the poet's 
personal renunciation of art has strong echoes in LoLZta, 
The childhood motif prevalent in ludic fiction has 
precedents in Rimbaud's obsession with the prelapsarian 
freedom of youth. What marks a vast difference between the 
Wordsworthian and the Nabokovian aspects of childhood is 
the ineluctable antinomy between the mature man and the 
child which both Rimbaud and Nabokov find irresolvable and 
without anodyne except in transient moments of aesthetic 
freedom. The loss of the mature man was felt personally 
by Rimbaud. Fowlie postulates.
With such a sentence as: ta vAaZe vZe absente,
we can feel that Rimbaud's illusions have been 
destroyed. This is the profound meaning of his most 
perfect poem, MemoZAe. It is a piece composed of 
material realities, presented in an Eden-like 
innocence, which the poet has renounced. Rimbaud 
believed that his happiness as a child must have 
existed in some other age, and he was forced, but 
briefly, to recreate in his art that age of legends 
peopled by centaurs, fairies, fauns, and angels. 
Rimbaud's work is a cleavage between himself and a 
certain past that he faintly e v o k e s . 55
55 Wallace Fowlie, "Introduction," in Wallace Fowlie, 
trans., RZmbaudi Complete WoAkz, Selected ietteA^ {Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1966), p. 6
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If Rimbaud's mind and art.were dominated by "following 
the direction of an idea," rather than an exploration of 
its truth or falsehood, such a principle was embraced by 
his fallow Symbolists, and by the Modernist and post­
modernist movements as well. Lewis observes that "No 
mcitter what the stimulus was for Mallarmé * s attempt to 
create a new world for himself, this process involved an 
effort of self-creation where poetry was to become 
synonymous with life."56 Language becomes the key to the 
universe and the artist is omnipotent within the realm of 
his works. Williams describes Mallarmé's reaction to the 
fallen state of postlapsarian consciousness: "The primal
fall from Edenic unity resulted in a fragmentation of 
consciousness and consequently, of language— the tool with 
which consciousness interprets itself and the world. Le 
VeAbe, as Mallarmé would say, is lost; all that remains 
are the several 'langues imparfai-tj^ of the marketplace. "57 ^
Kravis points to Mallarmé's concentration on the process 
of writing and the very personal relationship between 
perception and language, suggesting that for the poet
56 Paula Gilbert Lewis, The Ae6tketZc,4> oi SZepkane 
MalZcLAme Zn RelaZZon Zo HZ6 PubtZc (Rutherford, New Jersey 
Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1976), p. 50.
57 Thomas A. Williams, MaltaAme and Zke..\kçinguage o{ 
My^tZcZ4>m (Athens, Georgia; The University of Georgia 
Press, 1970), p. 35.
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writing liberates r e a l i t y . 58 Lewis sheds light upon this
part of Mallarmé's approach in an explanation useful for
ludic fiction as well:
The poet, for himself alone and within his own mind, 
obviously desired to be godlike. What is perhaps 
more important is that, throughout his life, he was 
desperately attempting to assert his free will in 
opposition £:o a feared doctrine of determinism. The 
problem of man's liberty was one that deeply concerned 
Mallarmé.
For if man is divine, and if he has created 
î'iiîaself, then, as an omnipotent god, he has also 
created or has the ability to create his own universe 
and is one with it.... This redemption shall offer 
mankind both a horizontal movement toward the future 
and a vertical rise toward heaven. In addition, 
salvation will be a nostalgia for the past, for 
Mallarmé's lost religious youth, and for humanity's 
lost primitive paradise. . But where shall such a 
universe exist? Mallarmé states that this ideal 
world will bring the absolute reign of the mind or 
the spirit over reality, but reality means the 
contemporary exterior world. The poet also empha­
sizes the fact that the new awareness on the part of 
humanity will be that of its "authentic earthly 
stay"... But once again, even if such a future world 
is earthly, it is ideal, a return to Paradise for 
"this civilized man of Eden," once only the poet, 
now all men.59
Mallarmé perhaps more than any other Symbolist poet 
played with the value of words qua words. In "The 
Afternoon of a Faun," sleep is indeed "the spirit empty of 
words," since words and language are for the poet the 
keynote of life and vitality. For Mallarmé'art comes
53 See Judy Kravis, Tke ?Ao4>e oi MaLLaAme: The
EooluZZon oi a LZteAaAy Language (Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 175-77.
5 9 Lewis, op,cZt,, p. 6 3.
t...
closest to the pure form of music as Schopenhauer suggested: 
The Edenic myth for the faun becomes an oneiric "uision.
In the dream world the faun comes near to possessing his 
nymphs. The world here evoked by Mallarmé reminds us of 
the fantasies of Humbert Humbert. Mallarmé creates an 
Arcadia in which the faculty of imagination is supreme.
The faun remarks, "I would perpetuate these nymphs'* while 
admitting "so I loved a dteam?" The poet reiterates the 
faun's self-consciousness of his artifice: "if those girls
whom you explain / be but an itching in your fabulour 
bruin!" The faun acknowledges the act of creation: "o
rg mphs, we swell with divers MEIMORIES. "60 MacIntyre
about this poem that "the highest pleasure one can 
get from it will be from the musical quality of che words 
themselves, in their seemingly careless but so artful 
and willful disarrangement from syntax and their ’n- 
tolerance of the common decent rules of coherence."51 it 
was the Symbolists who elevated the power of v/ords as the 
o nnral force of the literary creation. They looked at the 
wc. 11 t.nrough images and found an Eden of mind. Chiari 
concludes that "The result Was pure subjectivism entirely
60 Stéphane Mallarmé, "L'Après-midi d'un Faune," "The 
Afternoon of a Faun," in pAenck SymboZZ^t VoetAy, trans. 
C.F. MacIntyre (Berkeley, California: University of
California Press, 1958), pp. 56-63.
61 C.F. MacIntyre, trans., "Notes," in P^ td>iek 
SytnbûlZét VoetAy (Berkeley, California: University of 
California Press, 1958), pp. 128-29.
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based on language,"52
The influence of Edgar Allan Poe on Baudelaire and 
the French Symbolist movement has been widely acknowledged 
and discussed. Poems such as "Dream-Land," "The Raven," 
and "Ulalume" articulate sounds and colours and repetitions 
of words which were strongly echoed by the American's 
French devotees. The rhythmic patterns convey powerful, 
musical effects and the reader is conditioned to focus 
more on language than on meaning. Artifice, emotion, and 
subjectivity form prime elements of Poe's lyricism. Like 
H.rmbaud and Mallarmé, the only Eden Poe can possess is the 
aesthetic paradise, "Out of SP,^CE--out of TIME. *‘^ 2 in 
Poe, Hawthorne, Melville, and Emerson and in the works of 
the Symbolists, nature functions as an adjunct of mind. 
Baudclarie wrote in V ÂAt AomantZque: "'Swendenborg has
taught us that...everything, form, movement, number, color, 
perfume, in the spiritual as in the natural world, is 
Significant, reciprocal, conversely related, and corre­
s p o n d i n g .  ' "54 Poe tells us that the emotional movement of
62 Joseph Chiari, Symb'otZ^me iAom Voe to MalZaAme: The 
GAoa'th oi a Myth, Foreword by T.S. Eliot (London:
Rockliff, 1956), p. 170.
63 Edgar Allan Poe, "Dream-Land," in AmeAZcan VoetAy 
and VAo^e, Meu) ShoAteA EdZtZon, ed. Norman Foerster and 
Robert Falk (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19 60),
p. 24 i, line 8.
64 Charles Baudelaire, V  AAt AomayitZque, r^ited by 
C.-M. MacIntyre, trans., in pAench SymbotU-àt VoetAy 
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press,
1958), p. 119.
"The Raven" had to find correspondences in the verbal
flow of the poetic language; the meaning had to be i -
trinsic in the rhythm, harmony, and repetition of th.
words. He chooses the refrain: "I resolved to diversify,
and so to heighten, the effect^ by adhering, in general,
to the monotone of sound, while I continually varied that
of thought: that is to say, I determined to produce
continuously novel effects, by the variation oi tke
apptZcatZon of the AziAaZn,. . The concentration on
auditory effect and the careful ratiocination to determine
such effect remind us of Baudelaire's poem "Correspondences"
Like prolonged echoes mingling far away 
in a unity tenebrous and profound, 
vast as the night and as the limpid day, 
perfumes, sounds, and colors c o r r e s p o n d . 56
Among the writers examined thus far, we have observed
a preponderant concentration on pA0ce44, Process is the
ratiocination of technique. Poe is meticulous in his
is JUSsion of the literary process and the effect a
n c lar literary device will have. Poe sees himself as
. i-; lator of language. He suggests in "Tne P..iilosophy
c C i  non" that "The Raven" "proceeded. . .to its
1 . "^ 'ith tne precision and rigid consequence of a
. , -.ti Û. problem. "5/ p^e conceives the role of
V b d q a i  Allan Poe, "The Philosophy of Compor„t.icn, "
a::: ' téAZcü. : .  V o t t A y  and 'PAoée^ p. 253.
'. Jhcu:ies Baudelaire, "Correspondences," iii rAznck 
Po p. 13,
Edgar Allan Poe, "The Philosophy of Composit: on, " i 
4jütAZcaji PoetKy and PAOée, p. 251.
44
literary a m s t  as one of total intellectnalizaL^un and 
control over subject matter. The author proposes a 
magus-like positron relative to his art and to external
world. Poe’s proclivity toward process and pure poeexy 
and his preoccupation with anagrams, word gamer, p.z^xes, 
ana mysteries, ip both the poetry and the tales., co^ .,1 to 
mind the equally self-conscious methods of contemporary 
ludic fiction. We can see that Nabokov's involvement 
witn Poe in LoJLiXa partakes both of parody and homage.
Poe stands as the first authentically American writer 
interested in words qua words and in the literary process 
as process. If Poe's influence was greater than his 
oeu\)Ae, which it arguably was, it is nevertheless true 
that his exploration of poetry as "a dream within a d r e a m " 5 8  
defines the Symbolist quest for the paradise of mind in 
the self-referential work of art.
Far from the desolation and travail of postlapsarian 
life, Poe adumbrated in literature an Edenic escape through 
pure form. Pastoral scenes, arcadian landscapes, Edenic 
motifs attain a primary importance in his poetry. The 
ludic impulse cannot be minimized. Lois and Francis Hyslop 
have argued that "the tendency toward pure poetry which 
stems from Poe and was continued through three generations
68 Edgar Allan Poe, "A Dream Within a Dream," in 
kmeKZcan VoetAy and ?A0 6 e, p. 239, line 24.
of; French poets is by no means, an isolated p' no..:\
Yet as much as Poe embraced pure poetry ^ he df ;l .7 ..,tion
the meaning of words, that is, the ability of A', rds to 
convey meaning, as Hofmannsthal would a half antury .lal sr. 
Poe argued in EuA^ka that man must confirm his own 
Godhdad. He is startled by the immensit.y of tee " 
world and equally by the vastness of the human ...ire and 
imagination. Hoffman poihts out that for Poe 't prime 
mover of the universe isn't all that differe-r^ from, cur 
own s o u l .  "70 Tea challenge resides in the mend's abJ.ii.ty 
to " -3r slate the universe into pure form.
L i: contrast to Poe, Hawthorne's development as t 
;fy.:l)oIist was slow and incomplete. As Feidelson tom- 
on.,-.rates p Hawthorne reluctantly strode the ab\ cs between 
>jilago;y and symbolism. His thought hovered h 
.Ycckean metaphysics and Romantic idealism. Per ^ Mj.nd 
exists and finds hypostatization in the externa* -jorld.
Hawthorne nature exists and in it thought: nc^
e .{ I V W i t h  his commitment to the novel " "'r . ce, "
;:■! iwr.h •mo hoped to be exempted from the cons^r.. o. 
r. narration without fully plunging into ar. ir.rationai
50 Lois and Francis E. Hyslop, Jr., trans, , ono. ed. ,
"In t .re duct ion" in SauddZcU-Ad on Poe: CAZtZcal PacdA^j
(Stare College, Pennsylvania: Bald Eagle Press, 19:2),
pp. 32-3.
70 Daniel Hoffman, Pad Pad Pad Pod Pod .it.,,
-ax-on City, New York; Doubleday and Company Inc., 1972), 
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on"; possibly amoral supernaturalism. The crtiaccu di 
Thd SciLiAZ-dt LdttdX could not concede an indener, .-.int. j.b..;.r 
for man to assume the godhead of creation. His oicrieo 
reflect the belief in a natural hierarchy. '’Rappiu:. : r : ' s 
Daughter" and "A Birthmark" delineate precxsc.ly : rlj acy
of man assuming divine powers. The only Eden i\..h v thorne 
one rooted and conceived in the primordial , : ri,.. Any 
re-creation of such an Adamic experience, althoug: probed 
for possibility, concludes in typical postlapsariaa 
failure. Hawthorne remains unwilling to explore the 
potential spiritual chaos of process alone. Hescer Prynne
i.s conf ined in the scasis of concrete and well-ordere i 
.ly. mbcb r . He. chance for spiritual union with Dinmesdalo 
a..:enàc only ac a remote ethereal vision. Such a 
•;:a. , r ■ icu sta’:>À3 apart from Poe's concept of an emctional, 
borru'..dream-land in an apocalyptic re-creation of ‘ aen.
: r.c AdfUaic prospect for Hawthorne's characters i' light 
ic. :.iCc sky, a faint primordial glo\, as when Dimmasdale 
_rends the scaffold and a meteor flashes by. h rvhhc .;ne 
:'2v k:s Aden as a futile illusion, a nugatory realm ho.."' 
.i.lleii mar., appealing but beyond realization. hc.v;thc./ne 's 
. .'.p ;u.id women are allegorical figures cast out from 
paradise and neither the power of mind nor the aesthetic 
process can alleviate their postlapsarian doom. The allure 
of the freedom of pure mind conflicts with Hawthcrne's 
Intrinsic Puritan ideology, his need for allegory and 
for moral levelling. Feidelson has delineated
Hawthorne's ambivalence toward the antinomies of sale 
allegory and fantastic, possibly dangerous symboxism;
' Yet there can be no doubt that Hawthorne experienced 
- the attraction of inverted values— the artrerae 
Cor I of thai anticcnvtntional impulse whron & _ 
inherent in symbolism. In the Roman Eder, ho ventures 
to auy, " the final charm .is bestowed by th<; >1. ilaria. „ , . 
For if you come hither: in summer, and s o through 
uuese glades in the golden sunset, fever vc...k..r. aitt 
n arm with you, and death awaits ycu at the end of 
L:... dim vista.’’ The 'piercing., tnrilling, delicious 
kind of regret" which these thoughts arouse in him y
po Lt ts in an ubvious direction; '^ Aux objets 
répugnants nous trouvons des appas." Baudela.:.re /
stood at the end of the dim vista. If Hawthorne was 
unduly anxious about the freedom of symbolic 
.'.ccaning, it may be to his credit that he had soïeu 
Inkling of how far that method could g o . 71
For Melville and Whitman the prospects were greatly
altered. Whitman forged in Leaver ol a paean to a
nntioj,.; for him the prospect of Eden could be actualized.
J.a . .Idly declared, "the United States themselves are
C-. .cially the greatest p o e m .  "72 whitman sang of himself
althcugh he sought to move from subjective emotion to a
uni/crsality of feeling. The poet, in effect, stood as
proxy for the masses: "These are really the thoughts of
all men in all ages and lands, they are not original with
me, / If they are not yours as much as mine they are
7x Charles Feidelson, Jr. , Sçfmbotbém and AmdAÂdan 
idtü-"..A UAZ (Chicago: University of Chicago P r e s s 1959),
pp. 15-16.
73 Walt Whitman, Preface to leaver o[ 2, in
A; v-.'U.c->i't Vodthy and ?Ao-i>d, p. 584.
. or next to n o t h i n g .  "73 Most of all, ' f:..rr.ar
M.ited men and women as‘self-determining creators ox 
t:.eir own universe. For him the American Eden sprang f r Dm 
geography and culminated in mind. The Adamic point o: 
view began in an epistemology fed on nature ar: on tnn
potential glory of man in society. Whitman's or.
symbolism postulates the freedom of a fertile mine.,
0 Gtaaa is, in fact, a pôem about process, as Peidelgon 
has stated. The process of initiation in the v/xrlci, of 
coming to know it, equals the world itself, for universe 
s no more than the totality of man's experience in it,,.
, Drding to Whitman. Symbols of birth, childhood, fru.i rionj 
, stars, grass, flowers delineate the power of mini to 
;,:.t lin a cosnios. Whitman is bold. He has the hubris of 
'e firsr m fi iing the freedom of the garden and claiming 
Lie earth for ''is own territory. His garden is fulfilled 
in art, in the exaltation of the human spirit. Poetry 
oaniers limitless time and space. Whitman deifies the human 
. -di idual in his creative powers. He calls for a lew world 
-o L . "A new order shall arise... Through the di’inity of 
thent .. xes shall the kosmos' and the new breed of poets be 
intc. .'ureters of men and women and of all events and t h i n g s . "74
73 Walt Whitman, "Song of Myself," in Lzaozd o 
Gtaar, in AmdAZcan VodtAy and ?A0 6 d, p. 594, .seavion 17, 
Irnej 355-56. '
; A /hitman. Preface to Ldavdé GAaé^, p. 587
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The central place of process in Whitman 
foretells the direction of Modernism. Words sx n i ■ae 
immensity and power of renewal. Whitman is the Amer...n 
Adam singing of himself in the new world garden. He m^- .53
dialectically from myth to geography to mind; li /n; .ni.Stic 
reality posits aesthetic idealism. Men stand .3 . ; pi vot
of. a mind-centred universe. Feidelson exp:nine ’he m thod 
o:i "When Lilacs in the Dooryard Bloom'd" as the ooet'x 
at.,e.'.apt to reveal the process of mind in art. "...this 
unlike LycÂdaà or Adorrxl, does not t..rc.n3mr: : .0
ce.tti' : 1 figure merely by generalizing him out of .nlv.
0 prit. ion. Lincoln is seldom mentioned... fnitea... , tie 
t - cf the poem is a presentation of the poet's lin.:".
:J‘ work in the context of Lincoln's death.,., the m  
, a :)f Whitman's "Lilacs" is not the Poet but the 
■ O'jtic process.... "75
im.erson's aesthetic vision encompassed the '.ers 
b\ v;.bi:,L the mind absorbed and became the world. : 
focused not merely on man's new relationship wit... th 
un..r/f:,rse out also on the intellectual evoluticn Ly which 
man actually creates the cosmos. Greatly influenced by 
Berkeley, Coleridge, Carlyle and Goethe, Emerson nevertheless 
sought a new philosophy for a new continent. His writing is 
dominated by a nationalistic and personal assurance that a 
new land conferred intrinsic symbolic reality, Emerson saw
75 Feidelson, pp. 21-22.
.■X'-
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his country as a nation of promise in which the only 
vision to be created came from contemporary ideas and 
experience. He challenged his compatriots, "Why should 
not we also enjoy an original relation to the u n i v e r s e ? " 7 6  
He declared, "Each age...must write its own books; or 
rather, each generation for the next succeeding. The books 
o£ an older period will not fit this."77 Because the mind 
of m^ .i posits the essential reality for the human 
individual, nature is little more than a symbolic reflection 
of man’s own mind. In talking of nature and he avers,
"Its laws are the laws of his own mind." 7 8  we are reminded 
of Berkeley's dictum "thah existence is 'percipi or 
percipere'; to exist is either to be perceived or to 
perceive."79 Existence and man's consciousness of it form 
an inseparable unity. Sherman Paul has observed that 
Emerson "transplanted the dualism of the universe to the 
mind. 'The fundamental fact in our metaphysical constitution 
is,' he wrote, 'the correspondence of man to the world so 
that every change in that writes a record in the mind.' For 
him, correspondence covered all the ways by which man came
76 Ralph Waldo Emerson, HataAd, "Introduction," in 
kmanÂ-dOLYi PoztAy and Pa o6<Ij, p. 311.
77 Ralph Waldo Emerson, "The American Scholar,"
(Phi Beta Kappa Address a1; Harvard, 1837) , in ArnzAZaan 
PoztAy and Pa o6Z, p. 323.
78 Ibid., p. 322.
79 G.J. Warnock, BzAkztzy (Harmondsworth, Middlesex 
England: Penguin, 1953), p. 18.
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into relation with the world outsidz of himself, 
transformed the world into himself, and expressed the 
insight of the experience in words and character."80 
Symbols were able to delineate the vastness and 
variability of the "Over-soul," Emerson's term for the 
Platonic concept of fundamental cosmic unity, and the use 
of symbols demonstrated that art and reality commenced and 
terminated in the mind and spirit of man. Matthiessen 
emphasizes Emerson's "acceptance of Bacon's formula for 
poetry, an acceptance that for once he did not contradict 
elsewhere but recurred to as a touchstone, as 'our best 
definition': 'Poetry, not finding the actual world
exactly conformed to its idea of good and fair, seeks to 
accommodate the shows of things to the desires of the mind, 
and to create an ideal world better than the world of 
experience. ' "81 Through prevalent use of symtiols in his 
poetry and prose, Emerson confirmed his share in the 
profound idealism affecting America in the middle and late 
nineteenth century. Although Emerson did not read Hegel 
untrl late in life, the influence of Absolute Idealism was
80 Sherman Paul, EmzA^on'^ Angtz i/Z^Zon: Man and 
MatuAd In AmzAlaan ExpzAZznaz (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 4.
81 P.O. Matthiessen, AmzAÂzan RznaZ^ianzzi AAt and 
ExpzAÂznzz Zn thz Aqz EmzA^on and {iJkZZman (New York; 
Oxford University Press, 1941; paperback edition, 1968), 
p. 52.
pervasive in America during his seminal period. Emerson's 
thought was dialectical. Consciousness began in the soul, 
was enriched by nature, and returned to the self on a 
higher level. The poet argued that "the world--this 
shadow of the soul, or otkzA me,— lies wide around. Its 
attractions are the keys which unlock my thoughts and 
make me acquainted with m y s e l f . "82
Emerson's consuming interest in symbols reflected the 
speculative tendency of his age. William T. Harris founded 
the .louAnal o{^ SpzcaZatZvz ?kZto6opky in 1867. It was 
the first publication of its kind in an Anglo-Saxon nation. 
Harris, an eminent educational philosopher, embraced 
Hegelianism. Spiller zt at comment, "He took an active 
part in the Concord School of Philosophy, an informal 
summer group before which the lingering transcendentalists 
and younger philosophical minds discussed Plato, Kant,
Hegel, and their disciples."88 in St. Louis the 
Philosophical Society, largely devoted to the examination 
of Hegel, was a burgeoning community of scholars with 
energetic proponents and a wide circle of influence. The 
Hegelian network resisted an elitist framework and the study 
of German idealism and its application to American life
82 Emerson, "The American Scholar," p. 324.
83 Merle Curti, "The Literature of Ideas," iZtzAaAy 
HZàtoAy 0 {f tkz UnZtzd Statz^- HZ^toAy^ ed. Robert E. 
Spiller et al., 3rd éd., rev. (New York : Macmillan, 1963),
p. 972. Hereafter cited as LHÙS*
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soon became something of a national pastime. Goetzman 
observes, "Clubs devoted' to German philosophy sprang up 
all over the Middle West, from Milwaukee and Chicago to 
such unlikely places as Peoria and Davenport. These 
built up enormous support for the Hegelian-oriented 
national education policies of William Torrey Harris, 
when he became the first United States Commissioner of 
Education in 1 8 8 9 ."84
Passmore gives us William James's description of the 
Anglo-American popularity of Hegelianism: "'It is a
strange thing, this resurrection of Hegel in England and 
here [USA] after his burial in Germany. I think his 
philosophy will probably have an important influence on 
the development of our liberal form of Christianity. It 
gives a quasi-metaphysical backbone which this theology 
has always been in need o f . '"85 Passmore adds, "'Literary 
philosophers' like Coleridge and Carlyle in England, 
Emerson in America, helped to prepare the cultivated mind 
for Tkz SzcAzt oi Hzgzt--that very title points to the 
feeling that was abroad, the feeling that there was 
'something in' H e g e l . "86
84 William H. Goetzman, ed. with the assistance of 
Dickson Pratt, Tkz AmzAZzan HzgztZan^: An JntzttzztaaZ 
EpZéodz Zn tkz kZ^toAy o ^ ifJz4itzAn AmzAZza (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 9.
85 John Passmore, A HundAzd VzaA^ o{ Pk^Zo-àopky, p. 51 
S6 IbZd., p. 52.
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Josiah Royce contributed much to the development of 
American idealism and his emphasis was strongly centred 
on epistemology. The Absolute Idealism of Royce located 
reality as an act of mind and saw all minds informed by one 
transcendental Mind. The individual realizes this Absolute 
only through action in society. Stovall has commented that 
Royce "believed that the infinite is latent in the finite, 
the eternal in the temporal, the ideal in the real.... To 
relate his philosophy more closely to the practical world, 
Royce went so far as to identify the Absolute with what he 
called 'the Spirit of C o m m u n i t y 87 in Thz liJoAtd and 
thz îndtvtduat, published in 1900, Royce sought to mediate 
between internal and external meaning and to show that the 
individual and the world form a unity; subject and object 
are one. The correspondence between internal and external 
meaning is verified as truth. Blau explains that "the 
completion and fulfillment of an idea means, then, that its 
external meaning (the 'facts' or 'existence'),, corresponds 
to its complete internal meaning (the 'intention' or 
'purpose'),"88 Royce gave prime consideration to the 
internal meaning which Cunningham defines as "that which 
the idea aims to express and which, when expressed, may be
87 Floyd Stovall, AmzAtzan 1dzattém (Port Washington, 
New York: Kennikat Press, 1965), p. 118.
88 Joseph L. Blau, Uzn and Movzmznt^t tn AmzA^Lzan 
Phtto^ophy (New York: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1952), p. 214.
said to be the fulfillment of the idea." Ho ccuic .A,
"In the end the purpose is inseparable from the i.-.t: . _1
m e a n i n g .  "89 Muirhead underscores Royce's empha.....s on 
knowledge over being, on epistemology over ontc-lv-g;
Ontology is play, theory of knowledge alone work.
Quoting Royce Muirhead says, "'Ontology is the .slewing
soap bubbles, philosophical analysis is the r d'going
for g o l d . '"80 Royce's dialectically inclined ep, logical
f-onism explained the finitude of man by comparison w^ch 
the Absolute, suggesting that the very limitation af :aan 
Ov. ..ains v;i'Ll.i: an antinomical resolution, tn^t is,
; a... \ . hoy ce declared, "Every being who is ratiu on ally 
=■■'■0 cs.iious of time, is, by that very fact, living in part 
o'V' of “CO nor Id of time. For what we know we transcend. ”
.for oy,:e consciousness marked the progression t /rare, 
freidciYi. He continued, "To live in time by virtue oi 
ics's physical nature, but out of time by virtue of one's 
•, ..-.ry consciousness of time itself, is to share in che 
; freedom, and to be a moral a g e n t .  "91
G. Watts Cunningham, Thz JdzatZ-6tZc AAgumznt Zn 
kc ./ 3 ByiZ-tZ^ h and AmzAZcan PhZto^ophy (New York: The
C every Company, 1933), p. 264.
90 Josiah Royce quoted by John H, Muirhead, Tkz PtatonZc 
AaA.Atl.on Zn Angto-Saxon PkZto^ophy: StudZz-^ 3 Zn tkz HZ^toAy
0 IdtaZZ^m Zn Engtand and AmzAZza (London: George Allen
and unwrr. Ltd., 1931), p. 35 4.
9... Josiah Royce, Selections from S.tadZz-^ y^ 'â^  
ij- " j ivfi in Paul Russell Anderson and Max Harold Fisch,
Ï ... . p ’.g An ArntAZza: FAom thz PuAZtan6 to Jamzh, With 
I i i  :: .ative S^’lections (New York: Appleton-Century-
'non 1.J39), p. 518.
’ As man partakes in the infinitude of God, :>r the 
Absolute, he shares in an infinite process. hjgill hc^.s 
argued, "The WoAtd and tkz 1ndZvZdaat comes to be 
recognizable as a revolutionary manifesto directed to the 
human spirit. "92 it is notable that Royce's phi! j. jsophy 
reflected the fervour of the age in embracing aurl explaining 
the expansive potential of the individual, as we..l a. 
justifying the political expansion of the American nation.
Goei: znanr. has characterized American Hegelian th.t': 1 x\ ■■ as 
‘■'a i of Manifest Destiny of the mind, aiming alway:
‘ 0 V Ù.n.:. the formation of the greater community. '9 3 The
dago, i j:,. spirit of freedom derived through consc:.ousner? 3 of 
■\u' h'-.r:date receives in Royce the imprint cf Ai.crocru 
. o c. teal and optimism. ?.oyc3 stakes cut : -
s ■.;/ ci the mind ao t:h a birthright of the I'la-n 
iuai .i.o society. h  quotation :.rcm Volume . ...
- : and tki 1 a.dlvZdurt^ cited by Cunningh- « mdj-
v.j urify and summarize Royce '* s uuderstaiu.. j.u.i »; i.
. . hiu j whatever besides yourself determinoo u t Lr 
caused iy or otherwise just what constitute: \ :.'ur 
individuality, for you'are just this unique ilse-
wnere unexampled expression of the divine meaning..
And here and now your individuality in your .act .,'.6 
year freedom. This your freedom is your un...que
92 Frank Magill, ed., MattzApZdzz^ WûAtd Tklto^opky 
Zn SiLmmaAj foAon (New York: Harper and Row, 1951) , p. 744.
,h2 Goetzman, p. 16.
possession. Nowhere else in the universe is there 
what here expresses itself in your conscious being.
And this is true of you, not in spite of the unity of 
the divine consciousness, but just because of the very 
uniqueness of the whole divine life. For all is 
divine, all expresses meaning. All meaning is 
uniquely expressed. Nothing is vainly repeated; you, 
too, then, as individual are unique. And (here is 
the central fact) just in so far as you consciously 
will and choose, you then and there in so far know 
what this unique meaning of yours is. Therefore 
you are in action Free and Individual, just oecause 
the unity of the divine life when taken together with 
the uniqueness of this life, implies in every finite 
being just such essential originality of meaning 
as that of which you are conscious. Arise, /.non 
freeman, stand forth in thy world. It is fA c ccildr, 
it is also thine.94
The strenuous optimism of Royce, his confidence in 
the pcwer of consciousness to reach its object, reflected 
and coni.ributed to the spirit of the age. This or coursa 
was an important influence in literature as well. A±-soXute 
Idralisn. reinforced the Edenic concept in fictiir- i or 
placed lui power of existence squarely within the ken and 
centre 1 of the social individual. The auintescentilly
;-;-hr as i ’ To know is to transcend" rever be .cater in 
the  ^ . of H:Ot Crane and Wallace Stevens in the. 1 ' s.
- ; dt cit define the influence of idealism on tne c.ind
0.1 I ttica at the threshold of the new century as a raspionse 
ta hold growth of capitalism and industriaiitaticn:
"Here . a philosophy which restored to the ind vidual 
the purpose and dignity of which Darwinism and the new 
interdependent society of urban industrialism seemed to so
a A Josiah Royce cited by Cunningham; pp. 210-Gl.
a ü
many to rob him. Here, too, was a system of thought 
serviceable to an older individualistic democracy 
was being threatened by new aggregates of mass p o w e r . ... "95 
These thoughts were voiced by the eminent Americiu 
sociologist Lester Frank Ward, who argued in The, P^.yzkZa 
/'Ucii .'L.6 0 j CZvZtZzatZo n j, published in 1893, ch .it "within
a, .oontEtic and activistic universe the human mind has been 
and be in the future in even larger degree, a creative
force for the democracy and humanitarianism without which 
only a handful of individuals can truly l i v e . "96 Thorstein 
Veblen attacked the shibboleths and behaviour of the business 
community while adhering to a populist brand of individualism, 
but it was James Edwin Creighton who carried the tenets of 
the British idealists Bradley and Bosanquet into the first 
decades of the twentieth century in America.
Creighton's version of speculative idealism embraced 
nature and mind as complementary. That is, the natural 
world and social relations among individuals were external, 
discrete entities reinforcing the power of mind '.>ut also 
existing independently. Creighton emphasized, "We need 
also a material system of things, an order to which we have 
to siJbr.it our intelligence and our w i l l . . .  "97 Cunningham 
aummaxizes Creighton's notion of Absolute Mind as he under-
b... ! ec vhe place of experience in it: "In short, muct
: IT./ , G C -. "ti f "The Li ;,erature of Ideas, p, 971
TbACi, p.. J:f] L
CreigbtLG l.ted by Cimninghaa, p. 300,
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be the fulfillment and completion of the deeper demands 
of experience as the complementary relationship of self, 
other selves, and nature; it cannot therefore negate any 
of these coordinate moments of e x p e r i e n c e . "98
The central importance of experience was taken up by 
Charles Peirce and William James in the theory of pragmatism. 
James called pragmatism "'a new name for some oJd ways of 
t h i n k i n g , •" 9 9  acknowledging his indebtedness to John Stuart 
Mill and the tradition of British empiricism. Peirce 
adumbrated pragmatism as follows: "'Consider what effects,
L.hat adghx conceivably have practical bearings., we conceive
object of our conception to have. Then our conception
'..:L these effects is the whole of our conception of tha 
o b j e c t . A n d e f s o n  and Fisch delineate a prime difference 
re'c.v; "en Peirce and James to be the latter's corn, entrât ion 
■cn truth as well as meaning. "James's theory of tcnnh was 
individualistic, and it was nominalistic in tendency.” As 
cqaluEt: traditional empiricism, however, "James’o empiricism 
, .owed for a certain free play in the projection of ideas 
; • ,= ir the choice of some for belief and action at the
. . /."er- s and actor's r i s k .  "*^ 81
9 9 x,inningham, p. 301.
9b James quoted by Passmore, p. 109. 
TOO Peirce quoted by Passmore, p. 109.
T O P a u l  Russell Anderson and Max Harold Pi - cn,
.< K nmdAlaa: PAom the. Pa/ittanà to With
Riuresentative Selections (New York; Appleton-Ccatury“- 
Crofts, Inc., 1939), pp. 523, 522.
Although empiricism, broadly defined, has forged 
Ziii strongest aspects of British philosophy. Absolute 
Idcaixsm held a certain sway after the publication of J,H, 
Stirling's The. SzcA&t Hdgzt in 1865 until the influence 
of Bradley and Bosanquet diminished in the earl;^ ' part of 
this century. Hegelianism marked a significant devralion 
from the. empirical pattern of the British school, Afaer the 
reign cf Absolute Idealism in Britain, the movement in 
philosophy evolved toward a concern for linguistic proccose.s 
and preoccupation with the antinomies in words m.d lan.guag i. 
G.E. .hocre and Bertrand Russell demarcated tlie terms ci chu 
de Cet/O'./ci of idealism. As Passmore points out, ‘Gloore led 
e t c u c k  utct Idealism, particularly the Idealism of 
loy - chich first won for Moore and Russell thrcr 
.fXq; ucai.ion as philosophers. "10% Moore estaclish'u.. a 
% h: lose phical bc^ is for concreteness of thought t.cc s..implicitv 
f le. r'uage, for the common-sense approach, as he phrased 
•:o ruestivr'icd automatic assmnplr onx, such a ' the 
1 , • •. . « f t'vri or material objects, and mor^xricr. he
. '6 L d the ' -erÿ . ijvestigativc structure of m e  xypical
c, uei- pti los-.-Dho LS ore trained tc ask. He t;,ieught
pi.Ll: ::...'phcrs shot.Id oxariue the terms of their initial
re. € It ce -jno the frainework of the language employed.. Moore
emph.a.-.Lzed "the tAiixk of certain very common propositions,"
10 2 PassiftO;re p .  2 0 1 .
while eschewing any explicit theory of ordinary l a n g u a g e . ^83 
The clarification of language was a central feature of 
Moore's writings, which strongly pushed his successors 
in he direction of linguistic philosophy, as Passmore tells
In one exploration of logical atomism, Russell wanted 
to Assert the most basic elements which constitute "a 
logically perfect language." Both he and Wittgenstein in 
his early writings adumJaraued words as the basic unit of 
meaning and they posited the irreducible meaning or atomism 
of tl'io simplasr. verbal expressions. Warnock states that 
Wittgenstein, Ramsey, Wisdom, and Russell "all share-: a 
ting.i'C Anbition--the ambition, chat is, of establishing the 
thesis that there were in reality only atomic facts, and in 
language only atomic and molecular propositions. These 
’atoms*, linguistic or factual, were the final, or the 
nearest approach to the final, 'residue in analysis'^. They 
laid bare the essential character of language and of the 
'world. "105 The prevalent interest in the word and in the 
structure of language controlled the focus of mucn 
philosophical and fictional writing, as would later be 
manifested in ludic fiction, which seeks to merge the word 
and tho world.
10' G.J. Warnock, EngiUxk ?kZto4>opky ■
It: : . Oxford University Press, 1958), pj/:/.,
1. '■ Ï I as H i;< s' re, p . 213.
Warned, p. 36.
or
- Russell and Wittgenstein later recanted the glibness 
with which they associated meaning and the word. No one 
could describe exactly what constituted a logical atom of 
language. Words were the only certainty and even they were 
uficcrtain., The act of probing meaning from the verbal unit 
did, however, reaffirm the much more general twentieth- 
century push toward an analysis of language as central to 
'che comprehension of human consciousness and action. 
Postulating "the pluralism which regards the world, both 
thac of existants and that of entities, as composed of an 
infinite number of mutually independent e n t i t i e s -06 
Russell projected being in association with the linguistic 
presence.
In the TAac.tatu6 Wittgenstein took the external, 
descriptive meaning of words to be reflective of the world, 
and he identified language by the metaphor of the picture.
At this point his writings articulate a concreteness based 
on the concept of framing a world in words. To discuss 
language it is necessary to bare it to the core of 
signification since the ontological reality of words depends 
on the atomic facts we assert with their use. Stegmiiller 
points out that Wittgenstein in the TAaztatu6 "saw the 
descriptive function of language as its cardinal function
to which all the other functions could be reduced, wfiZAzat 
tatzA kd Adjdctdd tkd notZon o I a ^ZngZd zhZs^ -^^ . inncZZon
106 Passmore, pp. 225-26.
xn his seminal study. Finch arguas that 
"the basic change between Wittgenstein's earlier and later 
philosophies was the giving up of the idea of language as 
an exact calculus with a world necessarily of a corresponding
character"10 8
In his later writings Wittgenstein dismissed the 
philosophy of the TAaztatu6 as meaningless. Many 
commentators have nevertheless interpreted PkZtoé opkZcai.
'I <iveszZga.tZ,0 !>u more as a continuation of the TAac,tata.à than 
as a complete break. Feyerabend, for example, argues "tliat 
the 1 nvd-btt ga.tJ,on.6 basically contain an application, ox the 
Fain ideas cf the TAactatuA to several concrete problems,
only difference being the use of language-games instead of 
: x.nguage of the natural sciences which formed the 
ute ■ r-i tical background of the TAaatatu^ , For the 
eerii-:: :yv of contemporary ludic fiction, Wittgenstein's 
wcjlV. eteLni part .nular importance in the analysis ct 
la rug cage-gomes and of playing with structure, although
10 7 Wolfgang Stegmiiller, Main CuAAznt6 Zn ContcmpexaAtf 
Genno-.t, B'lZZZ^k and ÂmzAZaan PhZto6ophy (Bloomington, 
ïndlnra:’, Indiana University Press, 19 70), p. 41?
1Gb Henry Le Roy Finch, WZttgzn^tzZn-T kz latzb ^h.iCo^^opky i 
An tx:p::.ùZtZon Of} the, PhZto^ophZcat Inve^tZgatZxAt 
(At].antic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1977), p.11
109 Paul Feyerabend, "Wittgenstein's PhZtoé ooh.K cat 
In Ob? " in ModeAn Studze,6 Zn PhZtoXi oph.j ‘ A
CottdciZon 0  ^ CAZtZcat EA>^ay^, WZttgzn^tzZn: The
PkZtoà0phZdat Inve,^tZgatZon^ , ed. George PitoA',[hcncion: 
Msxrmr.Dian and Co. Ltd.-, Papermac, 19 66; rpth I'TlO) , p, 148.
his later work clashed with the received opinions of others 
dealing with language. Odgen and Richards' affective 
interpretation of literature based on scientific method 
contrasted greatly with the writings of their con t empo r a ry 
Wittgenstein. As particularly against the later 
Wittgenstein, Thz MzanZng MzanZng for all its amlDiguities 
stands out as a polemic for the significance of referential 
and correlative relationships in language. In Ogden and 
Richards' affective theory, "'Meaning* evidently ie a syiiobol 
some of whose elucidations must rest upon psychology..."
For these theorists "the grammatical alternative" ”tends 
very greatly to confuse the discussion. " H O
In ThZto^ophZzat lnvz6ZZgatZon& Wittgenstein, however, 
strates that words qua words have no meaning, 
psychological or otherwise. The specific manner or context 
In who’ on words are brought forward In ordinary language 
conaitiwCs the .acanrng and cognitive variation oi statements 
r.ei'ares t’.- arstiaguishing element. The language- 
gisxr cunouLu.i the frame of reference, the ostensive 
dafirit.xc:n cr use value, setting up both a syntactical and 
epJstemojogical structure. He has argued that "Language is 
6 labyrinth of paths. You approach from onz side and know
uuO C.K. Cgden and I.A. Richards, Thz Mzanzyig 
Mtaiung • A Study o^ Thz ln{^tuzvizz Languaaz i.gon Thoacht 
and Cl. ""bf. SciZznzz 'c\ ' Symb oZZtm^ With SupplebtmtaTy Essays 
by h. Malinowski and F.G. Crookshank (New Yiurk" barcourt, 
Irate and Coapauyq Inc., 1956), p. 186.
your way about; you approach the same place fro.a 
side and no longer know your way about, Long ...ego and
play join together in the invention and execution of the 
fictional world in which use-value is eschewed fax' the 
ludic element: "To invent a language could mean Lo invent
a.ri instrument fof a particular purpose on the :vi the
laws of nature (or consistently with them) ; but .t rlso 
has the other sense, analogous to that in which we cpea.h 
of the invention of a game." Wittgenstein concludes, "Here 
I am stating something about the grammar of the word 
'language', by connecting it with the grammar of the 
word 'invent'" (section 492, p. 137®). Writers must define 
their terms explicitly. Otherwise novelists will not only 
create their own precursors but will also compel infinitely 
different subjective readings of any one work of art. 
Richardson emphasizes that "in philosophy Wittgenstein 
maintains that we are not to look for scientific cneorles, 
word simply has the meaning which is given by luo use if, 
and so there can be no scientific investigation into what 
it 'really m e a n s . ' I f  language is a conventioi 
determined by social rules, then the readers of 1 i.ction are
!.. Ludwig Wittgenstein, PkAlotophZcaZ J nv(i6tigatZvn6, 
2nd V... . , trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
196 3) , :u 62®. Subsequent references are to tnis edition 
iVixd wi .3 . ùpear in parentheses.
112 :ohr; 'I.E. Richardson, The, GAammat o xc bti f t-x. ^ ZcatZon 
A'. Intetpxcra ■ ' . o-f. 'ilZttgzn^tzZn*4 Phxlot Dpny -j ..angaaga 
York: r- '.art .n's Press, 1976), p. 31.
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in a sense also its creators. Wittgenstein exists at the 
centre of the postmodernist struggle. The development 
in his thought illuminates a similar pattern in the 
progression from Modernism to literary postmodernism.
It is against such a philosophical backdrop that 
twentieth-century American literature, European Modernism, 
and ludic fiction evolve. Early in the century, the Imagist 
movement in poetry was a radical departure. Here the poet 
focused on the sensuous import of words in much the same 
way that contemporary philosophers believed in words as 
logical atoms of language. The Americans who joined the 
anti-romanticist T.E. Hulme in London affirmed with Yeats 
the power of the carefully-articulated, well-controlled word 
as image. The new style was a sparce one in which no word 
was to be supererogatory. Hulme urged, " ’Poetry is no more 
nor less than a mosaic of words, so great exactness is 
required for each o n e . '"^^8 with the onset of World War I 
and the death of Henry James, one age closed as another more 
turbulent one began. James stood at the threshold of 
Modernism. Pound pushed open the door. Pound made himself 
the spokesman for the Imagist movement and v/as associated 
with Hilda Doolittle and Amy Lowell. Harriet Moore's 
Chicago magazine PoztAy gave the Imagist poets exposure, 
and in turn they rescued the journal. Ezra Pound became 
its European correspondent. The new emphasis on the poem
113 Quoted by Willard Thorp, "The ‘New’ Poetry," 
LHUS, p. 1184.
s?
as wordsf as sensuous objects, may be summarized by 
Archibald MacLeish's statement that "the purpose of the 
expression of emotion in a poem is not to reereare the 
prev's emotion in some one else..,. The poem itself is a 
L .nility, an end, a creation. " H 4  in "Ars Poetica"
Mao^eish issued his famous dictum, "A poem should not 
mccan / But b e . "Its This credo articulated the beliefs
of the new poets working &ith Hulme, Richard Aldington.,
a.; . Flint in 1911-12. Pound helped to expose
" u audience to the innovations of the European
including the later French symbolists. Tne poet 
mirg an impersonal god building an artifice of verbal 
tty. The Byronic hero becomes for the Moderns an
Li'..- magus labouring OGcr structure,, Josipo /xci has
■ -C.Q the force of fcdernism and the stress cn xnedium. 
rt at "an art of tx.a kind makes the spew'" at/ar
I't.. ... /hat is , tjort. Y-'.t : not t-he finished
 / .. oners . " - -
y tho de.; . at lor/.ai.t demanded mere than a 
reeop'tivc -esponse : » om /■ : 'eaè.e / Y - ate, Joye- ^ PcouLd.,
■wot ..i:)'. :en?J.,atei ;q-mbols v ■ del:, .eate reality v.r the state
_ J Axchibci.ld MeoLeish quoted by Foerster and ,FaXt., 
k : r ÜV‘ PoztAy and PAotz,, p. 982,
1/h "’'irs Poetica, " kmzAtzcin VoztAy and pAotz^ „ 9 83.
118 Gabriel Josipovici, Tkz ii/ûAtd and tha.. :  A
S t - n . :  ’ o s  A o d z A n  Ttct-lon. 2nd ed. (London: I  ‘ i n   ^ 1979),
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of mind. Often these symbols formed complex and elaborate 
patterns based on myths, previous works of art, sounds, and 
scnriuous appeal. Frequently one image was carried over
; icen to poem; the reader had to be a student not only 
of lTx.ora.ry art but of particular movements and artists.
Thu verbal creation dominated meaning as the writer fused 
subjective and objective elements, striking up new 
juxtapositions and images which defamiliarized experience, 
in thus process the poet became an impersonal yet powerful 
inventor and manipulator of words and sometimes of reatiers 
as well. The poet saw himself as an agent conveying na'.. 
always meaning but rather essence. Bradbury and McFarlant 
point out the language cf uxymi' ron which pervaded tho 
Modernist movement in literature as well as the structurai 
which were unmistakable.
An erplo:-:ive fusion^ one mljht suppose, 1. ; it 
destroyed the tidy categories of thought > toppled
linguistic systems, i.hat. di^rupced formal ; crime ; and 
the traditional links between words and wet'..;; , words 
uci things, inaugurating the power of ami
parataxis and bringing in its train the task' to use
Eliot's phrase-”Cf making new juxtaposition^, new 
wholes ; or, in Hofmannsthal's words, of cre..v..irig 
' trom, man and beast and dream and thing - oi. . of ini cy 
q-j: new relationships.... it is the image o: art 
holding transition and chaos, creation and io,-cre.-ition, 
in suspension, which gives the peculiar concentration 
and sensibility of Modernist art— gives it...its 
Janus-faced q u a l i t y . ^^7
11" Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, '/ajTie and
Natiuc of Modernisa , 14 o dzxnxx m ; 1 S90'-19 30 yx&ï Malcolm 
Brac.bv;ry and James McFarlane (Harmondsworth, M" :.'i.
England: Penguin Books Ltd , 1976);, pp. 48-45.
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feats was absorbed in the Symbolist movement in 
France and in his early poetry shares much with Mallarmé. 
Yeatsbs poetry conceives the imaginative role of the artist 
and the outer real world as antinomies. He sees in his 
youthful lyrics a dreamlike artistic chimera and broadly 
follows Pater's aestheticism. Wilson argues that "when 
Pater says that experience gives us 'not the truth of 
eternal outlines, ascertained once for all, but a world of 
fine gradations and subtly linked conditions, charting 
intricately as we ourselves change,' he is stating a point 
of %-rew exactly similar to that of the Symbolists....
In Yerec -wa find the aestheticism of Pater carried through 
tc etc consequences."H8 In his study Vcxt.i>,. Harcld Bloom 
rates rhac Yeats was influenced by Pate:: oct .at the 
poet stands no a Romantic (rather than a Modernist) in the 
tradition of Blake and Shelley, Yet in his discucsicn 
i "hailing to Byzantium/’ Bloom arguen for some icur; ly 
obuious .Modernist characteristics of the poerm '’God's 
hen..y fire,' in this poem, is not a state where tie creator 
end bis creation are one, as in Blake, but rarhi l a ?:tate 
vvL ire the creator has been absorbed .Into his ere: :t:: oîï ,
V.....1.^ .0 the art work or 'artifice of eternity* draws all
.f ■ juito itself."119 Moreover, in his obsession with
A not/4 CaAttZj. pp. 32-33. s- g
Haro.I Vza.t^  (New Yorx: Oxford University
1970); u. 347.
the impersonality of the poet, with the necessary sal 
imposition of the objective Mask or Anti-Self^ Yeats 
partakes of the Modernist perspective, in which ::he poet 
loses himself in the drama of language and the aesthetic 
process. If for Yeats in "The Song of the Happy Shepherd," 
"The words of Arcady are dead,'" then the consolation jS that 
"Words alone are certain good. " Words give a tcmpcrary' 
anodyne; "And my own whispering words be comfcI't 1 liC. ' ^
AS the self is absorbed with words and syniool.s . so is tie 
ortside world, which is ;no longer a referrnci l;h,. a raoi. 
Commenting on the use of symbols, Wiiscu qu.: see hoats's 
Analogy of the writer to "'an old peasant to 11 stomas'" j.
■-lo will use the most extravagant words illuo L.
i.\ they suit his purpose. Or he will Invent a w 1 1 pa;:aole
tnd the more hxc mind is on fire or the tic-re vttott. it
t.. . t.'a. leas will he look at the outer t; c.::  lue
io.r ;j Uo o‘t.\ sake. It gives him metaphors and
a.:’d 1.1 at is cl .1. * *’
jcyoc us AC words and symbole extravagantly in th;- 
.."'- conscious exploration of an inner worlds to the extent 
t . Itimately in ftnyi.e.gayù ùla.kz he created not a new
W\ . ;ut a new language. Joyce disrupted the structure of
„■ 2 > Yeats, "The Song of the Happy Shop ,i Tko
i/AA-f. ruA' tilt Fatm^ o f\ W.B, . Co ter Allt
and lAsrer 1 K. Alopach (New York: Macmiliaj y ,
pp « 4-6 5..
Wilson, CaAttz^ p. 41.
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words flowing inexorably toward meaning. His words simply 
exist. Kenner postulates that words are the topic of 
Joyce's fiction. "Joyce was hardly more word-conscious; 
than his characters were.... The language of Dublin tS 
the subject; his books are about words, the complexity is 
there, in the way people talk, and Joyce copes with it 
by making it impossible for us to ignore the word on the 
p a g e . "^22 Joyce divorced words from meaning in the 
dialectical process of discerning and restoring intrinsic 
meaning rather than essences externally signified* In the 
moat basic and ^anal terms, in nursery rhymes,- In everyday 
words, in street language, in endearments, in curses, in 
word! about food, Joyce discovered profound and exciting 
concepts. His play with v/crds begins with the ccmmonplace 
and thrives on contradiction,,
By the skij.l of verbal and linguistic transformations, 
Jjyco cieaceo, as Wilson explains it, "the illusion or a
L] e3 0.1 a 1 organism.,,. we possess Dublin, seer.., neurd,, 
z me it £.7: d felt, brooded over, imagined, remembered.
A ixgtOA orgues that " h^n-events ■ are instir. ctrv?
re.-;; in Modernist writiny , " 1 ^ ^ As for conu.uiporaiy iudi,
cl Bugh Kenner. Jotct (Boston; Be .::con Press,
1/^/. , p. 12.
Wixuon, kxztj t CaéttZf pp. 210-11.
1•;= Mi chae I :U. 1 .Lington, " S ve vc Joy ce an .i'hitde ■- ncft 
T .juc, ' . 1, ieAU-2.6 I&9Ù-19-30, ad. Malcolm BrBdbu,;^’ and 
J MnB'U'Iune ^Hcumondsworth, Middlesex, England




fiction, the "action" of Vabttnz^â and of Uty-&Atà 
centres not on time and event but rather on the movements 
of mind, on memory, reflection, and the careful selection 
of words which define reality and foremost, which create 
it. As in ludic fiction, in Modernist and postmodernist 
literature alike, the writer takes on the character of a 
powerful magus. Unlike the ordered narration of nineteenth- 
century fiction, such god-like omnipotence in Modernist 
and ludic fiction resides completely in the possibly 
arbitrary and capricious will of the author. In 
Joyce toys with words qua music and then the song reverts 
to words anew*, Ellmann points out that "he constantly 
expanded the monologue by non-representational merhcdo ^ ^nd 
j.u the episode he stylizes it to the point of
absurdity. Fictional devices begin to break up as il they 
had grown sceptical of themselves. The presiding 
imagination of the book appears more and more diu tract, 
frcrs hi5 characters with purposes to which they .- re only 
tr^bccary. "“-25
in the context of Edenic fiction and the ludic rralra, 
it 1.1, 'uiLrrsetlug to consider the potent Adamrc . .itifs in 
üfyauêt, uli Leopold and Molly think of the past as 
paraaisatC/ as holding the secret of a primal unrry. The 
Ldeu Stephen hopes to attain resides in wordy al.une.v The
221 hi chard Ellmann, on tkt l ...-rk :
.lira uuiverr ity Press, 1972), p. 109,
'1
garden, water, flower, and nature imagery stand as motifs 
to work against, as models for dialectical conflict. There 
is also irony, as when the priest talks of paradise in 
the liturgical service and the comment is "Said he was 
going to paradise or is in paradise. Says that over 
everybody. Tiresome kind of job. But he has to say 
s o m e t h i n g . "^26 linking of paradise and the corpse
plays with the Christian concept of the final reward. 
Hollington remarks, "The paradise-fall-return pattern governs 
many readings of the novel." He adds, however, "the 
similarities [between Edenic myth and the symbolic events 
in are surely possibilities deriving from the uses
of association, which is the dominant method of the novel, 
prosecuted through puns, alliterations, homonyms, rhyming 
phrases, as well as e v e n t s . "^27 Thus one way of looking at 
the novel focuses on words, language, and the multifarious 
uses of verbal play. Kenner notes that "By the time of his 
mature work Joyce's realization that his subject was 
language, the protean empty language of the dead city, had 
so deepened that the reader is at first conscious of 
little but words and cadences, embalmed.... The subject is 
'style' and what style implies.
12 6 James Joyce, (New York: Random House
Inc., 1946), p. 103.
127 Hollington, pp. 439-40.
128 Kenner, VabtZn’6 Joytt, p. 17.
7^
Just as the singing woman in Stevens' "The Idea of
Order at Key West" evokes in the author the conviction of
the artistically circular vehicle of poetry, so do the
words and symbols of Ftnnzgan^ (Zakt delineate finally not
meaning but words, bare and alone. Thinking of VtnnzganA
Wakt as Stevens* woman, we as readers "Know that there never
was a world for her / Except the one she sang and, singing,
m a d e . "^29 without doubt,"Joyce's final fiction probes not
meaning but language as it postulates a universe of words
createj by supreme artistic consciousness. Cixous states;
In a sense, while Stzphzn deaxs with aesthetic
gestation, VoA.tfiatt is the gestation of a sou^
■.anturing among words, while in and after the
sentence itself becomes the scene of experience, 
in Vtnnegan^ Wabe, the words themsel■'ee 
contain the meaning carried by an ordinary sentence, 
the linear construction of the latter is .arst 
1 : ,Aider and replaced by a kind of verbal galaxy. At a 
' rt.ain level of prose and of the artist's scr.s & ,
l,e word and the perceptible appearance of e. thing 
: CO us cl t ate similar visions, as though the - i.rd 
...tseif were an object which one encountered tupned
i n t o  a n  e p i p h a n y . ^ ^ 0
M.c sense of entropy foain.rti. g h. h-J-cct' is
In /tixcgaMà For Joyce entropy i.;. r m c i v e d
ft. t:r brr down of idi.aa and consciousness r;rds,
urter lb ce A cUrcrdered and chaotic. In Vtnnzgctnt Joyce's
LiJ Wallace Stevens.. "The Idea of Order at Key West,"
Tk . C . . c t z d  Votmh oi WdttcLZQ.. Stcvcwa, 16th rptr , 18 th 
pii ri .  ^ 'New York; Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1978) : pp. 128-30
liC ar lent Cl::ous, T k t  BxZtz o ^ JcLme.6 Jcpyi-h , t.rans. 
fro.:r the French Sally A.J» Purcell (New Ybfk.; David 
Levi.,p It72) , 60lF
-isA-. .
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play with words comes as a premonition of a self­
destructive universe such as Pyn chon's. GA.avtty' 6 
Ratyihow chronicles World War II, and the entropie vision 
of Joyce's novel was presented to the world on the eve of 
that war. For both authors the twentieth century 
annihilated meaning. Forster's old dictum, "Only connect" 
rings in reference to these works obsolete and irrelevant.
For Pynchon, as was the case for Joyce, there exists 
nothing to which to connect, no secure anchor in the real 
world, no firm continuity with history and culture to 
define and expand human experience. We are left not with 
meaniig but with words.
Fenner exclaims that "Joyce worked seventeen years 
to ^ .ih the work away from 'meaning,* adrift into language;
: np is to be gained by trying to push it back."i31 This
.. turn to words as the essence of literary art was 
ulated by T.S. Eliot. He argued that "the progress of 
vA .'.rti.st is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual 
nation of personality. " He defined this as the 
■h'irncess of d e p e r s o n a l i z a t i o n .  Against the Romantics,
against Wordsworth, Eliot vowed that "poetry is not a turning 
loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the 
expression of personality, but an escape from p e r s o n a l i t y . "133
131 Kenner, ViLbttn' 6 Joytt, p. 304.
'I?2 T.S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," 
3ztz:itc..d LZi6ay6. Now Ed. (New York; llai'court.. Brace and 
World, Inc., 1964), p. 7.
133 Ibtd., p, 10.
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In a staunch revolt against the Romantic "I," Eliot saw 
the poet as a medium through which words travel to reach 
the reader. The poet is "the transforming c a t a l y s t . "^34 
i?or Eliot the consciousness of the writer is cruc.1 al as is 
th.:^ disappearance of this consciousness in words. Kenner 
notes about Eliot, "Like the Symbolists, he is not there, 
but has withdrawn in favor of the l a n g u a g e . "i35 Eliot's 
eusay "Tradition and the Individual Talent," written in 
1919, contains the germ of his poetic theory, for which he 
supplies a brief summary;
The analogy was that of the catalyst. When the 
two gases previously mentioned are mixed in the 
presence of a filament of platinum, they form 
sulphurous acid. This combination takes place only 
if the platinum is present; nevertheless the newly 
formed acid contains no trace of platinum, and the 
platinum itself is apparently unaffected; has remained 
inert, neutral, and unchanged. The mind of the poet 
is the shred of platinum. It may partly or exclusively 
operate upon the experience of the man himself; but, 
the more perfect the artist, the more completely 
separate in him will be the man who suffers and the 
mind which creates; the more perfectly will the mind 
digest and transmute the passions which are its 
material,136
For Eliot, words generate reality and reflect in their 
transcience the despair of civilization. The faith of the 
contemporary writer lies also in the word and the word 
alone. Eliot's wariness holds true:
. 1 3 1  I b i d . ,  p .  8 .
135 Hugh Kenner, Tkt 'Pound Eda (Berkeley , California: 
University of California Press, 1971, 2nd p:ifW#.lng, 1973), 
p . 136 .
136 Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," pp. 7-8
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Words move, music moves
Only in time; but that which is only living
Can only die. Words, after speech, reach
Into the silence. Only by the form, the:, pattern.
Can words or music react
The stillness, as a Chinese jar stilly
Moves perpetually in its s t i l l n e s s . ^37
For the poet this dependence on words contains a central 
contradiction, for "Words strain, / Crack and sometimes 
break, under the burden, / Under the tension, slip, slide, 
perish, / Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place, / 
. ’i .1 not stay s t i l l .  "^38 words exemplify the tenuous hold 
humanity has on existence. By employing words in this 
fashion, Eliot contributes to the transformation of form 
into content. This transformation was a key assumption 
of both Russian Formalism and New Criticism, and it fore­
shadows the controlling ethos of postmodernist ludic 
fiction. Jameson comments that the "geological shift of 
form into content is a relatively recent literary and 
linguistic phenomenon, but one which in modern times has 
become in some sense absolute."139
Following Joyce and Eliot, the New Critics have seen 
the poet as properly refined out of existence, Eliot tells 
us that "if poetry is a form of communication, yet that,
13 7 T.S. Eliot, "Burnt Norton," "Four Quartets," Tkt 
Coi'fipiz.t(i PottM and Vtay^ T.S. Bttot (London; Faber 
and Faber, 1969; rpt. 1970), V, lines 1-7, p. 175.
138 Ibid,, V, lines 13-17.
139 Fredric Jameson, Tkt Ptléon-Hotut o =( Lingaagc: A
Account StA.ucXuZLatl4 rn and P.u4>^lan'"'fotna.<U.àm 
(Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1972), 
p. 204.
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which is to be communicated is the poem itself, and only 
incidentally the experience and the thought whicn have 
gene into Cleanth Brooks interprets poetry in
formalist terms as a system of paradoxes and arrangements 
of words, "necessary overlappings, discrepancies, con­
tradictions." He notes that "T.S. Eliot has commented 
upon 'that perpetual slight alteration of language,
Ac.ndt perpetually juxtaposed in new and sudden combinations,* 
which occurs in poetry. It is perpetual; it cannot be kept 
out of the poem; it can only be directed and c o n t r o l l e d . "141 
Brooks attacked Yvor Winters' "heresy of paraphrase" in a 
condemnation of the separation of form and meaning. Brooks 
argues that form and content are a unity, and this recalls 
Coleridge's notion of poetry as an organic whole. Brooks 
adamantly states that "most of the distempers of criticism 
come about from yielding to the temptation to take certain 
remarlr.s which we make about the poem— statements about what 
truth it gives or about what formulations it illustrates—  
for tne essential core of the poem itself."142
Ransom believes formal considerations are the primary 
basis for the aesthetic judgement. He remarks, "it is
140 T.S. Eliot, Tkt U.&t ojJ ?ottn.y avid the. iiie Oq 
CAtttctAm: Studtt6 tn tkt RtZatton o^ CnXttcthm to "’^ ottxy
Bngtaiid (London: Faber and Faber, 1964; rpt. 1970) , p. 30
141 Cleanth Brooks, Tkt lOtZZ-WAougkt Sti dte.6 -in
tkc StAuctudt 0 ^ PottKy (London; Dennis 1949; rev.
ed. ; 1968), p. 6.
142 Ibid,, pp. 162-3.
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an order of content, rather than a kind of content, that 
distinguishes texture from structure, and poetry from 
prose.... I suggest that the differentia of poetry as 
discourse is an ontological o n e . "143 Again we hear the 
Atno of Coleridge: "Let it be said frankly that a poem
an organism in action."144 xn England, I.A. Richards 
took up the Coleridge strain as he postulated an affective, 
psychological, "scientific" approach to literature and 
criticism. He declared that "the two pillars upon which a 
theory of criticism must rest are an account of value and 
an account of communication." He continues in ?A.lnclptt6 
o{^ llt(LKah.y to push for the organicist Coleridgean
view of poetry and to urge the elimination of beliefs, to 
insist upon "freedom from, actual assertion."145 
Pfiactlcat CA.ltlcl6m, Richards heralds the flexibility of 
audience to subject matter, without the imposition of 
external hindrances such as the character of the poet or
his period.146
143 John Crowe Ransom, "Wanted: An Ontological Critic," 
Bza-tlng thz. Su6he,6: Sztzcttd E6Aay6, 1941- 1970 (New
York: New Directions Books, 1972), p. 2.
14 4 Ransom, "The Concrete Universal," Beating tkt 
BiUktà, p. 175.
145 I,A. Richards, P^lnclpZt-ô Lltt^a^y Cx,ltlcLÂ.6m
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1925), p. 276.
146 See I.A. Richards, Pk.aatlc.aZ Ck.ltlcU.xfi: a Study
0 Llttk.ak.y Judgmtnt (New York: Harcourt, ËraCe and World,
Inc., 1929), p. 322.
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According to Wimsatt and Brooks, Richards' affective 
theory concentrates on "synaesthesis— a harmony and 
equilibrium of our impulses.,'* They criticize this 
equilibrium as easily confused with v a c i l l a t i o n . 147 
Although part of the Modernist movement against belief and 
historical considerations, Richards largely found opposition 
among the New Critics. Thompson notes that "Richards 
posed his theory in an absolutist manner, and it was met 
with an absolutist refutation on the part of the American 
New Critics, the refutation culminating in Wimsatt's and 
Beardsley's 'The Affective F a l l a c y . ' "148
In both "The Intentional Fallacy" and "The 
Affective Fallacy," published jointly in The Seu)anee Revtew 
in 1946, Wimsatt demonstrated the errors of literary 
criticism which explores external aspects of the creative 
process, either from the author's or the reader's per­
spective. Meaning devolves from the structure and content 
of the work itself; the writer's intentions and the 
reader's feelings are ultimately irrelevant. The pivot for 
the poem is the interrelationship between words qua words.
In his essay "What to Say about a Poem," Wimsatt postulated
14 7 William K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Cleanth Brooks,
La. t c xak /./ Cxltl c.t4 m : A SkoKt HZ 6 to n.ij ( London : Rout lodge 
and Kagan Paul, 1957; rpt. 1970) , pp. 615-16.
14 8 Ewa M.Thompson, ’Ruttlan Tok.maZl6w ayid„jj\ngto~ 
Ainek.lcan hie(/J A Compa.k.cU.lve Study {The.
Hague: Mouton, 1971), p. 45.
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t?-:e fundamental understanding of words and diction in 
r to explicate meaning; he averred, "In poetry the 
artifice is a r t . "149 wimsatt declared, "There is a gross 
body of life, of sensory and mental experience, which lies 
behind and in some sense causes every poem, but can never 
be. and need not be known in the verbal and hence intellectual 
composition which is the poem. For all the objects of our 
manifold experience, for every unity, there is an action 
of the mind which cuts off roots, melts away context--or 
indeed we should never have objects or ideas or anything to 
tnlk a b o u t . "150 wimsatt further argues that application 
of the affective fallacy would negate universality of 
words and meaning for the particular, subjective, changeable 
response. Wimsatt sensibly decries "the measurement of 
poetic value by the degree of feeling felt by the readers 
of a given era."151
A detailed examination of Formalism and New Criticism 
is essential for the provision of a framework in which to
14 9 W.K. Wimsatt, "What to Say about a Poem," Hate^at 
Cont-iaY.te4-• StudleA In Lltekatake and With an
Essay on English Meter Written in Collaboration with .Monroe 
C. Beardsley (Lexington, .Kentucky: Kentucky Paperbacks,
University of Kentucky Press, 1966), p. 241.
150 W.K. Wimsatt, "The Intentional Fallacy," Tkt 
Vtk.bat Jeon: Studies In the Meaning ?oetk,y, with two 
preliminary essays written in collaboration with Monroe 
C. Beardsley (Lexington, Kentucky: The University of 
Kentucky Press, 1954), p. 12.
151 W.K. Wimsatt, "The Affective Fallacy," The Ven.bat 
Icon, p. 27.
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view ludic fiction. Nabokov reached his formative years 
during the heyday of Russian Formalism and the American 
writers of ludic fiction developed in a literary and 
academic environment which greatly valued the contributions 
of the New Critics. Moreover, Formalism and New Criticism 
cogently illuminate the fundamental assumptions of ludic 
fiction based on a word-centred, self-contained lexical 
universe. In the Russian' Formalist school the relationship 
of words within the poetic structure stood as the primary 
method of coming to know the work of art. The Formalists 
followed detailed textual analysis and emphasized close 
and careful reading. They looked to words and patterns or 
morphology as the keys to a particular work of art. The 
Russian Futurists and Formalists, active in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Erlich dates 
Formalism from 1914 to 1 9 3 0 ),^52 sought to assign value 
to the intrinsic work of art.
The leading Formalist critic Shklovsky reacted against 
the Symbolist movement in Russia, against Bely, its chief 
proponent. He saw art as technique, as the process of 
making things difficult to perceive, hence defamiliarized, 
in order to create and to elongate the process of 
aesthetic perception, "to make the stone
152 Victor Erlich, Rcutlan fok.maZl4m:
Voc.tk.lnty, 4th ed. (The Hague; Mouton, 1980), p. 9
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s t o n y . "153 Shklovsky calls for the exhibition of 
technique since for him the work of art is largely about 
coming to know the work of art. We are reminded of 
Schiller's sense of display or Scheln as a crucial sub­
stantive element in the aesthetic process. Shklovsky 
hails the chaotic transparency of literary technique and 
its gaming effect in ÏAl6tk.am Shandy, Erlich has noted the 
inappositeness of Shklovsky*s remark that Tk.l^tk,am Shandy 
is "the most typical novel in world l i t e r a t u r e . "154 on 
the other hand, Jameson remarks, "I believe that above and 
beyond the impudence, this sentence is to be taken 
literally: Tn.lZitk.am Shandy is the most typical novel because
it is the most novelistic of all novels, taking as its 
subject-matter the very process of story-telling i t s e l f . "1^5 
Erlich controverts the analogies between l'ait pouk.
Z'a/it and Russian Formalism, particularly since the latter 
held so little interest in the purpose of art. The 
Formalists were oriented toward morphology and empiricism, 
and they possessed scant flair for, or interest in, the 
speculative. Their orientation was basically positivistic. 
Concentration was concretely centred on words and verbal
15 3 Victor Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," Rut^Zan 
Tok.maZZZit Ck.ttteZz>m: Tout E66ay6, trans. and intro, by
Lee T . Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln, Nebraska; 
University of Nebraska Press, 1965), p. 12.
154 Victor Shklovsky, "Sterne's TkX.6tk.am-Shandy : 
Stylistic Commentary," Riuz>lan TotmaZZ^t CkUtZc.Zz>m, p. 57
155 Jameson, p. 76.
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structures. As part of the heritage of ludic fiction, 
this aspect of Formalism retains significance. Erlich 
cites the Formalist Zirmunsky's ideas of poetry, that 
"it has at its disposal the 'whole nexus of formal- 
?„ogical relations inherent in the language and incapable 
of expression in any other branch of art.*" Zirmunsky 
concludes that "'the material of poetry is neither images 
nor emotions, but words..*.. Poetry is verbal a r t . '"156
The Formalists attended to euphonic considerations, to 
the sound patterns and metrical forms of poetry, and as 
Wellek and Warren have written, their preoccupation was 
for the rhythms and unity of l a n g u a g e , 157 Erlich relates 
that "in Tomasevskij *s Theoty Lltetcutu/ie, the most 
comprehensive exposition of Formalist methodology, poetic 
language was defined as 'one of the linguistic systems 
where the communicative function is relegated to the back­
ground and where verbal structures acquire autonomous 
v a l u e . '"138 This exists as a primary concept of ludic 
fiction as well. For the members of the Moscow Linguistic 
Circle and the Petrograd Society for the Study of Poetic
1 5 6  Quoted by Erlich, pp. 174-75.
1 5 7  Rene Wellek and Austin Warren, Theoty o£
Lite/LoX ate, 3rd rev. ed. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1966)
p p .  1 5 9 ,  1 7 0 .
15 8 Erlich, p. 183.
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Language (Opoyaz), literature was the process of signi­
fication not of mimesis. Thus the Formalists wished to 
ruake the study of literature a science with its own 
methodology. Erlich emphasizes that "Formalist research 
soon shifted from phonetics toward semantics or more 
exactly, toward the interrelations between sound and 
meaning,... What was involved here was a broader and more 
mature notion of the verbal s i g n . . . .  "159 Thoit^on clarifies 
the evolution and orientation of Formalism;
...the beginnings are marked both by nineteenth- 
century positivistic beliefs and by the idealistic 
literary theories of Belyj. As time went on, the 
idealistic trend faded away and the 'scientific'
(in the sense the neo-positivists use the term) 
tendency began to gain more and more ground, to 
finish by taking over the field completely. In the 
course of this development, the theses put forward 
by the Russian Formalists and their successors,Czech, 
French and Bulgarian structuralists, began to parallel 
more and more closely the postulates of twentieth-century 
logical positivists. Doubtlessly the fact that among the 
Formalists there were many linguists contributed to this 
development: in twentieth-century linguistics the
scientific principle has been applied with persistent 
success. Those who knew linguistics professionally: 
Jakobson, Tomasevskij, Vinogradov, and others, began to 
apply their knowledge of the principles of semiotics to 
to the study of literature.150
As we have seen, the movement away from the poet to the 
poem, from the author to the work of art and ultimately to the 
word, became a focal point for the Formalists in the period 
directly before and after the Russian Revolution, and for the 
American New Critics duripg the 1920's, 30's, and
159 Erlich, p. 184.
160 Thompson, pp. 108-09.
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early 40’s. Today such preoccupations form an intrinsic 
part of contemporary play fiction. Many commentators have 
spoken of the similarities between the two historically 
diverse movements which had such force in predicating the 
central concerns of literature for much of the century.
In both we see the formal impulse and the concentration 
on words coupled with the breaking down of language into 
verbal models. However, Thoi^on argues forcefully that 
"the attitudes of the Russian Formalists and the New 
Critics sometimes represent a basic polarity within the 
contemporary language-oriented criticism-"^31 The political 
and historical differences must be asserted. Whereas 
Formalism emerged as a leftist, even revolutionary response 
to the excesses of Symbolism, as a movement against the 
interpretation of literature as a series of images, as 
Belinsky postulated, New Criticism acted as a force of 
literary and social conservatism. With T.S. Eliot as a 
key mentor, the New Critics simply sought to reorganize 
literary criticism along neo-classical lines. Thomson 
points out that "New Criticism owed much of its vitality 
to the anti-positivists Eliot and Hulme."^32 this light
we can understand the impulse toward the examination of 
classical and metaphysical literature. Here was an. 
absorption in the ordered past and a turning against'the
161 Thompson, p. 7,
162 Thompson, p. 109„
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Romantic surge toward freedom and consciousness in emotion 
and individuality. The New Critics sought to bypass poet 
and audience for the plen^itude of words alone; the ÿ
Formalists proposed, with the Futurists, a far more 
sweeping system of scientific, linguistic analysis which 
was deemed by it^ proponents to be "militantly anti- 
traditional, " to paraphrase Erlich. In contrast to the 
New Critics, the Formalists also "were anti-academic in 
the extreme."153
Pomorska demonstrates the indebtedness of the Formalists 
to the phenomenology of Husserl, to the perception of the 
autonomy of language and form. Questions of history and 
culture were explicitly disavowed, as with the New Critics. 
"Husserl maintained that all non-material, i.e. spiritual, 
phenomena have their own independent existence. Moreover, 
these phenomena can be studied only through their essence, 
which is manipulated in its pure form in each of them 
i n d i v i d u a l l y ."134 The emphasis centred on the specific 
formal analysis of a particular work rather than on any 
historical perspective. In this surge toward synchrony as 
articulated by Saussure and taken up by the Moscow 
Linguistic Circle, the Formalist method of studying 
language as a self-refracting system became the dominant
163 Erlich, p. 275.
164 Krystyna Pomorska, Rii66Zan TotmatZét Tkzoty and 
ttZi Poetic Ambiance (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), p. 19.
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methodology. This is a legacy inherited by contemporary 
ludic fiction.
To Ferdinand de Saussure we owe the fundamental 
precepts for discovering the synchronic operations of 
language freed from the exclusively diachronic grasp of 
the neo-grammari&ns. For Saussure, ta tangue or language 
(as opposed to ta patate or speech) "is a self-contained 
whole and a principle of classification. As soon as we 
give language first place among the facts of speech, we 
introduce a natural order into a mass that lends itself 
to no other c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . "^35 Saussure insists upon 
the purely arbitrary nature of the signs used in language 
to signify a particular concept. "Language is a convention, 
and the nature of the sign that is agreed upon does not 
m a t t e r . "136 The signs of the language system are defined 
by their differences in the relational network; there are 
no referents outside this system. Saussure argues that 
"in language there are only differences. Even more 
important; a difference generally implies positive terms 
between which the difference is set up; but in language 
there are only differences iolthout po-ôltlve tetmt. Whether 
we take the signified or the signifier, language has
165 Ferdinand de Saussure, Coûtée In Genetat Llngut4tlc6 
ed, Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye in collaboration 
with Albert Reidlinger, trans. Wade Baskin (New York; 
Philosophical Library, 1959) , p. 9.
166 Ibid,, p. 10.
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neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic 
system, but only conceptual and phonetic differences that 
have issued from the system.”167 Culler applies the 
following analogy to explain ideality, value, and meaning 
in language: "Thus one can say that the units of the
game of chess have no material identity: there are no
physical properties necessary to a king, etc. Identity 
is wholly a function of difference within a s y s t e m . " 1 3 8  
Although it was the American pragmatist C.S. Peirce 
who coined the term semiology as the study of signs, it 
was pre-eminently Saussure who established the basis for 
the discipline. The Swiss linguist posited that "language 
is a system of signs that express ideas."139 He demon­
strated that "the linguistic sign unites, not a thing and 
a name, but a concept and a sound-image."1^3 He called 
"the combination of a concept and a sound-image a sign" 
and designated the concept as the z>lgnl{^led and the sound- 
image as the 1 ^ 1 Saussure was careful to dis­
tinguish the linguistic sign from the term z>ymbot, since 
the latter does not retain an arbitrary nature. It is
1 6 7  Ibid., p. 120.
1 6  8  Jonathan Culler, SauZiZ> ute (Glasgow: Collins,
Fontana Modern Masters Series, 1976), p. 2 8.
1 6 9  Saussure, p. 16.
170 Saussure, p. 66.
171 Saussure, p. 67.
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rather purposive. Although the individual speaker cannot 
control the nature of the sign on whim, there is no 
logical or causal relationship between the signifier and 
the signified.
In its scrutiny of language and the use of words, 
ludic fiction assumes the arbitrary character of verbal 
games. Speaking of Beckett, Nabokov, Barth, and Borges, 
Fowler comments on the explicit linguistic foundation of 
contemporary literature; "Although experimentalism is not 
a novelty in the history pf fiction, the strong insistence 
in much of this new writing on the linguistic nature of
fiction itself is s i g n i f i c a n t . "1^2 The verbal play in 
ludic fiction shares much with Saussure's description 
of the sign. As Huizinga articulates in Hom(j Ludenz>, the 
selection of rules for a game or for play devolves from a 
purely arbitrary base but once determined, the rules reifiain 
rigid. Saussure suggests "that the individual does not 
have the power to change a sign in any way once it has 
become established in the linguistic c o m m u n i t y 3 go 
is it too with the verbal games of ludic fiction; their 
choice is capricious but once established the pattern of 
play serves as the basis for an entire set of fictional 
patterns put forward with a dogged albeit humorous
172 Roger Fowler, llngiU^tlcZi and the Waye£ (London; 
Methuen, 1977), p. 4.
173 Saussure, p. 69.
persistence, In addition, once the particular ludic laoie 
IS adopted, the fictional strategies and motifs become 
measured and even predictable,
baussure is diligent, in his emphasis of the opposition 
between diachrony and synchrony in the study or '.iogu.istics, 
that is ^ oetwesn.a linguistic analysis based c-r Liato-: cal 
t&rcors and evolution and the examination of language 
founded on static laws operating at any point in the 
.language-state. Synchrony focuses on the speaker. Thody 
ccgent:,;,/ stresses that "no one, in Saussure's way of 
looking at language, can ever possess the whole tangue.'"
Yeî; individual speech can exist "only by virtue of 
underlying tang tit that provides both a community of snared 
linguistic experience and the very thought-patterns by 
means of which the members of that community make thecî- 
selves u n d e r s t o o d . "174 Saussure remarks that "synchrony 
.las only one perspective, the speakers', and its whole 
h.ached consists of gathering evidence from speakers; to 
; ow to j ust what extent a thing is a reality ^ it is necessary 
a..id sufficient to determine to what extent it exists in the 
finds of the s p e a k e r s ^75 This focus on the mir.d of the 
speaker perfectly articulates the magus-like nature of 
'ludic fiction, at least to the ostensible elimination of 
prospective and retrospective aspects, which Saussure
17 4 Philip Thody, Rotand Battkez» : A CoyiAÔîoa.-'oo>jiz
EZitlr/fzte (London; Macmillan, 1977) , p. ix.
175 Saussure, p. 90.
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associated with diachrony.
Jakobson condemns Saussure's synchronic preoccupation
with "a static, uniform system of mandatory rules,
ignorant of the different functions of language and...the
time and space f a c t o r s . "^76 Most structuralists are
themselves intransigent when it comes to the elimination
of diachrony or historical analysis, Jameson offers the
following commentary concerning the synchronic proclivity
shared by the Formalists and structuralists;
We must here underscore a tendency which we found at 
work in an analogous moment of Formalism...which we 
must understand as a deformation structurally inherent 
in the method. This is the transformation of dia­
chronic events into synchronic categories, the re­
placement of the event by the static concept, of the 
verb by the neologism. Greimas h^ is himself evoked 
this tendency, as a kind of baleful spell hanging over 
linguistic analysis, "which, whenever one opens one's 
mouth to speak of relationships, causes the latter to 
be at once transformed, as though by enchantment,, 
into substantives, or in other words into terms whose 
meaning we must then negate by postulating new 
relationships, and so forth. Any metalanguage we are 
able to imagine for the purposes of speaking about 
meaning turns out to be not only a signifying, but 
also a substantifying language as well, which freezes 
all intentional dynamism into a conceptual t e r m i n o l o g y . ^77
Tne tendency here is toward a mechanistic, reductive,
and static system. The signifier and the signified
delinjcdn? language patterns which designate the limits of
the structuralist endeavour. The world is not only not
enough; it is irrelevant. It is not difficult to discern.
176 Roman Jakobson, Main TtendU In The Soitnae o{y 
Language (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1373) ,
p .  38,
177 Jameson, p. 126.
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that the model-based analyses of structuralism radically 
abbreviate the force and extent of human consciousness.
One is always searching npt for the idea but for "the 
model behind the idea," which Derrida has labelled the
work of " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n . "^78 Ludic fiction partakes of
the auto-referenbiality of structuralism and indeed of 
Modernist art in general, but at its best Adamic play 
fiction differs in attitudes about consciousness and the 
ability of the mind to posit freedom. At worst, however, 
ludic literature degenerates into predictable models of 
parody and empty gamesmanship, which like the proponents 
of structuralism, retreat from aesthetic idealism and from 
any expansive epistemology by which man creates his world. 
Both Formalists and structuralists dwell on function and 
product to the exclusion of the power of the individual 
artistic process and the neglect of author and audience as 
prime movers in the fictional world. Jameson has averred, 
"The most scandalous aspect of Structuralism as a movement- 
its militant anti-humanism, as found both in Marxists 
(Althusser) and in anti-Marxists (Foucault) alike— must 
be understood conceptually as a refusal of the older 
categories of human nature and of the notion that man (or 
human consciousness) is an intelligible entity or field of 
study in h i m s e l f . "^79 The qualities of man's humanity
178 Jameson, p. 136.
179 Jameson, p. 139.
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are forgotten. The danger of structuralism and of ludic 
fiction comes in ignoring the human condition for the 
easily articulated and repeatable paradigm. Kurzweil 
confirms this pattern. She demonstrates that for the 
structuralist Ricoeur the outer world is gradually ignored: 
"By finding meaning through linguistics, Ricoeur causes 
political and social issues to recede." About another 
French structuralist she argues, "Barthes’ drift into texts 
represented a further depoliticization."180
The neglect of the social realm common to Formalism, 
structuralism, and ludic fiction encountered strong 
criticism. Trotsky decried Formalism. Although of course 
he had in mind the utility of social realism, he also gauged 
the full measure of Formalist limitations in thought and 
theory. Trotsky does not deny the formal basis of art nor 
itr existence as an autonomous entity. He acknowledges 
t . h 'rrr can end must be; judged from the point of view 
of its achievements in form, because there can be no art 
f  'thout t h e m . "181 por the radical leader the concentration 
on sounds and verbal patterns in the midst of social and 
political revolution seemed, understandably, absurd. The 
Formalists’ neglect of thi? real world appalled Trotsky.
As a materialist he posited that the deed or the reality
1 3 0  Edith Kurzweil, The Age SttactataZl^m: Levi-
Slxaust to T0 ueautl (New York: Columbia University Press,
1 9 8 0 ) ,  p p .  1 0 7 ,  1 7 7 .
181 Leon Trotsky, Lltetalute and Revotutlon, trans. Rose 
Strunsky (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ann Arbor Paperbacks for the
Study of Communism and Marxism, The University of Michigan 
P r e s s 1960) , p. 179.
must necessarily precede the word; "The poet can find 
material for his art only through his own artistic
c o n s c i o u s n e s s . "182 ignore the fact that art is the
product of man, of the social individual, is for Trotsky
tantamount to disregarding the whole history of the
struggle for freedom. Trotsky agrees that "personal
lyrics of the very smallest scope have an absolute right
to exist within the new art. Moreover, the new man cannot
be formed without a new lyric poetry. But to create it,
the poet himself must feel the world in a new w a y , "183
For Trotsky the absorption in synchrony denies the history
of man's struggle for full consciousness as it lingers on
the low mechanistic level of words as playthings in a
void. Much the same indictment can be made of ludic
fiction, of its predilection for verbal categories, naming,
for games and tangential references, elaborate tropes,
parodies of meaning. Trotsky views the artist separated
from society, exiled into the world of self, as a lost
creature unable to struggle out of a pervasive bewilderment
The form of art is, to a certain and very large 
degree, independent, but the artist who creates this 
form, and the spectator who is enjoying it, are not 
empty machines, one for creating form and the other 
for appreciating it. They are living people with a 
crystallized psychology representing a certain unity, 
even if not entirely harmonious. This psychology 
is the result of social conditions. The creation and
182 Trotsky, p. 167.
183 Trotsky, p. 170.
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perception of art forms is one of the functions of 
this psychology. And no matter how wise the 
Formalists try to be, their whole conception is 
simply based upon the fact that they ignore the 
psychological unity of the social man, who creates 
and who consumes what has been c r e a t e d . ^84
In his essay, "Art as Establisher of Value,"
Wallace Stevens has discussed the appearance of form as
the delineation of content and of human consciousness:
"The first [idea] is that the style of a poem and the
poem itself are one; the second is that the style of gods
and the gods themselves are one; the third is that in an
age of disbelief, when the gods have come to an end, when
we think of them as the aesthetic projections of a time
that has passed, men turn to a fundamental glory of their
own and from that create a style of bearing themselves in
r e a l i t y . " 1 8 5  Stevens avers "that, above everything else,
poetry is words.... A poet's words are of things that do
not exist without the words.... Poetry is a revelation
in words by means of the w o r d s .  "186 A. host of modern
thinkers, from Malraux to Buber, sees forms, words, colours,
sounds as the fundamental aspects of the work of art,
supplanting content altogether. Malraux views modern
painting as the quintessential achievement of form. He
184 Trotsky, p. 171.
185 Wallace Stevens, "Art as Establisher of Value," 
The. ModG.tR T/tad^.ÙLOn : Baakg^n-o uncLs Mod&tR
ed. Ri.chard Ellmann and Charles Feidelson, Jr., (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 218.
136 I6td., p. 221.
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discerns in Expressionism, Fauvism, and Cubism the central
significance of colour. He comments that "the triumph of
art was also the triumph of c o l o r . "187 Buber postulates,
"This is the eternal source or art; a man is faced by a
form which desires to be made through him into a w o r k . "188
The absolute distinctness of words in themselves,
separate from precedents and antecedents, defines the
order of verbal play in the ludic novel and helps
explain the frequent sense of discontinuity, digression,
and tangential speculation, from the disunities of Tkd
MagiL6 to the paradoxes of love and lust in LoZZta and the
anarchic moments; of GA,av4,ty ’ -6 Rad-nboiA). Saussure's analogy
of language with chess moves postulates the relationship
of words in ludic fiction, in the arbitrary and disharmonious
nature of play;
In a game of chess any particular position has the 
unique characteristic of being freed from all 
c ;n zecedent positions; the route used in arriving there 
makes absolutely no difference;one who has followed 
the entire match has no advantage over the curious 
party who comes up at a critical moment to inspect 
the. state of the game; to describe this arrangement, 
it is perfectly useless to recall what had just 
happened ten seconds previously. All this is equally 
applicable to language and sharpens the radical 
distinction between diachrony and synchrony. Speaking 
operates only on a language-state, and the changes 
that intervene between states have no place in either 
state,189
187 Andre Malraux, "Art as the Modern Absolute," 
T/te Mod&ta T/iad^tZon, p. 32.
188 Martin Buber, "The Primary Words," Tkt Modern 
TAad'i'tZon^ p. 873.
189 Saussure, p. 89
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The concentration on the momentary experience of 
the word and on the literary game elicits an immediate 
response from the reader based not on the cumulative 
general pattern of the fiction so much as it is derived 
directly from the given, specific ludic engagement. There 
is an undeniable synchronic focus, with little of the 
traditional character development or conventional temporal 
and spatial continuity. In many of his stories, Borges 
seeks consciously to destroy diachronic unity; in "The 
Secret Miracle" and "Pierre Menard" he deliberately plays 
with distortions of time and space. Essentially as we 
shall see, it is the aim of Edenic fiction to project 
itself out of time into prelapsarian fulfillment. Language 
marks the individual means of creating the aesthetic Eden. 
The writers of ludic fiction discern in the structure of 
words the substance of literature. For them the formal 
arrangement and play of language constitute the aesthetic 
goal. They would claim for their art what Hjelmslev 
claimed for "a true linguistics," that is, "a self- 
sufficient totality, a structure 4 uf
Hjelmslev argues that to attempt a linguistic theory, 
"we shall best achieve this aim by forgetting the past, 
to a certain degree, and by starting from the beginning 
in all cases where the past has yielded nothing of positive
190 Louis Hjelmslev, ?^ loIçLQomnyia to a Tkeoty oX 
Language.^ trans. Francis J, Whitfield (Madison, Wisconsin: 
The University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), pp. 5-6.
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u s e f u l n e s s ^81 sapir postulates that although language 
derives from society, the basis of language analysis lies 
not in culture, speech, or physiology but in form. He 
declares, "The ease with which speech symbolism can be 
transferred from one sense to another, from technique 
to technique, itself indicates that the mere sounds of 
speech are not the essential fact of language which lies 
rather in the classification, in the formal patterning, 
and in the relating of concepts. Once more, language as 
a structure, is on its inner face the mold of t h o u g h t .  "'^ 82 
Thus although "language is an immensely, ancient heritage," 
any analytic approach must confront it as "the elements Of 
speech," syntax, and structure, in a given synchronic 
instance.193
Benjamin Whorf carried this further. He delineated 
a particular linguistic structure not as a reflection of 
reality but quite possibly the generative force of that 
reality. The self-sufficiency of the language unit thus 
Whorf is an implicit entity. In the principle oi 
linguistic relativity, as, articulated by this Aiærican 
linguist, and student of Sapir, "the structure of a huinaja
191 Ibid., p. 7.
192 Edward Sapir, Language,-^  An IntAoduetton to the, 
Studi. oj Speech (New York; Harcourt, Brace and World, 
1921), p p .  21-22.
] 9 3 Ibid., p p .  23, 22,.
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being's language influences the manner in which he under­
stands reality and behaves with respect to it."194 whorf 
signals that on a basic level the structure of language 
preconditions the nature of conceptualizations. For him, 
linguistics determines ideology. Pointing to the consider­
able divergence in time conceptions between the English 
language and Hopi, Whorf concludes that
Concepts of 'time' and 'matter' are not given in 
substantially the same form by experience to all men 
but depend upon the nature of the language or 
languages through the use of which they have been 
developed. They do not depend so much upon ANY ONE 
SYSTEM (e.g., tense or nouns) within the grammar as 
upon the ways of analyzing and reporting experience 
which have become fixed in the language as integrated 
'fashions of speaking' and which cut across the typical 
grammatical classifications, so that such a 'fashion*
. may include lexical, morphological, syntactic, and
otherwise systemically diverse means coordinated in a 
'certain frame of c o n s i s t e n c y . ^ 95
In ludic fiction, Whorf's postulate regarding the
ability of language to structure thought takes on an
idealistic mould preserving his basic tenets. This is
achieved by the thorough self-consciousness of author and
protagonist in using language as a playful Edenic apparatus.
The author creates characteristic language patterns and a
unique fictional world, as for instance, Barth achieves
through overstatement and parody in "Lost in the Funhouse."
194 Benjamin Whorf, Language^ Thought, and Reattty■ 
SeZeeted (il/Uttng^  o^ Benjamtn Lee (jJho^ £, ed. and intro, 
John B. Carroll, Foreword by Stuart Chase (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1956), p. 23.
i SS Whoif, p. 158.
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Even were we to accept Whorfs theory wholeheartedly, we 
might without sophism suggest that there exists in it a 
strong potential idealism, for the recognition that language 
determines reality can be applied to achieve the reality 
we desire by manipulating linguistic patterns. The individual 
can gain control through a plenary awareness of the manner 
in which language generates a certain predictability of 
thought. By this knowledge and such actions, the writers 
of ludic fiction hope to control language, to create an 
evolutionary situation in which language becomes a tool 
for man to pattern a new reality. The old uses of language, 
deterministic syntax, and set patterns must change. The 
projection of ludic worlds indicates that a new conscious- 
ness about words can effect changes in our perception of 
the world and of social relationships. Eco suggests that 
aesthetic language may ultimately entail "'a complete 
".organizing of our conceptual impression of the u n i v e r s e .  "^96 
- 11,2 0 ': states, "the artist lends to an outward phenomenon 
of .ngaoge an inner significance...; just Mhtek phenomena 
the literary artist will choose for the embodiment of his 
meanxncj is arbitrary from the point of view of the 'user* 
of the work of art. To overcome the impression of an 
arbitrary association in the work of art, the reader must
19C- Umberto Eco, "On the possibility of generating 
aesthetic messaaes in an Edenic language," RtU^-ian 
F0 r ...a,: -r r A >iobutctton o cfea and texi .in toXtof:.
act Stephen Bann and John E. Bowlt (Edinburgh: Scottish
Academic Press, 1973) , p. 163.
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seek to place himself in the creative center of the artist
himself— and re-create the artistic o r g a n i s m . "^97 yet 
Sapir notes that "the sense of almost unlimited freedom 
which each individual feels in the use of his language 
is held in leash by a tacitly directing n o r m . "198
The contrast; between structure and randomness is a 
pervasive antinomy in ludic fiction. As the author 
builds meaning he simultaneously seeks to subvert or 
destroy it through multifarious games and parody. Thus 
the cryptogrammatic ploys of Clare Quilty in Lcltta are 
counterposed against the utter velleity of Humbert's 
uile drive across America- The search for the
in The CKytng o{^ lot 4 9 delineates both Oedipa's 
. toward meaning and the empty chaos of Southern 
California, its society, and culture- The writers of 
contemporary ludic fiction are lost without normative 
aicaj'.irLjS for their parody. Capricious gamesmanship on 
the part of authors and their characters-personae balances 
.n} ,CiSL t.ho refinement of carefully structured woris and 
vc’.c>'..i patterns. Mukarovsky describes the inherent 
p:>l.,*.r. :i t.ies operant in language, the tension between 
Ci.c-y’C l2 acion and fragmentation in aesthetic analysis:
*If we nevertheless differentiate between the unstructured
197 Leo Spitzer, Ltngut-6tte6 and LtteH,ah.y
in StyZX^ttcx (New York: Russell and Kcssell,
1962), pp. 28-29.
198 Sapir, p. 148.
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and the structured esthetic, we want to use these 
concepts to point out the internal antinomy contained 
in the esthetic, the antinomy between freedom and bounded­
ness, between uniqueness and generality which in extreme 
cases leads to almost pure unstructuredness, or conversely, 
structuredness."199
It is crucial to consider the parallels between 
linguistic, formalist and structuralist trends and the 
lexical gamesmanship prevalent in ludic fiction today. 
Critics of linguistic philosophy and fiction as play 
protest against the narrowness of concern, the obsession 
with language games and words qua words rather than with 
ideas, social issues or metaphysical concepts. What is 
massing in both literature and philosophy is any sense of 
ontological order, a notion of being, or perceptions 
-tDoit man’s relationship with the universe. Although a 
supporter of Wittgensteinian philosophy such as Kenny 
oUu.Ù argue that "In the 7nve-6ttgatton6 the use of a word 
is . c"'. part in a language-game, in a form of l i f e ,  "300 
éundla sees larger topics to be addressed. "What needs 
to be doue," he argues, "is to show in some detail that 
there are important philosophical problems which are not
199 Jan Mukarovsky, "The Esthetics of Language," A 
P/iague Reader on , Ltteaaty Stfiuetuh.e, and Styte,
trans. Paul L. Garvin (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown
University Press, 1964), p. 45.
2 00 Anthony Kenny, (iUt tg anétetn (London: Allen Lane,
The Penguin Press, 1973), p. 223.
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about words, not generated by misuse of ordinary 
language and not soluble by the method recommended by 
Wittgenstein."301 One might posit that ludic fiction 
operates, as does linguistic philosophy, in a consciously- 
chosen vacuum.
Although ludic fiction shares with linguistic 
philosophy a central absorption with words qua words, 
integrated into systematic language games, and a propensity 
toward formalist scrutiny, a sharp difference surrounds the 
specific perception of the world. In the analyses to 
follow, we hope to show the controlling focus of aesthetic 
idealism underlying the ludic element in fiction. The 
"real'' world is not accepted in play literature as given, 
x'oi the world as it exists is not enough. It is the goal 
of ludic fiction to create the world anew, to demonstrate 
the Adamic impulse in words and concepts, so that in effect 
the world is transformed when merged with the realm of mind. 
The very nature of Absolute Idealism and its aesthetic 
cortllavy in ludic fiction assumes that man is an un- 
. y uaLÛ 1,, a free, being. In contrast, linguistic 
ruj^osop^ers are adamant in their rejection of idealism 
and o theory of knowledge,, Stegmuller argues that for 
Wittgenstein the transcendental subject "is the subject that 
understands a logically exact language. Of such a subject.
201 C.W.K. Mundle, A Cn.tttque Ltngut^ttc Fktto^ophy 
(Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 274.
10
[Wittgenstein] ... says *T/ie Ztmtt6 o i my Zanguagz mean 
the limits of my world.' The ’my' here refers not to my 
personal ego but to the transcendental subject whose 
language fixes the logical space of the possible w o r l d s . "302 
The study to follow seeks not to praise ludic fiction 
but rather to offer an interpretation and understanding 
of it. The preceding synoptic comments serve to elucidate 
the relationship of ludic fiction to the literary and 
philosophical background of Western society. Contemporary 
Edenic literature exists in the mainstream of a tradition 
which it modifies and enriches. The movement is more 
than derivative but it is not wholly innovative. Its 
manifest weaknesses are extensive. When such fiction loses 
itself in the funhouse of language by an abandonment of the 
larger issues of man's role in the society he helps to 
crests and to perpetuate, thus does it waste meaning in 
favour of trivia and solipsism. If words in fiction de- 
/ . as for some of the Russian Formalists, to a scrutiny
of stresses and sounds, to euphony, to the exclusion of 
tne relationship between the mind and society, then these 
words 1: id such criticism become empty noises. If the 
structuralist dead-end of architectonic description prevails 
in Adamic fiction at the expense of consciousness realizing 
freedom, or indeed at the cost of an ordered expression
202 Stegmuller, McUn Zn Contempûtaty GeJiman,
and AmetZean PkZZoé opky, p. 420,
1 0 6
of the inherent contradictions of the human condition, 
then such fiction fails. Insofar as ludic fiction 
synthesizes verbal play with the creation of a new world 
of mind, to the dialectical achievement in fiction of 
unalienated man in a free society, it merits criticism, 
analysis, and attention. If as Nabokov urged "'We should 
always remember that the work of art is invariably the 
creation of a new w o r l d , ' " 3 0 3  ^0 ^ust also never forget 
that we have more than words to play with. We may argue 
with Schiller that the reality of mind in art serves to 
inform a potential, palpable new universe made possible 
by full consciousness of the infinite capacity of the 
human individual to know himself and to change his world. 
At best, therefore, ludic fiction acclaims the stirring 
idealism of Josiah Royce : "Arise, then, freemen, stand
forth in thy world. It is God's world. It is also 
thine. ’’30 4
20 3 Vladimir Nabokov, from LectuAe^ on iZteAcctuAe quoted 
by Robert Alter, "From Books to Cultural Questions," New 
VoAk TZmeé Book Revfew, October 12, 1980, p. 38.
20 4 Josiah Royce, excerpt from The WoAid and the 
JndtotduaZ, cited in G. Watts Cunningham, The TdeattJi,tte
kAQVjift.ent, p .  2 9 1 .
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CHAPTER TWO 
Eden as a Lexical Playground
The Edenic myth is an ancient one and has appeared 
in Western culture in fairly continuous fashion since 
Biblical times. The Christian religion focuses on the 
li-egeud of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden and the 
notion of the Fortunate Fall. Before this the ancient 
Greeks had honoured the Arcadian ideal in pastorals 
commending innocence and simplicity, and in the 
Renaissance the notion of a secular Golden Age took 
hold of the popular and literary imagination. The 
image of Eden in contemporary ludic fiction rejects 
religion and becomes secular as the author and audience 
partake of the godlike role of creating their own world 
in which to live. Ludic fiction unifies the innocence 
and experience of the primal garden, where the creation 
myth is transferred from an omnipotent God to the 
individual human being. A basic result of banishment 
from the Garden of Eden was that Adam and Eve turned 
inward to themselves and to their own resources and 
actions for sustainment. In effect, they had to 
take upon themselves the role of providing for their 
needs that was formerly the sole providence of Yahweh. 
Joseph Campbell quotes Jane Ellen Harrison in this 
regard :
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In the Garden of Eden, on the other 
hand, a different [ambivalent] mood prevails. 
For the Lord God (the written Hebrew name is 
Yahweh) cursed the serpent when he knew that 
Adam had eaten the fruit of the tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil; and he said to 
his angels: "'Behold, the man has become
like one of us, knowing good and evil; and 
now, lest he put forth his hand and take also 
of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever* 
therefore Yahweh sent him forth from the 
garden of Eden, to till the ground from wnich 
he was taken. He drove out the man; and at 
the east of the garden of Eden he placed the 
cherubim ... and a flaming sword ... to guard 
the way to the tree of life.
The artist in ludic fiction becomes a new Adamic 
figure, a magician teasing the reader as he plays his 
godlike games. Ironically, then, by the plenary loss 
of Eden, man realizes the potential to replace it with 
his own creation. In the life of art, exile from the 
garden forces man into a new relationship with nature, 
and implies a strong potential for independent action as 
man progresses to a position of self-determination. By 
the act of taking up his burden, man gains control,
Alan Watts has described this essentially idealistic 
process of mind, postulating and determining its 
environment :
But somehow more in line with twentieth- 
century science would be an oAganZe image of 
the world, the world as a body, as a vast 
pattern of intelligent energy that has a new 
relationship to us. We are not in it as 
subjects of a king, or as victims of a
1 Joseph Campbell, The God, Volume III:
Oec-idzyLtal Uytkotogy (Middlesex, England: Penguin,
1976); rpt. 1978), p. 16.
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blind process. We are not Zn it at all.
We aAe itI ....Every individual in this 
organic myth of the world must look upon 
himself as responsible for the world ..,
It goes right back to the story in the 
Garden of Eden: when Adam was asked by the
Lord God "Didst thou eat the fruit of the 
tree whereof I told thee thou shouldst not 
eat?" Adam replied, "This woman, that thou 
gavest to me, she tempted me, and I did 
eat." ^
The ludic artist develops some of the powers of 
the King of the Wood in Frazer's The Golden Boagk, as 
he directly and through the protagonist guards and 
protects the Adamic experience. Humbert Humbert may 
be seen as a King of the Wood hovering over his Diana- 
Eve figure, the nymphet Lolita. Similarly, Conchis in 
The Magu^ performs a priestly, magician-like role for the 
benefit of Nicholas and on behalf of various young, 
beautiful women. Borges as author is more directly a 
King of the Wood preserving hi si vision of art. Frazer 
endows the King of the Wood with magical powers and a 
certain quality of gamesmanship and he notes the 
significance of rites and rituals, although he voices 
a distinction between the impersonal, absolute quality
3
of magic and the personal consciousness of religion.
Yet Frazer goes on to call the magus figure a type of
2 Alan Watts, "Western Mythology: Its Dissolution 
and Transformation," in l^ yZh-6, VAeam^ and RelZgZon, ed. 
Joseph Campbell (New York; Dutton, 1970) pp. 22-3.
3 Sir James George Frazer, The Golden Bought A 
Study Zn MagZe and RelZgZon. One Volume, Abridged 
Edition (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 60.
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"man-god,"  ^and this is precisely the function of the
Adamic archetype. Moreover, Vickery demonstrates the
pervasive irony of Frazer's quest romance when he argues,
'And finally there is irony employed for comic purposes
and directed at his own controlling concepts, like that
of the dying and reviving god." As with Coover and
Pynchon, "Frazer's irony begins in realism with a wry
recognition of human folly and broadens out into a
mythic treatment of men who imitate gods, are sacrificed
5to the needs of society ..." The pervasive tone of 
ludic fiction is ironic and comic.
The Adamic quest in contemporary fiction searches 
for an essential freedom of mind, and the protagonist 
exists, as Underwood phrases it, to articulate "the 
mythic function of philosophy," by assisting "in the 
birth of a new consciousness which is itself a 
restoration of man to the full-ness of his being and 
a realization of his relationship with B e i n g . W h a t  
the Adamic heroes of ludic fiction have in common is 
the freedom of consciousness to create a self-defining, 
autonomous realm patterned by the play of language and 
the inner spirit of the magus-gamesman, who is no longer
4 Îbid,, p. 69
5 John B. Vickery, The LZtcAaAy Impact oi The.
Golde.n Bough (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1973), p. 138.
6 Richard A, Underwood, "Myth, Dream, and the 
location of Contemporary Philosophy," in h\ytk-i, VAcamz, 
and Rcttgton, ed. Joseph Campbell (New York: Dutton,
1970), p. 244.
controlled, but is rather the controlling force. If 
the concrete metaphors of Eden lay the groundwork for 
the ludic imagination, they yet do not confine it. The 
spirit of consciousness a.nd the freedom of mind transcend, 
in essence, the new world garden as they secure for man 
the play of words and ideas. Thus the myths of Eden, of 
Arcadia, of a Golden Age, are touchstones by which to 
compare the far greater and finer possibilities of the 
human mind to project itself upon the external world and 
to change the external world according to this projection 
of the self and its essential freedom.
The dialectic movement of ludic fiction follows the 
Blakean pattern of innocence giving way to experience, 
with both synthesized back into a state of "organized 
innocence." Thus at its dialectic best, the idea of a 
primal and primitive childhood garden, breached by the 
corruption of the postlapsarian world, of the machine
7
in the garden, rises to maturity in the artistic 
production of the adult, and returns to itself as the 
free consciousness of man in society. The novels and 
stories in this study concentrate on images of play 
and on the stratagems of games; both aspects remind us 
of the free and innocent play of children. If, as 
Huizinga argues, coeval man has lost the capacity for
7 An important critic on this topic is, of course, 
Leo Marx, The MachZne Zn the GaAcLen: Technology and the
, Vaztotal Ideal Zn AmetZca (Oxford; Oxford University 
Press, 1964; rpt. 1972).
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Play by an absorption in s e r i o u s n e s s ,8 and as Marcuse
avers, that repression and alienation in capitalist
9
society deny the Orphic mood of eros and freedom, then
it becomes clearer why these contemporary authors should
turn to an ostensibly regressive symbol, that of play,
as a possibility for the free life of the mind. The
critic Hassan notes an "escape toward freedom," in the
focus on "childhood and youth," in recent American
f i c t i o n . K l e i n  has commented that "fiction has the
techniques to accomplish the departure from Eden and
the coming of worldliness. Innocence travels toward 
11
experience." The remarkable thing about ludic 
fiction, remains, however, the capacity for wonder and 
delight in play, even horrid, tenebrous play, as in 
Pynchon’s GtavZty * 6 RaZnbouf, For Pynchon, for Nabokov, 
for Barth, play creates the milieu of freedom.
The mytkoi> of the Adamic experience posits a new 
relationship with the universe and it places the onus on 
nan as creator to determine his own reality. In the
8 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ladens : A Study oi the
Play-blement Zn Cultute (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955;
rpt. 1972), p. 198.
9 Herbert Marcuse, BAo^ and CZvZtZzatZon: A
PkZlczophZcal InquZty Znto Pteud (New York: Vintage,
1962), pp. 146-7.
10 Ihab Hassan, RadZcat 1nnocence (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp.37-8
11 Marcus Klein, Aitkin. AlZenatZon: AmtAZcan
HooeZ-i Zn MZd~ Ce.ntuty (Cleveland: World Publishing,
1964), p„ 177»
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fictions in which this mythoz> is strongest, we find a 
plethora of motifs which suggest man's creative 
capacity. It is, moreover, important to note that the 
protagonists of ludic fiction are ephemerally somewhat 
successful in actualizing, for themselves, this aesthetic 
ideal. Humbert eternalizes Lolita, Van finally wins Ada, 
Henry Waugh maintains his fictional game, Oedipa Maas 
makes it to the inner sanctuary of Lot 49, Nicholas Urfe 
gains his chance to play the meigus. Ebenezer Cooke 
mythologizes a world of mind in his poetry and play­
acting, and Borges's Pierre Menard supersedes Cervantes's 
text with an "infinitely richer" one. These protagonists 
find that they can change reality, at least their 
individual reality, by the force of play and games, 
of pleasure and beauty away from the main structures 
of their social worlds. As Levin has demonstrated about 
the myth of paradise, "If there is a single unifying 
concept which runs through the corpus of texts about 
the golden age, it is pleasure —  pleasure unabashed, 
as Tasso is at pains to specify." Levin continues:
Each of the many different versions, with 
some regional variance, seems to take place 
against the same setting: a pleasance or
pleasant landscape, the JLocu^  amoenaz. Such 
images were projections of ideas, skeptical 
and naturalistic in purport, fostering an 
emphasis on free will, an ethic of hedonism, 
a cult of beauty ,.,
"The lament for a golden age is only a 
lament for golden men," wrote Thofeau in his 
journal. In either case, it remains a lament, 
and its mode has been prevailingly elegiac.
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However, there have been occasions when 
elegy was transformed into carnival, most 
spectacularly at the courts and in the 
cities of the Renaissance. The humanistic 
revival of learning conjoined with the 
unprecedented efflorescence of the arts 
to act out the fancy that the golden age 
had returned ...
... No discovery can have made more 
impact on the European consciousness than 
the exploration of the Americas....
The voyagers reported on the natives of the 
western hemisphere in language which created 
a new myth .,.
As Pater tells us in The UenaZz>z>anae, the revival 
of the arts during this period sought to recapture the 
light and intensity of the Greek golden age. Giamatti 
has written, "In the epics of the Renaissance, the garden 
was dealt with at length for perhaps the last time in 
Western literature. We would be mistaken, however, if we 
concluded that man ceased to search for the lost state 
of bliss and innocence. Indeed, the hope of finding it 
seemed to increase enormously with the discovery of the 
New World, and American literature itself is constantly 
read as a record of the quest for happiness and innocence 
in the great unspoiled g a r d e n . M a r x  has pointed out 
that "most Elizabethan ideas of America were invested 
in visual images of a virgin land." He goes on to
12 Harry Levin, The Myth oi the Golden Age tn 
the Renata6anee (Bloomington, Indiana; Indiana 
University Press, 1969), pp. xvi-xviii.
13 A. Bartlett Giamatti, The BatthZy ?CLAa.dt.he and 
the Renatttanee Bptc (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1966; rpt; 1969), p. 6,
sUfl c'A
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describe the fervent ideology of the American Eden:
Although fashionable, the image of 
America as a garden was no mere rhetorical 
commonplace. It expressed one of the deepest 
and most persistent of human motives. When 
Elizabethan voyagers used this device they 
were drawing upon utopian aspirations that 
Europeans always had cherished, and that, had 
given rise, long before the discovery of 
America, to a whole series of idealized, 
imaginary worlds ... Centuries of longing 
and revery had been invested in the conception. 
What is more, the association of America with 
idyllic places was destined to outlive 
Elizabethan fashions by at least two and a 
half centuries ... As for the ancillary notion 
of the new continent as a land of plenty, that, 
as we all know, is now stronger than ever.,
Today some historians stress what the sixteenth- 
century voyager called "incredible abundance" 
as perhaps the most important single 
distinguishing characteristic of American 
life. In our time, to be sure, the idea is 
less closely associated with the landscape 
than with science and t e c h n o l o g y . 14
In The AmetZaan Scene, Henry James finds himself 
reflecting about the New Hampshire mountains, "Why was 
the whole connotation so deZZcateZy Arcadian, like that
of the Arcadia of an old tapestry, an old legend, an
15old love story in fifteen volumes ...?" Even so 
acute an observer as James found himself caught by 
the idea of the American Eden, in life no less than in 
his art. Jorge Luis Borges reflects the prevalent 
ethos of America's endless potential when he begins 
his study of American literature with this allusion to 
Bishop Berkeley, "that the last and greatest empire of
14 Marx, op, cZt, , pp. 39-40. 'A
15 Henry James, The AmetZcan Scene, introd. Irving 
Howe (New York: Horizon Press, 1967), p. 14.
nlscory, conceived as a tragedy in five acts, would be 
that of America.' The European mind, indeed, projected 
a stirring climax for humanity in the experience of the 
new world garden. In discussing Cooper, D.H, Lawrence 
cites the essential escape mentality of America, that 
sloughing of the European consciousness and "a great 
release into a new world, a new moral, a new landscape,** 
For him American literature signified banishment and 
retrieval :
Natty and the Great Serpent are neither 
equals nor unequals. Each obeys the other 
when the moment arrives. And each is stark 
and dumb in the other’s presence, starkly 
himself, without illusion created. Each is 
just the crude pillar of a man, the crude 
living column of his own manhood. And each 
knows the godhead of this crude column of 
manhood. A new relationship.
The Leatherstocking novels create the 
myth of this new relation. And they go 
backwards, from old age to golden youth.
That is the true myth of America. She starts 
old, wrinkled, and writhing in an old skin.
And there is a gradual sloughing of the old 
skin, towards a new youth. It is the myth 
of America.17
When Vickery discusses Frazer's quest romance, he 
underlines the irony and comedy extensive in it and 
stresses the affinity of The Gotden Bough with the 
literature of Modernism, their sharing of archetypes.
16 Jorge Luis Borges, An 1nttoduetZon to Amettcan 
LttetatuAe, trans. and ed„ L, Clark Keating and Robert 
O. Evans (New York: Schocken Books, 197 3), p. 6.
17 D.H. Lawrence, Studte.6 tn CZaaaxc Atne'tZca.n 
LttetatuAe (London; Heinèmann, 1924; Phoenix ed.,
1964), p. 51.
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myths, and the close relationship between character and
author. As already indicated, the ludic fiction in
this study carries tne ir-oa of the ironic quest romance
even further, bathitg it iji the Edenic myth, and
transforming it to a state of mind and a magus-like
power of creation and renewal. This parallels the
obiective of Frazer's work, for, as Vickery argues,
"the real hero or protagonist of The Golden Bough
proves to be the civilized mind which explores uncharted
ways to uncover new facts about man's way of life, facts
which may be simultaneously horrifying, engrossing, and
revolutionary
The ludic novel or story is thus in the tradition
of the American romance articulated by Richard Chase
when he affirms about American literature that "It has
not wanted to build an imperium but merely to discover
19a new place and a new state of mind." Character, 
author, and reader become new Adams in the structure 
of ludic fiction and the ironic mode is pervasive.
The primacy of plot, of quest, discovery, and ironic 
reversal and the inattention to character, motivation, 
and manners may well originate in the propensity of 
American literature toward the romance form. Chase
18 Vickery, op. ett., p. 132.
19 Richard Chase, The Ametlcan Hooel and tt.6 
Ttadltlon (Garden City, New York; Doubleday, 1957), 
p. 5.
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outlines the concerns of this genre, which are indicative 
also of ludic fiction:
... the romance, following distantly the 
medieval example, feels free to render reality 
in less volume and detail. It tends co prefer 
action to character, and action will be freer 
in a romance than in a novel, encountering, as 
it were, less resistance from reality....
The romance can flourish without providing 
much intricacy of relation. The characters, 
probably rather two-dimensional types, will 
not be complexly related to each other or to 
society or to the past. Human beings will on 
the whole be shown in ideal relation -- that 
is, they will share emotions only after these 
have become abstract or symbolic. To be sure, 
characters may become profoundly involved in 
some way, as in Hawthorne or Melville, but it 
will be a deep and narrow, an obsessive, 
involvement.... Character itself becomes, 
then, somewhat abstract and ideal, so much so 
in some romances that it seems to be merely 
a function of plot. The plot we may expect 
to be highly colored. Astonishing events may 
occur, and these are likely to have a symbolic 
or ideological, rather than a realistic 
plausibility.20
The tradition of the romance prepares the way for 
the formal disposition of contemporary play fiction 
in which the search for Eden develops into lexical 
absorption. The concrete verisimilitude of British 
and European realism was never eimbraced wholeheartedly 
by the writers of the new continent. The great works 
of Melville and Twain really have no counterparts in 
nineteenth-century European literature. Ishmael and 
Huck Finn set out to explore the world in the sense of 
creating the world they wish to explore. The quest
20 Chase, p. 13.
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for them centres on the search for self outside of and 
separate from society. The guest already is inward 
and explicitly away from the social realm. Huck floats 
dowie the Mississippi on a raft and Ishmael sets out to 
se 1 on the Veqttod. Ahab is obsessed with the idea of 
the great white whale and "Nigger" Jim wants his freedom. 
Thiü American fiction features one-dimensional 
characterization and a predictable concentration on a 
few key motivational concepts. Jay Gatsby shares 
similar distinctions and rather than having originated 
from a particular class and locale, he seems to have 
arisen from "a Platonic conception of himself." He is 
singularly dominated by the impulse to re-create his 
vision of himself,. Fitzgerald's metaphors are obviously 
Edenic as Gatsby attempts to grasp a share of the new 
world garden. His involvement with this dream becomes 
an obsession acted out in virtual isolation.
We can discern that the solipsism of ludic fiction 
partakes of the tradition of the Adamic hero of the 
American romance. The Edenic dream becomes a sort of 
Roycean manifest destiny of the lexical, mental realm.
The faith in geography, in the virgin continent, which 
lay shattered in the sombre, lifeless wasteland of 
ashheaps, recurs in contemporary American fiction as an 
assertion of the self in language. The inward aspe-jt of 
the narrative continues in uninterrupted fashion,- It is, 
however, given over entirely to the word and to doubts
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about the capacity of words and fiction to articulate any
sense of the individual as an agent of Absolute Mind, Yet
the consciousness of character, author, and reader reaches
toward the promise of an apocalyptic freedom in the self-
refracting mirrors and games of today's ludic fiction.
Fiedler acknowledges the quest and failure of "a
chamber of horrors disguised as an amusement park 'fun
house,. ' where we pay to play at terror and are confronted
... with a series of inter-reflecting mirrors which present
21us ... with our own face."'
The assertion of self and a new relationship to 
the universe delineates the goal of the Borges protagonist 
as he structures reality from mind; it denotes the play 
of Henry Waugh with the baseball game as the plenary 
projection of individual spirit; it tells us much about 
the role of the magus in Fowles's eponymous novel. A 
similarity between the Romantic quest and the 
ideational matrix of ludic fiction becomes clear in 
the following passage from Abrams, about the growth of 
consciousness :
Hegel's book [The. Vh2.nome.notogy] , taken 
as a literary form, is thus one of the 
earliest ... of modern involuted works of 
the imagination. It is a self-contained, 
self-sustained, and self-implicative puzzle- 
book, which is enigmatic in the whole and 
deliberately equivocal in all its parts and 
passing allusions. But it is evident that 
... the work is notably parallel to Wordsworth's 
exactly contemporary poem on the growth of his 
own mind ... That is, it is the representative
21 Leslie A. Fiedler, Love, and Vzath L^n the, t\meKtc,an 
Hovzt (New York; Dell, 1960; rev. ed,, 1966), p. 7.
autobiography of a spiritual education, told 
explicitly in the mode of two consciousnesses 
... ; it justifies evil and suffering as 
necessary conditions to the achievement of 
maturity and the recognition of one's identity 
and aim, is climaxed by the discovery of the 
implicit principles governing its own 
organization, evolves both into its own 
genesis and into the masterwork to which it 
serves as prelude, and reaches ... "that 
point"■ in the progressive "experience of 
consciousness," as Hegel specifies in the 
last sentence of his Introduction, at which 
"its exposition- [V(ZA,^ te,ZZung] . . . falls into 
coincidence with the genuine 
of the spirit" ...22
In the cultivation of individual consciousness 
moving towards the spirit of freedom, ludic fiction 
recalls the exigencies of the Romantic drive and the 
intellectual force of idealism. Yet its proponents 
firmly reject eschatology for a carapace of parody and 
play. The inherent problems of such an approach cloud 
the landscape of the verbal Eden. A carelessness, a 
looseness prevail. The mirrors in this fun house are 
distorted. The hope of visionary wisdom is negated 
by the grotesque self-mockery of writers in love with 
the emptiness of facile language. We lose sight of 
anything larger or grander than the threads in the 
carpet of syntax. In many ways the hope for a new 
relationship with, the universe devolves to verbal and 
metaphysical entropy, to nothingness adorned by trivia. 
The body of opposing criticism signifies a strong
22 M.H. Abrams, f^atuAaZ Supe,AnatuAaZt6m : TAadttton
and Re..volut.loyi -in Romantta Ltte^ Katafie. (New York: Norton,
1973), pp. 236-7.
A 2
uneasiness with the value of ludic self-involvement for 
character, author, audience.
Within the fictional endeavours themselves, the 
figures are often dehumanized, prey to the wanton sport 
of their creators, if not the gods. The arbitrary nature 
and randomness of such tales coupled with frequently 
barren artifice generate laughter in the face of any 
literary great tradition. Dr. Leavis would find nothing 
to recommend. In ludic fiction we have no remarkable 
tradition of singular proportion and few powerful insights 
into social relations and the wider human condition. The 
pressure in these novels and stories is hermetic and the 
focus looks always inward, We suspect that the self- 
propelling game has lost its purpose. In his polemic 
against verbal play, Gardner argues, "My objection is 
not to the game but to the fact that contemporary critics 
have for the most part lost track of the point of their 
game, just as artists, by and large, have lost track of 
the point of theirs." He voices the concerns of a 
larger audience:
The traditional view is that true art 
is moral: it seeks to improve life, not
debase it. It seeks to hold off, at least 
for a while, the twilight of the gods and 
us. I do not deny that art, like 
criticism, may legitimately celebrate the 
trifling. It may joke, or mock, or while 
away the time. But trivial art has no 
meaning or value except in the shadow of 
more serious art, the kind of art that 
beats back the monsters and, if you will, 
makes the world safe for triviality....
Art is essentially serious and beneficial, 
a game played against chaos and death,
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against entropy. It is a tragic game, for 
those who have the wit to take it seriously, 
because our side must lose; a comic game 
... because only a clown with sawdust 
brains would take our side and eagerly 
]orn rn.^J
Broad moral objections to the ambiguity of the
ludic creation, to the confusions of irony and self-parody
are voiced by Booth, Kermode, Graff, Gass, Steiner, and
Howe. These critics decry-the negation of control and
clarity in much postmodernist literature. They see
rampant weeds growing in the green paradise of the lexical
garden. Booth is troubled by the elitism implicit in
Nabokov and the erudition of such authors as we examine,
by which he means the difficulty with which most readers
will approach these works. Booth insists on the importance
of value over innovation and experimentalism, and he
discerns an obligation of ludic communication as the
assumed burden of authorial responsibility;
When human actions are formed to make an art 
work, the form that is made can never be 
divorced from the human meanings, including 
the moral judgments, that are implicit w h e n e v e r  
human beings act. And nothing the writer 
does can be finally understood in isolation 
from his effort to make it all accessible to 
someone else —  his peers, himself as 
imagined reader, his audience. The novel 
comes into existence as something 
communicable, and the means of communication 
are not shameful intrusions unless they 
are made w i t h  shameful i n e p t i t u d e . 24
23 John Gardner, On U o/lclZ ftat-lon (New York:
Basic Books, 1978), pp. 4, 5-6.
24 Wayne C. Booth, The, Rhzto^ta oi Ttctton 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 397.
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2 5Booth claims, "The author makes his readers." He 
scrutinizes the care or slackness of this creative act 
and warns against the refuge of word qua words, Citing 
Zola's credo about the well-made phrasei. Booth argues,
"If writing well were simply creating a. well-turned 
phrase, the statement could mean only that.... A well- 
made phrase can serve the rhetorical purposes of a Hitler 
as well as the literary purposes of a Zola. But in 
fiction the concept of writing well must include tne
successful ordering of your reader's view of a fictional
2 6world.""' The entropy of unreliable narration and 
ironic ambiguity prevalent in ludic fiction perplexes 
Kermode as well, for he views the "ava.nt-gaA.de effort" 
of postmodernist fiction as a schism severing man from all 
history and his past and as a degenerative endeavour.
The critic argues, "There is an element of convention 
in the dominant mood of crisis and apocalypse. Novelty 
becomes the inflation of triviality; the apocalypse is 
signalled by trivial games, mostly not original.
Millennial renovationism declines into antithetical
27multiform influx; there is more noise than information."
In TocvaA.d.6 a SoatoZogy ol the Novet, Lucien
25 Jbtd., p. 397. 
2 6 Ibtd., p . 388.
27 Frank Kermode, The Sen6e an Bndtng: 
Stadte6 tn the Theory ol Ftctton (London: Oxford
University Press, 1967; rpt., 1975), p. 121.
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Goldnicinn defends Sarraute and Robbe-Grillet by emphasising
"the declaration that if these two writers have adopted
a different form from that of the nineteenth-century
novelists, it is primarily because they had to describe
2 8and express a different human reality." For Graff
this statement remains invalid. He avers, "Such a
justification could be given for virtually any piece of
nonsense writing (though this is not to equate Robbe--
Grillet with nonsense). The critical problem ... is to
discriminate between anti-fealistic works that provide
some true understanding of non-reality and those which
29 ■are merely symptoms of it." Graff elucidates an 
important point; chaos in the service of chaos clarifies 
nothing. In Pynchon's entropie symbols particularly 
we often witness a nihilist groping too frequently and 
facilely promoted as the sustaining grace of art.
Graff is appalled by "the attitude expressed in the more 
celebratory forms of postmodernism." (He would include 
Nabokov, Barth, Coover in this category.) He argues,
"Here there is scarcely any memory of an objective 
order of values in the past and no regret over its 
disappearance in the present. Concepts like 'significant 
external reality' and 'the human condition' figure only
28 Lucien Goldmann, TowaA.d6 a SoctoZogy the 
SJoveZf trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock^ Publications,
1975), p. 133.
29 Gerald Graff, LZteH,atLiA,e AgaZn^t lt^eZ£i 
IZteKCL^y Ideal Zn ModeAn SoeZety (Chicago; The University 
of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 12,
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as symbols of the arbitrary authority and predetermination 
of a repressive past, and their disappearance is viewed 
as a liberation.
William Gass, himself an American postmodernist
writer of national reputation, objects to the isolation
and self-reflexivity pervasive in contemporary fiction.
He criticizes the regressive impulse in Borges and the
lack, of development in Nabokov. About the general level
of contrivance in ludic fiction, Gass submits a warning,
applied to the author of LoZZtai "Nabokov's novels
often ... seem like those Renaissance designs of
flying machines —  dreams enclosed in finely drawn
lines -- which are intended to intrigue, to dazzle,
but not to fly."^^ The sterility of games and language
in postmodernist fiction distresses Steiner and he
characterizes this pattern as "the retreat from the
word," the decline in confidence that truth "can be
3 2housed inside the walls of language."
In ExtAateAAZtoAZaZ Steiner takes up the theme 
of the death of the novel, its exhaustion as a form of 
art. He states, "Like many of the institutions and 
formal presences which it articulates, the novel will
30 Ibid,, p. 57.
31 William Gass, Fiction and the FlguA,ci o^ Ll^c 
(Boston: Nonpareil Books, 1971), p. 118.
32 George Steiner, Language and Silence: Eiiayi 
on Language, LlteAatuAe and the 'inhuman (New York: 
Athenaum, 1970), pp. 13,14,
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have a considerable afterlife; a nostalgic or parodistic
animation may continue. But the vitality of expressive
33need is largely gone." In his well-known essay on 
the entropie destiny of the novel as form, entitled 
"The Literature of Exhaustion," John Barth interprets 
the fictions of Borges as "not only footnotes to 
imaginary texts, but postscripts to the real corpus of 
literature." Barth posits, "This premise gives 
resonance and relation to all his principal images.
The facing mirrors that recur in his stories are a dual 
AegAeimi, The doubles that his characters, like 
Nabokov's, run afoul of suggest dizzying multiples and 
remind one of Browne's remark that 'every man is not 
only himself ... men are lived over a g a i n . I n
33 George Steiner, ExtAateAAltoAlat: PapeAl on
LltcAatuAe and the Language Revolution (Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1972), p. 173.
34 John Barth, "The Literature of Exhaustion," 
in On ContempoAaAy LlteAatuAe, ed. Richard Kostelanetz 
(New York: Avon Books, 1969), p. 672. In an article 
about postmodernist fiction published in January 1980,
Barth reconsiders this "much-misread essay." He points 
out, "What my essay 'The Literature of Exhaustion,' was 
really about, so it seems to me now, was the effective 
'exhaustion’ not of language or of literature but of 
the aesthetic of high modernism: that admirable, not-
to-be-repudiated, but essentially completed, 'program' 
of what Hugh Kenner has dubbed 'the Pound era.' In
19 66/67 we scarcely had the term poitmodeAnlim in its 
current literary-critical usage ... but a number of us 
.., were already well into the working out, not of the 
next-best thing after modernism, but of the belt next 
thing; what is gropingly now called postmodernist 
fiction; what I hope might also be thought of one day as 
a literature of replenishment." See John Barth, "The 
literature of Replenishment: Postmodernist Fiction," in
The Atlantic, Volume 245, Number 1 (January 1980), pp. 65-71,
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much the same vein, both Harold Rosenberg in The TAadltlon
Oj( tkg. Wew; and Irving Howe in Vecl-cne the Neu) explore
35the decay of the vitality and conventions of Modernism. 
Howe postulates, in an application valid for ludic 
fiction, that "Just as in the verse of Swinburne echoes of 
Roraanticism sag through the stanzas, so in much current 
writing there is indeed a continuity with modernism, 
bur a continuity of grotesque and parody, through the 
doubles of f a s h i o n . I n  an exciting study on LtteAatuAe 
and Negation, Kurrik articulates about Robbe-Grillet what 
stands as a central concern and the omnipresent liability 
of ludic fiction;
Robbe-Grillet writes in a new time of 
deletion, a time of the surface sentence.
The surface sentence, liberated from 
dialectical thought, has forgotten its 
need for knowledge and its relation to the 
real subject and object. It has also 
forgotten what was once the deeper 
significance of repetition (sameness) and 
difference —  the need for affirmation, 
synthesis, gathering together, and the 
need as well for negation, division, tearing 
asunder. The surface sentence is separated 
from the deep structure or form of 
affirmation by a deletion that is a 
radicalized no, a will only for stylistic 
elegance and simplicity. Deletion by­
passes the corruption both of our yessas 
and noes. It no longer knows anything 
about that negation which was sin....
35 Harold Rosenberg, The Tradition o{, the New 
(New York: Horizon Press, 1959). Rosenberg's study is a
seminal contribution; he speaks of the "creative 
absurdities" of the new as it becomes a tradition,
36 Irving Howe, Veetlne o{^  the Mew (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970) , pp. 259-60.
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It also knows nothing about affirmation or 
virtue.,.. It knows nothing about either 
because it emerges not from consciousness 
as such but from the activity and possibilities 
of writing. Upon the written, deletion 
acts with as absolute and as total a force 
as negativity had upon what is thought, but 
its consequences are disappointing: a
surface form of meaningless, albeit 
exciting, dispersions and condensations.
This surface form brings to a closure the 
classical novel of consciousness, dominated 
by the aesthetics of negation. In the 
postmodern novel-inspired by deletion, 
negation and affirmation must submit to 
being merely momentary content in a form 
governed by an aesthetics of deletion.3/
In the face of powerful opposing criticism, all is
yet not lost for ludic fiction, Nabokov in Lotlta,
Pynchon in The CAylng Lot 49, I/., and GAavtty'i
Rainbow probe dialectical consciousness. Pynchon
confronts most fully the spectre of alienation and loss
in society. Borges is boldly defended from the most
intransigent critical perspective of Graff since the
Argentine writer retains a strong sense of negation.
Graff demonstrates, moreover, that in Borges's stories
the "condition of imprisonment ... is presented from a
tragic or tragicomic point of view that forces us to see
it ai a problem.... His work affirms the sense of
reality in a negative way by dramatizing its absence
38as a deprivation." In a similar vein, Coover mocks
3 7 Maire Jaanus Kurrik, LlteAatuAe and Negation 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p, 236.
38 Graff, LlteAataAe Agalnit Itieti, pp. 55-6.
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popular culture as he simultaneously suggests the higher
creative realm of human consciousness capable of conferring
an unalienated relationship between man and society.
Gass has commented in a statement cogent for ludic fiction
generally that, "A number of our finest writers —  Barth,
Coover, and Barthelme, for example —  have begun to
experiment with shorter forms, ... to instruct us in the
art of narration, the myth-making imagination. The
regions they have begun to develop are emphatically not
like the decaying South, the Great Plains, or the Lower
39East Side; they are rather regions of the mind ..."
Pynchon offers a picture of society which is 
highly critical of contemporary American life, which 
condemns the mechanized, plastic world and the 
oppressions of the industrial work force. He presents 
a vision of entropy lurking in the garden of Californian 
suburbia and he articulates the possibility of 
consciousness to create another, freer vision for the 
social individual. Coover also describes life 
overwhelmed by artificial mechanisms of control, by 
the corporation denying the liberty of the worker, by 
the continual drudgery of alienated labour. Nabokov 
delineates the manipulative ideology of the American 
dream, the crassness of a conformist society, the 
destructive selfishness of artistic solipsism. He
39 Gass, Fiction and the FlguAel Ll{e, p. 10
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adumbrates cultural artifacts and a landscape of
great beauty and also of barrenness. Borges tells of
the mythic conflicts of peasants,, of the gaucho experience
Povd.es reveals much of the English class system and of
s.iObbejrieo of accent and education, John Barth presents
th": '".cial and emotional problems of adolescence. He
also Ù.Lt tes the contradictions inherent in the
control ling episteniology of a nation,
In Lotlta., Nabokov discusses his role as that of
an illusionist and a conjuror or magus, and in
co: cspondence with Edmund Wilson he also projects
tnxs i;v.ace of the artist as a magician with words.
For Fowles, Coover, and Pynchon,. the absorption with
verbal tricks, with scintillant language, with elaborate
and humorous conceits, conveys the dominance of the
word as the means and product of fiction, Fogel has
explained that "What is involved here is a radical shift
in epistemology which calls into question the traditional
41use of prosaic language as a window onto the world."
Schulz postulates that "if all novels are parodies of 
something else —  either the raw data of experience, 
dreams, reconstructed memories, or concepts of the 
mind — * then the truest and most interesting novels
4 0 Vladimir Nabokov and Edmund Wilson, The Nabokov 
lettcAi: CoAAeipondence Between Nabokov
and Edmund Wttion, 19 40-1971, ed. and introd. Simon 
Karlinsky (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), pp. 131,177.
41 Stanley Fogel, "'And all the little typtopies': 
Notes on Language Theory in the Contemporary Experimental 
Novel," UodeAn Ftctton Studtei, Volume 20, Number 3 
(Autumn 1974), p. 328.
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will be those that frankly parody and ingenuously
admit their artifice (in the same way as Cezanne and
the Cubist painters rejected perspective in favor of
admitting that a picture consists of paint on a
42canvas surface),"
This study necessarily must scrutinize the 
patterns of images set out by the Sdenic thrust oi 
ludic fiction. We must examine images of the garden, 
of the child's primal world, of Arcadia, of magic, of 
youth, innocence, bliss, timelessness, and their 
contradictory counterparts in mechanization, decay, 
destruction, entropy, illusions, temporality, and death. 
Through the close textual scrutiny of these fictions, 
we realize the controlling vision of a mental apocalypse, 
the flow of consciousness ^toward freedom. We are 
reminded of a similar conclusion by Lewis, specifically 
about the millennial vision of Hart Crane; "The SAtdge 
(1930) is the very type of the apocalypse of imagination: 
a poem written out of a deepening despair over the 
conditions of life in America, but a poem which ... aims 
nonetheless at establishing a new relationship between 
the human consciousness and that life Hegel
42 Max F. Schulz, "Characters (Contra Characterization) 
in the Contemporary Novel," in The TheoAy oi the Novel:
New Eiiayi, ed. John Halperin (New York; Oxford University 
Press, 1974), p. 145. av
43 R.W.B. Lewis, TAtali the Wo Aid: E.hhayi tn
AmeAtaan LtteAatuAe and the Humantitlc TAadttlon (New 
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 202.
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lends credence to this aesthetic quest of postlapsarian 
man in pursuing the freedom of consciousness when, in 
the LogtCf he uses the Edenic myth itself as an 
introduction to the exploration of the infinite world 
of mind. He argues, "The final concord [of fallen man] 
then is spiritual? that is, the principle of restoration 
is found in thought, and thought only."^^
In an excellent analysis of self-reflexive fiction, 
Robert Alter has noted the crucial importance of 
contradiction and the "quixotic tension between what 
is fictional and what is real."^^ This tension generates 
the success of ludic fiction's transcendent aims, for 
the word recovers meaning as a countersign to the 
exhaustion of artifice through the dialectical 
restoration of history and time and concrete referentiality. 
Alter argues, "Perhaps the most reliable index to 
whether a piece of self-conscious fiction is closed off 
from life is whether it tends to diminish the actuality 
of personal and historical time."^^ The reentry into 
history, culture, and society signals the emergence of
44 G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel'l Logic, Being Part One
of the Encyclopaedia ol the Vhlloiophlcal Sciences (1830), 
trans. William Wallace, foreword by J.N. Findlay 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975; rpt. 1978),
p. 43.
45 Robert Alter, PaAtlal Nagle: The Novel ai
a Sel^-Conicloui GenAe (Berkeley, California: University
of California Press, 1975), p. 224.
46 Ibid*, p. 232,
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language and linguistic play into enduring art as an 
element of human consciousness, hence as part of the 
real life of the individual. Emerson's and Royce's 
visions of a new, self-created relationship to the 
universe are transformed in ludic fiction from the 
American Eden to the Edenic possibilities of 
c on sc iou sne s s.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Nabokov's Lolita: A Last Mirage of Wonder
And as the moon rose higher the inessential 
houses began to melt away until gradually I 
became aware of the old island here, that 
flowered once for Dutch sailors' eyes —  a 
fresh, green breast of the new world. Its 
vanished trees, the trees that had made way 
for Gatsby's house, had once pandered in 
whispers to the last and greatest of all 
human dreams; for‘a transitory enchanted 
moment man must have held his breath in the 
presence of this continent, compelled into 
an aesthetic contemplation he neither 
understood nor desired, face to face for 
the last time in history with something 
commensurate to his capacity for wonder,
F. Scott Fitzgerald, The GAeat Gatiby
Lolita recaptures the movement of Gatsby's wasteland, 
The last mirage of wonder becomes a corrupt, barren 
landscape rendered through the frail musings of a pervert. 
Nabokov toys with the idea of aesthetic consummation 
as Humbert plays with the caprices of a lonely, coy, 
confused adolescent. Lolita presents the American Eden 
as oxymoron, a failed yet potent material hope which 
Nabokov parodies on two levels, the social and the 
artistic. American society undergoes a harsh scrutiny; 
a culture of book clubs, finishing schools, and anti­
intellectual academe is explored and ridiculed. As 
Humbert drives across America, the nation stands revealed. 
What is powerful and exciting about Nabokov's artistic
j j6
revelation is the brilliant delineation of a culture and 
a society by the use of a few key images and motifs. The 
billboard, the advertising slogan, project a terse 
significance reminiscent of the giant eyes of Doctor T.J. 
Eckleburg on the optician's probing billboard in The 
GAeat Gatiby, and equally as effective a symbol. Humbert's 
peripatetic travels across America trace the pattern cf 
westward settlement and exploration which our ancestors 
pursued in search of their equally elusive Edenic quest.
The difference between Humbert and the early settlers is 
not in their capacity for wonder, for Humbert in many ways 
does perceive America as a land of promise and wonder.
But the conflict between the green hope and the more 
difficult reality consumes the consciousness of Nabokovas 
protagonist in a way, we may assume, that it did not 
dominate the perceptions of those seeking, and finding, 
a virgin territory, instead of motels with neon lightsp 
and hamburger chains.
If Humbert's sense of wonder is betrayed by the land 
he adopts, the discovery of fulfillment is not denied him. 
Lolita sparks the discovery; she is the fulfillment of 
Humbert’s capacity for wonder, of his strange version of 
the American dream. Lolita, perfect girl-child that she 
is, articulates the vision of Humbert's Eden, and for him 
she encapsulates the quintessence of paradise. The blonde 
nymphet embodies the lavish promise and desire for which 
Humbert longs. She is the physical ideal of Eve, the
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first woman become contemporary gum-chewing American.
Here the fundamental word is "ideal," for it is as a 
mental conceptualization more than a concrete adolescent 
that Lolita figures as the central interest of the novel,
Humbert is more concerned with consciousness and 
art than with life’. He sees the Edenic myth as a mental 
and aesthetic pursuit. Words and images predicate the 
nature of the Eden he adumbrates. Humbert "safely 
solipisizes" Lolita from the beginning. In fact, it would 
not be amiss to state that the American girl-child is a 
figment of Humbert's imagination, in the Hegelian sense 
of consciousness determining the pattern of any external 
reality which may exist. Nabokov has skilfully 
transferred the notion of the American Eden from geography 
to epistemology. Humbert's thought framework triggers off 
the idea of Lolita? the actual Lolita is incidental to the 
original ideal which has been present in Humbert since the 
days of his youth. However, the ideal cannot be sustained 
if there is no external reference to promote it and to 
give rise to the specific expression it conveys. Art and 
life, consciousness and reality, are thus in this novel 
reciprocal and interdependent forces, acting upon and 
forming each other in the way Hegel described.
Yet many critics confront the solipsism of Humbert as 
a primary limitation of Nabokov's art. They decry the 
aesthetic apotheosis of a sick man as consummate artist 
and question the moral landscape the author promotes.
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They demonstrate the death and destruction caused by Humbert's 
quest, the sheer evil of destroying an unprotected child.
If we accept Humbert's vision of Lolita as a ghost of her 
former self after the inception of their coital relationship, 
as a sad, lonely child who cries mutely into the mirrors of 
cheap motels, then it is difficult not to controvert the 
methods and goals of this novel. The ludic landscape becomes 
an authentic prison for Mrs. Haze, for Lolita, for Quilty, 
and for Humbert; it is not at any point a real garden or an 
essence of freedom. Humbert denies freedom; he does not 
create it. His egotistical violence counteracts any 
humanity conferred by the character's palpable ayigit.
Thus, for many readers Humbert portrays the ignominy of the 
child abuser rather than the delightful patrimony of poetic 
creation. His own reiterated defensiveness simply echoes an 
abject culpability. The love for Lolita represents more 
solipsistic auto-eroticism than paradisaic unity. With 
Lolita Humbert replicates the exploitative element of the 
American Eden, that fervour for making over natural wonder into 
entrapped artifice or mechanized myth, the passion for 
change and possession which becomes an obsession and a 
nemesis.
It is hard for readers to ex^lt in the cruelty of 
Humbertos games despite the compelling rhetoric. The 
naive reader may be horrified without grasping the 
subtleties of Nabokov's art. The literary audience may be 
just as eager to translate every innuendo of molestation and
1inhumanity to the level of metaphor and gamesmanship, 
thereby averting any discussion of outrage or moral disgust, 
A third possibility is to accept the fictive nature of the 
story as given, but also to wonder at the method of 
Nabokov's craft. It is unlikely that Nabokov wishes us to 
Gee the victim Lolita as the author of her own suffering, 
as an adolescent enchantress and rank manipulator. The 
pow\';.r ful vision of her person missing from the concord of 
children at works against such ultimate depiction,
Nabokov exploits sympathy for Lolita, for her childish 
helplessness as the antinomy of Humbert's fear of her 
calculated rejection. Humbert is saved or redeemed only 
by the superimposition of Nabokov's power of language upon 
his seedy reminiscences. The artist Nabokov glorifies is 
Nabokov; Humbert assumes a pathetic demeanour any way we 
envision him. He is not Dante or Petrarch and his acute 
lack of judgement and dearth of artistry are amplified 
through such comparisons. Humbert dies. Nabokov uses the 
prop of the posthumous publication as vindication of 
aesthetic process not elevation of the artist manque or 
the dispossessed lover. As he has himself articulated, 
the subject of Lolita is words, the artist's love affair 
with the English language. Humbert is as horrible as 
his detractors claim. Nabokov's ludic gift demonstrates 
the creative potency of words to expel the destructive 
capability, through the durable pigments of the'Edenic 
projection of mind. There is no mysterious, mystical
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plvor. at. which Humbert ceases to be pervert and snaps
into his artistic mantle. The aesthetic consciousness which
moves us is Nabokov's.
Nabokov makes no attempt positively to promote the 
delusions of a pervert and madman. Readers troubled by 
such a statement need to distinguish between the narrative 
persona and the artistic creator, to separate the substance 
of fiction from its chosen vehicle. The author does show 
us an art which transcends baseness and insanity with the 
halcyon rectitude of the Edenic imagination. What Nabokov 
commits to memory are words, simply words on the printed 
page. He amplifies the power of the language by contrasting 
the prose with the fervent fantasies of a grotesque figure. 
The method may be clarified by placing it within the 
framework of postmodernist mannerism. Merivale points 
out that "both Borges and Nabokov exploit, for their own 
thematic purposes, all the narrative tricks and devices 
cf the Gothic fantasy writers of the last two centuries, 
ctnd they blend mannerism and Gothicism together in their 
single most important parodie pattern, the metaphysical 
detective story." The obviously grotesque and mannered 
character!zations of Humbert and Quilty serve to delineate 
the transforming process of words, of the temporary refuge 
of the Edenic landscape.
Nabokov takes the idea of America as Eden, and he
1 Patricia Merivale,, "The Flaunting of Artifice in 
Vladimir Nabokov and Jorge Luis Borges," in Nabokov: The 
Nan and Hli WoAk/ ed. L.S. Dembo (Madison: The University
of Wisconsin Press, 1967), p* 210.
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stresses the core significance of the ideational framework 
and the verbal Eden it engenders. Unlike the physical 
pattern of America as a place of Edenic possibility, the 
self-contained universe of the conceptualized, idealized 
Eden is a fairly obtrusive concern, which requires a high 
degree of awareness on the part of author and audience. 
Usually as well, within the novel the protagonist is self­
consciously knowledgeable Of his role as a creator and 
inyth-maker, Humbert pre-eminently forms his sense of self 
on this basis. He sees himself as the bearer of an idea, 
the only idea in which he can live, that of a nostalgic 
Eden typified by the image of a blonde girl-child. The 
physical reality of his relationship with Lolita can only 
be a feeble attempt to reclaim a mental impression.
Lolita is more an entity of the memory and desire of 
Humbert than she is the actuality of its embodiment:
Lolita had been safely solipsized. The implied 
sun pulsated in the supplied poplars; we were 
fantastically and divinely alone; I watched her, 
rosy, gold-dusted, beyond the veil of my 
controlled delight, unaware of it, alien to it, 
and the sun was on her lips, and her lips were 
apparently still forming the words of the 
Carmen-barmen ditty that no longer reached my 
consciousness ...
... I felt proud of myself. I had stolen the 
honey of a spasm without impairing the morals 
of a minor. Absolutely no harm done. The 
conjuror had poured milk, molasses, foaming 
champagne into a young lady's new white purse; 
and low, the purse was intact. Thus I had 
delicately constructed my ignoble, ardent, 
sinful dream; and still Lolita was safe - and 
I was safe. What I had madly possessed was 
not she, but my own creation, another fanciful 
Lolita - perhaps, more real than Lolita; 
overlapping, encasing her; floating between 
me and her, and having no will, no consciousness
U 2
“ indeed, no life of her own.
The child knew nothing, I had done nothing 
to her. And nothing prevented me from repeating 
a performance that affected her as little as if 
she were a photographic image rippling upon a 
screen and I ^  humble hunchback abusing myself 
in the dark.
Inasmuch as Lolita conforms to a pre-established 
pattern of Humbert's mind, her reality exists in that 
mind and never leaves it. From the beginning of the 
novel it is clear that Lolita is a product of Humbert's 
art. His passion for her is largely an aesthetic one; 
it has existed, in essence, before Lolita herself was 
conceived and long after she is gone. Thus Humbert is 
foremost aware of himself as artist and manipulator, and 
the reader is meant to see Lolita's true existence as a 
creature of Humbert's imagination. The Eve and Eden we 
perceive are fully created and art is a conscious pursuit.
The Idea of Lolita is the supreme fiction.
After the parodie grounding of the "Foreword" in a 
spurious and amusing reality, the novel itself exists in 
a constant emphasis of its fictionality. The opening 
chapter lends an excellent example of this dynamic. It 
begins with a lyrical paean to Lolita; "Lolita, light of 
my life, fire of my loins. My sin, my soul. Lo-lee-ta: 
the tip of the tongue taking a trip of three steps down 
the palate to tap, at three, on the teeth, Lo. Lee. Ta" (p. 11)
2 Vladimir Nabokov, Lolita (New York: Berkley Press,
1966), pp. 57, 59. All future references are to this 
edition and will appear in parentheses.
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The emphasis of this initial statement is on a word, 
"Lolita", The verbal aspect of Humbert's obsession is 
nicely conjured by the rhythmic quality of the pronunciation 
of the name. It is important to note that it is as a word 
that Lolita is first introduced, for this heralds the 
pattern of her existence as a created entity within the 
make-up of the lexical Eden. Humbert might have recalled 
the softness of Lolita's skin or the vibrancy of her smile 
or the beauty of her body at motion in a game of tennis.
But instead he has chosen to recollect a syllabic 
impression of a spondaic sound. The word dominates over 
the person, and this demonstrates the crucial significance 
of the word and hence the creation in Humbert's mind of 
an Edenic ideal called "Lolita"„
The second paragraph, while seeming to underscore 
the physical reality of an American adolescent by 
describing concrete facts about her height and apparel, 
paradoxically undercuts this by a continued emphasis on 
the nominative import of one protean word. This 
paragraph also renders the essence of Humbert's creative 
powers by letting us know that no matter what the outward 
transformation of the girl, she had always an artistic, 
imagined stability for Humbert. Whatever the external 
reality, the internal meaning is independent of it and a 
self-promoting constant. Lolita is safe forever as an 
idea in Humbert's mind, a passion in his soul, an 
eternalized product of art, never to fade or die or lose
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her "nymphancy".
If the first two paragraphs are not^blatant enough
announcement of Humbert's artistic quest achieved
through locating an idea in the clothes and person of a
nymphet, then the third paragraph serves to dispel any
final reservations about the fiction of the fiction we
are reading. Here the emphasis is on the power of memory
to instil an Eden, and on the capability of art to locate
and preserve the initial Adamic experience: "In point of
fact, there might have been no Lolita at all had I not
loved, one summer, a certain initial girl-child. In a
princedom by the sea" (p. 11). The paradisaical essence
of this recollected summer crystallizes in the poetic
rendering, so that the poetic rendering itself is
transposed as the source of further artistic expression.
This is evident by the hybridity of Lolita; she is based
on Humbert's childhood love and drawn from his parodie
consciousness of the poem of Edgar Allan Poe, "Annabel
Lee". The nature of Lolita as American adolescent is
grafted from the Edenic imagination. It would be impossible
for an intelligent American reader not to recognize the
allusion to Poe almost immediately. These lines from Poe
are paraphrased in the opening chapter and continue to
reverberate throughout the novel, bringing the reader back
from reality and drawing him to the circle of art:
"She was a child and I was a child.
In this kingdom by the sea,
But we loved with a love that was more than love —
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I and my Annabel Lee —
With a love that-the winged seraphs of Heaven 
Coveted her and me."^
Not only does Nabokov ground his work of art in art
by means of the Poe allusion, but also he merges his art
with the theme of play. Through a sense of parodie
amusement he establishes a comic undercurrent which flows
throughout the fiction. He counterposes the tautness of
a tale of passion and perversion against a comic background,
The play element within the opening chapter is
apparent on another level, the level on which ioZAXa may
be perceived as describing a child's world of play and
freedom. The childhood state contains a necessary key
to any later attainment or re-creation of primal bliss.
Its hallmark is sensuous gratification and a freedom of
imagination. Hence it is important to recall Poe's
lines, "She, was a child and I was a child". A regressive
concept dominates the notion of Edenic fiction. Both
Humbert and Quilty seek Lolita as much for their own
pursuit of the freedom and play of childhood, as for her
beauty and appeal. Humbert repeats and emphasizes the
importance for a nymphet still to be within the bounds
of childhood. Full development into womanhood is anathema
for a nymph. Childhood, then, occupies a central symbolic
value, and it is noteworthy that childhood signifies for
man a world of play and of infinite possibilities.
3 Edgar Allan Poe, "Annabel Lee" in The. PeyiguA^ n Book 
0^ AmzAZcan ed. Geoffrey Moore (Middlesa}:, England:
Penguin, 1977), pp. 111-12.
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The freedom most adults feel denied they associate with 
the iudic realm of children.
By prevalent use of the childhood motif throughout 
the novel, Nabokov suggests the central cohesion this 
element lends to the concept of the Edenic creation, and 
the indispensable meaning to be retrieved from the 
experience of childhood. The evocative image of children 
at play generates a major emphasis at the beginning and 
end of the novel. On the first page the reference to "a 
certain initial girl-child" and the allusion to Poe 
contribute, as we have already seen, to the primal Edenic 
feeling of the artist as Adam in a world of play. At the 
conclusion of Humbert’s narrative, as he is a cornered 
man waiting to be arrested and carried away to prison, 
there is the brilliant, moving image of the pastoral 
scene in the valley below, an image so powerful that it 
cancels, for a moment, the crimes and evils of Humbert’s 
life. The rendering of the scene is a lyrical reminder 
of the poet's Adamic quest and its realization in his 
art :
And while I was waiting for them to run up to 
me on the high slope, I evoked a last mirage 
of wonder and hopelessness ... of asters 
bathing in the detached warmth of a pale blue 
afternoon in late summer ... Small grasshoppers 
spurted out of the withered roadside weeds ..• 
As I approached the friendly abyss, I grew 
aware of the melodious unity of sounds rising 
like vapor from a small mining town that lay 
at my feet, in a fold of the valley i'. . And 
soon I realized that all these sounds were of 
one nature, that no other sounds but these 
came from the streets of the transparent tovm.
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with the women at home and the men away.
Reader! What I heard was but the melody of 
children at play, nothing but that, and so 
limpid was the air that within this vapor of 
blended voices, majestic and minute, remote 
and magically near, frank and divinely enigmatic 
- one could hear now ^nd then, as if released,, 
an almost articulate spurt of vivid laughter, 
or the crack of a bat, or the clatter of a toy 
wagon, but it was all really too far for the 
eye to distinguish any movement in the lightly 
etched streets. I stood listening to that 
musical vibration from my lofty slope, to 
those flashes of - separate cries with a kind of 
demure murmur for background, and then I knew 
that the hopelessly poignant thing was not
Lolita's absence from my side, but the absence
of her voice from that concord (pp. 279-8 0).
Childhood and the experiences of childhood engender 
the only sort of actual unity and perfection postlapsarian
man may know. It is the task of the artist, then, to
recapture the unity of childhood in the higher level of 
synthesis in art through adult perception. This may be 
a regressive step for Humbert, but for Nabokov it is a 
progressive attainment. The child's world contains an 
Eden forbidden outside its realm, and to regain the 
child's world is to approach paradise. Art must have the 
freshness, unity, and freedom possessed by the child at 
play. Abrams notes "an equation, implicit or overt, 
between the infancy of the individual and the condition 
of Adam in Eden, so that to restore the fresh and 
wondering vision of the child is to recover the pristine 
experience of paradise".^
4 M.H. Abrams, UatuA,al Sup2.fiyiatiiKatJ.,&mî Tfiad^t-ion 
and Révolution tn Romantic. LiteA,atan.e (London: Oxford
University Press, 1971), p. 380.
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Nabokov dwells at length, in both LoZita and Ado., 
on the life of the child, and the freshness and beauty 
which appertain to it. It is the function of art to 
build for all men a universe of freedom and play, modelled 
on that of the child, while advanced in art as the only 
Edenic realm available, a temporary paradise in which to 
live« In Nabokov's credo, art remains the last wilderness 
where men can achieve a new relationship with the universe 
There are no more continents to discover. America 
betrayed its Edenic potential long ago. Yet the mind can 
still attain an Eden, where man gains a fresh relationship 
with himself and with nature, where man is free and the 
possibilities are limitless. For Nabokov, as for the 
other writers in this analysis, the pastoral of Eden
takes shape in the^ landscape of the mind, a fertile region 
to nurture the freedom and play of the child reborn as an 
adult Adam.
Through Annabel and through Lolita, Humbert seeks 
and finds the unity and freedom he enjoyed as a child in 
the protected environment of the Hotel Mirana, "a kind 
of private universe, a whitewashed cosmos within the 
blue greater one that blazed outside" (pp. 12-13). What 
Humbert remembers of his infancy and of his mother are 
vague evocations of the primal bliss in an Edenic 
setting, a happiness which the nymphet alone is capable 
of rekindling: "those redolent remnants of day-suspended,
with the midges, about some hedge in bloom or suddenly
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entered and traversed by the rambler, at the bottom of 
a hill, in the summer dusk; a furry warmth, golden 
midges" (p. 12). Yet the plenary bliss of childhood is 
denied Humbert, for the death of his mother and more 
significantly, of his beloved Annabel, curtail the 
freshness, wonder, and hope of his primal paradise, and 
cause him to seek an atavistic recapitulation through the 
obsessive pursuit of nymphets.
This regressive need for a primal unity dominates
Humbert's later emotional life, and the child or nymphet
becomes central to the quest for a paradisaical state as
both a symbol and the actuality of its attainment. The
child's world of play delineates the landscape and
properties of Eden. Thus Humbert's search for the
nymphet is the enactment of his desire for the freedom
and gratification of the original garden. Humbert is
Adam in quest of the primal Eve-child. His imagination
bequeaths a created, albeit unrealized, paradise:
How marvelous were my fancied adventures as I 
sat on a hard park bench pretending to be 
immersed in a trembling book. Around the 
quiet scholar, nymphets played freely, as if 
he were a familiar statue or part of an old 
tree's shadow and sheen. Once a perfect little
beauty in a tartan frock, with a clatter put
her heavily armed foot near me upon the bench 
to dip her slim bare arms into me and tighten 
the strap of her roller skate, and I dissolved 
in the sun, with my book for fig leaf, as her 
auburn ringlets fell all over her skinned 
knee, and the shadow of leaves I shared 
pulsated and melted on her radiant limb next 
to my chameleonic cheek ...
Rope-skipping, hopscotch. That old woman
in black who sat next to me on my bench, on 
my rack of joy .(a nymphet was groping under 
me for a lost maxble), and asked if I had a 
stomachache, the insolent hag. Ah, leave me 
alone in my pubescent park, in my mossy 
garden. Let them play around me forever.
Never grow up (pp. 21-22).
The constant reiterated image of "pale pubescent 
girls" (p. 18) evokes for Humbert the delights of a 
child's paradise, a re-creation of the primordial ideal. 
Once the nymphet reaches the threshold of womanhood, she 
is no longer fertile territory for the erotic imaginings 
of Humbert. The protagonist acknowledges that he is 
talking about a sort of prolonged childhood held in 
abeyance for, from his point of view, the exclusive 
cultivation of perverse adult males: "It will be marked
that I substitute time terms for spatial ones. In fact,
I would have the reader see 'nine' and 'fourteen' as the 
boundaries - the mirrory beaches and rosy rocks - of an 
enchanted island haunted by those nymphets of mine and 
surrounded by a vast, misty sea" (p. 18). Humbert dwells 
at length on the nuances of nymphetry, "the ineffable 
signs" (p. 19). He makes this irrational pursuit and 
selection seem quite rational. Yet the reader is left 
to reflect that the choice seems as arbitrary as that of 
a child picking one piece of ribbon-candy over another.
Age and eroticism are the primary ingredients of Humbert's 
choices. However, the lack of sophistication and the 
innocent, naive, childlike demeanour with which Lolita 
is endov/ed, are qualities Humbert cannot do without.
151
Lolita is as crude as any uninhibited, unself­
conscious child might be. She has the lack of discrimination 
of the playful child: "Mentally, I found her to be a
disgustingly conventional little girl. Sweet hot jazz, 
square dancing, gooey fudge sundaes, musicals, movie 
magazines and so forth - these were the obvious items in 
her list of beloved things" (p. 136). Perhaps the reason 
why Nabokov spends so much narrative time on the childish 
fancies of Lolita is to make explicit the importance of the 
mental as well as physical attributes of her childhood.
To be a child is to want pure and immediate gratification, 
to live in a free primal state. Rather than Lolita's 
various repulsive proclivities being counter to an Edenic 
evocation, they are thus essential to it. Lolita's 
worthless trinkets are the artifacts of Humbert's priceless 
Eden, and they also serve dialectically to amplify the 
tawdriness of his ostensibly idyllic quest.
The elaborate cataloguing of the clothes and toys 
of Lolita represents a paean to childhood as much as it 
reflects the transcendent power of the imagination.
Like Wordsworth, Nabokov is capable of transforming the 
lowest, most ordinary experience or object into the realm 
of beauty and art. Bobby socks and blaring records have 
never before conveyed such poignancy nor have they 
previously described the palpable potentiality of the 
fictional imagination. By the présenta cion of’^'the 
accoutrements and objects surrounding the girlhood of
X. z
Lolita, Nabokov heightens the poignancy of Humbertos 
quest to maintain the child as an eternal nymph. Perhaps 
the underlying reason Humbert showers Lolita with gifts 
and luxuries is to contribute to and elongate the period 
of her play world, as much as it is to bribe her into 
compliance and submission. The desperate quality of his 
compulsive buying of toys, books, and trinkets is symbolic 
of Humbert's frantic search for his own lost childhood, 
for the freedom and play he can now only re-create in the 
realm of the mind. The plight is critical, for if Humbert 
cannot satisfy and enlarge the ludic element of Lolita's 
life, he cannot preserve his position in it and its position 
in his imagination. Humbert thus instinctively realizes 
that he must encourage the child in Lolita, and he goes 
about it with a frenetic zeal which claims much poignancy, 
in addition to the frivolity and ludicrousness which his 
attempt also entails. Lolita is plied with bicycle and 
tennis racquet, dresses and slacks, candies and ice 
creaift, movie magazines and comic books. Humbert indulges 
her every childish whim and their drive across America 
represents the bizarre gratification of her puerile 
impulses.
In a fine integration of the American scene with the 
passionate conatus of an obsessed pervert questing after 
apocalyptic fulfillment, Nabokov details the path of 
Humbert and Lolita through a wry exposure of the American 
pastoral. As the nugatory attempts to satisfy the playful
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desires of a frivolous child guide Humbert on his way, 
he tries hard to make America into an Eden she will 
remember: "By putting the geography of the United States
into motion, I did my best for hours on end to give her 
the impression of 'going places,' of rolling on to some 
definite destination, to some unusual delight" (p. 139).
But to engage the child is more arduous than composing
an Eden in the mind. Lolita is an obdurate subject; she
refuses to pay attention to the landscape; an object of
gratification must be directly before her before she
will consider it. To keep his Eden Humbert must pacify
this nymphet at every turn in the road. Her protean
play impulse propels him across the highways of a continent.
An irony develops, for as Lolita becomes the realization
of Eve and Eden for the protagonist, she lives for him
mainly as a mental image. Moreover, the American
landscape disappoints Humbert's child-concept of the
verdant paradise. Its antithetical aspect of machine-
eroded pasture comes into play for him. Once again,
however, the mental Eden asserts itself over the outward
reality. The mind fashions nature to fit its own demands.
Thus America, like Lolita, becomes the stereotype of
Humbert's childhood fantasy, regardless of the obvious
external reality. It is interesting to note how the
5
pervasive notion of "the middle landscape," that
5 Leo Marx, The Machine in the GaKdem 
Teehnotogij and the ?ai>toH.aZ. Ideal in America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 23, 71.
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hallowed ground midway between wilderness and mechanized
civilization, prevails in the immigrant’s dream:
By a paradox of pictorial thought, the average 
lowland North American countryside had at first 
seemed to me something I accepted with a shock 
of amused recognition because of those painted 
oilcloths which were imported from America in 
the old days to be hung above washstands in 
Central-European nurseries, and which fascinated 
a drowsy child at bed time with the rustic 
green views they depicted - opaque curly trees, 
a barn, cattle, a brook, the dull white of 
vague orchards in bloom, and perhaps a stone 
fence or hills of greenish gouache. But 
gradually the models of those elementary 
rusticities became stranger and stranger to 
the eye, the nearer I came to know them.
Beyond the tilled plain, beyond the toy roofs, 
there would be a slow suffusion of inutile 
loveliness, a low sun in a platinum haze with 
a warm, peeled-peach tinge pervading the upper 
edge of a two-dimensional, dove-gray cloud 
fusing with the distant amorous mist (pp. 139-40).
But if the landscape of America yields some reminder 
of pastoral glory, or some harmony of natural setting, 
Humbert is not able to enjoy the vision of such an Eden 
any more than he can enjoy for long the pleasures of 
Lolita. The reality of both remain firmly lodged in the 
mind even as they disappear from their putative apotheoses. 
The ludic instinct in Lolita persists as a drive to buy 
and to consume and her diversions determine a less 
colourful path of travel, one that appeases a child’s 
amusement with roadside toilet signs and "junk" food.
The play mood thus contributes an itinerary of its own, 
even before the cryptogrammic game with Quilty begins.
Play is properly defined as without meaning beyond 
the limited world it creates and as possessing an
1 i 5
absorption unto itself. It casts a temporary spell 
around those who participate in it, with a transforming 
puwer to leave behind the real world as its universe 
takes over. Play has a time and space unique to its 
creation, and rules of behaviour to perpetuate the game 
to a conclusion. As Huizinga observes, "Play is a 
voluntary activity or occupation executed within certain 
fixed limits ..., according to rules freely accepted but 
absolutely binding, having its aim in itself and accompanied 
by a feeling of tension, joy and the consciousness that it 
is 'different' from 'ordinary life'. Thus defined, the 
concept seemed capable of embracing everything we call 
'play' in animals, children and grown-ups: games of
strength and skill, inventing games, guessing games, games 
of chance, exhibitions and performances of all kinds, 
Although adults play, play peA 6e is seen as the natural 
realm of children.
The play element in Lolita, reinforces Nabokov's 
theme of aesthetic idealism- The drive across America 
represents a mental sojourn as well as the ludic 
challenge offered through the elaborate verbal games 
with Quilty. In all of this, Humbert desperately seeks 
the play world of his childhood. Despite the trash cans, 
gasoline stations, lollipop wrappers, and the general
6 J. Huizinga, Homo Ladens : A Study oi the. Play-
Element in CultuAe, trans. R.F.C. Hull (London: Routledge
and Regan Paul, 1949), p. 28.
6debris of life in contemporary, consumer-oriented
America, Humbert retains his mythic dream of pastoral
loveliness, always perceiving greenness instead of
metal, always playing with the artist's dream. As for
Lolita, she sees in the metal, the signs, the candy
wrappers a world of play and her ideal of Eden;
Now and then, in the vastness of those plains, 
huge trees would advance toward us to cluster 
self-consciously by the roadside and provide 
a bit of humanitarian shade above a picnic 
table, with sun flecks, flattened paper cups, 
samaras and discarded ice-cream sticks littering 
the brown ground. A great user of roadside 
facilities, my unfastidious Lo would be charmed 
by toilet signs - Guys-Gals, John-Jane, Jack- 
Jill and even Buck’s-Doe's; while lost in an 
artist's dream, I would stare at the honest 
brightness of the gasoline paraphernalia 
against the splendid green of oaks, or at a 
distant hill scrambling out - scarred but still 
untamed - from the wilderness of agriculture 
that was trying to swallow it (p. 140),
It is only while appeasing the child in adventurous
play that Humbert can approach the gap between himself
and Lolita, that "thirty million years ago when I was a
7child" (p. 144). The image of children's voices at 
play at the end of Lolita contains a sadness, a sense of 
pain heightened for Humbert because he denied Lolita the 
appeasement of normal play with her peers. It is his 
tragedy that he can never attain a state of Edenic play
7 The poetics of Lolita's play and its connection 
with Huizinga's Homo has been discussed by
Alfred Appel, Jr., in "Tristram in Movielove: ^Lolita
at the Movies," in A Book oi Thing^â about VladimiA 
MabokoVf ed. Carl R, Proffer (Ann Arbor, Michigan:
Ardis, 1974), p. 153.
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with Lolita. In the real world he remains an outsider 
beyond the perimeters of unity in ludic action. This 
is the central ang^t of Humbert's situation, for he is 
an alien even within the special climate of passionate 
involvement.
The play realm as Humbert knows it is a falsification 
of the spirit of freedom it should entail. For Lolita, 
too, the sham and superficiality of their amusements 
cause pain and a grave sense of loss. Lolita is racked 
upon a wheel of ludic torment, as is Humbert. After 
the physical violation of Lolita, the sense of loss 
and entrapment becomes pervasive. The child takes on 
the static, oppressed, deadening qualities of an 
objectified being totally out of harmony with her inner 
rhythm and the appropriate, normal social environment. 
Humbert's attempts at play with Lolita evoke a pathetic, 
hollow enactment of postlapsarian failure. The function 
of play is relegated to the imagination because reality is 
inadequate to it, or rather because Humbert's visions 
involve the plenary corruption of those norms of behaviour 
we associate with the real demands of happiness and well­
being. The play in which Lolita is bathed is a contrived 
attempt to rescue a blighted affair from the defeat of time, 
space, and contemporary mores. Bruss emphasizes the evil 
of Humbert's oneiric vision and sees his Edenic projections 
as evidence of pathology, not poetry. She points out the 
dominance of the protagonist's destructive potential:
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Humbert's madness is not really a perverse 
desire for little girls but a willful attempt 
to copulate with his own dreams and to murder 
his own nightmares in his vengeful guilt and 
disappointment. All the women who become 
involved with him, save only Rita, are ultimately 
killed by the effects of his attentions, as though 
he robbed them of vitality by combining them 
with his fantasies. Both his first wife and, 
later^ Lolita herself, die in childbirth, as though 
to indicate the essential and murderous sterility 
of Humbert's love .... There is some suggestion 
that the reformation and change of heart which 
Humbert undergoes while pondering Lolita in his 
prison ... is merely an exchange of one delusion 
for another —  a willed sacrifice of both lover 
and beloved for the sake of artistic 
immortality .... In his memoirs, Humbert hopes 
to construct a timeless space he may share with 
his nymphet, a shrine no doubt, but a tomb 
as well, recalling the necrophiliac closure to 
the fable with which Humbert began, the tale 
of Annabel Lee. &
Most readers are not so troubled by Humbert's 
insincerity. We accept the unauthentic nature of the 
self-professed madman and it is difficult to question his 
intentions since they are so basically bizarre. Nabokov's 
full-scale parody militates against such interpretation; 
the ludic element and ironic tone counteract the tenebrous 
circle of denial, death, and destruction. The power of 
play assuages the impact of Humbert's nefarious actions.
Yet his games are never able to pierce the palpable 
world. Merivale postulates that Nabokov "asserts the 
primacy of 'reality' over insane fantasy .... In each case 
reality disrupts fantasy as a mode of action. The heroes 
are left only with the books they have written, their 
self-created artifices, foi." only a lunatic wouid behave
8 Elizabeth W. Bruss, Auto biogAaphica.1 Act6: The
Ckctnglng Situation oi a LiteAoKy GenAe {Baltimore; The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 134.
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as if the world were his own work of art, would try to
9make the world book-shaped."
We have explored how Humbert predicates his Eden 
on the play element and have noted the power of games 
to sustain and promote this paradise. The overlying 
control for the preoccupation with play and games is 
found in the analogous function Nabokov establishes for 
his fiction. The novel itself is transformed into a 
self-contained ludic universe, in which aesthetic purpose 
and meaning come about through a labyrinth of puzzles.
Quilty's cryptogrammic game with Humbert equals 
Nabokov's game with the reader, and as always the case 
with Nabokov, there are "only words to play with" (p. 32). 
The other games in the novel are secondary to those played 
with words. The Edenic freedom and value common to all 
play and games occupies a fundamental concern. The 
aesthetic texture is dominated by the quest for paradisaic 
perfection and fulfillment represented in microcosm by 
the well-defined limits of autonomous play.
As we shall see in The Mdgiu, the novelist's role in 
contemporary fiction is that of gamesman, magician, and 
creator, he who controls an imagined universe by the 
power of words and the ideas they evoke. The artist 
possesses the keys to Eden which are moulded from the 
fabric of games and illusion. Unlike the pattern of the
9 Patricia Merivale, "The Flaunting of Artifice in 
Vladimir Nabokov and Jorge Luis Borges," in Habokov- 
The Man and Hi4> OJoAk, P* 221.
160
realistic novel or that of the traditional detective 
fiction, verisimilitude is not an ethical postulate of 
the contemporary Edenic play novel. The world of reality 
is suspended as art and illusion take over. A certain 
magical sleight of hand by the author sets forward the 
tricks and rhymes of a cleverly crafted literary game 
which the reader enters when he picks up Lolita, I'he 
audience must agree to hold their conventional expectations 
in abeyance, lending the author the license to create a 
paradise for the postlapsarian world. By the transforming 
power of words the author is able to articulate a verbal 
Eden in which we live for the moment of the fictional 
experience. Words are the raw material and the product, 
the beginning and the end of the artistic creation. For 
within the words are the games and the puzzles, the 
illusionary inducements of play, what Nabokov has 
described as the accoutrements of a gifted native tongue: 
"those apparatuses - the baffling mirror, the black 
velvet backdrop, the implied associations and traditions 
“ which the native illusionist, frac-tails flying, can 
magically use to transcend the heritage in his own way."^^ 
The author as magus is a man in love with language 
and the manifold nuances and meanings which give rise to 
a verbal Eden. Nabokov promotes his fiction through the
10 Vladimir Nabokov, "Vladimir Nabokov o.u a book 
entitled Lolita,^' in Lolita, op, ait,, p. 288.
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metaphor of games and tricks. He finds it difficult to 
talk about Lotita without-sounding "like a conjurer 
explaining one trick by performing a n o t h e r . H u m b e r t ’s 
search for Lolita and Eden and his hunt for Quilty depend 
on the tricks of language and the chimeras of the mind. 
That is to say, the plot is dependent on the willed and 
wily imagination of two perverts, both of whom see 
themselves and are portrayed as gamesmen. Moreover, 
they are, as well, both conscious artists. Humbert 
seeks the solace of a self-propelling Eden and Quilty 
tries to satisfy Adamic ardour through his plays.
The poetics of play is given its final major 
expression in the cryptogrammic game between Humbert and 
Quilty. Each artist is trying to outwit the other, with 
Eve (and Eden) as the prize, and Eve-Lolita as a player 
as well. In the process of this game the American 
continent is turned into a vast game board. The meaning 
of a place name, of a motel, or of the nomenclatures
Quilty scribbles in a register, each is a signification
for the pieces of a puzzle Humbert must connect. As the 
reader is pulled into the game, so he, too, is at play
in the novel, competing against author and characters
to find a solution first. Yet it is not so much the 
solution as the process that counts. The means is the 
goal, in the sense that playing itself forms an essential 
element in the creative act, and of the Edenic-imagination, 
I'he. fertile regions of the mind are the real boundaries.
.1 I bid, , p. 282.
Life exists as it applies to art and otherwise it does 
not matter. The enigma for these characters is the 
external world; Quilty has difficulty realizing Huïabert 
has xn fact shot him; it all seems to him to be part of 
a game or a movie set. Humbert encounters insurmountable 
reluctance in his psyche to acknowledging Lolita's outward 
realiry as an adolescent girl with social and personal 
needs of her own. This problem is not due to Humbert's 
lack of concern for his nymphet; rather it proceeds from, 
his complete inability to see her apart from his imagined 
concept. A solipsism of the mind becomes dominant. Play 
is the answer for Humbert and Quilty but it leaves Lolita 
neglected and finally destroyed.
Nabokov's parody is weak in its comprehension of 
Lolita's destruction. Only as a paean to Humbert's 
poetic intensity does the image of the bereft and desolate 
girl-child attain metaphorical significance. Levine 
argues that "the major act of his life has been to take 
away the freedom of Dolly Haze," that Humbert callously
12"wants to make of her an objet d'aAt for his own shelf." 
Tekiner demonstrates that "for Humbert art is often the 
means by which life is transformed, and in this sense 
his art is a product of his solipsism and is the sole 
object of his love,.., the only love Humbert achieves
12 Robert T. Levine, "'My Ultraviolet Darling': The
Loss of Lolita's Childhood ," MoSeÆn Ftatton Studies,
Volume 25, Number 3 (Autumn 1979), pp. 476-77.
163
is love for Lolita, a character produced by his
scxipsiscic art. " Merrill postulates that "the
novel oraces Humbert's attempt to thwart time, then,
but.also the growth of his awareness that this
effort has been both futile and morally criminal,
in so far as it has led him to impose his desires
on Lolita and thus deprive her of her childhood
and her status as an independent being." He does,
however, acknowledge that "whether Humbert really
14achieves this awareness has been much debated."
Nabokov's relentless ludic engagements would 
seeivt to make any moral focus ultimately
ambiguous.
In so far as the American landscape entrances 
Humbert with ins Edenic promise, he suffers equally 
with Lolita as victim of its raw yet enticing 
delusions. Humbert's naive European belief in the potency 
of the American dream cond^ïmns him to an impossible, 
inevitable postlapsarian despair. That the only Eden 
to be attained is the process of mind in art confirms 
the absolute abuse of a mortal, fragile human being 
for this purpose, Appel avers that "what is extra­
ordinary about Lolita is not the presence or
13 Christina Tekiner, "Time in Lolita," Moa'cAn 
fiction Studied, Volume 25, Number 3 (Autumn 19^9), 
p. 469.
14 Robert Merrill, "Nabokov and Fictional Artifice,' 
Mode/Ill fiction Studies, Volume 25, Number 3 (Autumn 19'. 9), 
p. 452.
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absence of the author's 'moral position,' but the
way in which Nabokov enlists us, against our
15will j. on Humbert's side." Nabokov's symbolic use 
of the American Eden forces the reader to project 
himself into Humbert's viewpoint, to share Humbert■s 
romance with words.
The vast landscape of America dominates the fiction, 
and within and beyond the geographic location is the idea 
of the eternal, apocalyptic garden, the natural preserve 
of Ederu If art leads through games to a verbal Eden, 
then it is critical to perceive how intricately Eden is 
grounded in the images and motifs of the fictional world.
In Lolita, the initial garden figures from the beginning
of the story as a significant foretaste of the artistic
potential of the imagination. The novel is grounded 
in the milieu of the garden and in the language of Eden,
Lolita is the primal woman, the wife of Adam, Lilith,
if not Eve. Humbert sees himself as Adam: "I was as
helpless as Adam at the preview of early oriental history, 
miraged in his apple orchard" (p. 67), and again, "I 
stood Adam naked" (p. 273). Humbert's repeated adult vision 
of his long-lost childhood ecstasy is Edenic: "But that
mimosa grove - the haze of the stars, the tingle, the 
flame, the honeydew, and the ache remained with me, and 
that little girl with her seaside limbs and ardent tongue
15 Alfred Appel, Jr., "Lolita: The Springboard of
Parody," in Uabokov: The Man and Hi^ (JJoAk,p, 126.
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haunted me ever since" (p. 17).' Play and love-making 
with Annabel in the first garden are transposed into the 
image of Lolita in the suburban American Ramsdale garden,
"''The breathless garden" re-enacts the beauty of man's 
Edenic past and presents the possibilities of a corresponding 
mental paradise. ■ Indeed, the garden setting of Humbert's 
first meeting with Lolita is redolent of his pervasive 
hallucinations of Eden and full of lyrical power. The 
artistic element elevates imperfect reality. Certainly, 
a vulgar, gum-chewing, foul-mouthed twelve-year-old never 
has been spoken of with equal lyrical rapture.
The transforming power of the garden overtakes 
Humbert's imaginative faculty; "I was still walking 
behind Mrs. Haze through the dining room when, beyond 
it, there came a sudden burst of greenery - 'the piazza,* 
sang out my leader, and then, without the least warning, 
the blue sea-wave swelled under my heart and, from a mat 
in a pool of sun, half-naked, kneeling, turning about on 
her knees, there was my Riviera love peering at me over 
dark glasses." "'That was my Lo,' she said, 'and these 
are my lilies'" (pp. 38-39). Constant attention is 
given to the Edenic motif and its correlates in images 
of nature, viridity, and fruit. In a later scene,
Humbert describes Lolita as holding "in her hollowed 
hands a beautiful, banal, Eden-red apple" (p. 55). He 
describes himself as being "like one of those inflated 
pale spiders you see in old gardens. Sitting in the
middle of a luminous web" (p. 47).
The loss of Lolita becomes felt as "Lo in white 
shorts receding through the speckled shadow of a garden 
path" (p. 149) . The ang,6t that Humbert experiences in 
Lolita's actual and ultimate unknowableness evokes a 
dead Eden: "there was in her a garden and a twilight,
and a palace gate - dim and adorable regions which 
happened to be lucidly and absolutely forbidden to me 
This state and such moments are described by Humbert as 
"icebergs in paradise" (p. 259). More significant is the 
emphasis Nabokov gives to the imaginative function of the 
garden, its ability to engender a mental Eden from the 
nostalgic softness of a child's play world. Humbert 
attains a perspicacity in recognizing the creative force 
of memory:
I find it most difficult to express with 
adequate force that flash, that shiver, that 
impact of passionate recognition. In the 
course of that sun-shot moment that my glance 
slithered over the kneeling child ... while I 
passed by her in my adult disguise (a great 
big handsome hunk of movieland manhood), the 
vacuum of my soul managed to suck in every 
detail of her bright beauty, and these I 
checked against the features of my dead 
bride. A little later, of course, she, this 
nouv ette, this Lolita, my Lolita, was to 
eclipse completely her prototype. All I 
want to stress is that my discovery of her 
was a fatal consequence of that "princedom 
by the sea" in my tortured past. Everything 
between the two events was but a series of 
gropings and blunders, and false rudiments 
of joy. Everything they shared made one 
of them (p. 39) .
Nature motifs are used by Humbert to clarify his • 
position, both to himself and to his audience, and to
demonstrate the Edenic basis of his quest for Lolita,
In relating his obsession, Humbert uses metaphors to 
emphasize a unity which the nymph gives to his life, a 
sort of metaphysical union with the world around him :
of tenderness enfolded mountains of longing. Now 
and then it seemed to me that the enchanted prey was 
about to meet halfway the enchanted hunter, that her 
haunch was working its way toward me under the soft sand 
of a remote and fabulous beach." "The gentle and dreamy 
regions through which I crept were the patrimonies of 
poets - not crime's prowling ground" (p. 121).
Through union with nature, Humbert comes to know 
himself and Lolita and to approach the realm of art.
Thus any art he produces must be grounded in the poetry 
of the natural world. Nature reinforces art and art 
eternalizes nature by capturing the essence of a natural 
paradise through the created landscape of the imagination. 
Lolita —  nature’s child. Eve, Lilith, Diana —  is properly 
seen as a natural fiction: "The noncommittal mauve
mountains half encircling the town seemed to me to swarm 
with panting, scrambling, laughing, panting Lolitas who 
dissolved in their haze" (p. 204). Since the child's 
natural Adamic universe has predicated Humbert's 
predisposition for the re-creation of that world in the 
nymphet, it is apposite that the new Eden of the mind 
will portray the imagined paradise in the full glory 
of the primordial universe, a cornucopia of fantasies
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and delights. Humbert details his original ecstasy with 
Lolita as a "bubble of paradise" (p. 73). Defending 
his heinous behaviour, he pleads, "Please, reader: no
matter your exasperation with the tenderhearted, morbidly 
sensitive, infinitely circumspect hero of my book, do 
not skip these essential pages' Imagine me; I shall not 
exist if you do not imagine me; try to discern the doe 
in me, trembling in the forest of my own iniquity" {p. 119)
The dictum "Imagine me" signifies the protagonist's 
sensitivity to the creative potential of art, and the 
self-conscious role that the artist plays within his 
work. The .rest of the sentence confirms Humbert's 
identification with nature. The language he uses even 
for the most commonplace statements is impregnated with 
the aura of a natural world, sometimes sinister, sometimes 
bright, but always present. And when Humbert describes 
Lolita, the metaphors applied unite the artist with the 
iridescent flow of nature and a natural paradise. For 
example, Humbert recollects that after he had taken 
Lolita to the hospital, "I lay on her bed that smelled 
of chestnuts and roses, and peppermint, and the very 
delicate, very special French perfume" (p. 220).
Several days later he visited her and brought a bouquet 
"of wild flowers and beautiful leaves gathered with my 
own hands on a mountain pass at sunrise" (p. 221).
Strangely, Lolita herself is as indifferent to 
nature as Humbert is absorbed in it; she is a child of
169
nature but she does not have the artist's gift of
perceiving a natural paradise. Yet for Humbert she is,
of course, the centre of that paradise. As he merges
her with nature through the power of his artistic
imagination^ her being becomes a lyrical existence.
When the artist joins his mind with nature he is capable
of the sustaining fiction of Adamic perfection. Lolita
thus becomes the poetic product of this synthesis between
art and nature:
... I also had her dance for me ... But all 
that was nothing, absolutely nothing, to the 
indescribable itch of rapture that her tennis 
game produced in me - the teasing delirious 
feeling of teetering on the very brink of 
unearthly order and splendor.
Despite her advanced age, she was more of 
a nymphet than ever, with her apricot-colored 
limbs, in her sub-teen tennis togs! Winged 
gentlemen! No hereafter is acceptable if it 
does not produce her as she was then, in that 
Colorado resort between Snow and Elphinstone, 
with everything right: the white wide little-
boy shorts, the slender waist, the apricot 
midriff, the white breast-kerchief whose 
ribbons went up and encircled her neck to end 
behind in a dangling knot leaving bare her 
gaspingly young and adorable apricot shoulder 
blades with that pubescence and those lovely 
gentle bones, and the smooth, downward-tapering 
back. Her cap had a white peak. Her racket 
had cost me a small fortune. Idiot, triple 
idiot! I could have filmed her! I would have 
had her now with me, before my eyes, in the 
projection room of my pain and despair 
(pp. 210-211).
Humbert is without a film of Lolita, but he has the 
eternizing power of words to preserve the glory of an 
Eden that lives in the mind. This is to say, Eden is 
palpably alive as the re-creation of a new world of
1?0
freedom in fiction. It is through art that man rises to 
the freedom and harmony of his primordial past. In art 
the sense of the past is alive as a hope for the future 
of a paradise, in the mind. LotAlta shows us the fulfillment 
cf this potential, the promise of nature completed in 
poetryf and the ability of fiction to bring nature into 
contact with its Edenic origin. The sublime transforming 
power of the art of fiction raises Lolita from silly 
nymphet to the stature of Botticelli*s Venus, and elevates 
Humbert and his love to the level of an immortal artistic 
tradition, the realm of Dante and Beatrice, Petrarch and 
Laura. As Humbert is the first to explain, love with a 
nymphet has an intrinsic other-worldliness; it is not 
isolated and perverted sexuality, it is paradisaic and 
artistic bliss, Nabokov attempts to show the unique 
capability of fiction to regain for man the beauty and 
freedom of a lost world, to distil a new universe 
through words.
The formal element is crucial, for without it, chaos 
reigns and the freedom to play is lost in a morass of 
incoherence and confusion. Order is the requisite for 
any aesthetic freedom. Play does not deny order, rather 
it is born of it, as Marcuse has observed, through the 
"reconciliation (union) of man and nature in the 
aesthetic attitude, where order is beauty and work is
171
play.""^^ For Humbert the re-creation of Lolita in art 
through the. power of imagination preserves a freedom other­
wise denied by the chaotic demands of his cruel obsession;
What had begun as a delicious distension of my 
innermost roots became a glowing tingle which 
yiouJ had reached that state of absolute 
security, confidence and reliance not found 
elsewhere in conscious life ... I had ceased 
to be Humbert the Hound, the sad-eyed degenerate 
car clasping the boot that would presently kick 
him away. I was above the tribulations of 
ridicule, beyond the possibilities of retribution 
In my self-made seraglio, I was a radiant and 
robust Turk, deliberately, in the full 
consciousness of his freedom, postponing the 
moment of actually enjoying the youngest and 
frailest of his slaves. Suspended on the 
brink of that voluptuous abyss (a nicety of 
physiological equipoise comparable to certain 
techniques in the arts) I kept repeating 
chance words after her - barmen, alarmin', 
my charmin', my carmen, ahmen, ahahamen - as 
one talking and laughing in his sleep while 
my happy hand crept up her sunny leg as far 
[as] the shadovr of decency allowed (p. 57).
The freedom inherent in art equals the experience
of play in the natural world. The aesthetic experience
re-establishes a new Eden. And as Marcuse has suggested,
"This experience, which releases the object into its
'free' being, is the work of the free play of the 
17imagination." The freedom of imagination is the key 
to LotÀXa and this freedom is preserved in art. In the 
landscape of the mind, there is still the great promise 
of the Emersonian dream of a new relationship with nature.
16 Herbert Marcuse, and : A
?kZ£.06 0 ph^c.al InqaZn^y Znto Fteud, with a new preface
by the author (London: Sphere Books, 1969), pp. 129-39.
17 Ibid., p. 131.
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of a vast green wilderness to be explored and cultivated. 
Yet the freedom of Humbert's fiction exacts a tremendous 
price. For him the Edenic quest leads from love to death 
through great suffering. He cries out in ang^t, "as if the 
sun had gone out of the game" (p. 217). When he finally 
locates Lolita, he knows he has lost her forever: "Loî
LolaS Lolitai I hear myself crying from a doorway into 
the. sun, with the acoustics of time, domed time, endowing 
my call and its tell-tale hoarseness with such a wealth 
of an>:iety, passion and pain that really it would have 
been instrumental in wrenching open the zipper of her 
nylon shroud had she been dead. Lolita!" (p. 216).
Humbert loses Lolita at the moment he fully possesses
her. He is tortured by his love, and that he loves with
all his soul is beyond question: "No matter, even if
those eyes of hers would fade to myopic fish, and her
nipples swell and crack, and her lovely young velvety
delicate delta be tainted and torn - even then I would
go mad with tenderness at the mere sight of your dear
wan face, at the mere sound of your raucous young voice,
my Lolita" (p. 253). An overpowering poignancy is
called forth in the realization that Humbert destroys
Lolita in his quest for a perfect world, that Lolita
should die in the bloom of her youth, and that Humbert
expires abjectly in a prison cell:
Alas, I was unable to transcend the simple 
human fact that whatever spiritual solace I 
might find, whatever lithophanie eternities
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might be provided for me, nothing could make 
my Lolita forget the foul lust I had inflicted 
upon her. Unless it can be proven to me - to 
me as I am now, today, with my heart and my 
beard, and my putrefaction - that in the 
infinite run it does not matter a jot that a 
Worth American girl-chiId named Dolores Haze 
had been deprived of her childhood by a maniac, 
unless this can be proven {and if it can, then 
life is a joke), I see nothing for the treatment 
of my misery but the melancholy and very local 
palliative of articulate art. To quote an old 
poet;
The moral sense in mortals is the duty 
We have to pay on mortal sense of beauty
(p. 258).
Yet the play of art reconciles memory and desire 
and as such preserves for man a self-contained, transcendent 
entity of Edenic fulfillment. As Huizinga has demonstrated 
about the ludic experience, "Once played, it endures as a 
new found creation of the mind, a treasure to be retained
by the memory. It is transmitted, it becomes tradition.
It can be repeated at any time ..."^^ To play in the Eden
of art is never to lose the primal harmony of the child's
world and the holism of man and nature attained through 
the mediating promise of the imagination. Humbert begins 
in a postlapsarian state of tainted mortality and moves 
to a transcendence of time through the fineness of 
artistic creation. His solace is that he does have 
words to play with. For Nabokov, as for Humbert, "There 
are things that should never be given up" (p. 191).
The fiction of LoZlta is a series of glistening images
Huizinga, pp. 9-10.
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and ideas which redeem time, like the ?H.lma.\} tn.a. of 
Botticelli, Wordsworth's T^e VKttadz, or Stravinsky's 
TiiQ: Rllii ûi spring Î "I am thinking of aurochs and angels, 
the secret of durable pigments, prophetic sonnets, the 
refuge of art. And this is the only immortality you and 
I may share, my Lolita" (p. 281).
What makes the novel much more than a parody or 
literary game is the brilliant order of its language 
fused with the play element in the synthesis of artistic 
creation. Art is the only reahti in which man can 
approximate the play of Eden. Art is the remembrance of 
things past as it recaptures the essence of our Adamic 
universe. The progress of Humbert is from corruption 
and chaos to a Blakean sort of "organized innocence" in 
freedom. He moves from lust to love to its Edenic 
apotheosis in art. As in Keats's "Ode on a Grecian Urn," 
art is the means of immortalizing the never-to-be-had 
quality of love in the Golden Age, As Josipovici suggests, 
the memoir of Lolita is "at once the quest and the goal.
For the goal is the quest transmuted into language. 
Elevation into the Edenic state, into a universe of 
verbal play, is attained through the achievement of art.
By means of aesthetic permanence "infinite perfections 
fill the gap between the little given and the great '
19 G.D. Josipovici, "LoZlta: Parody and the Pursuit
of Beauty", C/iltlcaZ Q^ ua/LtnA.ty, VI (Spring, 1966), p. 44.
17:
oroxnlBoi the great rose-gray never-to-be-had" (p. 241) . 
The illusion of art reconciles man's fancy with nature's 
reality. The play world of the mind has a distinct 
transforming power. It generates a realm of freedom, a 
realm in which a typical adolescent becomes a character 
in Eden; in which a pervert becomes a poet; in which a 
culture of soda pop, potato chips, and roadside motels 
becomes an American Eden; in which man's relation to 
nature is reconciled through art; in which the machine 
in the garden disappears.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Metaphors in the Garden:
Ada. and the Limits of Ludic Fiction
Ada. represents a major reworking of the dominant 
Adamic theme in the Nabokov oeuvte, and carries on the 
tradition already established by Lotlta, It is, like 
its predecessor, a novel of hope and despair, of a 
forbidden Eden thwarted by societal forces but achieved, 
ultimately if briefly, through the mind's sustaining 
power. Art triumphs over the failures of life and the 
real world of edict and denial. It challenges death and 
destruction. Van and Ada attain Edenic bliss ephemerally 
in two summers of childhood on the fantasy planet of 
Antiterra, Nabokov's name for his created Russian-American 
universe centred in Ardis, America. The book Van writes, 
whrch is the novel we read, captures the paradisaical 
essence of Ardis, and preserves it, in much the same way 
an entomologist pins a butterfly under glass for all to 
gaze on and admire. However, this is a paradise entombed 
and devitalized as much, at least, as it is enthroned, 
for the problems encountered in the fiction are major and 
rise to the foreground of any discussion of Ada. Thus 
before examining Nabokov's conceptualization of the 
Adamic myth, we shall look at some of the dilemmas of 
diction, language, and tone.
Centring Eden in an eighty-year mindspan deadens
J. /
the impact of an Adamic saga which buries itself in the 
trials of recollection. Since this recollection covers 
an enormous timespan in the long lives of a man and a 
woman, there are inherent temporal problems. On the 
one hand, the narrative is tediously sweeping and 
comprehensive; on. the other, large gaps concerning the 
middle years of Van and Ada plague the narration. Most 
cl; this period is discussed and dismissed as a tangential 
reference, and treated without elaboration or insight.^
0:.e further danger is the lack of selectivity of detail. 
Another is the loss of immediacy and of reader involvement, 
The fiction loses a directness of impact after the 
childhood narrative ends and Van's adult quest to 
recapture it begins. The reader, moreover, cannot accept 
the plethora of contrivance which dominates even the 
earlier sections of the story. The banality and the 
predictability of the gamesmanship destroy much of the 
excitement of the children's bright and vibrant fantasy.
The second half of the fiction remains unable 
to capture any sense of energy and vitality. It becomes 
increasingly repetitious and tedious as Van recalls and 
repeats the youthful saga in enervating detail. The 
author gluts his creation and by so doing, negates its 
poignancy and effect. Whereas Lotlta merges action wrth
i. This point is discussed by Douglas Fowler in 
’<2.adlng Mabokov (London; Cornell University Press, 
1974), p. 189.
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image in a tense, exciting, and dynamic plot which 
demands a participatory response from the reader, Ada 
relegates this to a minimum for the primacy of Van's 
solipsism, and Nabokov's self-indulgence. There is 
little tension and no conflict in Ada, only a stultifying 
paean to a lost childhood. What passes as the central 
conflict between man and time is dispersed over such a 
long and rambling chronicle that it is unable to compel 
the reader's involvement, quite unlike the ordeal of 
Humbert, which is moving to the final word. And the 
inability of the reader fully to be absorbed into the 
Eden of Ardis spells the failure of the fiction to 
implement its aesthetic ethos.
The prime element in this artistic limitation is
Nabokov's cloying insistence on contrivance and ludic
self-absorption. Steiner notes that for negative
commentators, "Nabokov's prose is a macaronic, precious,
maddeningly opaque and self-conscious piece of candy
floss .... At a first reading, Ada ... seems self-indulgent
and, at many points, irredeemably overwritten. The
Newspeak of Ardor is often on the same predictable level
2of ingenuity as double acrostics." Steiner reserves 
judgement but it is unlikely most readers will be so kind.
Non-sequiturs are rife. Ada interjects into
2 George Steiner, ExtA.ats.Aa.LtoalaZ ’ ?apzat on 
HtdJ'Latuin.e. and the. Language RevoZuZlon (Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex, England: . Penguin, 1972), p. 19.
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the tale, to make the sorts of comments one might expect 
from an involved proofreader. For example, when Van as 
narrator makes a pejorative comment about his book
piom Te/L.Aa, the author has Ada parenthetically 
reiinciirk, "I disagree, it's a nice, nice little book! " 
Similarly, Ada makes other editorial comments, such as
3
"Hue or who? Awkward. Reword!," which contribute an 
air of dilettantism, and add the dubious merit of the 
pastiche to the quality of the narration.
The narrator obtains a childish glee from looking 
back disjointedly on his story, and this story is the 
novel within the novel, which Nabokov projects as the 
novel we are reading. One feels the author is playing 
with mirrors and prisms to reflect images on his fiction 
at different angles, with little regard for the holistic 
pattern. Nabokov tries to create a whole through an 
exhausting series of superficial details and random 
images, with little cohesion beyond the element of play. 
The play element is central, yet within it, contrivance 
takes such a major role that one wonders about the 
essence; for the essence from many points of view rings 
strikingly hollow.
The author allows himself every indulgence in 
arranging and manipulating his story, in posing a set
3 Vladimir Nabokov, Ada. ok Atiot: A family
Chaonlale. {New York; Fawcett World Library, 1969), 
pp. 258, 18. Further references are to this edition 
and will appear in parentheses.
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piece. He gives unedited reign to his various biases, 
to his anti-Freudianism, to his dislike of T.S. Eliot, 
tc his distaste for unrefined plebeians, to name a few; 
all of which make the novel seem more like an exercise 
in free association than a work of art. The author 
indulges himself through the central character. Van Veen, 
and his ludic predilection for games, puns, and puzzles, 
for walking on his hands and standing on his head, 
metaphorically as well as literally. Often the aesthetic 
achievement is comparable to that of a crossword puzzle 
or unscrambled anagram. The effect is of an artful yet 
contrived and silly composition.
Something is wrong with the way words and phrases 
flow. They are coyly studied; there is an aesthetically 
uncomfortable ring, as Nabokov hovers on the edge of 
self-parody. The affecting pathos of Humbert is 
exchanged for the bathetic ramblings of a satiated 
aesthete. Van Veen exists to tell us how much he knows, 
and what a brilliant man is his creator. The novel is 
consequently an immense catalogue of references to art, 
to writers, novels, and paintings, and especially to 
other works of Nabokov, Van is a self-conscious narrator 
and we feel we are observing a prolonged bout of navel- 
gazing. The effect is comparable to being shown a very 
personal family photograph album and being expected to 
exclaim in delight, without so much as recognizing a 
single figure or much caring who he is. In this fiction
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contrivance destroys cogency, and authorial self-indulgence 
distances the reader out of the audience. Enchantment is 
lost in excess, and the importance of the tale for the 
reader dwindles to the minute as the story progresses.
No negative capability helps Nabokov project Ada. into the 
realm of the universal.
Unrefined and unedited bits and pieces of description 
and detail stare us in the face, and we are unable to 
discern why they are there. What, for instance, is the 
function of the band of poor townspeople intruding on 
Ardis as Ada's sixteenth birthday celebration gets 
underway? It is as if the story proper is stopped in 
mid-air, several unrelated paragraphs inserted, and then 
the story continued, unaffected by the tangential insert. 
The juxtaposition is odd; there are no elaborations or 
further references to the incident elsewhere in the book. 
The effect is somewhat cinematic; it is also disconcerting. 
One might, from it, anticipate a Tolstoy-like reference 
to the plight of the worker or the poverty of the peasant, 
or the vast indifference and imperturbability of the 
ruling class. Nabokov lays all these cards on the table, 
and then, with a wave of the hand, withdraws them. With 
tongue in cheek and a twinkling eye, he laments this 
"most melancholy and meaningful picture - but meaning 
what, what?" (p. 207).
The random character of this passage is notable? 
it is a felt incongruity characteristic of a Beckett
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play or a Pynchon novel. For Nabokov this represents 
another jibe at the falsehood of verisimilitude and a 
reification of the novel as fantasy. Yet for the reader 
many confusions are created as he inevitably, and perhaps 
not so foolishly, looks for meaning and purpose. The 
vignette surely demonstrates the elitist imperturbability 
of the carefree Edenic world at Ardis, the bitchiness of 
Marina, the stuffiness of the whole family, the empty 
joys of a posh picnic. Yet if the reader dwelt on these 
issues Î he would be mistaking a brushmark on a canvas for 
a studied, but enigmatic message. The confusion is a 
dead-end muddle.
Similarly, the episodic and vague aspect of much of 
the narrative is echoed again in the excursus in Part Two 
concerning the "Floramors," or exotic bordellos, it is a 
picaresque and nonsensical intrusion into the novel's 
plot. Presumably the main issue with which this chapter 
concerns itself is the folly of Van's sexual excesses, 
and his questing for Ada in unlikely places. The passage 
may also demonstrate the central "polymorphous perverse" 
sexual ethos of the entire novel. It may, further, 
comment on the relative immaturity of Van's Adamic dream 
and the exploitative nature of his sexuality. As 
evidence of Van's untiring satyriasis, the idleness of 
his life, the otiose qualities of his fantasies, and the 
irreplaceability of Ada, it makes itself felt. There is 
a correspondence between the nugatory experience of the
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brothels, in microcosm, and Van's vitiated adult life, 
for surely no Eden exists out of Ardis but in the mind.
Even Van has the inchoate perspicacity of such a 
judgement. He knows that Floramors are a dream-like 
re-creation of his original paradise: "I had frequented
bordels since my sixteenth year, but although some of 
the better ones, especially in France and Ireland, rated 
a triple red symbol in Nugg's guidebook, nothing about 
them pre-announced the luxury and mollitude of my first Villa 
Venus. It was the difference between a den and an 
Eden," Moreover, "the ruinous villa no longer bore any 
resemblance to Eric's 'organized dream,' but the soft 
little creature in Van's desperate grasp was Ada"
(pp. 269, 273). The chapter has many potential 
relevancies, yet there is an amorphous, discursive 
quality, the quality of an inserted rather than integrated 
element- No clear meaning exists to resolve thin passage 
out of a thicket of incongruity and ambiguity.
Thus it is evident that Ada is plagued by a 
constant problem of tone. Indeed, this is a common 
dilemma of the contemporary novel, particularly ludic 
fiction, in which irony forms a fundamental tonal basis.
Here we are not talking about a moral problem, though 
this issue may arise as well, but rather a central 
interpretational confusion.^ A destructive .crony prevails
4 For a clarification of this issue see The 
0  ^ fiction, by Wayne C, Booth (Chicago: University oi
Chicago Press, 1961), Chapters Twelve and Thirteen.
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in the experimental fiction of today. Interpretation 
stands ridiculed. Readers who bring modest formal 
expectations as they approach this fiction are 
meant to realize a terrible anachronistic fervour, 
a literary regression. Heckard calls Nabokov, Pynchon, 
Borges, and Barth authors of "metafiction," which represents 
"a renunciation of content, a tendency toward formalism, 
a lack of suppositions about human nature, and a 
preference of method to metaphysics." Heckard suggests 
"Metafiction's principal tool for the expanding of vistas
5
is irony," Readers may expect unreliable narration, 
reversals of romantic and sentimental tradition, the parody 
of myth and popular culture. Where this leads, if anywhere, 
remains uncertain. The parody in Ada is wide-ranging 
and undisciplined. The ideal of Eden existing in Van's 
mind deploys a grotesque visage upon the nature of 
Nabokov's idealism; the frcimework confers distortion rather 
than empathy upon characters and author. There is no order 
or meaning beyond the reflections of the individual,
Heckard points out that "It is because of this belief in 
something beyond the self that Gass criticizes Nabokov 
for writing novels which reflect only Nabokov."^
Lack of control and denial of a sense of the universal, 
of the external world, plague Ada. Throughout the third-
5 Margaret Heckard, "Robert Coover, Metafiction^and 
Freedom," in Tcocntlctk CentuAy LlteAatuAe., Vol. 22, No. 2 
' 1976). o. 211.(May , p
6 Ibid., p. 217.
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person narration, the point of view is Van's; reality, 
memory» desire are perceived within the framework of his 
mind, sometimes under the guise of impersonal narration. 
The novel, after all, is a confessional chronicle told 
xn a putatively impersonal fashion. What we are reading 
is the protagonist's self-conscious account of his own 
life, and his perception of these events is an unreliable 
gauge of emotional content.
The reader cannot but fail to have a dissimilar 
response to the world of Ada than that felt in the text
by Van and Ada, The problem for the author is to bridge 
the gap between character and reader. The reader's 
immediate reactions are to be held in abeyance by the 
intricate use of irony. The dominant ironic control 
exerted in the novel is the paradox of a seemingly 
pristine and innocent child's world, a blithe and free 
Eden, infused with the central carnal knowledge of adult 
sin. This is not a moral confusion so much as a thematic 
difficulty, with an elaborate set of images and motifs 
contributing to an overwhelming but slightly inappropriate 
pictorial and metaphorical paradise. The paradise is 
inapposite because the created world of the novel fails 
to sustain it.
Farther problems of tone are raised by the one­
dimensional quality of the characterization. This 
problem is encountered in the works of Barth, Coover, and 
Pynchon, as well as Nabokov. One. is unable to determine
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whether the characters are sincerely depicted or 
affectedly delineated. As young as Van and Ada are in 
the opening sections of the novel, they never seem like 
children, or if they are children, they are the most 
singularly precocious children in the history of 
literature. Already they are acting the roles of 
tlttcAdtCLiA and pedant. They ^re multilingual and 
communicate with, each other easily in English, French 
and Russian. Their capacity for literary allusions and 
intellectual references is remarkable, though these 
transparently remind one of the author's own proclivity 
for literary gamesmanship, rather than the leisured 
pursuits of brilliant offspring. The highly stylized 
tone undercuts the possibilities of a realistic 
interpretation of the early part of the book, in favour 
of an exotic and esoteric fantasy. Yet the achievement 
of the novel is poised on the precarious tottering of 
Part One between sheer allegorical fantasy and psychological 
and chronological truth.
The trappings of setting, dress, and accent are 
clearly conceived and rooted in phantasmagoria; but the 
cogency of the tale depends on how well Nabokov can 
paint a convincing picture of two free children in the 
primal love relationship. To do this, the author must
convince the reader that the characters are real within 
the terms of his work and their world. Taken within 
this context, there are many elements which ring false
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and appear artificial, never transcending the appearance 
of authorial imposition. Van and Ada are depersonalized; 
crten they are missing a life of their own by force of 
patently Nabokovian dialogue. Frequently they are wooden 
spokesmen for the authorial voice. At other times they 
are far too clever and cute. They are overly sophisticated 
despite the evidence of their precocity. They possess a 
peculiarly Proustian capacity for remembering and recording 
the past even while it is alive as the present. It is 
hard to conceive the following representative dialogue,
for example, as casual conversation between a boy of
fourteen and a girl of twelve; nor do prodigies speak as
Nabokovian tomes read:
But as Van casually directed the searchlight 
of back-thought into that maze of the past 
where the mirror-lined narrow paths not only 
took different turns, but used different 
levels (as a muledrawn cart passes under the 
arch of a viaduct along which a motor skims 
by), he found himself tackling, in still vague 
and idle fashion, the science that was to 
obsess his mature years - problems of space 
and time, space versus time, time-twisted 
space, space as time, time as space - and 
space breaking away from time, in the final 
tragic triumph of human cogitation: I am
because I die.
"But exclaimed Ada, "is certain,
this is reality, this is pure fact - this 
forest, this moss, your hand, the ladybird on 
my leg, this cannot be taken away, can it?
(it will, it was). has all come together
hcAt, no matter how the paths twisted, and 
fooled each other, and got fouled up: they
inevitably met here!"
"We must now find our bicycles," said Van,
"we are lost *in another part of the forest-*"
lob
"Oh, let's not return yet," she cried,
"oh, wait."
"But I want to make sure of our whereabouts 
and whenabouts, said Van. "It is a philosophical 
need."
.,. Having worked out that metaphor, Van 
and Ada decided it was really time to go 
home (pp. 122-3).
In his depiction of these children, Nabokov attempts 
to be metaphorically amusing and contextually convincing. 
Unfortunately, he cannot be both. Although the reader 
will realize that the older Van is reflecting back on 
the unformed and incipient inklings of a child, 
nevertheless, there is a dissonance between character 
and expression; the reader cannot accept the plausibility 
of such dialogue. The audience is amused, yet the tale 
is reduced in the process. Parody and titillation, 
poignancy and authorial self-indulgence, may be exclusive 
of one another. In A d a , the American Adam degenerates 
into an abyss of narcissism.
Clearly, the reader never knows for certain how to 
take things in A d a . Nabokov's use of irony is not 
altogether successful, and both setting and language 
conspire from the beginning to confuse and to distort. 
Through the fantasy of Ardis, Nabokov tries to fuse 
many diverse and contradictory gdements. Before us in 
this novel we have the antipodal worlds of czarist Russia,
7 For a discussion of this problem, see Christopher 
Lasch, T kc  C u l t u A c  o i  H a A c l é ^ l ^ m :  A m n A l c a n  L l i n  I n  An
Age. 0 ^ V l m l n l . 6 k l n g  E x p e c t a t i o n s  (New York: Norton, 1979,
Chapter I).
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contemporary America, the late nineteenth and mid­
twentieth centuries, the traditional novel and the 
contemporary one, clothes of a previous era, machines 
of the present day. The novel is a bizarre panorama of 
two centuries and different worlds. There is no 
purposive direction for the parody of realism, and 
this lack of direction is one of the primary defects of 
ludic fiction. The dominant problem is that of cogent 
presentation which is able to eschew confusion while 
maintaining a sense of merriment and amusement. 
Chronologically, the novel begins in 188 4 and ends about 
1967, but often there is amorphous distinction between 
past, present, and future,, Past and present continually 
intrude on one another. The play of time is one of the 
preoccupations of the work, and confusion may arise as 
varied phases of time slide over each other like a 
series of coloured mirrors filtering pigment over a 
landscape. The effect is dazzling, daunting, sometimes 
hard to follow.
A final consideration of the problems generated by 
the fiction must be given to the difficulty and complexity 
of its language and allusions, Nabokov has coined many 
neologisms and they are disorienting. It takes the reader 
a while to discover where the action is taking place and 
the chronology of events. The "Antiterra" setting is 
a peculiarly Russian one; indeed, one is reminded of the 
great wooded estates of elite Russia during Nabokov's
1 9 0
childhood. Yet the venue is American. As much as it 
is a work of literature, the novel is also an elaborate 
and engaging puzzle. Pure fantasy merges with concrete 
reality. "Estoty," "Canady," "New Cheshire," California, 
and Manhattan are all part of the United States and 
"enjoy a halcyon climate under the Stars and Stripes"
(p. 13). Fantasy is as real as reality; the reader's 
part of the game is not to filter fantasy from reality 
but rather to move past such considerations altogether.
The innumerable foreign terms and sentences, which 
enrich the reading if one is multilingual, add complexity 
and dissonance. This factor is crucial, for to a 
distanced and unsympathetic reader, the chronicle of 
Ada appears extrinsically without meaning. And unlike 
Joyce, who manages to achieve holistic cogency through 
the complexity of his language, Nabokov in Ada, lets 
complex, disparate elements fall into incongruity and 
diffusion. Nabokov's style has always involved fairly 
demanding participation from the reader. Lolita contains 
many of these esoteric elements. Yet a fundamental 
difference between Lolita and Ada is the degree to 
which the enigmatic games of the author with his 
language dominate the narrative, or the extent to which 
the dynamism of character and theme transcends the 
ritual of language. The beautiful language and fine 
tropes which characterize Nabokov's style seem less 
free, less spontaneous, in Ada than in Lolita, Literary
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references are complex and ubiquitous. This is good for 
the industry of scholarship if little else. Proffer has 
researched "a page by page explanation of Russian words, 
phrases, puns, anagrams, parodies, and allusions in A d a . ”
He avers "Ada cannot be read intelligently if the ... allusions
Q
... remain beyond the consciousness of the reader,"
Despite the problems outlined above, Ada remains a 
partially successful work of art. It presents a 
powerful exploration of the Adamic myth in contemporary 
literature and an interesting reworking of the dominant 
Nabokovian images and themes. In Ada, Nabokov creates 
a primal world of Edenic bliss, locating this world in 
the playground of Ardis, in America, and later centring 
Eden in the mind and words of Van and the novel he 
produces, the chronicle that is Ada, Nabokov postulates a 
verbal Eden eternalized in aesthetics, as the protagonists 
carry on a love affair not only with each other but with 
the fabric of language as well. Steiner argues, "It would 
be by no means eccentric to read the major part of 
Nabokov's opus as a meditation ... on the nature of human 
language. The Lolita, and Ada are tales of the
erotic relations between speaker and speech ..."  ^ For 
Van Veen and for Nabokov, the aesthetic world preserves 
human experience and gives the permanence physical nature
8 Carl R. Proffer, "Ada as Wonderland; A Glossary 
of Allusions to Russian Literature," in A Book oi Things 
About \JtadlmlA Nabokov, ed. Carl R. Proffer (Ann Arbor, 
Michigan; Ardis, 1974), p. 250.
9 Steiner, ExtfiateK Alto Alai, p. 18.
lacks. Art renders man the ability to create and 
re-create himself which is the service of the gods and 
the freedom of paradise.
Through the brilliant use of images and motifs,
Nabokov presents a fictional world that recalls a lost
Eden. There are the primal characters. Van and Ada,
and the lush natural setting, the garden of Ardis. The
world we view is, like Edèn, entirely self-contained
and independent. First this is seen in the child's
freedom of play and later,, as the mental creation of the
protagonist, who by reliving, in his mind, the childhood
Eden, is able in later life to transcend the temporal
limits of the postlapsarian world through the solace of
art. Only by creation of the verbal Eden can Van come
to terms with the angst and loneliness of his adult life.
The converse of the aesthetic Eden is, of course, the
poverty of the real world and man's powerlessness to
11confront the inevitability of his own destruction. If 
Van's life as a child was full and vibrant, his adult 
life remained relentlessly empty and without meaning.
Only by the recollection of the past can the torments 
of present and future be assuaged. Thus Nabokov views the 
artful Edenic imagination, the aesthetic ethos, as the
10 For a tendentiously moralistic view of this topic, 
consult Bobbie Ann Mason, Nabokov ^ s GaAden: A Gutdei to
AVA (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ardis, 1974).
11 This point is made by Page Stegner, Escape Into 
Aestheticsi The Aat o^ Vtadlmla Nabokov (London: Eyre 
and Spottiswoode, 1967).
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sustaining force in Van's life and, by extension, in the 
generic life of man. To know Eden is to live, and to 
lose a sense of Eden means a spiritual and metaphorical 
demise, a desiccation of freedom and vitality.
After a sort of Biblical genealogy and a brief 
discussion of Van and Ada's forebears, the author 
introduces his protagonists to the reader in appropriately 
Edenic imagery; "The Veen-Durmanov wedding took place on 
St. Adelaida's Day, 1871. Twelve years and some eight 
months later, two naked children, one dark-haired and 
tanned, the other dark-haired and milk-white, bending in 
a shaft of hot sunlight that slanted through the dormer 
window under which the dusty cartons stood, happened to 
collate that date (December 17, 1871) with another 
(August 16, same year) ..." (p. 15). Certain key
images appear in this passage and are echoed throughout 
the fiction. "Two naked children," the first description 
we have of Van and Ada, sets up the basic Edenic 
reference of Part One, generating the unspoiled picture 
of two children undisturbed by anything outside their 
own world. Although it is hot until the next paragraph 
that the reader learns that one child is male and the 
other female, it is clear from the first that a primal 
relationship is involved.
The "sunlight" motif articulates words particularly 
associated with ifche Edenic world, and brings''fbrward two 
of the dominant images of the fiction. Both "sun" and
Mu >W-r
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"ligLl:’*' are powerful images found in numerous places
thrc ughout Ada., by which the author calls into play an
entire primordial galaxy and brings to mind an inviolable
natural world. The natural world is further adumbrated
by the names of the children's mother, Marina, and Van's
ostensible mother., Aqua, with the sea imagery they
evoke. Another important descriptive detail comes j{_n
the prolific use of flower, garden, tree, and other
verdant imagery, for the idea of Eden is predicated on
the lushness of a harmonious natural paradise, and the
I ?creation of a unique world through children's play.
Images of fauna and flora play a preponderant role 
in evoking the elemental world of Ardis, its prelapsarian 
content, and also the sin and evil of fallen man. It 
is rare that Arcadian bliss is not tainted or blighted 
in some way, and Ardis is no exception. For example,
"the two kids' best find ... came from another carton 
in a lower layer of the past. This was a small green 
album with neatly glued flowers ... The first twenty 
pages were adorned with a number of little plants 
collected at random, in August, 18 69, in the grassy 
slopes above the chalet ojp in the park of the Hotel 
Florey, or in the garden of. the sanitorium near it "
(p. 16).. In this case, the plants and flowers represent 
a "strange and sickening treasure" (p. 17). As a key
12 A fine consideration of this issue may be found 
in David L, Miller, Gods and Games' To_u)aAd a Tkeotogu 
oi ?tay (New York; World Publishing, 1969).
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to the past they attain significance, revealing the sin 
of Van's conception, and infusing the children's 3den 
with the knowledge of their parents' symbolic original 
sin; "'I deduce,' said the boy, 'three main facts: 
that not yet married Marina and her married sister 
hibernated in m y .ftea de that Marina had her
own Dr, Krolik, pouA. d-i-^ e; and that the orchids
came from Demon who preferred to stay by the sea, his 
dark-blue great-grandmother'" (p. 17). It is with this 
knowledge of their parents' sin, that Van and Ada must 
come to terms with the ineluctable loss of Eden, as the 
incestuous basis of their love creates an Eden it will 
grow to destroy. When this happens the fugacious physical 
Eden becomes a mental entity.
Van's first sight of Ada reinforces the Adamic 
purpose of his quest with the Eve-like purity and beauty 
of Ada as a young girl. The flower leitmotif is heard 
once again as Ada presents herself to Van: "A victoria
had stopped at the porch. A lady, who resembled Van's 
mother, and a dark-haired girl of eleven or twelve, 
preceded by a fluid dackel, were getting out. Ada 
carried an untidy bunch of wild flowers. She wore a 
white frock with a black jacket and there was a white 
bow in her long hair" (p. 38). The association of Ada 
with flowers continues on the next page as "Ada's black 
jacket and a pink-yellow-blue nosegay she had'composed 
of anemones, celandines and columbines lay on a stool
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of oak" (p. 39). Van's first bodily contact with Ada 
comes when she sits on his lap, with "her ample pine­
smelling skirt" enveloping him, as "hot gouts of sun 
moved fast across her zebra stripes and the backs of 
her bare arms and seemed to continue their journey 
through the tunnel of his own frame" (p. 74). Here, 
"pine-smelling" suggests a natural appeal, and the use 
of "sun" reiterates the light motif associated with the 
warmth of Ada's character. Ada's inherent sexuality 
comes across as well. Nabokov skilfully employs many 
images in groupings which are able to evoke particular 
essences as well as total entities.
Since Nabokpv paints a vivid pictorial reference 
for Ada from her introduction onwards, particularly in 
terms of flowers and light, the images he articulates 
are never far removed from the reader's conception of 
Ada. Thus attributes of the house and garden at Ardis 
come to us metaphorically as personal qualities of the 
heroine. When Ada takes Van on a tour of the great 
library, aspects of that room suggest Ada herself in 
parallel fashion. This symbolic interplay is reminiscent 
of the technique used by Virginia Woolf in tko.
, for example, to correlate character with object, 
though Nabokov is more explicit: "In a slant of scholarly
sunlight a botanical atlas upon a reading desk lay open 
on a colored plate of orchids" (p. 41) . Ada -is the one 
member of the family who enjoys and uses the library.
and it is she who takes a special joy in the wonders of 
the family estate. Therefore it is appropriate that 
;Lrnages which describe the family library are later 
specifically articulated in a poetic, Edenic, and lyrical 
description of Ada:
On those relentlessly hot July afternoons,
Ada liked to sit on a cool piano stool of 
ivoried wood at a white-oilcloth'd table in 
the sunny music'room, her favorite botanical 
atlas open before her, and copy out in color 
on creamy paper some singular flower. She 
might choose, for instance, an insect-mimicking 
orchid which she would proceed to enlarge with 
remarkable skill. Or else she combined one 
species with another (unrecorded but possible), 
introducing odd little changes and twists that 
seemed almost morbid in so young a girl so nakedly 
dressed. The long beam slanting in from the 
french window glowed in the faceted tumbler, 
in the tinted water, and on the tin of the 
paintbox - and while she delicately painted 
an eyespot or the lobes of a lip, rapturous 
concentration caused the tip of her tongue to 
curl at the corner of her mouth, and as the 
sun looked on, the fantastic, black-blue-brown­
haired child seemed in her turn to mimic the 
mirror-of-Venus blossom ... Van would return 
to the purity of the sun-suffused room where 
a little girl, now glistening with sweat, was 
still painting her flower: the marvelous
flower that simulated a bright moth that in 
turn simulated a scarab (pp. 82-3).
Apart from her intellect, perhaps the most distinctive 
feature of Ada is the whiteness of her skin. Despite 
the hot summer sun, Ada's complexion retains its milky 
softness; she never has a suntan. Clearly, her purity 
of skin has a symbolic value as the Arcadian innocence of 
Eve. Ada, like her mother, bears an uncanny resemblance 
to "'Eve on the Clepsydrophone' in Parmigianino's famous 
picture" (p. 21). This is a small art work which Demon
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collected while courting Marina. "It showed a naked 
girl with a peach-like apple cupped in her half-raised 
hand sitting sideways on a convolvulus-garlanded 
support" (p. 2 0). The leitmotif of Ada as representative 
of "that Edenic girl" (p. 21) flows throughout Part One 
as a deeply suggestive image, and it is reinforced in 
almost every descriptive passage about the young Ada.
The whole of Chapter Nine, Part One, is given over to a 
long lyrical discussion of the heroine's physicality, 
in which her pallor and blackness of hair stand out as 
dominant traits. Van, the perceiver, is overwhelmed by 
the purity and lustrousness of Ada's appearance. If 
white-skinned Ada is his country goddess, the Diana of 
Ardis, she is his Eve as well, as desire stirs within 
him ;
His sentimental education now went on fast. 
Next morning, he happened to catch sight of 
her washing her face and arms over an old- 
fashioned basin on a rococo stand, her hair 
knotted on the top of her head, her nightgown 
twisted around her waist like a clumsy corolla 
out of which issued her slim back, rib-shaded 
on the near side, A fat snake of porcelain 
curled around the basin, and as both the 
reptile and he stopped to watch Eve and the 
soft woggle of her bud-breasts in profile, a 
big mulberry-colored cake of soap slithered 
out of her hand, and her black-socked foot 
hooked the door shut with a bang which was 
more the echo of the soap's crashing against 
the marble board than a sign of pudic 
displeasure (p. 55).
With the prominence given to Ada as a symbolic 
Eve - it is apposite that Nabokov should concentrate 
narrative detail on the garden motif. Van's initial
^ 9.
exposure to Ardis comes by way of the surrounding park 
and forest, "through pinewoods and over rocky ravines, 
with birds and other animals singing in the flowering 
undergrowtii’ (p. 36) , Great trees line the lane to the 
manor as Van approaches, and the first thing he does 
aftv.r depositing his suitcase is "to make a touA, da 
j’a..tdrn" (p. 38). The sombre splendour of the imposing 
mansion is counterposed against "the green reality of 
the garden" (p. 47), where the children are at their 
freest. Ada’s name suggests her close association with 
the garden and with nature, as Van realizes early in 
the novel: "He was beginning to like very much arbors
and ardors and Adas. They rhymed" (p. 50).
It is in the arbor that Van and Ada's sexual 
contact begins. The are climbing an apple tree "at the 
bottom of the garden." Ada, "not wearing pantalets,” 
is climbing above Van, who is holding onto her ankle.
She slips, they lose balance, grabbing for each other, 
"and the next moment, as they regained a semblance of 
balance, his expressionless face and cropped head were 
between her legs and a last fruit fell with a thud - 
the dropped dot of an inverted exclamation point." Van 
then kisses Ada between the legs. This is transparently, 
parodically, Edenic; the scene could be labelled 
"temptation in the garden." To hammer this point 
(humorously) home. Van, in a later version of the 
incident given on the same page, authorially interposes
2 iC
a concluding continent by Ada about their tree of delights 
"It is really the Tree of Knowledge - this specimen 
was imported last summer ... from the Eden National 
Park ..." (pp. 78-79).
Hence it may be seen, that the garden metaphor is 
a key introduction to the extensive sexual imagery and 
erotic significance of Ada, Van and Ada often make 
love or have sexual interludes in the garden, as when, 
before the grand picnic on Ada's sixteenth birthday,
"the wild girl and her lover slipped away for a few 
moments of ravenous ardor in a ferny ravine where a 
rill dipped from ledge to ledge between tall burnberry 
bushes" (p. 204-5). If freedom is basic to Eden, and 
clearly the author thinks it is, then sexual freedom is 
a fundamental assumption. The lovers* relationship is 
founded on the free expression of their ardour, and it is 
when society, through the agent of Demon Veen, puts a 
stop to this sexual freedom that their love is destroyed. 
It is further demonstrated that the abuse of another, 
in this case Lucette, curtails the movement toward 
freedom. It represents another snake in the garden 
driving the lovers apart.
The children discover the nature of their blood 
relation by way of the dried garden collection of 
Marina, as they are romping, freely and nakedly, in the 
attic. However, despite the parental precedent of 
sexual indulgence, Ada and Van's erotic freedom is
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founded on a different code. This may be expressed as 
t.ho prim.acy, if not the exclusivity, the sustaining 
power, the eternalness of their love and devotion.
There are allusions to lesbianism, homosexuality, 
promiscuity, to the glories of the "polymorphous perverse*" 
Van's sexual gymnastics are emphasized. None of these 
activities impinges on the lovers' bond. Within their 
private world, there are few taboos, certainly not the 
traditional or expected ones. The total freedom of 
play in Eden merges with the unlimited ardour and 
constancy of Van and Ada’s sexual love.
The debauched atmosphere is articulated by the 
particular use of phallic images which function as a 
snake in the garden. A description of the dinner 
festivities on one occasion includes the memorable 
picture of Marina and Demon distorting "their shiny­
lipped mouths in exactly the same way to introduce 
orally from some heavenly height the voluptuous ally of 
the prim lily of the valley, holding the shaft with an 
identical bunching of the fingers ..." (p. 199). Van
masturbates well into middle age, and many sentences 
detail this activity. Sexuality becomes for the 
characters a relentless pursuit, a compulsive drive.
Inside the Eden of Ardis this compulsive passion remains 
passionate and is elevated to the level of art, but out 
of the adolescent Arcadia it is primarily destructive 
and degenerative.
20 .
Inside Ardis, Van feels an aesthetic satisfaction 
with his sexual activity. He imagines himself a figure 
in a Renaissance masterpiece, "an oil on unframed canvas 
depicting two misbehaving nudes, boy and girl, in an 
ivied or vined grotto or pear a small waterfall overhung 
with bronze-tinted and dark emerald leaves, and great 
bunches of translucent grapes, the shadows and limpid 
reflections of fruit and foliage blending magically with 
veined flesh" (pp. 112-13), Life merges with art in the 
Edenic conception. Sexuality itself is elevated to the 
level of an artistic if short-lived triumph, and this is 
made clear by the juxtaposition of this passage with the 
paragraph preceding it, connecting the erotic quest and 
the idea of freedom in the natural world with a pure 
state of aesthetic happiness:
They made love - mostly in glens and 
gullies.
To the average physiologist, the energy 
of those two youngsters might have seemed 
abnormal. Their craving for each other grew 
unbearable if within a few hours it was not 
satisfied several times, in sun or shade, on 
roof or in cellar, anywhere. Despite uncommon 
resources of ardor, young Van could hardly 
keep pace with his pale little amo^e.tte (local 
French slang). Their immoderate exploitation 
of physical joy amounted to madness and would 
have curtailed their young lives had not 
summer, which had appeared in prospect as a 
boundless flow of green glory and freedom, 
begun to hint hazily at possible failings and 
fadings, at the fatigue of its fugue - the 
last resort of nature, felicitous alliterations 
(when flowers and flies mime one another), the 
coming of a first pause in late August, a 
first silence in early September. The orchards 
and vineyards were particularly picturesque 
that year (p. 112).
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The fiction we are reading is, of course, the
aesthetic translation of ardour into art. Hence eros
is eternalized in the mind by means of the artistic
imagination. For us, as for Van and Ada, the verbal
creation is a renewal of the freedom and sensuality of
a golden age. The mystery and myth of the Adamic world
are re-enacted, through the function of memory, as the
product of artistic recollection. In the same way that
the tradition of courtly love preserved for medieval
man and woman the illusion of a perfect world where
love and passion flowered, so also does this modern
version of the Edenic myth seek to recapture, metaphorically,
the primordial state of freedom and play. Yet for Nabokov
the delight of words and images and the preeminence of
play remain the essence of the myth. The myth, through
art, survives the erosion of time and the limitations of
an imperfect world;
... But speaking of love and its myths, do 
you realize - because I never did before 
talking to her a couple of years ago - that 
the people around our affair had very good 
eyes indeed? Forget Kim, he's only the 
necessary clown -* but do you realize a 
veritable legend was growing around you and 
me while we played and made love?
She had never realized, she said again 
and again (as if intent to reclaim the past 
from the matter-of-fact triviality of the 
album), that their first summer in the 
orchards and orchidariums of Ardis had become 
a sacred secret and creed, throughout the 
countryside. Romantically inclined handmaids, 
whose reading consisted of Gcocn de: and
KZan,a Ue.'itvago, adored Van, adored Ada, adored 
Ardis's ardors in arbors. Their swains,
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plucking ballads on their seven-stringed 
Russian lyres under the racemosa in bloom 
or in old rose gardens (while the windows 
went out one by one in the castle), added 
freshly composed lines - naïve, lackey- 
daisical, but heartfelt - to cyclic folk 
songs. Eccentric police officers grew 
enamored with the glamour of incest.
Gardeners paraphrased iridescent Persian 
poems about irrigation and the Four Arrows 
of Love. Nightwatchmen fought insomnia and 
the fire of the clap with the weapons of 
yand.ada*^ kd\J , Herdsmen, spared by
thunderbolts on.remote hillsides, used their 
huge "moaning horns" as ear trumpets to catch 
the lilts of Ladore. Virgin châtelaines in 
marble-floored manors fondled their lone 
flames fanned by Van's romance. And another 
century would pass, and the painted word 
would be retouched by the still richer brush 
of time (pp. 311-12).
In this passage the sexual activity of Van and 
Ada is transformed, albeit with heavy ironic overtones, 
into an idyll, of courtly love. There is an obvious 
sense of literary fun-making, as there is in the excerpt 
from page 112. Nabokov here plays with another literary 
tradition, laughing at the notion of ideal romantic 
love, while at the same time retaining a core of Adamic 
seriousness. The love of Van and Ada is a mentally 
powerful experience even for those who observe it.
Art remains the key to man's hopes and memories of 
paradise. Just as the courtly ideal was preserved in 
the chronicles, songs, and poetry of medieval and 
Renaissance man, so also is this example of the Adamic 
myth safeguarded for modern man by the fictions of the 
contemporary novel.
The play element in Kda forms the work's central
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contribution toward Nabokov's aesthetic goal. The 
writer maintains a constant dialogue with the reader 
by means of extended literary games, by playing with 
his audience as with an opponent in a chess match.
The reader is teased and cajoled by the author, and an 
underlying sense of irony assures that the perceptive 
reader will be aware that he is involved in an elaborate 
literary puzzle. What Nabokov, Barth, Borges, and other 
contemporary writers are doing is to posit a new 
relationship between novelist and reader, one which is 
not didactic but rather diverting and playful. Yet a 
central seriousness pervades the comedy, for games and 
play describe a major aspect of the created Eden. Man 
had the freedom to play in paradise, and this kind of 
fiction attempts to recall and to re-create the play 
element in culture. The Edenic novel thus articulates 
a basic and important source of man's freedom, a freedom 
of expression, conceptualization, and imagination.
The province of the ^dnd becomes a sophisticated 
playground. Art's reason for being is defined by the 
culture of play, the fact that the spirit of man cannot 
survive for long without the freedom created by 
aesthetic expression, diversion, and release. In this 
context, then, it is not surprising that many contemporary 
novelists see fiction as a projection of the rich world 
of play. Certainly Nabokov rejects, vehemently, any 
tendentious imposition on the literary creation. Art
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for him is not an extension of the real world; it is a 
separate world altogether. Fiction serves as its own 
reward, rests on its particular merits, determines its 
own universe, and centres everything on the coruscant 
ornaments of language and play, the ephemeral glistening 
landscape of Eden.
Nabokov's contempt for a functional and didactic 
interpretation of his fiction is demonstrated by his many 
comments on the subject, in introductions to his novels, 
within the texts, and in personal interviews. However, 
one brief passage from Bo.nd illustrates the
essence of the Nabokovian preoccupation with "the caviar 
of moonshine and poetry." In this novel the repressive 
state wishes to alter art for its own ends. The key to 
the destruction of art is the revision of Hamtzt for the 
state's needs: "'As with all decadent democracies,
everybody in the Denmark of the play suffers from a 
plethora of words. If the state is to be saved, if the 
nation desires to be worthy of a new robust government, 
then everything must be changed; popular common sense 
must spit out the caviar of moonshine and poetry, and the
simple word, veAbam oJinatu, intelligible to man and
beast alike, and accompanied by fit action, must be
13restored to power
13 Vladimir Nabokov, Be.nd (Middlesex,
England: Penguin, 1974), pp. 97-98.
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Yet the poetic word alone cannot fulfill the demands 
of fiction. Moreover, Nabokov gives us a highly ornamented 
version of the verbal edifice. Simplicity and understated 
power are the last qualities we would anticipate finding. 
What is more serious and damaging, however, is Nabokov's 
adamant refusal to relate anything to the outside world.
The hermetic limitations of kda. and of much ludic fiction 
confront the reader with nothing but words and the words 
become oppressive in their own right. The novelists are 
telling us that words qua words are equally acceptable.
They do not attempt to evaluate the totalitarian vision 
versus the freely chosen one or the cruel, selfish person 
over the kind, giving individual. The essence of humanity 
is missing from the game. Greenman argues that "the 
new fiction writers ... represent the first literary 
movement towards a total refusal to define reality.
About the ostensible abandonment of mimesis, Greenman notes, 
"The plain fact remains, though it seems to be seldom 
acknowledged, that it is still the concrete detail in 
new fiction that makes it readable, however devalued.
incongruous, or apparently -- though only apparently —
15abandoned." In short, the visible world cannot be 
dismissed; our vision of it can simply be distorted, vitiated.
14 Myron Greenman, "Understanding New Fiction," in 
lUodaAn Stadd.e,6, Volume 20, Number 3 (Autumn 
1974}, p. 313.
15 IbZd., p. 309.
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Nabokov has unfortunately attracted a number of
adulatory interpreters, and such admirers have done
very little critically to evaluate his work. Rather,
they give us guides and legends by which to follow
the confusions and contrivances of the novels. Although
Appel offers only his characteristic ecstasy about Ada,
that It is "a supremely original work of the imagination,"
16 ""an erotic masterpiece," the critic Lee acknowledges that
Ada. "fails as does the later Look at the Haà.lequtn61 fox
the two novels tend to be more about Nabokov’s theme of
17the artist than realized works of art in themselves."
Stuart posits that "It is possible to consider all of
Nabokov’s novels, as, to some degree, revealing the fiction
of biography, and at least one of them, Ada, as a biography 
18of fiction." Such comments indicate the pervasive 
solipsism of the artist who writes ceaselessly about 
the process of writing and the ratiocinations of the 
artist. The spirit and animation of the novel extend 
as lesser matters than the author’s wholesale 
control over the literary game. William Gass has
].G Alfred Appel, Jr., "Ada described," in Mabokov: 
CKtttct^m, Kemtnt^cenjÆ^, t ^ a M Z a t t o n A  and tn.tbu.te6, 
ed. Alfred Appel, Jr. and Charles Newman (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), p. 160.
17 L.L. Lee, UZadtmtn. Nabokov (Boston: Twayne,
1976), p. 145.
IS Dabney Stuart, Nabokov: The Vtmen6ton6
VaK.od’j (Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Louisiana State 
University Press, 1978), p. 133.
offered perhaps the most penetrating analysis to date;
The funny, the comical, side-splitting 
Nabokovian thing is that Nabokov's novels are 
frequently formless, or when form presides 
it’s mechanical, lacking instinct, desire, 
feeling, life (nostalgia is the honest blood­
stream of his books, their skin his witty 
and wonderful eye); and when the form is so 
ruthlessly imposed from the outside, seldom 
allowed to grow from within, rather bearing 
its bones and its hide as some insects do, 
then not only the end, but beginning and 
middle as well, afe directed deu6 ex 
mcic.ktna. We perceive this at once when the 
critics, clothed in butcher's aprons, carving 
come, for they clearly regard their discussions 
of construction as interpretations, and as they 
go about their operations, we hear not a 
squeak from the beast. What our author possesses 
in plenty is technique. Pate Ptfie, L o t t t a , and 
Seba6ttan Kntght are built of devices: these
bones make the meat.^^
Nabokov risks much in Ada through his propensity for
contrivance and in his mania to include the vastness of
arcane trivia. Nowhere does he address the larger issues
of the human condition nor does he explore the meaning
of personal relations beyond the closed dyad of the
relatively insufferable central characters. Gass notes
that "Not only do the novels seem cold ..., there is a
striking contrast between their rich contrivance and the
20thin interest they have for the entirely engaged mind." 
Since Nabokov's games have no purpose beyond fleeting play, 
we feel with Rother that "it is as though a complex
19 William H. Gass, P te t to n  and th e  PtgaM,e6 Lt^e  
(Boston: Nonpareil Books, 1971), pp. 117-18. '
20 Ibtd./ p. 118.
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mechanism had been designed specifically to build
another mechanism whose only purpose was to observe
21itself in the act of being a machine." The exigencies
of man and society are forgotten. A sterility prevails.
If lexical playfields determine the landscape of
Ada, then some deeper probing into the nature of play
may be helpful. As mentioned in the previous chapter, an
excellent discussion of the play element in culture is
22Huxzinga's study, Homo Luden6, Although this work 
fails to join the idea of play with a theory of aesthetics, 
it powerfully elucidates the significance of play for 
the poetic imagination. Defining play as "an activity 
which proceeds within certain limits of time and space, 
in a visible order, according to rules freely accepted, 
and outside the sphere of necessity or material utility," 
Huizinga emphasizes the essential freedom of the play world 
and the mood of "rapture and enthusiasm" (p.132). He reminds 
us of Eden when he tells us of play, "Into an imperfect 
world and into the confusion of life it brings a temporary, 
a limited perfection" (p. 10). By these criteria Huizinga 
postulates an idea of play that bears central importance
21 James Rother, "Parafiction: The Adjacent
Universe of Barth, Barthelme, Pynchon, and Nabokov," 
Boandan.y 1, Volume V, Number 1 (Fall 1976), p. 31.
22 Johan Huizinga, Homo Laden6 : A Study o{^ the
Ptay-Etement tn Cuttute (London: Routledge & Kpgan
Paul, 1949). All references are to this edition and 
Will appear in parentheses.
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to the Adamic myth in the contemporary novel.
The poignancy of Ada and of Lottta depends on the
fleeting nature of the fictional universe, the limits 
imposed by time and space and the torments of death and 
denial. The freely accepted rules of the novel are the 
traditional literary conventions and more significantly, 
the agreement between author and audience that such rules 
exist to be flouted, or if'you will, the rule that the 
obvious rules may be disregarded. Yet a "visible order” 
is upheld by the intricacies of description and detail 
and through the singular power of words: "a latticed
gallery; a painted ceiling; ... butterflies and butterfly 
orchids in the margin of the romance" (p. 445). The 
memory of the adolescent Arcadia evokes in both reader 
and author a sense of childlike joy and wonder, and the 
playful mood is nurtured by a self-contained Edenic world 
of lexical games and literary puzzles.
A eurhythmy suffuses Ada; Nabokov controls the play
element by the rhythm of the language he employs* Thus 
it becomes clear that the uovel of play depends on 
balance and proportion. Nabokov's lexical playfielcis 
are ordered by form, Huizinga articulates the importance 
of form and order for play in a discussion which has much 
interest for the student of the contemporary novel, with 
specific relevance to the works of Nabokov:
Inside the playground an absolute' and 
peculiar order reigns. Here we come across 
another, very positive feature of play; it
creates order, t6 order. Into an imperfect 
world and into the confusion of life it brrngs 
a temporary, a limited perfection. Play demands 
order absolute and supreme. The least deviation 
from it "spoils the game", robs it of its 
character and makes it worthless. The profound 
affinity between play and order is perhaps 
the reason why play, as we noted in passing, 
seems to lie to such a large extent in the 
field of aesthetics. Play has a tendency to 
be beautiful. It may be that this aesthetic 
factor is identical with the impulse to create 
orderly form, which animates play in all its 
aspects. The words we use to denote the 
elements of play belong for the most part to 
aesthetics, terms with which we try to describe 
the effects of beauty: tension, poise, balance,
contrast, variation, solution, resolution, etc. 
Play casts a spell over us; it is "enchanting", 
"captivating". It is invested with the 
noblest qualities we are capable of perceiving 
in things: rhythm and harmony (p. 10).
It shows the success of Nabokov's craft that he 
approaches so close to artistry by the use of a few 
beautifully articulated images which echo throughout his 
fiction. Rich ornaments decorate the best poetic 
language of A d a , As Huizinga points out, "What poetic 
language does with images is to play with them. It 
disposes them in style, it instils mystery into them so 
that every image contains the answer to an enigma" (p. 134) 
Thus a few core motifs can adumbrate an entire Edenic 
epistemology. The literary games, the art motifs, and 
the images of flowers and trees, gardens and arbours, 
lightness and colour, delineate throughout the novel the 
fine irretrievability of the Adamic experience, and the 
memory of it which the mind retains. The key is poetic 
consciousness, a verbal creation in the mind. This is
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not a function of reality,, or an extension of the
everyday world. It is an imaginative entity complete,
23by itself, in the mind of the artist. Nabokov has 
designed a universe through reverberative images which 
engender a playfield of the mind. The formal cohesion 
of Ada is its pattern of images- Here the ludic nature 
of man asserts itself, as Huizinga argues;
?ote6t6 f in fact, is a play-function. It 
proceeds within the play-ground of the mind, 
in a world of its own which the mind creates 
for it. There things have a different 
physiognomy from the one they wear in 
"ordinary life", and are bound by ties other 
than logic and causality. If a serious 
statement may be defined as one that may 
be made in terms of waking life, poetry 
will never rise to the level of seriousness.
It lies beyond seriousness, on that more 
primitive and original level where the child, 
the animal, the savage and the seer belong, 
in the region of dream, enchantment, ecstasy, 
laughter. To understand poetry we must be 
capable of donning the child's soul like ci 
magic cloak and of forsaking man's wisdom 
for the child's (p. 119).
The notion of literature as game is a pervasive one 
in Ada and merits close attention. The kaleidoscopic 
perspective taken by Van as narrator illustrates this. 
Often Van will describe an incident, such as the "shattal 
tree" adventure, in the active tense, presumably <xs it 
occurred. Then he will offer his revised recollection 
of the event which is, in turn, altered by Ada's 
negation of Van's version or her correction of it. This
23 This issue is discussed by R.G. Collingwood, 
The Pn..inatpte6 An,t (1938; rpt. London: Oxford
University Press, 1975), pp. 125-53.
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is in microcosm somewhat like Fowles's dual endings of 
The ftench Lteatenant'6 Wpmcin. The reader is reminded 
that there are "only words to play with." Similarly,
Ada will tell Van as he iiS writing the autobiography 
we are supposedly reading, that she never had an outfit 
like the one he claims he initially saw her in, producing 
an indelible image on his mind. Anyone who takes 
verisimilitude as an aesthetic tenet will be worried 
by the playfulness of these passages. Obviously the 
author feels that only temporary truths come in fictional 
glimmerings, that fiction is as true as any other fantasy. 
Like the poetry of Wallace Stevens, the fiction of 
Nabokov offers a transient verbal Eden in which to live; 
this world is valid briefly until another fiction comes 
along and supplants it. Evidently, then, to assess 
fiction as a guide to or recommendation of life in the 
real world would be seriously to misread Nabokov's 
intent. The novel of play looks essentially into itself 
and its genre rather than beyond. A different or 
renewed consciousness is the reward of the novel, and its 
meaning. The other meanings are the richness of language 
and the fun of the game. The play of words becomes the 
communicated refuge of art and artists, the anodyne of 
Nabokov and his protagonists. Moreover, a consciousness 
produced by the Edenic imagination is not disposable.
Pifer argues that the ludic games in Ada are balanced by 
a strong awareness of the moral and social limitations
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of aesthetic bliss; "After rendering a world like
Antiterra, whose characters are so devoted to the
'supreme' reality of art and ardor, Nabokov reverses
ail our expectations by illustrating just how devastating
to kiunan life such a world can be." She notes that the
lust for art "has eaten through the barriers of restraint
and moderation, destroying, as well, the consolations —
affection, loyalty, charity —  which make relations among
24human beings bearable on earth."
In many ways art itself is the subject of A d a , and 
the novel may be seen as a K u n 6 t t e t t o m a y i about the 
development of Van into an artist. Yet unlike A 
V o t t t a l t  o{  ^ t h e  A t t t ^ t  a6  a Voung  M a n , for example.
Van's struggle comes to us with a lightness and a 
frivolity foreign to the Joycean prototype. For Van 
and for Ada, art and the creation of fiction are basically 
other forms of diversion and play, a play which 
communicates and distils words and images into the 
fineness of language. The novel presents a category 
of comments about language, painting, literature, and 
the development of the novel. Nabokov plays upon the 
element of contrivance and depends upon the reader's 
familiarity with literature and painting to parody- 
famous artists and eminent works ; he takes art from the 
pantheon and brings it into the gameroom. The play of
24 Ellen Pifer, "Dark Paradise: Shades of
Heaven and Hell in A d a , "  \ k o d e t V L  P t c t t o n  S t a d t e 6  , 
Volume 25, Number 3 (Autumn 1979), pp. 493,494.
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Eden continues in art, and renews the aesthetic 
perspective.
Humour is a crucial factor in the verbal pattern, 
and this novel is no less a homage to art because it is 
funny. Thus in one early passage we are told how "Jane 
Austen might have phrased it,, for the sake of rapic 
narrative information" (p. 17); in another we learn that 
our introduction to Ardis is presented in the narrative 
style of the Victorian novel, as, "At the next turning, 
the romantic mansion appeared on the gentle eminence of 
old novels" (p. 37). Nabokov has a joke on Maupassant 
as the sensationally bad novella written by the French 
governess has striking parallels with Maupassant's own 
work. Nabokov has fun with his own previous novels as 
well, particularly with L o t t t a .  We learn that on Ada's, 
twelfth birthday she "was permitted to wear her lolita 
(thus dubbed after the little Andalusian gipsy of that 
name in Osberg's novel and pronounced, incidentally, with 
a Spanish 't,' not a thick English one), a rather long, 
but very airy and ample, black skirt, with red poppies 
or peonies, 'deficient in botanical reality, ' as she 
grandly expressed it, not yet knowing that reality and 
natural science are synonymous in the terms of this, and 
only this, dream" (pp. 66-57).
"Nyniphets" is a recurring word in A d a , and its 
connection with the obsession of Humbert is never far 
from the surface of the narrative. Lucette is identified
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as a nymphet and she is destroyed by sexual obsession in 
the same way as Lolita, a victim of unintended cruelty.
The allusion is carried further as Ada's role in Von 
Jaandé ia6t fttng is that of the nymphet Dolores, "lifted 
from Osberg's [Borges's] novella" (p. 371). The author 
mènerons John Shade, "a modern poet" (p. 411), who appears 
familiar to readers of Pate Ftte, The effect of these 
allusions is akin to that of a gigantic crossword 
puzzle or the challenge of a chess match. The only 
cohesive meaning is that of the game.
As the K’dnAttetAoman takes shape, we see Van as the 
artist and the artist as a player and gamesman. Van 
can stand on his head and walk on his hands; he is 
excellent at cards and "a first-rate chess player" (p. 172) 
He even enters the stage, briefly, as a sort of magus, a 
magician-cum-showman. The game motif is reiterated 
throughout the novel, and Chapter Thirty of Part One 
describes the exploits of the protagonist in the theatre 
as Mascodagama the illusionist. Mascodagama delights 
his audiences with the athletic tricks he can perform in 
the same way that Nabokov charms his readers with lexical 
puzzles to unravel. In later years we see Van, fat &nd 
alone, wondering "what really kept him alive on terrible 
Antiterra, with Terra a myth and all art a game" (p. 344). 
The metaphor of Antiterra is an elaborate game. Verbal 
play, games, and tricks are metaphors "in the rose garden 
of Ardis", To develop a game, to play with metaphors in
216
the garden, restore to man the Adamic consciousness.
Van speaks in the authorial voice when he describes the
importance of a playful talent and the talent of play:
The essence of the satisfaction belonged 
rather to the same order as the one he later 
derived from self-imposed, extravagantly 
difficult, seemingly absurd tasks when V.V. 
sought to express something, which unttt 
expressed had only a twilight being (or even 
none at all —  nothing but the illusion of the 
backward shadow,of its imminent expression).
It was Ada's castle of cards. It was the 
standing of a metaphor on its head not for 
the sake of the trick's difficulty, but in 
order to perceive an ascending waterfall or 
a sunrise in reverse: a triumph, in a sense,
over the ardis of time. Thus the rapture 
young Mascodagama derived from overcoming 
gravity was akin to that of artistic revelation 
in the sense utterly and naturally unknown to 
the innocents of critical appraisal, the 
social-sense commentators, the moralists, 
the idea-mongers and so forth. Van on the 
stage was performing organically what his 
figures of speech were to perform later in 
life —  acrobatic wonders ... (pp. 144-45).
The Edenic world at Ardis is a realm of play. The 
novel discusses in detail actual and imaginary games 
conceived by the children. Ada introduces Van to her 
sun-and-shade games; he initiates her into erotic gcimes. 
She also finds pleasure in word games and likes to make 
anagrams with her friend Grace: "insect, incest, nicest"
(p. 205). To play their amorous games. Van and Ada must 
engage Lucette in numerous diversions; they play scrabble 
and hide-and-seek while scheming to keep Lucette out of 
their erotic preserves. Marina has her acting games.
Kim the houseboy has his own invidious photographic 
games. And amorous play absorbs most of the Veen
219
household. The notion of playing in the garden is one 
of the novel's dominant leitmotifs; the words "game," 
"player," and "play" are displayed prominently.
The major game besides sex is played with words,
and in a larger sense, the game of words is the content 
25
of the novel. Hence we can understand the significance
of the "verbal circuses" (p. 17 0) of the narrative if we 
discern them as intricate metaphors for the creation of 
the Adamic experience of fiction. This explains why 
Nabokov dedicates a relatively long chapter to a discussion 
of word games. Chapter Thirty-six is central to an 
understanding of the novel because it demonstrates the 
key to Eden through a verbal passage, a word-nurtured 
idyll. The pursuit of words for their intrinsic beauty 
and the consciousness they confer, this is the centre of 
Nabokov's aesthetic ethos.
The other word game that the children play is with 
literature itself, becoming not only a game but a
communication as well. To obtain secrecy in their 
correspondence, they adopt an elaborate system of codes 
based on two literary works, Marvell's poem "The Garden" 
and Rimbaud's "Mémoire." Ada and Van, like the author, 
centre much on the enigmatic quest for the right word.
Just as Marvell's Adam creates in his mind a transcendent
25 Julia Bader, in Cty6tat Land: tn
Nabo kov * 6 EngZtéh Novet6 (Berkeley, California: 
University of California Press, 1972), p. 126, makes 
this point.
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world, similarly the literary Adam effects a transfer of
consciousness through play. The verbal Eden of the mind
is shown "Annihilating all that's made/To a green thought
26
in a green shade,” The effect of the novel, stripped 
of its excesses, is precisely this. Van has the 
perspicacity to discern that the Edenic world and the 
real world will intersect only once, in the play of 
childhood. In old age Ada and Van hardly remind us 
of the primal couple; Van is fat and balding and Ada 
has varicose veins and dyed blonde hair. Their final 
reunion is antic1imactic. Yet as far as a recollection 
of the past through the writing of the novel can 
briefly deny the mundane oppressions of growing old and 
impotent, then the power of the mind and memory can 
retrieve the green garden of Adam. Memory is an 
important tool, but at the core there are only words 
and the games we can play with them. The expression 
of meaning preponderates insofar as words and images 
form a coherent unit and pattern a particular consciousness 
Concluding remarks must focus on the temporal 
element in Ada, and the relationship it has, if any, 
with the Edenic experience. Nabokov's application of 
the time theme depends, too, not on the solidity of 
language and metaphor, but on the disharmonious function
26 Andrew Marvell, "'The Garden," in Tk(L Udtaphyé^caZ 
ed. Helen Gardner (Middlesex, England: Penauin,
1974), pp. 255-58. -
yof biased, pedestrian opinions and hollow-sounding 
words. Part Four, where the time theme is expounded 
in great and unnecessary detail, suffers a dearth of 
elegant language, penetrating wit, and stylistic 
subtlety., It is long and tedious, and offers little 
else bur. a chance for Nabokov to cavil at his pet 
dislikes, such as Einstein's Theory of Relativity. 7^ 
bnder the guise of Van's philosophical work, T ke. T 
Tint, the author delineates his notion of time as 
nonlinear and independent of spatial perceptions. He 
tells us that rhythm is basic to "perceptual Time," and 
declares time's prime immobility. The most significant 
point about time as far as this novel is concerned 
comes to us, however, in the consideration that "Time 
is but memory in the making" (p. 425) . The treatise 
on time connects with the Edenic myth in its emphasis 
on the function of memory; both underscore the act of 
consciousness in creating its own world, and the innate 
mental capacity of men to recollect the past by the power 
of images and language: "The Past, then, is a constant
accumulation of images. It can be easily contemplated 
and listened to, tested and tasted at random, so that 
it ceases to mean the orderly alternation of linked 
events that it does in the large theoretical sense.
It is now a generous chaos out of which the genius of
27 Douglas Fowler, KdadZng Nabokov, p. 200
22
total recall, summoned on this -summer morning in 1922,
can pick anything he pleases . (p. 413). The
metaphors of the novel create Eden in the mind just as
the images of the past re-create it. The author
establishes "that Time is a fluid medium for the culture
of metaphors" (p., 406). Clearly Nabokov's analogy
between Van's later life and the art of the novel is
well taken as the ability of words in fiction to defeat
time. Verbal playfields render a new consciousness
28
from fictional fantasy. And Nabokov's fictional
metaphors seem better able to express this notion than
his philosophical ramblings. Art makes time cease and
preserves a moment forever:
... about the rapture of her identity. The 
asses who might really think that in the 
starlight of eternity, my. Van Veen's, and 
hdn,, Ada Veen's, conjunction, somewhere in 
North America, in the nineteenth century 
represented but one trillionth of a trillionth 
part of a pinpoint planet's significance can 
bray (the English
word would not supply the onomatopoeic element; 
old Veen is kind), because the rapture of her 
identity, placed under the microscope of 
reality (which is the only reality), shows a 
complex system of those subtle bridges which 
the senses traverse —  laughing, embraced, 
throwing flowers in the air -- between 
membrane and brain, and which always was and 
is a form of memory, even at the moment of 
its perception. I am weak. I write badly.
I may die tonight. My magic carpet no longer 
skims over crown canopies and gaping nestlings, 
and her rarest orchids. (p. 17 0)
23 This point is made by Tony Tanner, CZty 
Wo^ .d-&: A Study 0  ^ Am&Abc&r fjetton tn tkd Mtd-
Cdntun.y (London: Jonathan Cape, 1971), pp. 15-49.
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The miseries of being old and near to death can be 
overcome, fleetingly, by the "very local palliative of 
articulate art, " as Humbert declares in a moment of 
despair and recrimination. The rare Edenic moments of 
being transcend time while preserving it; they are 
verdant glistenings from the garden, an eternal green of 
renewal. Again, as in Lottta, we perceive the 
.imposrib.ility of a worldly Eden, the ineluctability of 
its defeat amid degeneration, corruption, and death.
But in contrast to the moving portrayal of Lolita's 
destruction, Humbert's realization of his culpability, 
and his own approaching death, the language of kda 
never attains the defamiliarization and universality 
of its predecessor. Eden lies buried in a lexical morass. 
If much is lost in Ada, not the least is the relevancy 
of time, the meaning of language, the immortality of 
words, and the sustaining embrace of humanity.
29 Vladimir Nabokov, lotZta {New York: Berkley,
1966), p. 258.
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CHAPTER f i v e 
The Eden of Words:
The SeJ.f-Generating Parody of John Barth
Play fiction presupposes an object of play, an 
object ever malleable and fluid, one which grows from 
itself and then stands outside and alone, a separate 
entity ephemeral yet invincible. Such is the function 
of the word and the idea in contemporary fiction. To 
examine the works of John Barth is to illustrate both 
the seminal and the sterile aspects of the coeval 
literary endeavour. Barth assumes the presence of an 
American myth, he unites it with a function of verbal 
play, and then he explodes the whole structure into an 
abyss of clever blankness and artful absurdity. It is, 
for him, a tenebrous mist which covers the glitter of 
language and allusion. Fitzgerald's green light at the 
end of the bay becomes for Barth an Edenic illusion 
which focuses the role of fiction as affirmation ot its 
potency and as the simultaneous denial of its reality. 
And for Barth, reality is the least important region 
with which the mind need bother.
To understand the critical framework in which "Lost 
in the Funhouse" and Tkd Sot~i^ddd Vactofi will be viewed, 
it is necessary to discuss some of the analytic notions 
pervading the Edenic myth. Eden itself implies a 
fertile region of endless possibility, a natural freedom
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in which man can create anything his mind can imagine. 
Eden means a garden where the word became flesh, where 
an idea attained fulfillment and man was free to 
formula'ce his universe. For the novel, this Edenic 
myth is translated into a verbal territory, so that 
man and his experience are reified, so that man himself 
becomes the creative agent of the word, and the word 
creates the world anew. Just as Adam pursued a 
pattern of play in paradise, so also does the novelist 
play in a special and essential manner in the fiction 
of today.
We are talking fundamentally about the potential 
for form to be imposed on a created fiction. The 
crucial difference between the form of the Edenic 
novel of play and that of the traditional novel is the 
dominant tone of ironic, arbitrary, and self-conscious 
imposition or artifice pervading contemporary fiction, 
the adoption of a gamesman-like attitude, and the 
conatus toward higher consciousness and freedom by 
means of the verbal pattern. The reader feels that the 
author is performing a rite of entertainment, that he 
is witnessing a magus erecting a structure of willful 
illusion, in the same way that Conchis in Tkd Nagui and 
Burlingame in Tkd Sot-Wddd f-actoA, deliberately enact 
roles and stage events. The author, through his 
characters and sometimes directly in his ov;n voice, 
demonstrates that reality is a fiction and that the
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source of belief for man must centre on self-created 
words and ideas because there iis no external sustaining 
structure.. Yet the consolation of the mental landscape 
is great since in its fineness and endless possibility 
man can locate and fulfill his visions of paradise. He 
can create a verbal and ideational playground with the 
mythical beasts of Borges, the neologisms of Nabokov, 
or the simulated history of Barth. And to these he may 
add the fictions of his own.
If "in the beginning," as John Locke said, "all the
World was America,"^ this idea of America has now colonized
the mind of man and structured the aesthetic groundwork
of the contemporary fiction discussed in the present
study. As Chapter Two delineates, for the European,
as later for the American, the notion of a virgin
wilderness, a potential garden of delights, has always
been a potent and moving conception. Indeed, it is
the synthesis of this concept with the aesthetic of
play and freedom which generates the power of today's
fiction. The verbal Eden is aligned with, yet
transcends, the myth of ap earthly paradise. This is
2a myth explored by Shakespeare in The Tempest, and 
probed by the European artist for centuries. It has 
been shown to be an illusion, perhaps even a delusion,
1 Quoted by Peter N. Carroll and D a v i g , N o b l e  in 
Thd FAdd and the. A Me.io Ht^toAy oi the. United
Statct) (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1977), p. 15.
2 Leo Marx, in The Machtne tn the GaAden w York ; 
Oxford, 1964), Chapter II, makes this point in a -ogént' 
discussion.
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yet the myth is imbued with an attraction so strong tha;t 
rt lingers still, palpably felt in fiction and in the 
national life of the American people.
Similarly, although clearly Barth wishes to deny 
the truth of the Edenic claim of the American continent 
on the European mind and on the native point of view, 
his ineluctable containment in it controls some eight 
hundred pages of narrative prose in The Sot-liJeed faatoA, 
The enormous network of the myth is fecund enough to 
spawn a fictional dialectic of Eden and play and to 
translate itself into the ironic novel in which author 
and protagonists exist as players who, magus-like, 
create themselves and a fiction in which to live. The 
audience play, too, and join the artist and his heroes 
in becoming the new Adams, through a wholly fictional 
vehicle posited to exist out of time and apart from 
history.
The translation from myth to fiction (which one 
can perceive as an interchange)^ is dependent upon the 
free play of consciousness, upon the mind of man 
creating its own idea of itself and determining other 
facts of life from this basic premise. More than any 
other single idea, such fiction is dominated by the 
author's internal drive to create himself, to let his 
consciousness play upon a story, rather than simply 
relating a story in the traditional fashion. It is a 
striving inward toward a verbal garden of freedom, in
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which the self is defined through characters and plot, 
and the author refrains from dilating upon the world 
outside. The contemporary novelist in this study 
subscribes to the Hegelian precept wherein the mind 
patterns the world and consciousness creates fre.rdom:
The absolute goal, or, if you like, the 
absolute impulse, of free mind ... is to make 
its freedom its object, i.e. to make freedom 
objective as much in the sense that freedom 
shall be the rational system of mind, as in 
the sense that this system shall be the world 
of immediate actuality ... In making freedom 
its object, mind's purpose is to be explicitly, 
as Idea, what the will is implicitly. The 
definition of the concept of the will in
abstraction from the Idea of the will is 'the
free will which wills the free will'.
The will's activity consists in annulling 
the contradiction between subjectivity and 
objectivity and giving its aim an objective 
instead of subjective character ...3
Hence the artist pursues his own Eden through the 
novel of artifice and play, the novel which is iniiroduced 
as an act of self-conscious yet objective creation 
standing outside the world or beyond its confines. 
Nevertheless, the fiction owes much to the world outside
it, 'for the source materials are those belonging to the
"real" world and the author's experience in society.
But it has been at a further stage filtered through the 
artistic consciousness and transformed by it. As 
Poirier has noted, "the creation of America out of a
3 G.W.F. Hegel, H eg et'-6 Vkttotopky o a RxghX, 
trans. T.M. knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1952; reprint, 1978), pp. 32-3.
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continental vastness is to some degree synonymous in the 
imagination with the creation of freedom, of an open 
space made free ... for some unexampled expansion of 
human consciousness."^ Just as Burlingame and Ebenezer 
create themselves in the course of The Sot-Weed I'-actoJ, 
so is this a metaphor for the function of art to determine, 
renew, and expand consciousness, to postulate and enlarge 
a mental region of infinite creative possibility and 
endless potential for freedom, a realm in which the 
subjective quest for freedom becomes universal.
Play is a corollary of the freedom of consciousness 
in the novel, and this is nowhere better demonstrated 
than in Barth's short story "Lost in the Funhouse". The 
story is valuable in itself and further serves as a 
heuristic device for pointing out some essential precepts 
of the contemporary fiction under discussion, which I 
have labelled "ludic fiction". The title theme is, in 
fact, indicative of the probing of its author for an 
artistic playground, for a verbal labyrinth leading 
ultimately to an Eden of the mind. Written in 1967,
"Lost in the Funhouse" (hereafter abbreviated as "LF") 
articulates the central thrust of the fiction of Barth, 
Nabokov, Pynchon, Fowles, and Coover, and it illuminates 
a search which seeks the commitment of consciousness to
4 Richard Poirier, A WoAtd Eté eioheAe: Th ' Pt ucc
o; State tn AmeAtcan LtteA.^tuAe (New York: Oxford,
1966)^ p. 4.
itself, independent of the demands of society and the 
external world. The fertile ground of the story is 
analogous tc the contemporary aesthetic preoccupation 
of locating reality in words, in the signifier, as much, 
if not more so, as in what is signified. Words are the 
ideas which form the content of these fictions, and 
"LF", which may be taken as an engaging story of 
adolescence, may be seen as an equally competent and 
cogent view of the art of fiction, of the contemporary 
negation of verisimilitude, and of the role of the 
author as a magus in a funhouse of words.
As noted in the preceding chapters, the role of 
writer as magician juggling words means that the artist 
is necessarily a self-conscious artificer. Barth 
grapples with his task as a writer and ponders in his 
fiction the open-ended possibilities for consciousness 
to expand a world where all the signposts have teen 
dismantled and the limits made void. He incorporates 
into "LF" a challenging perspective of critical analysis 
in much the same way that a magician might expose his 
bag of tricks, doing so as much for his own fun as for 
an eagerly curious audience.
The ludic metaphor is particularly fitting for this 
short story because the dominant motif is that of games 
and play in a funhouse at an amusement park on a day of 
national celebration and revelry. The setting itself 
has many Edenic echoes; the weather is hot and pleasant.
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the sun is shining, and the sea presents an inviting 
vista. The funhouse itself may be taken as an effective 
symbol of the garden of play in industrial society, and 
on a further level, as a skilful metaphor for fiction 
qaa fiction. And Ambrose, the protagonist, is as 
innocent and na'ive as we may presume Adam to have been 
when his eyes beheld the first garden of pleasure. The 
other visible actor in the funhouse drama is, of course, 
the author, who takes on an Adamic role as well, as he 
creates his imagined world from the endless possibility 
awaiting his touch. The artist, like primordial man, 
is free to experience and create a unique universe.
It is through the consciousness of Ambrose, the 
young Adam, that the story reaches us. Ambrose, as we 
know from "Ambrose His Mark," one of the early stories
collected with "LF", named himself in the bee-covered 
garden of his parents' home. That is, in the sense 
that his (bee-shaped) birth-mark created an identity 
for him, it may be said that his personality intrinsically 
contributed to his nominative conception. Hence Ambrose
is innately gifted with a place in the world of artifice. 
He is reflective and clever and endowed with a special 
quality of being able to seek out experience and 
"reality" until he can uncover the bag of tricks which 
lies beneath the surface. For example, Ambrose gained 
an early initiation into "the shade-sun situation,
5 John Barth, "Lost in the Funhouse," in io6t tvi 
the. funkouy^e (New York: Bantam, 1969), p. 73. All 
future references are to this edition and will appear in 
parentheses.
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bhe game of spotting the towers of a power station 
first, Ambrose knew the solution by the time he was 
four years old. This car game of recognition is 
significant as it introduces and enlarges the metaphor 
of games throughout "LF", as it reveals the overriding 
thematic import of Barth's fiction.
The play world of the tale, a natural and unobtrusive
device presented in the context of a family on holiday,
is yet taken further by Barth to encompass the stage of
literary tricks and the mechanisms activating them,
Ambrose, as an authorial representative, must know the
game and participate in it, at least sometimes, although
he understands the artifice involved, for without the
game and the awareness it brings, the journey would
indeed be tedious. If meaning is denied on one level,
it yet is increased on another, for Ambrose, like Barth
with language, is self-consciously cognizant of the
props employed, and thus more highly conscious in general:
For as long as the boys could remember,
"looking for the Towers" had been a feature 
of the first half of their excursions to 
Ocean City ... Though the game was childish, 
their mother preserved the tradition of 
rewarding the first to see the Towers with 
a candy-bar or a piece of fruit. She insisted 
now that Magda play the game: the prize, she
said, was "something hard to get nowadays." 
Ambrose decided not to join in; he sat far 
back in his seat. Magda, like Peter, leaned 
forward ... The simple strategy for being 
first to espy the Towers, which Ambrose 
had understood by the age of four/''was to sit 
on the right-hand side of the car. Whoever 
sat there, however, had also to put up with 
the worst of the sun, and so Ambrose, without
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mentioning the matter, chose sometimes the 
one and sometimes the other. Not impossibly 
Peter had never caught on to the trick, or 
thought that his brother hadn't simply 
because Ambrose on occasion preferred shads 
to a Baby Ruth or tangerine.
The shade-sun situation didn't apply to 
the front seat, owing to the windshield? if 
anything the driver got more sun, since the 
person on the passenger side not only was 
shaded below by the door and the dashboard
but might swing down his sunvisor all the
way too (pp. 72-3).
Ambrose's knowledge of the tricks in the game on 
the way to the beach parallels Barth's self-consciousness 
about the tools of his craft. In the course of the story 
Barth compulsively opens the writer's bag of tricks and 
reveals not so much the beauty of his play with words 
as the possibilities for play itself. In this sense 
Barth's style is more similar to that of Nabokov in Ada, 
where a dominant toying with language and with the 
audience prevails above all else, rather than the style 
of Lottta, where language is exalted for the rich patterns 
of the poetic landscape it evokes. In much the same way 
that Pynchon in I/, makes a game with events and identities, 
so does Barth tease the reader as he plays with words, 
bantering us with our expectations for fiction. For this
writer, the form of a conventional tale is a subject for
raillery, since he sees it as an anachronism in the 
contemporary world. Barth implies, why should our fiction 
attempt to be true to "reality" when even thcicxternal 
world sometimes falls sho^t of attaining that expectation?
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What is beneath the surface of a story is not a model of 
reality waiting to expose itself, but rather an intricate 
network of verbal tricks and literary jokes, and it is 
these which "LF" points out. In doing so, it functions 
as a key foil to the assumptions of the conventional 
reader.
The studied emphasis on the fictive framework 
records a central concern "for the role of the imagination, 
for the facility of consciousness to create its own 
freedom. In this sense, contemporary literature elevates 
and exalts the role of the reader and makes him an Adam 
of sorts, for ultimately it is he who grasps the fiction 
and makes it live in his mind. As we shall see in the 
next chapter, Barth shares this idea with Fowles, who in 
The Magué shows Nicholas representing the role of the 
reader as he re-creates the fictions of Conchis in his 
mind. Here the reader is an active participant, a new 
Adam along with the author, for the creative sensibility 
of the audience is a requisite if meaning can be ascribed. 
No longer does the writer arrange a set pattern of reality 
to which the reader brings little but the power of literacy, 
The reader must be active in order skilfully to perceive 
the irony in ludic fiction. The reader is also a player.
He must make his moves on the chessboard of a story for 
the author to achieve the crucial communication and the 
agon of gamesmanship (in the classical Greek sense) for 
which he aims. The verification for the power of a story
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is not the outside world; it is not some conduction 
with "reality," but rather a merging with the imagined 
response in the reader's mind. The mind is the landscape 
on. which the funhouse is built. It is consciousness which 
contains and asserts the resources of freedom and creativity 
for the verbal Eden.
The extreme and deliberate authorial self-consciousness 
apparent in "LF" is a pellucid veil for the mind's 
knowledge of itself, for the natural shorthand utilized 
by the artist in the creative act. Barth is revealing 
the nerve endings and the energy transmissions which 
produce ideas and initiate the story or the novel.
It is as if he is slowing down the process of the literary 
autonomic nervous system and exposing all the neural
connections which must be made before any clear notion
of plot, character, or ideas can be conveyed. Yet: the 
point to which he returns again and again is the pivotal 
function of words. What literature amounts to is words.
This is no meagre assumption, for what words amount to 
are signifiers for the whole world.
The narrative begins in dramatic fashion. The idea
of the funhouse is introduced immediately and is immediately 
challenged. Taking the funhouse to be a concrete 
amusement at Ocean City, the reader finds himself drawn 
into Barth’s opening query with a spontaneous rush. He 
also discovers a quick sympathy for the protagonist 
Ambrose, although he does not know why Ambrose fet Is
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"fear and confusion" (p. (59). In the third sentence,
Barth articulates the basic plot of the story. Ambrose, 
he relates, "has come to the seashore with his family for 
the holiday, the oc.c,a6ton thetx Jndependenae
V a y , t h e  mo6t tmpoAtant 6ec. i i taA ko Liday the Untted
States. 0 {) AmeAteu" (p. 69). The major portion of the 
paragraph is, however, given over to a detailed analysis 
of italics: "A single straight underline is the
manuscript mark for italic type, Lvhtch tn tuAn is the 
printed equivalent to oral emphasis of words and phrases ... 
(p. 69). The digression takes over the story, and as 
illustrated in the foregoing paragraphs, the digression 
may be seen as a constitutive element, as much as the 
fears and confusions of thirteen-year-old Ambrose. We 
are reminded of the plaintive words of Todd Andrews, anti- 
hero of The Ftoattng OpeAa, that one can hardly think of 
composing a story without becoming entangled in a web of 
ultimately relevant digression.
The discussion of italics is amusing and absurd on 
first view; on reflection, it may seem a logical if an 
inexcusably banal and tediously literate interpretation 
of a technical convention,, The intelligent reader has 
something like Barth's digression on italics embedded in 
his mind, so that when such a form comes into view he 
automatically knows how to deal with its message. Thus 
the author's verbosity concerning something as trivial 
as italics indicates how the ge^tatt of an idea filters
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through our consciousness,, Once Barth has set up the 
matrix which encloses our concept of italics, then 
whenever he uses italics we recall the original framework, 
which triggers a chain reaction involving all the information 
we are storing mentally about italics. This process becomes 
a metaphor for the way language works and also for the 
essential artifice which the structure of fiction entails.
Digression serves as a continual reiteration of thg» 
funhouse of language. It tells us that literature is a 
synthetic creation, man-made, and establishes that 
literature, born of language, must return to itself as an 
entity of words moulded with ideas into a verbal whole.
Since the digression is an interruption and seemingly a 
tonal incongruity as well, it also foils the flow of the 
"real" story, and thus displays the arbitrary confines of 
the fictional reality. Hence we are informed that the 
narrative proper is no more essential to the progress of 
the "real” world than are the digressions themselves, 
for the total creation is an artifice of play, a function 
of imagination, and a suspiension of the external world for 
the game of words:
Ambrose was "at that awkward age." His 
voice came out high-pitched as a child’s if 
he let himself get carried away; to be on the 
safe side, therefore, he moved and spoke with 
det-lbdAate eatm and adult g/iavtty. Talking 
soberly of unimportant or irrelevant matters 
and listening consciously to the sound of 
your own voice are useful habits for 
maintaining control in this difficult 
interval. En Aoute to Ocean City he sat in 
the back seat of the family car with his
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brother Peter, age fifteen, and Magda G_ 
age fourteen, a prett 
young lady who lived 
B Street in the
y girl and exquisite 
not far from them on
town of D______, Maryland,
Initials, blanks ; or both were often substituted
for proper names in nineteenth-century fiction 
to enhance the illusion of reality,. It is as 
if the author felt it necessary to delete the 
names for reasons of tact or legal liability.
Interestingly, as with other aspects of
realism, it is an that is being
enhanced, by purely artificial means. Is it 
likely, does it violate the principles of 
verisimilitude, that a thirteen-year-old boy 
could make such a sophisticated observation?
A girl of fourteen is t h e  p 6  y e h o t o g t c a l  
c o e v a l  o f  a boy of fifteen or sixteen; a 
thirteen-year-old boy, therefore, even one 
precocious in some other respects, might be 
three years h e A  e m o t i o n a l  j a n l o A  (p. 69-70).
The paradox which Barth illucidates is that realism, 
though seeking to be "reai," is as fictional and illusory
as any other mode of fiction, and that it is inherently
odd and incongruous for man to want the oxymoron of 
"real" fictions, for man to place the centre of fiction
outside himself instead of in the individual mind. The
false grounding in reality that, for example, Defoe 
used to buttress the acceptability of ^ o l l  F l a n d e A à  in 
1722, has outlived its original usefulness. Yet 
Barth's self-consciousness demonstrates that the power 
of verisimilitude cannot easily be dismissed. It shows 
that beyond the parody of realism and the ironies of 
literature lies the uncertainty of the contemporary 
novelist, Barth's style in "LF" and in The Sot-W e e d  
h ' a c t o A  is parodie; it is playing against something 
which must powerfully exist for the parody to have
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sardonic effect.
One weakness of Barth's ludic fiction is that he 
can posit no replacement for the organic whole of the 
traditional novel. He deçries its implausible 
plausibility while utilizing its conventions with 
provisos of parodie explanation crammed behind narrative 
action and character descriptions. He does not replace 
it with a new form for fiction, rather with an all- 
encompassing ironic tone of parodie display. The 
irony would be more convincing if the need for 
conventional foils were not so great, the author's 
dependence on them less overwhelming. Beyond the 
parody of "LF," one can see the nihilistic inanity of 
Burroughs' "cut-out-paste-in" novels; the potential is 
present.
Barth's central commitment to the ludic ethos 
retrieves him from the fiction of waste, and achieves 
a solid dialectical method mediating between convention 
and innovation. Moreover,, the action and humour of the 
story save its thesis from becoming a tendentious, 
academic one. We follow Ambrose on his journey, we 
laugh at his impatience and superior knowledge of the 
car game. We empathize with his adolescent insecurity 
and the pains of growing up. We are engaged by the 
lively descriptions of Uncle Karl, Magda, and Ambrose's 
mother . Despite the author ’ s protests to ■chi? contra.i y 
—  "’Is anything more tiresome, in fiction, than the
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problems of sensitive adolescents?'" (p. 88) -- the
desire of Ambrose for Magda and his awkward sexuality
create an amusing and convincing tension. The
interruptions are inserted by the author as running
tangents yet integrated with the action of Magda eating
a banana. Uncle Karl knocking ashes off his cigar on
the ventilator window, or the prickling sensation of
"plush upholstery" "through gabardine slacks in the
July sun" (p. 73). Barth will not let the reader
lose sight of the funhouse or its metaphorical import
for fiction:
Actually, if one imagines a story called "The 
Funhouse" or "Lost in the Funhouse," the 
details of the drive to Ocean City don't seem 
especially relevant. The beginning should 
recount the events between Ambrose's first sight 
of the funhouse in the early afternoon and his 
entering it with Magda and Peter in the evening. 
The middle would narrate all relevant events 
from the time he goes in to the time he loses
his way; middles have the double and 
contradictory function of delaying the climax 
while at the same time preparing the reader 
for it and fetching him to it. The 
ending would tell what Ambrose does while 
he's lost, how he finally finds his way out, 
and what everybody makes of the experience.
So far there's been no real dialogue, very 
little sensory detail, and nothing in the way 
of a theme. And a long time has gone by 
already without anything happening; it makes 
a person wonder,, We haven't even reached 
Ocean City yet: we will never get out of
the funhouse (p.. 74).
The funhouse is the controlling physical object 
of the "real" side of the story, of the children's 
trip to Ocean City. Simultaneously, we cannot forget 
the mental funhouse created for us by the fiction as
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both m.ecins and product. The digressions and the italics, 
the reiterated symbols of mirrors, maze, and labyrinth, 
articulate and promote the Adamic picture of an 
epistemological funhouse. For the way we come to know 
the world is a process of consciousness. The source 
of freedom is the knowledge of the mind's power to 
create, determining itself and the outside world. The 
funhouse is not only fun but important because within 
it the possibilities are limitless. The new Adam may 
grant himself, through his own creative energy, a 
renewed garden, a fertile mental landscape in the 
realm of words and ideas. "LF" is the story of fiction 
creating an artistic Eden„ no more nor less real than 
any other products of mind and consciousness, of which 
the world is a primary example. The mind patterns a 
verbal paradise through the perfections of form and the 
fine rhythms of language. To be involved in the movement 
of consciousness toward freedom is thus to be "lost in 
the funhouse". Barth posits nothing beyond the role 
of the imagination in the Eden of words. The notion 
is expansive and transcendent; it possesses the faint 
breath of the Emersonian vision, and it adumbrates the 
limitations of plot and convention for the goal of a 
fiction in which to live.
Just as Ambrose conjures most of the excitement of 
the funhouse through a plethora of imagined 'events and 
hopeful fantasies, the author similarly predicates his
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fictional play on the creative interaction between his 
mental patternings and the imagination of the reader.
For the author to perform his role as magus postulating 
an Edenic realm of play, there must be a responsive 
consciousness on the part of the reader. The audience 
must be willing to grant the role of gamesman to the 
author and to accept the active role of players 
themselves. In the same way that Ebenezer Cooke engages 
himself and his consciousness in the games and disguises 
of Honry Burlingame, or that Nicholas Urfe becomes 
absorbed in the mental play of Conchis, thus does the 
reader of "LF" need to aba,ndon himself to the full force 
of the fictional creation, suspending not only belief 
but all the requirements o,f the external world for the 
world of play. The laugh of Fat May at the entrance to 
the funhouse, the laugh which "you couldn't hear 
without laughing yourself, no matter how you felt"
(p. 7 6), signifies the ludic base of the Adamic creation 
and the compelling source of the magus's power to engage 
man's consciousness in the games of fiction.
As Ambrose wanders in the labyrinth of the funhouse, 
oblivious of the external world, fully conscious of 
the realm of play, he patterns a new world created by 
the force of mind. Here his imagination has plenary 
control and "the glittering maze" (p. 91) filled with 
mirrors and illusions absorbs his full attention. He 
is conscious of a freedom he had not known before. He
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is freed from the control of his parents and the need
to emulate the example of his older brother. He is
freed from the uncomfortable façade he exhibits for
Magda. He is alone in the world of play and although
lost, he feels calm and unafraid. Being lost in the
funhouse means for Ambrose a new consciousness, an
Adamic perception which patterns a world separate from
Ocean City, away from its'postlapsarian confines of
time and space, a dirty beach, and unrequited love;
He envisions a truly astonishing funhouse, 
incredibly complex yet utterly controlled 
from a great central switchboard like the 
console of a pipe organ. Nobody had enough 
imagination. He could design such a place 
himself, wiring and all, and he's only 
thirteen years old. He would be its operator: 
panel lights would show what was up in every 
cranny of its cunning of its multifarious 
vastness; a switch-flick would ease this 
fellow's way, complicate that's, to balance 
things out; if anyone seemed lost or 
frightened, all the operator had to do was.
He wishes he had never entered the 
funhouse. But he had. Then he wishes he 
were dead. But he's not. Therefore he will 
construct funhouses for others and be their 
secret operator -- though he would rather 
be among the lovers for whom funhouses are 
designed (p. 93-94).
Ambrose thus is metamorphosed into an artist, a magus
patterning a funhouse outside and transcending an
unredeemed landscape. Art is the redeemed landscape,
the New Eden, which is, on the one hand, an ephemeral
vision, and on the other, an eternal hope.
The artistic vision of the New Eden is the guiding 
motif and central experience controlling not only the
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world of "LF" but also the universe of Barth's major 
novel, The Sot-Waed FactdA, first published in 196C, 
seven years before "LF". The later, shorter fiction 
may be viewed as a less complex instance of the same 
aesthetic ethos, and as such the later work may be seen 
to furnish a useful groundwork on which to build an 
understanding of the labyrinthine and more difficult 
novel. In both, the protagonists create themselves 
through a fiction in which they choose to live. Ambrose 
seeks the Adamic comforts of a funhouse maze and comes 
to a new idea of himself and a promise for the future he 
previously doubted. Ebenezer Cooke creates a fiction 
which he pursues for a lifetime. The fiction becomes his 
identity. He employs the role of Poet Laureate, and 
having found a fiction wholly suitable to his temperament 
and his goals, he forges himself and his experience to 
the demands of the role. Even as he approaches death 
the fiction yields a pattern of interest and escape as 
he revises his UaAytandlad of sorts, the poem The Sot- 
Weed raetoA. Henry Burlingame, of course, is the 
archetypal magus-figure as he plays on reality with the 
cunning genius and multifarious disguises of a true 
illusionist, Ambrose, Eben, and Henry, each creates 
the pattern of his consciousness from a fiction he 
imposes on himself and the world. Each lives in an 
Adamic creation outside the confines of external reality. 
The separate visions are particularly Edenic as they
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fccus on an artful world of play.
One source of the complexity of The. Sot-(Plac'd 
factoà. (hereafter shortened to Vacto^) is the way Barth 
plays with the Edenic concept itself. He plays with it, 
he plays against it, he transfers it to art, he removes 
it from nature, he denies it to the New World, he uses 
it as motivation for the Old. The Adamic myth is the 
central foil for the adventure Eben pursues. As the 
promised land of Lord Baltimore's former colony is show;n 
to be barren ground, we witness geography yielding to 
the terrain of art to encapsulate the notion of an 
American Eden. The Adamic myth is the generating force 
behind the fiction of Ebeu's search for a poetry by 
which to live, and of Henry's desire for a primal past 
denied him. Thus the mytjfi pervades Barth's novel even 
as it is turned inward to the mind of man, even as it 
is reversed in the poverty of experience it brings forward. 
It is in this context that the main parody of ¥actoA, 
manifests itself, that the dominant irony bursts forth, 
and that the sardonic appeal of the work emerges.
Barth writes of Eben's Adamic quest with the inherent 
mirth of one who is aware of a tradition which he 
amusedly plays with and turns upside down.
As a Professor of English, Barth is fully 
cognizant of the Adamic model into which Vacton. would 
be placed, and he thus operates as magus from a position 
of controlling irony and pervasive self-consciousness.
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In the same way that the author plays with the concept 
of history, he demonstrates that the critical framework 
of the myth of the American Eden is an illusory fiction 
about fiction. He postulates all history as false 
because it imposes itself as an unambiguous, universal, 
and inflexible analysis of "reality". From Barth's 
perspective, history is rather a fiction, and cultural 
myths are illusions imposed by the false truths of 
questionable accounts and records reflecting limited 
individual consciousness rather than any outward "reality" 
about the external world. Barth plays with history as 
words and with words he creates his own history. Words 
qua words inherit a truth unavailable to "reality". Words 
pattern an imagined universe, words form the Eden of the 
mind out of the falsity of history and the cruelty of 
myths. We cannot challenge the validity of the Adamic 
realm of mind because consciousness is its source and 
product and its only touchstone. It does not have to 
measure up to "reality", for in its essential freedom 
it stands beyond the measures of the postlapsarian 
world, in the realm of the idea, annulling the 
contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity, 
as Hegel described it.
There are those who call for the American Adam to 
assert himself anew, for the expansive joy of the 
Emersonian vision of a new relationship with nature and 
fellow man to be implanted in the contemporary mind.
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R.W.B, Lewis, in his important study, has concluded on 
the note of a need for a new "party of hope," which he 
posits to overtake the age of containment and its ironic, 
pessimistic point of view. He has —  and I think it a 
valid issue demonstrated the inherent vitality and 
energy of the Adamic vision and its powerful source of 
creative ferment. Yet an unrealistic and faintly 
jingoistic need to "stand "up for America" pervades the 
conclusion of Thti ArmAtcan Adam, as Lewis discusses 
contemporary fiction:
These novelists do not, of course, write 
simply in order to keep alive some particular 
American tradition. Nor is it the tradition 
they are working in which accounts for their 
artistic accomplishment. But, taken together 
along with a few others, the novels I mention 
do suggest the indestructible vitality of the 
Adamic vision of life -- and what that vision 
can contribute fo the alchemical process of 
the narrative art. They suggest that the vision 
and the process which transforms it can, after 
all, continue to present us with the means of 
grasping the special complexities, the buoyant 
assurance, and the encircling doubt of the still 
unfolding American scene.6
Other critics writing about the dream of the American 
garden show, as Barth delineates, that the history of the 
nation has continually belied the myth, and that the 
myth itself is no more innately American than the scores 
of European immigrants who brought the hope of Eden 
with them as they sailed away from the decaying cities
6 R.W.B. Lewis, The. Am&^.tcan Adam: Innocence.,
T/iagedy, and TKadttton tn the. Mtmte.enth CayitufLy (Chicago: 
Ü. of Chicago, 1955), p. X98
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of the Old World to the (then) green shores of the New, 
Noble suggests that "ironically, it was the thrust of 
romantic ideology in Europe which made possible this
7
concept of American exceptionalism". In this suggestion 
he is supported by the evidence of Abrams in NataAaZ 
Sapc-^ i'iCLtafiai.l6m^  ^ that particularly in the aesthetic 
realm, the Romantic notion of a union between man and 
nature is capable of nourishing the creative mind and 
possibly, the Edenic imagination as well.^
Even as the writer rejects the geographical or 
metaphoric possibility of an American paradise, it 
lingers as a potent and yet-controlling motif, a source 
of central conflict and tension in fiction. The 
cumulative weight of the tradition is so great that 
the writer can scarcely elude its effect. Barth, no less 
than Nabokov, Bellow, or Mailer, yields to this mythic 
framework, if only to rebel against it. His hero, 
Ebenezer Cooke, is an undeniably Adamic figure as he 
seeks to create and define himself in the innocence and 
timelessness of the New World. In Noble's terms, Barth 
is testing "the national faith":
Our major novelists, from James Fenimore
7 David W. Noble, The. £tea.naZ Adam avid zke fVew 
Wo^td Gcn.d^n: The. Ce.nta.aZ Myth tn the. Ame.atc.aA kcvet
Stnae 1830 (New York; Grosset and Dunlap, 1968), p. 4.
S M.H. Abrams, Nataaat Supe.anataa.att4>m : Taadttton
and Re.voZutton tn Romanttc Ltt&aatuae (Londons Oxford 
University Press, 1971), p. 408.
Cooper to Saul Bellow, are public philosophers 
and theologians who continually test the national 
faith in an American Adam living in a New World 
Eden against their experience with the human 
situation; they must test the validity of 
innocence as the American condition. Until 
the national community ceases to define itself 
as a congregation of earthly saints living outside 
of historical culture, our novelists have no 
choice but to make their heroes philosophers 
and theologians who contrast their initiation g 
into the realities of America with this ideal.
Ludic fiction is Adamic because it is formed in the 
light of the challenge for man to create his Eden. The 
novel of play posits the impossibility of the pastoral 
myth to be realized. Nevertheless, it conveys the 
energy of that dream, its vitality and spontaneity, and 
transfers it to the ideal region of mind. Thus the 
dialectic completes itself. It comes full circle as 
the myth, begun as an idea in the mind of man and 
transformed into a call to action in society, returns 
to itself as an ethos of creative attainment. If 
the world cannot encompass the ideals of the mind, 
the mind can yet encompass the world. Barth's fiction, 
while denying the efficacy and presenting the falsity of 
the dream of a New World paradise, does nonetheless 
illustrate the mind's power to create its own Eden and 
to live in the fictional Eden it has created. Eben 
Cooke and Henry Burlingame pattern themselves according 
to their idea of what they want to be; as such they 
resemble Whitman's central hero who creates and names 
himself; "For if the hero of leaver o£ radiates a
Noble, op, att,, pp. 5-6.
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kind of primal innocence in an innocent world, it was 
not only because he had made that world, it was also 
because he had begun by making himself.
Poirier talks of the thrust in American fiction for
the idea to project itself. He demonstrates that American
writers have, from the beginning, found an inherent freedom 
in words, away from society and the external world. This
is particularly relevant 'to the Edenic novel of play since
the same dynamic of the primacy of mind is brought forward. 
The importance of a freedom regulated by consciousness and 
asserted by the creative power of the fictional imagination 
informs both the traditional Adamic novel and the ludic 
fiction of today. We are reminded of the creators of 
Humbert Humbert,, Van Veen, Ambrose, and Ebenezer Cooke, as 
Poirier discusses the essentially Edenic style of "'a 
distinctive American tradition within English literature":
The books which in ray view constitute 
a distinctive American tradition ... are 
early, very often clumsy examples of a 
modernist impulse in fiction; they resist 
within their pages the forces of environment 
that otherwise dominate the world. Their 
styles have an eccentricity of defiance, even 
if the defiance shows sometimes as carelessness. 
Cooper, Emerson,Thoreau, Melville, Hawthorne, 
Mark Twain, James —  they both resemble and 
serve their heroes by trying to create an 
environment of "freedom", though as writers 
their efforts must be wholly in language.
The classic American writers try through 
style temporarily to free the hero (and the 
reader) from systems, to free them from the 
pressures of time, biology, economics, and 
from the social forces which are ultimately 
the undoing of American heroes ....What
10 Lewis, op. att, ^ p. 49,
25,
distinguishes American heroes of this kind 
... is that there is nothing within the real 
world, or in the systems which dominate it, 
that can possibly satisfy their aspirations. 
Their imagination of the self ... has no 
economic or social or sexual objectificacion; 
they tend to substitute themselves for the 
world.
Such, then, is the critical heritage which forms
an intellectual background for the creation of Factor.
The thesis of this chapter is that while Barth mimicks
and plays ironically with the traditional notions of
the Adamic myth, he simultaneously incorporates this
myth as a central focus of meaning for his novel, and
goes further to postulate the ultimate non-historical,
non-geographical ludic realm of the Edenic creation of
mind. There is no denying that the hero is a new Adam,
12for "Ebenezer was born American," and was nurtured 
on an unusual love of words and verbal play. In fact, 
the opening paragraph of this herculean novel establishes 
Eben's connection with the games of verbal creation and 
announces his self-appointed role as poet: "In the
last years of the Seventeenth Century there was to be 
found ... one rangy, gangling flitch called Ebenezer 
Cooke ... who ... had found the sound of Mother English 
more fun to game with than her sense to labor over, and
11 Richard Poirier, A Woatd EtAewte/ie: The. Ptaae
c £ S ty le  tn  Ameatcan L t te a a tu a e (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1966), p. 5.
12 John Barth, The Sot-Wae.d Faatoa, rev. ed.,
(New York: Bantam, 1969),, p. 4. All future references
are to this edition and will appear in parentheses.
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SO rather than applying himself to the pains of scholarship, 
had learned the knack of versifying" (p. 3).
The next few pages confirm the aptness of Eben's role 
as the new Adamic hero of ludic fiction. We are told that 
one distinguishing feature of the protagonist is his self- 
effacing behaviour and his innocent outlook. We learn that 
his favourite pastime as a child was play-acting. Eben and 
his sister Anna, like Van* Veen and Ada, "might spend an 
autumn morning playing at Adam and Eve out in the orchard," 
or alternatively, they would "play word-games" (pp. 6-7).
The children are thus presented as free creatures in an 
Edenic child-world of play.
Much is made of Ebenezer's innocence and his naivete. 
His purity and his zealous desire to remain a virgin 
contribute to the bawdy humour of the piece, and illustrate 
its specific parody of the eighteenth-century novel.
Ebenezer's earnestness to maintain his virtue above all 
else is reminiscent of Richardson's novels Pameta and 
CZaatééa, and it is clear that one result of Barth's 
satiric style is to mimick the literary patterns of the 
early English novelists. Eben assumes the female role 
of chaste resolve against the encroachments of evil 
society and the temptations of the flesh. Yet the irony 
is that for Barth there is no such thing as "virtue 
rewarded," as there was for the more pious eighteenth- 
century epistolary novelist. '1
In this sense Factoa establishes a kinship wrth the 
ludic displays in LoZtta, Ada, and The. Faench Lte.ute.Hant*6
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Woman, all of which parody specific traditional novels 
and poetry. There is a tone of gamesmanship in which 
the author challenges the reader to fit the contemporary 
novel into the parodie reference the writer plays 
against. Fully to play this literary game the audience 
must be cognizant of the early English novel. A 
familiarity with the picaresque tales of Fielding will, 
for instance, create an additional centre of enlightened 
amusement for the reader of Factoa, A knowledge of 
Fielding’s theory of the comic-epic, conceived in the 
introduction to Jo-&epk Andaew-à, and an awareness of the 
idea of history which he articulates in Tom Jone6, will 
provide the contemporary audience with a deeper 
perception of the parodie and satiric motivation of the 
verbal games in which Barth indulges. The games exist 
for themselves in the dynamic of ludic fiction and the 
funhouse of language, but they cannot be fully appreciated 
without knowledge of the conventions and traditions 
forming the source material of play. There is no 
question that the average reader will miss much.
If Eben is the innocent Adam thrust upon the world 
with himself as his only resource, the world upon which 
he is projected lacks any propinquity to Eden. The 
Cambridge of the late seventeenth-century is described 
as a den of iniquity, with some of the eminent men of 
the day reduced to buggery and acts of sexual' perversion. 
Barth indulges himself in the games of ironic reversal
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as he creates Henry Moore and Isaac Newton as lecherous 
subjects for Eben's comminution, who prey on the bodies 
of the young men at Trinity College. Barth allows the 
excesses of human nature to overtake any ostensible 
veracity.
London comes across as a city of ubiquitous vice apd 
scrofulousness. It is a centre for pimping, prostitution, 
and colonial intrigue. The pub frequented by Eben is an 
unlikely haunt for an innocent young man wishing to 
remain so. His Adamic nature is hard pressed by the 
rough demands of city life. Much of the humour of the 
early chapters is generated by Eben's steadfast ignorance 
of the ways of the world and his totally unconvincing 
transcendence of it. Not a stupid lad, the protagonist 
is yet uncommonly obtuse. Barth's overstatement of 
Eben's natural innocence forms a central parody 
throughout the novel, wherein the writer attenuates the 
Adamic myth by showing its patent absurdity and its lacK 
of cogency as modat opeaandt. Hyperbole is thus 
incorporated as an important aspect of style. The 
focus is not on the destruction of the myth but rather 
on the games which can be played with it and the general 
parodie fun involved.
Ebenezer begins his quest for the New World on the 
most inauspicious of terms. He is turned out by his 
father much like Adam in Faaadt^e and presented
with one last chance of redeeming himself. Nearly
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penniless, he is on his own against the world, Henry 
offers assistance, but his help is of a most dubious 
nature and seems to spell only more trouble for the 
hero. The chronology of hardships is intense with 
threats against his life. Chapter Fourteen alone 
presents an absurd excess of problems challenging the 
Adamic optimism of the hero: "The Lauaeate Ï6 Exposed 
to Tlvo Ai^a64>tnatton-& o£ Ckaaaetea, a Ftaaey, a Neaa- 
Pe£loi\)eatng, a Neaa-Muttnij, a Muadea, and an AppaZZtng 
Colloquy Between Captains o£ the Sea, All Wtthtn the 
Space o£ a Feu) Fage^" (p. 258). We cannot take the 
horror seriously and of course, we are not meant to.
The ironic tone of the work assures that the audience 
will fully suspend belief in the conventions of realism 
and verisimilitude, that they will accept the parody 
for what it is, that they will appreciate how well 
Barth can play the game.
Despite his sufferings and misfortunes, Ebenezer 
is filled with joy at the prospect of writing poetry 
and hailing the pristine quality of the New World.
Like Adam and Eve at the threshold of the primal garden, 
he is, as an artist, still "dizzy with the beauty of the 
possible" (p. 12). Notwithstanding the numerous trials 
which Barth renders in full picaresque, comic-epic 
detail, Eben retains a sense of wonder. The key to 
Ebenezer's resilience in the face of near-disaster is 
his sense of identity as a poet. In him, Adam and the
poet are fused. Everywhere he goes, Eben announces his 
,ro„ie as Poet Laureate wit^ the unquestioning confidence 
of the Adamic hero secure in the limitless possibilities 
of the future. As the poet for the pastoral landscape 
of Aiderica, Eben compares his role with that of Virgil 
and he announces his fervour to extol the fineness of the 
New World garden which the house of Calvert will transform 
into an ideal example of the middle landscape mediating 
between European civilization and the untamed wilds:
"Trees felled, towns raised, a very nation planted in 
the wilds" (p. 83). When this original conception is 
turned on its head in the wars, vices, antinomy, and chaos 
which confront Ebenezer in the New World, he transfers his 
Adamic commitment to the artistic pursuit. Virtually held 
a prisoner at Malden, in the midst of a drug and 
prostitution ring, he achieves his finest hour as a poet 
in composing the jeremiad entitled The Sot-Weed factoa.
Clearly, poetry becomes the New Eden for Ebenezer 
as the inability of any land or territory to fulfill that 
claim is made manifest. Aud ironically, it is this poem 
decrying the New World Eden which dialectically asserts 
itself on the European mind and foments anew the Adamic 
search in the mind of the potential emigrant. The idea 
returns to itself as the creation of a verbal Eden and 
as such, it focuses a powerful declaration to the world. 
Critics in London hail the poem as a satiric triumph and 
they are generous with encomiums about "its rhymes and
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v/it ... the characterizations and the farcical action".
The poem is praised as both an interesting example of 
verbal play and an unquestionable instance of the fruits 
of the New World Eden, as one writer observed; "It 
h eaa.ioa6 tktng that Baltimore, 4o anxtoa^ to pea^uade 
0 {) the elegance o£ htA £oamea Valattnate, should 6 0 
kaadly u6e that Falattnate* 6 £ta.6t Poet, when the veay 
poem he de6pt6e6 t6 oua tntttal paoo£ o£ Maryland's 
ae£tnement" (p. 816). Eden is maintained through the 
resources of art. Moreover, for the poet and his 
audience, the aesthetic act not only structures the 
patterns of reality; the Adamic consciousness makes 
freedom possible as the poetic experience creates the 
world. Barth, like Whitman and Wallace Stevens, 
postulates the role of poet as prime creator, the magus 
in the garden:
We have become familiar ... with the notion 
of the poet as the magician who "orders reality" 
by his use of language. That notion derived 
originally from the epochal change -- wrought 
chiefly by Kant and Hegel —  in the relation 
between the human mind and the external world; 
a change whereby the mind "thought order into" 
the sensuous mass outside it instead of 
detecting an order externally existing.
Whitman ... adapted that principle to artistic 
creativity with a vigor and enthusiasm unknown 
before James Joyce ... What is implicit in 
every line of Whitman is the belief that the 
poet paoject6 a world of order and meaning 
and identity into either a chaos or a sheer 
vacuum; he does not dt & eooea it. The poet ^^
may salute the chaos; but he creates the world.
13 Lewis, op. ctt,, p. 51.
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Henry Burlingame is the other prime creator in the 
novel, and his role is crucial as it delineates the ways 
of the magus. As Ebenezer*s childhood tutor and indeed 
his guide throughout the tale, Henry sets the pattern 
for the prototypical gamesman, trickster, and player. 
Henry is the magus paa excellence, for his life is a 
series of games and play as he changes personalities 
and throws off identities"faster than Eben changes 
clothes. He is similar to Conchis in The Magu6 as he 
converts from one role to another, creating himself 
anew each time. Henry exuberantly projects to Eben 
the gift for formulating a new self, an ability which 
not only once causes Eben to ask himself "whether I am 
Magus, Messiah, Lazarus, or the Prodigal" (p. 517).
Yet Ebenezer follows Henry's lead in asserting the 
artistic capacity to bring forward a new reality in which 
to live, a reality posited by the creative resources of 
mind. Henry has the grand artistic hubris to pattern 
the world from his image of himself. The consciousness 
of the moment determines life for Burlingame and 
generates the disguises and-fictions through which he 
challenges the external world. Eben must corroborate 
for himself the efficacy of Burlingame's fictions and 
the transcendent power of the imagination, even as he 
hopes for an ultimate, answerable reality:
"Thou'rt not John Goode thyself?" Anna 
asked half seriously.
Henry shrugged. "I have been, now and
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again; for that matter, I was once Francis 
Nicholson for half a day, and three Mattawoman 
tarts were ne'er the wiser. But this I'll 
swear; albeit 'tis hard for me to think such 
famous wights are pure and total fictions, 
to this hour I've not laid eyes on either 
Baltimore or Coode. It may be they are all 
that rumor swears: devils and demigods,
whichever's which; or it may be they're 
simple clotpolls like ourselves, that have 
been legend'd out of reasonable dimension; 
or it may be they're naught but the rumors 
and tales themselves."
"If that last is so," Ebenezer said,
"Heav'n knowns 'twere a potent life enough I 
When I reflect on the weight and power of such 
fictions beside my poor shade of a self, that 
hath been so much disguised and counterfeited, 
methinks they have tenfold my substance 1"
(pp, 763-64).
On many occasions it is the games of Henry which 
rescue Eben from the brink of disaster. Inasmuch as 
Eben lives in a self-created world of poetry, it can be 
said that the games of disguise and the fictions of 
identity preserve for him the Adamic realm. Games 
predicate an Eden beyond the external world. Playing 
Lord Balitmore, Henry officiates at Eben's birth as a 
poet and offers confirmation of Eben's quest for the 
New World paradise and the artistic garden. Throughout 
the dangers and adventures in the journey of Eben, it is 
the sustaining power of the game which saves him from 
defeat and destruction. Fictions are the central anodyne 
of Ebenezer's life. By pretending to be Bertrand, he is 
able to reach the shores of America. By accepting the 
fictions of Burlingame as Colonel Sayer, John Coode,
Tim Mitchell, and Nicholas Lowe, the poet is rescued
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each time from imminent threats. And indeed, it is the 
supreme fiction of poetry which most often calls Ebenezer 
back to the safety of the mental preserve. At Malden tne 
resources of poetry save Eben from becoming an indentured 
servant, and the last fiction of Eben's life, that 
Burlingame is in his midst as a new Nicholas Lowe, 
preserves for him a stability and continuity. Ebenezer 
is bequeathed by Henry a last fiction in which to live.
Much of the story is devoted to Burlingame’s 
fictions, the disguises of a master gamesman. Burlingame's 
life demonstrates the power of imagination to transform 
reality and by so doing, he shows Eben the verbal road 
to paradise. As a magus figure, Henry inherits a love 
of words and verbal play. Thus his life as a seaman, 
just as Eben's job as a clerk in London, proves 
unsatisfactory. He becomes a street singer, is adopted 
by a group of gypsies, decides to become a scholar at 
Cambridge, supports himself as a tutor to Eben and 
Anna, and finally assumes the multifarious disguises 
and games of the master spy and creative intriguer. 
Burlingame is the Adamic figure who plays at creating 
a world which defies reality as he first creates 
himself from his own Platonic image. It is Burlingame 
who initiates the discussion about the primacy of 
imagination. An early exchange between the two heroes 
puts forward the opposing claims of reality" add fiction. 
Henry of course offers a pogent argument for the
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dominance of the mind over the external world, for the 
primacy of the mental realm and the fictions it creates. 
Burlingame, like the contemporary novelist, turns 
conventions upside down. The controlling metaphor 
remains the game and the skill of the artificer:
"Nay, 'tis to the point. Suppose today 
I'd claimed to be Burlingame, for all my 
alteration, and composed a line to fit your 
quatrain ... suppose I'd challenged your own 
identity, and made you out to be the clever 
imposter. At best you'd have no proof, 
would you now?"
"I grant I would not," Ebenezer admitted
"... If I had learned aught of your past, 
however, the discrepancies could be charged to 
your own poor posing ,.. And if I brought a few 
of your friends in on the game, or even old 
Andrew and your sister, to disclaim you, i'll 
wager even you would doubt your authenticity."
"Mercy, mercy I" Ebenezer cried. "No more 
of these tenuous hypotheses, lest I lose my 
wits I ..."
"True enough," Burlingame said good- 
humoredly, "I wished only to establish that 
all assertions o,f thee and me, e'en to oneself, 
are acts of faith impossible to verify."
"I grant it; I grant it. 'Tis established
like the " He waved his hand uncertainly.
"Marry, your discourse hath robbed me of 
similes; I know of naught immutable and 
sure I"
"'Tis the first step on the road to 
Heaven," Burlingame smiled (pp. 140-41).
The theme of tenuous reality versus created fiction 
is one which Burlingame uses to challenge Eben, and is 
similarly projected by the author as a central ambiguity 
for his audience to ponder. Barth as narrator leaves
2 6 2
the door slightly ajar as to whether Eben's last fiction 
really is a delusion. As for John Coode, both hero and 
villain of the tale, Eben and Barth pose the question,
"Dici the 'real' John Coode exist at all independently 
of his several impersonators, or was he merely a fiction 
created by his supposed collaborators ...?" (p. 814).
The dense anfractuosities of the story seem to indicate 
the Hegelian notion that no external world can exist 
apart from the mind's power to create it. As Burlingame 
assures Ebenezer, "'The world's a happy climate for 
imposture'". He goes on to conclude, "'Tis but to say 
what oft I've said to you ere now, Eben; your true and 
constant Burlingame lives only in your fancy, as doth 
the pointed order of the world'" (p. 357).
Barth repeats this point many times. It is a central 
idea of his theory of fiction and it is of the utmost 
significance for consciousness. Just as the force of 
Eben's imagination as he looks at the night sky makes 
him think he will fall into it, the palpable reality 
is the one we create for ourselves, or alternatively, 
the one the artist creates for us. This is the function 
of the ludic novel as it posits an Adamic realm in 
which man temporarily becomes absorbed. The play realm 
of art is the mediating link between the harshness of 
external reality, the betrayals of fiction, and the 
Adamic conatus of consciousness. Eben happily concludes, 
as does Barth, with a fiction superseding reality as an
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anodyne for the limitations of that reality, as a last 
source of freedom: "‘I sjfiall make the piece a fiction!
X'li. foe a tradesman, say nay, a factor chat comes to 
Maryland on‘s business, with every good opinion cf uhe 
c o r n ^  and is swindled of his goods and property. All 
Li.y trials I’ll reconceive to suit the plot and alter 
just enough to pass the printer!'” (p. 494).
Marts final recourse, as Barth sees it, is to the 
play of words in fiction. When the dialectic of the 
novel completes itself, we are left with the fiction of 
words. Words thus assume for the contemporary writer 
of ludic fiction an ultimate primacy, a crucial 
importance. Like Nabokov, Pynchon and Fowles, Barth 
pursues words not only for the ideas they convey but 
as things in themselves, entities which sparkle when 
placed in the right light. Part of Barth's quest as a 
writer is the self-conscious task of utilizing words 
for their maximum effect, in the proper context, with the 
correct: syntax, but more than this, he extends the goal 
of exposing the beauty and infinite variability and 
richness of the language. It is not unusual, then, that 
Barth should write novels, publish them, and in 
subsequent years, work on revising them. He has altered 
the ending of The FZoattng Opeaa and rewritten parts of 
Facto a. in the latter case he explains his objective 
as "a'.'zireiyj where possible, to make this long narrative 
d q a swifter and more graceful" (Foreword tc Second
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Edition),
Just as Ambrose enjoys the mirrors, mazes, and 
labyrinths in the funhouse at Ocean City, Ebenezer and 
Henry also love the reflections, distortions, and 
allusions that the play with words involves, Eben's 
idea of a poet is one who plays with the conceits and 
traditions of language, one who toys with words as 
children play-act through the richness of their 
imaginationV Indeed, his nurture of verbal delights 
may be seen as an extension of the Edenic world of 
childhood play carried into the adult world. As 
Robert Neale stresses, "'To have a playtime and 
playground with a story to tell and a game to play is to 
have a life of adventure that surpasses all description 
... What happens to the child in play can happen to 
the adult. And when it does, paradise is present.
Certainly for Eben and for Henry words never lose 
their power to thrill and to excite with primal energy 
and natural beauty. Ebenezer, like the novelist, is;
more than amused by words; they sustain him. Poetry is
4
his aatéon d'etae» Barth cannot help undercutting the 
seriousness with which Ebenezer pours out hackneyed 
verse and trite fustian. Hence he exerts a strong 
ludic tone as he has the protagonist dilate upon the
14 Robert Neale, quoted by David L. Miller in God6 
and 0am6 : Towaad a Theology o{^  Play (New York: World
Publishing, 1969), p. 115.
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sublime characteristics of poesy. If the hero enshrines 
poetry, then the author strips it of exaltation and 
removes it to the funhouse. Ebenezer's poetic pomposity 
as the new Laureate is a bauble the novelist must match 
with his games of parody:
"LOCKET'S!" CRIED EBENEZER to his cabman 
... With what a suddenness had he scaled the 
reaches of Parnassus, while his companions 
blundered in thq foothills! Snatching out 
his commission, he read again the sweet, word 
Lauaeat and the catalogue of Maryland's 
excellencies.
"Sweet land!!" he exclaimed. "Pregnant with 
song! Thy deliverer approachethi”
There was a conceit worth saving, he 
reflected: the word dettveaea, for instance,
with its twin suggestions of midwife and savior 
... He lamented having no pen nor any paper 
other than Baltimore's commission, which after 
kissing he tucked away in his coat.
"I must purchase me a notebook," he 
decided. "'Twere a pity such wildflowers 
should die unplucked. No more may I think 
merely of my own delight, for a laureate 
belongs to the world" (p. 104).
Much significant dialogue between Eben and Henry 
centres on the word, and on the games they can play with 
language. Poetry was at first a hallowed pantheon for 
Eben; for Henry it was always a funhouse. The funhouse 
is replete with mirrors of intense reflection. Burlingame 
emphasizes the importance of meaning and of technique.
He cautions, "'You must attend the koM of 't'" (p. 146),
He shows that the gaming is never arbitrary or wasteful; 
that levels of meaning ripple the surface cf words^ that 
play betrays neither intensity nor depth. The irony
■;6S
IS that Eben, nascent poet that he is, formulates
conceits but does not always probe meaning. Scmecxmes
he is unaware of the multiplicities of thought .o bo found
in his verse. In additiop to establishing it0 2.y and
suggesting a parodie counterpoint, Henry as audience
supplies meaning. This creative interchange between
poet, and audience is a basic postulate of the verbal
Eden. The readers must possess a capacity for wonder
and for play which the aesthetic process is able to
encage. Like ludic fiction, Bren's poetry and the
many fictions within the fiction only assert their
power inasmuch as they generate a creative response
from the audience. The organism of poetry grows and
expands as both author and audience challenge each
other in play :
" ... 'tis but a dt££eaent view ye get as 
author. Nor am I the dullest of readers:
I quite appreciate the wordplays in your 
first quatrain, for instance."
"Wordplays? What wordplays?"
"Why, chaste Penelope, for one," Sayer 
/Henry/ said. "What better pun for a wife 
plagued twenty years by suitors? *Twas a 
clever choice!"
"Thank you," Ebenezer murmured.
"And Andromache's bouncing boy," Sayer 
went on, "that was pitched from the v/aj.ls of 
Ilium "
"Nay, 'tis grotesque!" Ebenezer protested.
”I meant no such thing!"
"Not so grotesque. It hath the salt of 
Shakespeare."
t l
"Do you think so?" Ebenezer reconsidered 
the phrase in his mind. "Haply it doth at 
that. Nonetheless you read more out than I 
put in."
"'Tis but to admit," Sayer said,. ’I 
read more out than you read out, which was 
my claim. Your poem means more to me,"
"I'faith, I've not the means to refute 
you!" .Ebenezer declared. "If thou'rt a 
true sample of my fellow planters, sir, then 
Maryland must be the muse’s playground, and 
a paradise for iDoetsi..." (p. 135),
Perhaps the quintessential illustration of the 
verbal game in Factoa is the chapter devoted to the 
discussion of the Hudibrastic. To the modern reader 
the Hudibrastic is an arcane form. But in the later 
seventeenth-century it was a popular and amusing 
entity. Significantly, the Hudibrastic is closely 
associated with games and play, as it is conspicuous 
for its humourous quality of mock-epic, satire, and 
burlesque,, Samuel Butler initiated this iambic- 
tetrameter, rhyming-couplet form with bold, outrageous 
rhymes which took one off guard since they were slightly 
jolting and irregular, and somehow, deliberately, not 
quite right. The Hudibrastic is like the mirror in the 
funhouse -- reflected in it, "reality" is more lively, 
thoroughly playful, because the image is slightly, 
humorously, awry. On another level, the Hudibrastic 
functions as a metaphor for the ludic ethos of contemporary 
fiction, Barth postulates it as a symbol of,.,%he gaming 
interchange between poet and audience. This is finely 
adumbrated in the rhyming exchange between the whores
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at Malden and most particularly, in Chapter Twenty-Six 
of Part Two, in both the agonistic engagement between 
Eben and Henry and the rhyming impossibility of "month"„ 
Playfulness is the dominant tone in the Hudibrastic 
lesson Eben is pleased to give Henry:
"'Tis kind pf you to praise the piece," 
Ebenezer said. "Haply 'twill be a part of 
the Maaylandtad,"
"I would I could turn a verse so well.
But say, while ’tis fresh in my mind, doth 
pea6on6 really rhyme with vea.6ton6, and folk 
with soak'd?"
"Indeed yes," the poet replied.
"But would j^ t not be better," Burlingame 
persisted cordially, "to rhyme vea.6ton6 with 
dt6pea6tovL6, say, and £otk with 6oak? Of 
course, I am no poet."
"One need not be a hen to judge an egg," 
Ebenezer allowed. "The fact o f t  is, the 
rhymes you name are at once better and worse 
then mine: better, because they sound more
nearly like the words they rhyme with; and 
worse, because such closeness is not the 
present fashion. Vtipeaitovi and veaiton:
'tis wanting in character, is't not? But 
pea.6on and vea^ton —  there is surprise, 
there is color, there is wit! In fine, there 
is a perfect Hudibrastic" (p. 410).
Gaming with literature is for Barth, as for his 
characters, not only the process of fiction but the 
product as well. As Eben uses "the sot-weed factor 
conceit" (p. 498) to structure his major poem, so the 
author also employs this conceit as the grand design 
and symbol of his novel, for it is in "the sot-weed 
factor conceit" that art and artifice become joined 
in the synthesis of play. The funhouse of words and
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language provides the ground for the verbal garden of 
fiction, the imagined Eden beyond the confines of the 
external world, beyond the disappointments of Malden and 
the oil-clogged waters of Ocean City. Like the differences 
in the journals of Sir Henry Burlingame and Captain John 
Smith, the ambiguity of contemporary ludic fiction 
enshrines the power of imagination and consciousness to 
pattern the world. It exalts the truly Edenic creative 
possibilities of man, demonstrating the capability of 
mind, and corroborating the remarkable freedom of a 
paradise lost in the funhouse of language.
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Magué: Freedom in the Verbal Eden
The imaged Word,f it is that holds 
Hushed willows anchored in its glow.
It is ithe unbetrayable reply 
Whose accent no farewell can know.
"Voyages,” Hart Crane
Grounded in the real world, T/ie is never
confined by it, for Fowles, like Barth, explicitly probes 
the possibilities of the imagined world and the creative 
act. The central thrust of the novel transcends any 
consideration of verisimilitude. Fowles presents a 
panorama of the modern world. He chronicles two world 
wars, personalities from the Third Reich and the Greek 
Resistance; he pays homage to the conditions of existential 
man. There is a deliberate attempt at internationalization 
among characters. Black man, American, European all take 
part. The cast includes hundreds, if not thousands, and 
the fabric of the twentieth century is probed and discussed. 
History plays an important part. Both Conchis and Urfe 
represent the character of their respective generation. Yet 
for all these sometimes Iciborious efforts on the part of 
the author to ground his fictive world in the appearance 
of reality, the most striking feature of this novel is 
its ultimate obliviousness to time and space and the 
demands of quotidian life,, No thematic perceptions are 
pushed out into the real world. For all the political
Z 7 l
tal„k, politics is seen as an irrelevance.
What matters, what is given significance, is the 
labyrinthine mystery of the unique created world at 
Bourani. Conchis offers Nicholas a masque in which to 
live, a world of players, games, and acting. Agaxnst 
the rich created.ambience of Bourani, Nicholas' previous 
life seems paltry, and Nicholas equally small in relation 
to its vast mysteries and cosmic allure. The novel is 
conceived as an elaborate dt pa^&age,, but unlike
the traditional work of its kind, it only minimally 
seeks to project its protagonist, converted and transformed, 
toward a superior capacity for dealing with the problems 
of life or society. The aim is more centrally aesthetic 
as freedom for the individual becomes integrated with the 
artistic consciousness, Conchis re-educates Nicholas in 
terms of an artistic sensibility. Art, not life, ij 
the ultimate goal, the supreme quest. In a parallel 
irtshion Fowles, as the writer-magus, wants to propose 
' r' the ro,::der the insular rhythms of the self-contained™
1,:**■ .Limiting pageant.
he iirpcrtance of the creative act dominates the 
: .-...t.'-.etic Dej.iefs of John Fowles. It forms an obsessive 
. The ouest toward the primacy of words and the 
lexical Eden impelled the author to revise the original 
novel eleven years after its first publication in 1.966,
In hrs Foreword to the new edition of The Ua.gu6 Fowles 
notes, "Though this is not, in any major thematic or
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narrative sense, a fresh version of The. M&gua, it is 
rather more than a stylistic revision. A number of scenes 
have been largely re-written, and one or two new ones 
invented",^ In the interest of a new audience or perhaps 
new purchases by a large old audience (with the revised 
version in hardback making the best seller lists in both 
American and Britain in 1977), Fowles overstates the 
impact of the revised edition. For our purposes in this 
chapter, the revisions serve only to underscore the 
Edenic main currents of the fiction and to corroborate
our arguments. As Fowles continues in the Foreword:
No correlative whatever of my fiction, 
beyond the above, took place on Spetsai during 
my stay. What ground the events of the book 
have in reality came after I had returned to 
England. I had escaped Circe, but the withdrawal 
symptoms were severe. I had not then realized 
that loss is essential for the novelist, 
immensely fertile for his books, however painful 
to his private being. This unresolved sense of 
a lack, a missed opportunity, led me to graft 
certain dilemmas of a private situation in 
England on the memory of the island and its 
solitudes, which became increasingly for me 
the lost Eden, the domaJ^ no, 4an-6 nom of Alain- 
Fournier —  even Bevis's farm, perhaps.
Gradually my protagonist, Nicholas, took on, 
if not the true representative face of a modern 
Everyman, at least that of a partial Everyman 
of my own class ahd background. There is a 
private pun in the family name I gave him.
As a child I cogld not pronounce tk except j
as.&, and Urfe really stand/for Earth —  a S/
coining that long preceded the convenient « 
connection with Honoré d'Urfé and
1 John Fowles, T/ie A
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1977), p. 5.
2 I , p. 9.
Doubtless there will be studies examining the 
significance of the differences between the original and 
the revised TTie Uaga^, This, however, is not one of 
them. Textual comparisons between the two books can and 
ought to be made, but they do not strike this reader as 
central to an understanding of the fiction beyond one 
fundamental proviso: that the nature of Fowles's
act of revision acknowledges the pressing commitment of 
ludic fiction to formal matters and to a resolution in 
verbal patterns. Despite Fowles's disclaimer, his 
changes are hardly substantive; they are more those of 
the conjurer sorting his cards the order is slightly 
different but the substance remains essentially the same.
We are reminded of a similar pursuit by Nabokov while 
readying his Russian novels for publication in English; 
he wanted to polish his verbal gems before presenting 
them to the English-speaking public and sought to eliminate 
all signs of youthful folly and literary immaturity.
Fowles avers about Tke Magu^: "it must always substantially
remain a novel of adolescence written by a retarded
3
adolescent". He is perhaps too harsh with himself in 
order that the reader will not be. Clearly, the efforts 
of ludic writers to perfect their works long after 
initial publication signify an absorption with the 
creative act pe,^  and an unwillingness to depart from 
the fictional garden of play.
3 IbÂ^ d,, p. 9.
274
What Fowles does in Tke. Magu-6 and in the act of 
revision, is to posit the artistic creation as its own 
best world. No attempt is made to demonstrate life 
outside it as worth anything but a trifle as much as 
the rich, warm patterns in the carpet of the creation.
Thus life creates a world for art, and not the other way 
around. Aesthetic consciousness precipitates full being. 
The Eden of the mind, that perfect world of pleasure, 
pain, and perception, exists as the only significant 
reality. To this end, Conchis presents for Nicholas, 
as Fowles presents for the reader, the brilliant masque 
of Bourani, with its hundreds of actors and many splendid 
illusions, Nicholas arrives on Phraxos an empty, serious, 
and mundane young man. He takes things at their face 
value and he is literal to a pedantic degree. He writes 
bad poetry, and he yearns for an artistic capability 
which does not assert itself. For Conchis, all this 
makes Nicholas an ideal subject, and the liberties which 
Conchis takes with Nicholas are to an obvious degree 
those same liberties which Fowles perpetrates on his 
equally unsuspecting readers. Conchis and Fowles 
deliberately thwart any attempt at ultimate explanation 
or meaning. Nicholas greets the domaine of Conchis 
with quizzical resignation: "I was back in a
polysemantic world" (p. 267). The mystery is the meaning 
and the reality is in the mind. Once again, nothing 
exists but that we think it does. The mind provides
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both platform and audience. The seeker claims his 
Ederij and the Eden he claims is the free play of his 
own mind, the aesthetic gratification of image and word. 
With this goal , Conchis stands as Epicurean man 
holding forth the mental beauty, the serenity, of the 
created world.
This Eden of the mind, the playground of artifice 
and invention, of games and laughter, determines the 
imagery, setting, and ton^ of the novel. The movement 
is away from the confines of English society to the 
freedom of the Hellenic world. The cradle of Western 
thought, Greece is now a playground. Always an Arcadia,, 
Greece pulsates with the untranuneled life of Eden.
The choice of setting is a conscious one and works on 
many levels. It is Edenic in that it presents a natural 
world untainted by the ravages of time. Indeed, Conchis 
makes the point that even during the terror of the 
German occupation of the Island, Bourani escaped harm. 
Clearly, the world of Conchis is a protected paradise, 
wherein both art and nature have free rein. And if anyone 
has the power to re-create the Golden Age, that man is 
Maurice Conchis. He moulds nature and art into a perfect 
symmetry. With his resources of wealth, culture, and 
intellect, Conchis is able to create a unique synthesis 
of art with nature. One ps reminded of a comment by 
Polixenes in T/ie  ^ Tate.: "this is an art/Which
does mend naturechange it rather, but/The art itself
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is nature (IV, ill, 94). Without the resources of his 
Hellenic paradise, withoujp fauna and flora and the power 
of water, beach, and sky, the mask/masque of the magus 
anu his troupe would fall rather flat. The mystery 
evaporate 13 when that setting is lost; and then this Eden 
becomes internalized in a new consciousness. The 
transference is complete; one is sustained by the mind's 
image.
The games and tricks in Th^ Maga-ô echo Nabokovian 
intellectual flirtations with the reader. If Nicholas 
feels trapped in a maze, like Theseus, so does the 
unsuspecting reader. It is hard to "get the story 
straight". Again, the polysemantic world foils one's 
attempts to pin down reality. The traditional novel 
is used as a foil, for when one finally feels he grasps 
the plot, Fowles, through the figure of the magus, turns 
it upside down again. The act of creation is the 
essential thing; the performance matters, not the 
analysis. If Nabokov gives the reader chess problems 
to figure out, or at leasp to dally with, Fowles 
presents us with the great puzzle of Bourani to try 
to piece together. That is, we, like Nicholas, feel 
compelled to analyze, and Fowles is happy to engage us 
in the game if we like. Conchis points out, however, 
that it is only when one can get past the calculation 
and the analysis, that one can know the essence. The 
interesting paradox is that no matter how intensely
Conchis/Fowles pushes against the claims of interpretation, 
and the rational utility pf language, the work of art 
cannot exist without the search for meaning. That is 
why Nicholas makes a good subject for Conchis's 
experimentation. His dogmatic lust to know sustains 
him when the game, is about to exhaust itself. Beyond 
the game is the word and the world it creates; this is 
the meaning. Bradbury elucidates the ludic and gamesman­
like dimension of Fowles'g; fiction:
So of course the real Magus in the novel 
is the novelist himself. The creation of 
myth in our modern employment of language is 
itself a precarious exercise. We use language 
to explore contingent reality and not to create 
systematic and numinous orders. But the 
rationalistic use of language (here roughly 
associated with Urfe) implies no logic, no 
structural unity .... Fowles*s purpose in 
the novel is therefore to create a context of 
illusion and a language of illusion which has 
the capacity to go beyond theatrical play and 
display and actually create structural myths. 
This, by confronting and connecting the world 
of rationalism q,nd the world of illusion, 
feeding the former into the latter and then 
withdrawing it in its incompleteness, he does. 
Urfe's dilemma i!s at the beginning of the 
book that of losis of structure .. . And the 
Magus, whatever his deceptions, provides 
precisely that -- a structure for feeling art, 
and history, which makes possible not only 
a fantastic world beyond 'reality' but art 
itself. In order to create this awareness,
Fowles has in the book effectively to create 
another language or at least another order 
of notation. Tel do that, a large part cf 
the action of the book has to develop in a 
world of feigning, convention, stylization, 
which we historically associate with high 
art, art as play and d i s p l a y . ^
4 Malcolm Bradbury, on the.
Stat-z 0  ^ the. Wovef. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1973), p. 270.
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The whole process of converting Nicholas to the 
meaning and the mystery of art is a self-conscious 
enterprise for players and creator. One weakness 
of the novel lies in the problem of this intense 
authorial self-consciousness becoming an artificial 
presence in the work. This is especially true of 
Fowles"s elaborate attempt to ground the novel in 
cultural context and literary allusion. For example, 
the belaboured explanations of Artemis lose in subtlety 
what they mean to convey in syml)olic aura. The many 
reference-book comments which Fowles, through the 
researches of Nicholas, presents to the audience only 
contribute to an artificiality which cloys the reader.
It is as if Fowles tells us to read each chapter side 
by side a comparable one from Thz Gotd&n Bough, yet he 
is without the ability to integrate such material with 
his story. Such is manufactured invention at its worst. 
Fowles is confined by the limitations of his aesthetic 
in the same way that the device of the stage and the 
dramatic charade of set-piece acting boxes in Conchis.
The self-preoccupation of magus and author may mean the 
stultification of the reader. The way around this is 
outside, and neither magus, nor author seeks that route.
The result is internalized jargon and a self-absorbed 
style. Graff speaks to Fowles’s dilemma when he comments, 
"The writer's problem is to find a standpoint from which 
to represent the diffuse, intransigent material of
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contemporary experience without surrendering critical
5
perspective to it".
To postulate his idea of art, Fowles presents a 
veritable panorama of cultural references. Often the 
function of thesp cultural references is to merge life 
with art. For example, tlpie landscape of Bourani is 
described, in Nicholas' first person narrative, with 
painterly expansiveness in terms of a Claude canvas: 
"When I reached the central ridge, I looked back.
From that particular point the house was invisible, 
but I knew where it lay. The sea and the mountains 
floated in the steady evening sunshine. It was all 
peace, elements and void, golden air and mute blue 
distances, like a Claude ..."  ^ Nicholas recognizes the 
painting above Conchis*s mantlepiece to be a Modigliani 
reproduction. Conchis corrects him; it is an original 
Modigliani and the woman portrayed is Conchis's mother, 
who figures in the story. The staring brown eyes which 
dominate the picture belong to Conchis. This image 
delineates the magus's ever-watchful control, even when 
the pictures are shown to be fakes. Again, in Conchis's 
bedroom, art probes reality and confers life. Art, not 
life, is the determining factor in Conchis's inner 
sanctum:
5 Gerald Graff, Agatn^t
Idza^ tn ModzAn Soctety (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1979), p. 238.
6 John Fowles, The Magu^ (New York: Dell, 1973),
p. 67. All future references are to this edition of the 
1966 original novel and will appear in parentheses.
But its tone was ^peally set by its two 
paintings: both nudes, girls in sunlit
interiors, pinks, reds, greens, honeys, 
ambers,'! all light, warmth, glowing like 
yellow fires with life, humanity, domesticity, 
sexuality, Mediterraneity.
"You know him?" I shook my head. "Bonnard. 
He painted both of them five or six years before 
he died." I stood in front of them. He said, 
behind me, "These, I paid for."
"They were worth it."
"Sunlight. A naked girl, A chair. A 
towel, a bidet. A tiled floor. A little dog. 
And he gives the whole of existence a reason."
I stared at the one on the left, not the 
one he had inventoried. It showed a girl by 
a sunlit window with her back turned, apparently
drying her loins and watching herself in the
mirror at the same time. I was remembering 
Alison, Alison wandering about the flat, naked, 
singing, like a child. It was an unforgettable 
painting; it set a dense golden halo of light 
round the most trivial of moments, so that the 
moment, and all such moments, could never be 
completely trivial again (p. 93).
It is interesting to note that Nicholas finds the painting
unforgettable insofar as it informs his experience of f#lt
life. That is, Ifhe painting engenders an aesthetic
response which in turn prompts Nicholas to re-evaluate
his experience with Alison. This is, in microcosm,
exactly what Conchis hopes to do on a larger scale.
Life is predicated on the aesthetic moment.
Art induces a consciousness which forms an Eden 
of the mind. As the acting magus, Conchis maintains a 
powerful artistic overview. As the magus-in-the-making, 
the potential creator, Nicholas also perceives life as 
a,.: essentially artistic pageant. This may reduce both
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people and nature to a figment of the artistic imagination. 
In a particularly amusing passage, as night brings 
aolitude to Bourani, Nicholas comments, "Outside, the 
crickets chirped monotonously, with a Webern-like 
inconsistency yet precision of rhythm" (p. 98). Conchis 
describes Lily, his putative childhood sweetheart, in 
specifically artistic terms: "Lily. She had, yes, I
suppose a Botticelli beaulpy, long fair hair, gray-violet 
eyes. But that makes her sound too pale, too Pre- 
Raphaelite" (p. Ill). Nicholas tells us that Conchis 
renders Bach on the harpsichord, not in a modern capacity 
or in a contemporary interpretation, but rather as the 
master himself would have done. Nicholas considers 
Lily to be acting "like a heroine in Chekhov" (p. 27 0). 
Conchis manipulates all his players with the controlling * 
force of the dramatist. Much is said of his power to 
reduce people to puppets. This dynamic also predicates 
Nicholas' behaviour with others. Similarly, 
the author falls afoul of his o’wn method, for he 
reduces the characters to fulfill his aesthetic goal.
The merit of the novel, and it is considerable, 
lies in the primary force of its aesthetic theme, which,^ 
in turn, is brought to the front by the categoric 
rendering mentioned above, Fowles pays homage to a 
cultural tradition. If frequent conscious artfulness 
becomes fulsome, Fowles*s style at its best is an 
effective defense against this. Often, the author's
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sardonic wit will serve a swift deflation to Nicholas’ 
studied pedanticism, as in the Webern comment. Frequently, 
the aesthetic motifs rise to a lyrical power and bring 
forward the Edenic image with skilful appropriateness. 
Bonnards form a central reference point, and it is, 
specifically, the playful ambience of Eden which 
unobtrusively strikes the reader. The lightness of 
touch and the vibrancy of colours are, in this context, 
exactly right. The Bonnards signify play and pleasure, 
and it is this playfulness of Eden which solidifies 
the essential artistry of the lost world which Conchis 
seeks to re-create as an Adamic perception in Nicholas:
Those Bonnards, their eternal outpouring 
of a golden happiness, haunted me; they were 
like windows on a world I had tried to reach 
all my life, and failed; they had reminded me 
of Alison, or rather of the best of my 
relationship with Alison, before; and now they 
bred a kind of Watteau-like melancholy in me, 
the forevergoneqess of pictures like L'EmbaAcatton 
pouA CythzAZ, As if Bonnard had captured a 
reality so real that it could not exist; or 
only as a dream, a looking back and seeing 
where the way was lost and if it had not been 
lost but it had been lost ... then I thought 
of Julie. One day I should see her so, naked 
at a sunlit window; my naked wife (p. 3 69).
The controlling leitmotif, the central Edenic 
image, of the novel is that of "the smile". It receives 
a particular aesthetic impetus early on, when Conchis 
presents the ancient stone face to Nicholas, in order 
for him to absorb its mystery. We recognize this, "the 
Leonardo smile" (p. 430), as the smile of all those who 
are touched by the mystery and wisdom of the Bourani
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masque. Even Mitford, the failed initiate, is possessed 
by the smile. It is the image most clearly identified 
with Conchis and his role of artist as magus, Lily has 
the capacity for this gifted smile; her mother possesses 
its serenity. Alison greets Nicholas with it on her 
reappearance. Eyen Nicholas, the difficult smiler, 
begins to know its meaning by the conclusion. The 
ubiquitous smile is the motif which classifies and 
explains the moral, or anti-moral, of the fiction.
With his back framed in the sunlight of Arcadia,
Nicholas is introduced to it by the magus:
"Go and sit at the table. With your back 
to the sun."
In a minute he appeared, carrying something 
heavy draped in a white towel. He put it 
carefully on the center of the table. Then 
he paused, made sure I was looking, before 
gravely he removed the cloth. It was a stone 
head, whether of a man or a woman it was 
difficult to say. The nose had been broken 
short. The hair was done in a fillet, with 
two side pieces. But the power of the 
fragment was in the face. It was set in a 
triumphant smile, a smile that would have 
been smug if it had not been so full of the 
purest metaphysical good humor. The eyes 
were faintly Oriental, long and as I saw, 
for Conchis had put a hand over the mouth, 
also smiling. The mouth was beautifully 
modeled, timelessly intelligent and timelessly 
amused.
"That is the truth. Not the hammer and 
the sickle. Not the stars and stripes. Not
the cross. Not the sun. Not gold. Not ytyi
and yang* But the smile" (p. 142).
In the smile Fowles transmits a sort of,aesthetic 
élan, a zeal for life and play secure for those who can
develop a mental and spiritual Eden. Those who share in 
the smile are "the elect," and they are chosen to form 
an elite coterie: "It was above all the smile of dramatic
irony, of these who have privileged information. T looked 
ap at Conchis‘s face; and knew I was right" (p. 14 3). 
the smile is for .those v7ho know the primacy of the artistic 
experience. The smile is bathed in irony and humour; it 
recognizes the inevitability of the joke and the necessity 
of the game, for such are the indispensable qualities 
cf the Edenic consciousness: "Suddenly the humor, the
absurd, tender, touching incongruity of the whole thing,, 
made me smile. I realized that it must be some elaborate 
joke of Conchis'b, mounted for my exclusive benefit,,
There was no need to rush about trying to discover how 
it was done" (p. 129). For Fowles, with his bag of 
clever literary tricks, with his riddles, the pursuit 
of the smile involves games and gamesmanship, and of such 
stuff is art created. Lily, as performer, acts in a manner 
toward Nicholas quite similar to that adopted by Fowles 
and Nabokov toward the reader: "She had a way of looking 
slightly obiquely at me, as if she knew something I did 
not —  not anything to do with the role she was playing, 
but about life in general; as if she too had been taking 
lessons from the stone head" (p. 164). Art, in its ironic, 
oblique pattern, revels in the glory of words and images, 
and attains meaning as the process of revealing the 
elemental smile, the only Eden in which the postiasp-arian
world may share. In the context of the godlike smile, the
words of Hegel lend clarification:
The ideal work of art confronts us like a 
blessed god. For the blessed gods [pt Greek 
artJ7, that is to say, there is no final seriousness 
in distress, in anger, in the interests involved 
in finite spheres and aims, and this positive 
withdrawal into themselves, along with the 
negation of everything particular, gives them 
the characteristic of serenity and tranquillity.
In this sense Schiller's phrase holds good;
'Life is serious, art cheerful.' Often enough, 
it is true, pedants have poked fun at this, on 
the ground that art in general, and especially 
Schiller's own poetry, is of a most serious 
kind; and after all in fact ideal art does not 
lack seriousness —  but even in the seriousness 
cheerfulness or serenity remains its inherent 
and essential character. This force of 
individuality, this triumph of concrete freedom 
concentrated in itself, is what we recognize 
... And this results not at all from a mere 
satisfaction gained without struggle, but on 
the contrary, only when a deeper breach has 
rent the subject's inner life and his whole 
existence. For even if the heroes of tragedy 
for example, are so portrayed that they 
succumb to fate, still the heart of the hero 
recoils into simple unity with itself, when 
it says: 'It is so.' The subject in this
case still always remains true to himself; 
he surrenders what he has been robbed of, 
yet the ends he pursues are not just taken 
from him; he renounces them and thereby does 
not lose Man, the slave of destiny,
may lose his life, but not his freedom. It 
is this self-reliance which even in grief 
enables him to preserve and manifest the  ^
cheerfulness and serenity of tranquillity.
In the Leonardo smile we find the key to Fowles's 
aesthetic, as well as a stylistic device of central 
unification. The omnipresent smile pursues us throughout 
the work, and in it Fowles places the task of unifying the
7 G.W.F. Hegel, Hzgzt^-6 LzctuAzJ> on
Aa z , trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1975), Volume I, pp. 157-8.
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various tales and fables. Alison, a New World figure 
of primal, instinctual innocence, is bathed in the smile 
from the very beginning, and the progress of the novel 
may be. seen as Nicholas' increasing awareness of the 
importance of her endowment. Alison, Lily, Rose are 
variations on the virgin-temptress figure of Eve; they 
seek to expose Nicholas to the pleasures of an internalized, 
self‘"Created world, an Eden of the mind. Lily de Seitas 
performs the same function. The masque, art, is an 
elaborate process of initiation into the Edenic consciousness, 
as are the many tales Conchis unravels under the benign 
sky of Bourani. The story of Conchis's mythical childhood 
has obvious meaning beyond the facilitated introduction 
of Lily and Rose, and later, their mother. Through it 
Conchis describes a paradisaic world where art, nature, 
and play are indulged with the freest rein possible.
It is this memory of Eden which Conchis seeks to convey 
to his pupil.
Figures as diverse as de Deukans and Nygaard are 
joined in their parallel pursuits of the Adamic experience.
For de Deukans, collector and aesthete, limited though 
he was by the compulsion to possess, the path to Eden 
was a directly aesthetic pne made secure by paintings 
and music. For Nygaard, primordial Adam, naked and 
alone, the stars and the cosmos, no less than God, 
provided the essence of an innocent, prelapsàlh'ian world.
For Conchis, the masque is Eden; it allows him tO connect
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pusty present, and future, to play forever, and to live 
eternally, through others and by means of his creations..
The masque, the game, and the quest form the splendid 
godgarric- of art, which provides the full gratification 
cf creator and audience.
Even the wars and the German Occupation of Phraxos, 
dark and destructive plagues of the postlapsarian world 
counterpoise Eden only to 'provide moments of ultimate 
freedom, those moments when the wild primal cry of 
ztzatkzAXa rings out. The significance of the smile, 
the only ultimate significance, Conchis relates, asserts 
itself even in the finality of death. As the force of 
art and beauty, it alone survives. The smile is the 
lost world of Eden preserved. Nicholas, rational, 
Apollonian man, the doubter, challenges the smile, and 
this is Conchis's reply: "Because a star explodes and
a thousand worlds like ours die, we know this world is.
That is the smile: that what might not be, is" (p. 142).
The process of the masque simulates, by means of artifice 
and invention, those various paths to the smile which 
Conchis had already narrated, but which Nicholas, 
rational and artless, must experience to understand.
A significant scene of initiation into these mysteries 
is the trip Nicholas and Alison take to Mount Parnassus,, 
an event given impetus by Conchis and stimulated by the 
Bourani experience. It is not in the masque but of it, 
and it is an act undertaken by Nicholas only with the
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greatest reluctance. He is not won easily by the smile. 
Alison leads the way into nature. She is free in a way 
Nicholas is not. Totally without pretension or pose, 
she picks flowers and plays with the children. Her 
spontaneous joy greets everyone; only Nicholas will not 
partake of it. Her smile annoys him, as do the smiling 
faces of the peasant children. He wants to go back into 
the car to escape the encounter, but the Edenic power of 
the landscape overwhelms him nonetheless. He begins to 
know the essence of the experience when he realizes that 
"what we were doing began to loom like the precipitous 
blue shadow of Parnassus itself, over what we were" (p. 240) 
The prose attains a high lyricism; Fowles renders an 
unspoilt world, nature before the Fall. The journey 
toward Parnassus takes Nicholas into a fresh world, 
different from the world of Bourani in that it is totally 
natural and unconfined. Here there are no barbed wire 
fences nor threatening guards, just the essential world 
of man, woman, and nature, Nicholas begins to have an 
inkling of what it means to be magus:
"We wound up the high hills and glens 
and had a picnic lunch in a meadow dense with 
clover and broom and wild bees. Afterwards 
v/e passed the crossroads where Oedipus is 
reputed to have killed his father. We stopped 
and stood among the sere thistles by a dry 
stone wall; an anonymous upland place, 
exorcized by solitude. All the way in the car 
up to Arachova, prompted by Alison, I talked 
about my own father, and perhaps for the first 
time in my life without bitterness Or blame; 
rather in the way Conchis talked about ktà 
life" (pp. 240-4)•
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As the actual ascent to Parnassus begins, the
Edenic vision is inescapable. The imagery of Eden
preponderates: "The path mounted ... through clearings
alive with butterflies" (p. 243). A lone mule and his
raster greet the couple on their way. One solitary hut
offers refuge. Despite the difficulty of the long
climb, Alison moves effortlessly. Nicholas has a
harder time, but even he xs dominated by the relentless
spirit of the quest. Wild and infinite, Parnassus
becomes a garden of perceptual delights. An Edenic
landscape extends for miles, in all directions that man
can see. The imagery is as lush as the scene described,
and the scene is as luxuriant as any known in the Golden
Age. I shall quote a long passage which, as much as it
describes nature, delineates as well the vibrancy of the
artistic imagination and the exuberance of the world it
creates. Poetry claims nature; the smile is complete;
Fowles's aesthetic of the verbal Eden is clear:
Before us lay a wide basin of green turf, 
ringed with peaks and festooned by streaks 
of snow still clinging to the screes and 
hollows of the steeper slopes. Everywhere 
there were flowers —  harebells, gentians, 
deep magenta-red alpine geraniums, intense 
yellow asters, saxifrage. They burst out 
of every cranny in the rocks. They enameled 
every stretch of turf. It was like stepping 
back a season. Alison ran on ahead, wildly, 
and turned, grinning, her arms held out, like 
a bird about to take wing; then ran on again, 
dark blue and jeans blue, in absurd childish 
swoops.,
. . we came on beds of violets in bloom, 
huge purple flowers that had a délicata
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scent; and then at last, hand in hand, we 
struggled up the last few yards and stood 
on the little platform with its crowning 
cairn. Alison said, "Oh my God, oh my 
God. "
On the far side a huge chasm plunged 
down two thousand feet of shadowy air. The 
westering sun was still just above the 
horizon, but the clouds had vanished ...
We seemed to stand immeasurably high, where 
land and substance drew up to a narrow 
zenith, remote from all towns, all society, 
all drought and defect. Purged.
... it came to me like a shock ,.. that
the reality of the place was as beautiful,
as calm, as ideal, as so many poets had 
always dreamed it to be,
..„ There came back the memory of that 
mind-voyage Conchis had induced in me under 
hypnosis. They seemed almost parallel 
experiences; except that this had all the 
beauty of its immediacy, its uninducedness, 
its being-nowness (pp. 244-5).
On Mount Parnassus, a place traditionally sacred
to the Muses, Nicholas gains his first real artistic
insight. Spontaneously, he knows beauty. It reaffirms 
life, heightens one's awareness; but fundamentally, it 
exists in and for itself. In this context Fowles's 
aesthetic becomes clear; aestheticism stands for itself.
Art is its own ultimate experience, yet this aesthetic 
experience does not limit one to an isolated and effete 
perspective; rather, Fowles suggests an ever-expanding 
perspicacity and a cyclic return to the primordial 
myth —  the renewal of Eden. These Parnassian implications 
postulate the central concern of the novel. If Fowles 
is guilty of none of the aesthetic dandyism which marked
the English Parnassian movement of Pater and Wilde and 
their followers, his aesthetic perception is similar to 
that of late nineteenth-century L^aAt pouA t ’dAz. Fowles 
joins the revolt against meaning, and for this he could 
not have created a better foil than the character of 
Nicholas, with his compulsive drive for interpretation 
and answers. The magus leads Nicholas away from the 
search for meaning; he is‘urged to stop worrying about 
the ultimate reality and to enjoy the mystery. The 
unrestrained play of the word, the masque, and the game 
offers its own rewards.
The Edenic consciousness is not the glorification 
of form against the merit of substance. It is not 
ignoring the water for the wave, as Nicholas would like 
to suggest when he decries "this characteristically 
twentieth-century retreat from content into form, from 
meaning into appearance, from ethics into aesthetics, 
from aqua into unda" (p. 364). It is for Fowles a 
drinking of the water without ignoring the pleasure of 
the wave, without separating them and classifying, since 
as Hegel demonstrates, form' and content describe an 
organic whole and are inseparable. Fowles treats the 
novel as a masque in which full sen^ous participation 
prepares the path to an understanding of the aeschetic 
involved. To enjoy the fineness of the word and the 
beauty of the created world, is to play in tRe^Eden of 
the mxnd; this is the closest man comes to the me^nrng
292
of art. In fact, such is the only meaning of art which 
the postlapsarian world allows. Alone, the Edenic 
memory of art survives. The act Nicholas performs for 
Alison upon learning of her putative death offers an 
analogy to the function of the novel, and it echoes the 
lament of Humbert Humbert upon learning of the death of 
I.clita: "I did not pray for her, because prayer has
no efficacy; I did not not cry for her, because only 
extroverts cry twice; I sat in the silence of that 
night, that infinite hostility to man, to permanence, 
to love, remembering her, remembering her" (p. 4 00)„ 
Conchis rejects the pradition-bound novel of the 
nineteenth century: "The novel is no longer an art
form". He burnt "every novel I possessed, Dickens,. 
Cervantes. Dostoievsky, Flaubert. All the great and 
the small, I even burnt something I wrote myself 
when I was too young to know better" (p. 92). The 
traditional narrative is not valid in our time, but 
Conchis the magus cannot stop from making fictions; 
the masque at Bourani is his fiction and his life.
The polysemantic world of the smile determines the ludic 
novel. For Fowles, as for Nabokov, to "look at the 
harlequins" is the art of the contemporary novel. 
Nicholas' capacity as the new magus derives from his 
ability to participate in the rites of Bourani and to 
pursue the new Eden as a state of mind. The direct 
Edenic import of the Parnassian episode becomes more
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obvious as Chapter Forty-Two carries the imagery already 
quoted from Chapter Forty even further. Arcadia 
transforms, rf only ephemerally, a conventional modern 
couple into the new Adam and Eve. Nicholas is learning 
to "drink of the water," to taste the truth of a new 
consciousness:
She stopped. We both noticed it at the 
same time. Below us to our right, the sound 
of water, a lot of water.
"I’d love to bathe my feet. Could we get 
down?"
... At one end was a waterfall some ten 
feet or so high,, A pool of limpid water had 
formed beneath it. The clearing was dense 
with flowers and butterflies, a tiny trough 
of gold-green luxuriance after the dark forest 
we had been walking through. At the upper 
edge of the clearing there was a little cliff 
with a shallow cave, outside which some 
shepherd had pleached an arbor of fir branches. 
There were sheep droppings on the floor, but 
they were old. No one could have been there 
since summer began.
"Let's have a swim."
"It'll be like ice." 
"Yah."
She pulled her shirt over her head, and 
unhooked her bra,grinning at me in the 
flecked shadow of the arbor; I was cornered 
again.
"The place is probably alive with snakes."
"Like Eden."
... she wore a smile of touching innocence. 
She did not know it, but it was at first for 
me an intensely literary moment. I could 
place it exactly: Engtand'^ Hzttcon7 I had
forgotten that there are metaphors and metaphors, 
and that the greatest lyrics are very rarely
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anything but direct and unmetaphysical.
Suddenly she was like such a poem and I 
felt a passionate wave of desire for her.
In was not only lust, not only because she 
looked, as she did in her periodic fasnion, 
disturbingly pretty ... but because X was 
seeing through all the ugl\', the unpoet ic 
accretions of modern life to the naked real 
self of her — - a vision of her as naked in 
that way as she was in body; Eve glimpsed 
again through ten thousand generations 
(pp. 2154-5) .
The essence of Nicholas' experience in the literary 
and metaphorical Arcadia is learning the process of the 
new Eden and attaining a mental synthesis of it. The 
episode at Parnassus must continue at Bourani and in 
England as well. It is something to be retained and to 
grow into a central consciousness. Such is the mystery 
Conchis presents for Nicholas and which Fowles's 
aesthetic conveys to the larger audience. Nicholas, 
however, still feels the initial hesitancy which he can 
abandon only towards the last pages of the novel, and then 
with ambiguity. He, much like the modern reader, wants 
more control over the fictional Eden-game: "Yet in the
end this unflawed natural world became intimidating.
I seemed to have no place in it, I could not use ir and 
I was not made for it" (p. 52). In order to convert 
Nicholas, the Garden of Eden must be transferred to his 
mind. Eden becomes art, and this is epitomized exactly 
in the conception of the "theatre in the garden".
After the war, Conchis planned and executed a theatre 
in the garden of Bourani where the masque was performed.
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Clearly, the process of the masque is established 
as a remembrance, homage, and continuation of the 
preïlapsarian world. It is this theatrical, aesthetic 
rden which seduces Nicholas, the reluctant new Adam..
Fowles arranges his novel theatrically, in three 
parts, as in a djcama; the artifice is conscious and 
parallels the method of Cone his with his theatre-in-' 
the-garden. Eden merges in art, where its world of 
play and games continues unscathed by the disturbance 
and ravages of the tenebrous postlapsarian universe.
The conscious artifice, the studied aestheticism, 
occurs to Nicholas early in the book, Conchis presents 
his story with "an air of stage management", "as a 
dramatist tells an anecdote where the play requires"
(p. 106). The characters are referred to as players, 
and late in the novel Nicholas even uncovers an elaborate 
series of stage directions. Fowles unmistakably throws 
out these motifs as a suggestion of his own conception 
of the new novel. The author places his fiction in the 
revolutionary mould of contemporary art obviously and 
cogently when he has Conchis discuss the theory of 
drama, Conchis presents his theory to Nicholas who 
as the new magus will eventually carry it forward:
He smiled almost benignly at me 
then went on. "Before the war we used to 
amuse ourselves with my private theatre 
here. And during the war, when I had a 
great deal of time to think, and no friends 
to amuse me, no theatre, I conceived a new 
kind of drama. One in which the conventional 
relations between audience and actors were
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forgotten. In which the conventional scenic 
geography, the notions of proscenium, stage, 
auditorium, were completely discarded. In 
which the continuity of performance, either 
in time or place, was ignored. And in which 
the action, the narrative, was fluid, with 
only a point of departure and a fixed point 
of conclusion." His mesmeric eyes pinned 
mine. "You will find that Artaud and 
Pirandello and iprecht were all thinking, 
in their different ways, along similar 
lines. But they had neither the money nor 
the will —  and perhaps not the time -- to 
think as far as^I did. The element that 
they could never bring themselves to discard 
was the audiencp." He spread his arms.
"Here we are all actors. None of us are as 
we really are" (p. 366).
A similar rite of renewal is what Fowles proposes 
for the novel in discarding the nineteenth-century 
tradition of the well-formed work with its obligatory 
conventions and techniques, the straight plot line, the 
omniscient narrator, the ubiquitous moral message. 
Fowles posits the invalidity and emptiness of such 
codification and rigidity for the novel of today. In 
a way similar to what Conchis suggests, the ludic novel 
created by Fowles depends crucially on the involvement 
of the reader in the various games, word plays, tricks, 
and manoeuvres that form the aesthetic. Without the 
participation of the reader, a participation demanding 
much more than the passive reading of words and a 
suspended disbelief, this theory of fiction does not 
work. The reader is active, and his countermove on the 
chessboard of the fictive encounter is essential. 
Moreover, in a lighter fashion, if the author did not
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offer us the pick of his bag of tricks, the work 
would not be as engaging as we find it. Part of the 
message is clearly to lose oneself in the "funhouse" 
of the fiction, as John Barth suggests in his short 
story.
Inasmuch as .Fowles indulges the mythic character 
o.t the Edenic consciousness, his characters become 
proportionally one-dimensional, as was noted above.
It is a director's game. Part of this problem works 
cleverly to the author's advantage, for the protagonist 
is one who views all women as but variations on the 
theme of his own sexual gratification. Hence, until 
the last chapters of the novel demonstrate the protagonist's 
compassion for Kemp and Jojo, it is quite conceivable 
that Nicholas as narrator makes little differentiation 
between the various women he knows. But even with this 
in mind, it is hard to read the novel and feel anything 
but the cardboard flimsiness of Alison, Lily, and Rose. 
Indeed, they are stock characters. Alison is a New 
World provincial, rather coarse but lively and enthusiastic 
and full of love and/or masochism. Lily and Rose are as 
identical as their twin status suggests. They are 
upper-class, attractive, well-mannered. Each woman 
is blonde-haired, sexy, intelligent, and male-manipulated. 
Nicholas relates to each "girl" in a basically lustful 
manner:' each is the same to him ultimately; only the 
façades differ.
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Fowles offers no independent characterizations 
of these central figures; the reader views them as one- 
dd7..:.ens2.onally as does Nicholas. If synibolic meaning 
rests in our perception of Alison as the new Eve, we 
have also to see Lily and Rose in this light as well.
The readers® perception is conceived along the same 
lines as Nicholas'. All the women resemble Botticelli's 
Primavera, graceful and innocent, even the original 
Lily Montgomery and Lily de Seitas. Nicholas® comment
on the Eve-like consistency of the women he knows 
conveys the substance of this weakness, as well as the 
power of its mythic continuity for the re-creation of 
the verbal Eden: "I thought of other baths shared;
Alison. Of how all naked women become the same naked 
woman, the eternal naked woman ; who could not die, who 
could only be celebrated as I was going, in an obscure 
way, to celebrate Alison in Julie; almost to mourn her 
as I remet and remade her" (p. 433-4). The danger of 
Nicholas' solipsism and the author's banal self-indulgence 
becomes apparent,, Safely to solipsize characters is 
to destroy their life and palpability for the pleasure 
of the panorama and in the interest of the chess move.
The fiction may pursue its; quarry into the ground.
The central character does not escape the creator's 
weak hand. The establishment of Nicholas as the new 
magus rests with his potential for the Adamic experience, 
for creating his own internalized Eden. Fowles resurrects
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the sterility of the exploitative young man and gives 
him centre stage. The portrayal of Nicholas as the new 
creator would be more cogent if the protagonist were 
not an obvious puppet of Fowles no less than of Conchis.
On the other hand, the reader's doubt of Nicholas' 
capacity for the masque and the growth it entails provides 
much of the suspense and tension of the novel. It is 
part of Fowles's game of unpredictability. Lack of 
definition of the protagonist leaves the avenues of 
stratagem open and it generates mystery and enticement.
Such lack of depth in characterization is a calculated 
loss, a chess sacrifice, if you will, but a loss nonetheless 
The scope of the novel extends into the mythic and 
aesthetic; since the artist-magus is thoroughly and 
obviously in control, characters become a secondary 
consideration. They exist to be manipulated and for 
the humour of the manipulation. The gratification and 
the perpetuation of the smile are essential.
With the reduction of characters to symbolic 
values, relationships become tableaux. Thus it is 
understandable that Nicholas acts similarly with the 
different women. We have already remarked that Nicholas' 
behaviour with Alison and Lily is confined to sexual 
and emotional seduction. This dynamic becomes, clarified 
if we remember that the quest for sensual gratification 
plays a large part in the Edenic consciousness? as was 
demonstrated in Chapter Fpur about Ada. The prelapsarian
300
world glorified erotic pursuits and the free rein of 
the senses. On Bourani this process continues. Perhaps 
the most unconventional portrayals in the book those
‘’polymorphous perverse" couplings which Conchis 
orchestrates. Love and sex take prime importance.
Sexual imagery is plentiful. Eden is an untainted 
sexual playground, and Priapus reigns in the garden.
At first, Nicholas is ignorant of the identity
and meaning of the statue in the garden- With his
promiscuous past and his pursuit of sex as an avenue
of assertive triumph, Nicholas has a completely non-Edenic
understanding of Eros. For him, sex involves not love
but performance, and the sort of grossly insensitive
exploitation which Eden countervails. Hence Priapus
offers a significant initiation. As Nicholas tells
Conchis about Alison for the first time, Eros confronts
him in the garden:
... once again X felt no real sympathy 
coming from him;f simply his obsessive and 
inexplicable curiosity. I told him I had 
recently written a letter.
"And if she doesn't answer?"
I shrugged. "She doesn't."
"You think of her, you want to see her 
-- you must write again." I smiled then, 
briefly, at his energy. "You are leaving 
it to hazard. We no more have to leave 
everything to hazard than we have to drown in 
the sea." He shook my shoulder. ’'Swim'."
"It's not swimming. It's knowing in 
which direction to swim."
"Towards the girl. She sees through 
you, you say, she understands you. That is 
good."
I was silent. A primrose and black 
butterfly, a swallowtail, hovered over the 
bougainvillea around the Priapus arbor, 
found no honey, and glided away through 
the trees. I scuffed the gravel. "I 
suppose I don't know what love is, really.
If it isn't all sex. And I don't even
really care a damn any more, anyway."
"My dear young man, you are a disaster.
So defeated. So pessimistic" (p. 141).
On the following page, Conchis introduces Nicholas to
the Edenic mystery of the smile, which is to form the
basis for his sensual exploration. If he knows little
else, Nicholas is aware of the need this will eventually
fulfill; "I needed a new land, a new race, a new
language; and, although I couldn't have put it into
words then, I needed a new mystery" (p. 15),
The new land of Eden which awaits Nicholas promises
sensual gratification, and such is the prime motivation,
by means of the allurement of Lily, which draws him
further and further into the mystery's vortex. Indeed,
one reason why Nicholas journeys to Greece in the first
place is that he wants to drop Alison in favour of new
sexual adventures which "Circe-like" Greece may offer.
In a beautifully undercut passage, Fowles demonstrates
the ego-centricity and banality of Nicholas' initial
quest. One goal of the masque is to destroy Nicholas'
platitudinous sexual framework which this passage
voices; "I could not spend my life crossing such a
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Sahara; and the more I felt it the more I felt also 
that the smug, petrified school was a toy model of the 
entire country and that to quit the one and not the 
other would be ridiculous., There was also a girl I 
was tired of" (p„ 14). With a Nabokovian trenchant 
brilliance, the final sentence reduces Nicholas' quest 
to the level of a new sexual adventure. Such ironic 
undercutting continues in "the figure of Lily-Julie, 
who personifies the solipsism of Nicholas' puerile 
sexuality. The masque of Bourani seeks to inculcate 
in him its Edenic antithesis. The eros which Conchis 
proposes is diametrically opposed to the shallow, 
callous operations of Nicholas. Nicholas is a 
narcissistic figure whose only pursuit is the 
reaffirmation of the self in others. Thus the ironic 
reversal of each self-gratified moment with Lily-Julie 
is superlatively effective in showing postlapsarian 
man only and always making love to himself.
Lily acts as the protector of Alison, for she 
helps to create in Nicholas an Edenic consciousness 
which he is meant to share with Alison. Lily is 
described in terms of the smile leitmotif, and she 
seeks to imbue Nicholas with the mystery and meaning 
of the smile. Despite the scope and intensity of her 
efforts, Nicholas is a slow learner. His hubris is 
such that he cannot believe Lily is not wholly* 
in love with him; he continues with the game to
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determine and to secure her love. The idea of the 
game for its own sake has not yet engaged him: "In
so many ways, it seemed all no more than a game. Lily 
gave strongly the impression that she was playing with 
me —  amusing herself as much as acting a role at 
Conchis’s command. But all games, even the most 
literal, between a man and a woman are implicitly 
sexual ... I wanted to be seduced, to drink the wave"
(p. 198). Nicholas drifts for a long time; his new 
awareness approaches hesitantly. Lily is the chief 
impetus and gradually Nicholas absorbs the force of 
the play itself, the joy and the dalliance of a new 
mental perspective. These early perceptions become 
expanded: "I had a sensation that I couldn't define;
except that it was new" (p. 97). "After all, it was 
a masque, and I wanted, or after a very short while 
began to want, to play my part" (p. 165).
Through Lily, this Artemis figure of Arcadia, 
Nicholas finds the outlines of Eden. Their meetings 
occur in wonderful natural settings, in lilac groves 
and under pine boughs. Nicholas enters the realm he 
knew at Parnassus with Alison, and he commits himself 
to probe the centre of the smile. Sensual gratification 
leads to new meanings and is associated always with the 
mystery of the masque and the structure of artful play:
I went back to the gate and ran “down 
the path to Moutsa. There I stripped off 
my clothes and plunged into the sea and
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rubbed my face in the salt water, then swam 
a hundred yards out. The sea was alive with 
phosphorescent diatoms that swirled in long 
trails from my hands and feet. I dived and 
seal-turned on my back and looked up through 
the water at the blurred white specks of 
the stars. The sea cooled, calmed, silked 
round my genitals. I felt safe out there, 
and sane, and out of their reach, all their 
reaches, (p. 300)
As I swam out there, with the dark slope 
of Bourani across the quiet water to the 
east, I could feel in me a complex and 
compound excitement, in which Lily was the 
strongest but not the only element. I thought, 
I am Theseus in the maze: let it all come,
even the black minotaur, so long as it comes; 
so long as I may reach the center, (p. 3 01)
Nicholas agrees to partake of the game. He puts 
himself into the hands of the magus, whose "so potent 
art," like Prospero's in T/it Te,mpe.6t, asserts its power„ 
Conchis, like Prospero, creates his own magical island, 
and "his art is of such power" that Nicholas must obey. 
The art of Conchis's created world takes over Nicholas' 
life. He is ineluctably drawn inside the game. Art 
is conceived as the creation of a new consciousness 
which leaves Nicholas spellbound. The spiritual, and 
at times quasi-magical, influence of the new world 
brought forward by the masque is a controlling metaphor. 
Conchis is variously characterized as "a conjurer"
(p. 76), a healer (through his training as a physician), 
a a dramatist, and "a sort of novelist 6an6
novel, creating with people, not words ... as a genius 
among practical jokers" (p. 229). The latter may also 
describe how the novelist sees himself. The novel is
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conceived as play, play which recalls the smile of 
Eden and secures once again the joy of that world, 
challenging history as it engenders its own past and 
postulates its unique future. In the face of modern 
absurdity, of the age of puclear obliteration, the 
ambiguity of history, all man can do is what Conchis 
urges the protagonist to do as the masque ends:
"'Learn to smile, Nicholas. Learn to smile'" (p. 479). 
Ludic art hails the fiction of reality and the reality 
of fiction. As Kermode asserts about Pynchon ' s The.
Cn.yi.ng Lot 49: "We can, indeed, no longer assume
that V7e have the capacity to make value-free statements 
about history, or suppose that there is some special 
dispensation whereby the signs that constitute an 
historical text have reference to events in the world".
The way to the smile is through the labyrinth of 
the game, and the modu^ ope.^and^ is, as Kermode indicates, 
a subjective aspect of consciousness. Nicholas sees 
himself as Theseus caught in the maze; so, too, the 
author projects the audience into the perplexity of 
his artifice, Fowles employs the dominant imagery of 
the chess game and of the child's fun at hide-and-seek. 
Both motifs are further linked with images of Eden, 
such as the garden and nature. In one scene, Lily
8 Frank Kermode, The. Ge.ne.^ X^  Se.cAe.ci/:- On the. 
7 ntcApActatton MaAAattve. (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 108.
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calls herself "Astarte, mother of mystery," an Eve-like
figure of the primal womaj;i, Nicholas is surprised to
hear that she was in the garden when he told Conchis
about Alison. His reply points out the dynamic at
play; "I'll bet you're good at chess" (pp. 202-3).
Nicholas describes his interaction with Conchis in
terms of game strategy: '"He did not smile, but incline^
his head. We said nothing more. I had the distinct
feeling that he was a chess master caught between two
moves; immensely rapid calculation of combinations.
Once he even turned to say something, but changed his
mind" (p. 213). The essential quality of play asserts
itself again through the hide-and-seek metaphor, which
is similar to Nabokov's use of this motif in Ada.
Conchis explains the method of the Bourani masque,
and the importance of the seeker ;
I was beginning to lose my sense of total 
sureness that he was inventing a new 
explanation of the masque. So I smiled 
again.
"And me?"
"Do children in England still play 
that game ..." he' put his hand over his 
eyes, at a loss for the word ... cacke- 
cae/ie.?"
"Hide-and-seek? Yes, of course."
"Some hide?" He looked at me to guess 
the rest.
"And I seek?"
"The hiders must have a seeker. That 
is the game" (pp. 215-6).
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I had the now familiar feeling thar came 
in conversations at Bourani; of ambiguity; 
of not knowing quite what statements applied 
to —  in this case, whether to the assumption 
that Lily was really ci schizophrenic or to 
the assumption that of course I knew that 
her "schizophrenia" was simply a new hiding 
place in the masque.
... I became the dupe again (p. 216).
... I hadn't played chess for years; but 
I remembered that the better you got, the 
more it became a game of false sacrifices 
(p. 217).
In an obviously parallel fashion, the game is the 
method by which the author controls and toys with the 
reader. As in the novels of Nabokov, in the fiction of 
Fowles irony is strong and pervasive. Art becomes 
"a sort of game inside a game inside a game" (p. 267), 
just like the masque at Bourani. The reader participates 
in the guesswork and ambiguity; he is actively involved 
in the created world of play. The sustaining power of 
art retrieves the smile of life. The nature of the 
aesthetic realm is that writer and audience enter a 
voyage back to the entertainment and liberality of a 
recaptured Eden, an Eden which lives in the mind.
Nicholas plays the game himself, perpetuating the 
smile. He tells the next subject, John Briggs, nothing 
which will prevent his role as the new Adam in the 
masque. Instead, all he puts forward to guide Briggs 
is the power of the smile: "I gave him a long smile;
I wanted him to remember it was a smile that had gone 
on. too long and hadn't quite fitted in with the
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situation" (p. 571). In such a way Nicholas asserts 
his capacity as artificeras a new magus, becoming 
a conjurer himself, reaffirming that conjuring potential 
which previously he could only put to selfish use in 
seducing women (p. 17). With the positive aspirations 
of Icarus the artificer, to whom Nicholas compares 
himself early in the work (p. 91), he may guide
himself to a new Eden without being scorched by the
sun. As the godgame ends and the masks fall down, 
art is Synthesized with life. Nicholas rejoins 
Alison; the game has achieved the smile. Alison is
transformed into Eve and she wears the Leonardo smile
imbued with the grace of Botticelli's Venus: "... she
was slowly smiling. That archaic smile, her variant 
of theirs, steadier, braver, far less implacable, 
without malice or arrogance, yet still that smile"
(p. 604). Through the labyrinth of games and play, 
man realizes the essential freedom of art as it releases 
in him the capacity to be fully human.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Borges and the Paradise of the Tale;
Fiction as the Immortal Dynasty
The Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges occupies a 
unique place among contemporary literary figures and most 
particularly among the group of writers producing what 
this study postulates as ludic fiction. His status 
outside Latin America as cin author of eminence is a 
relatively recent one, especially for a writer who 
published his first book in 1923. Little notice was 
taken of Borges until the 1950's, when the first Spanish 
interpretations and criticisms of his work began to 
appear. It was not until the early 1960's that the 
English-speaking world recognized the value of Borges's 
short stories, essays, and poems. As the writer 
himself has noted, the world was slow to acclaim the 
worth of his created universe:
Fame, like my blindness, had been coming 
gradually to me. I had never expected it,
I had never sought it, Nestor Ibarra and 
Roger Caillois, who in the early 1950's 
daringly translated me into French, were my 
first benefactors. I suspect that their 
pioneer work paved the way for my sharing 
with Samuel Beckett the Formentor Prize in 
1961, for until I appeared in French I was 
practically invisible —  not only abroad 
but at home in Buenos Aires. As a 
consequence of that prize, my books 
mushroomed overnight throughout the western 
world.1
1 Jorge Luis Borges, "An Autobiographical Essay," 
in The. Alcph and OtkcA Ï 933- 1 969, ed. and trans.
Norman Thomas di Giovanni (New York: Dutton, 197 0), p. 254
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What strikes the contemporary reader is the amazing
qualicy of fictional innovation and freshness inherent
in stories written well over thirty years ago, stories
predar..ing Lottta., for example, by over a decade. These
air stories which ring powerfully coeval and exciting
in comparison with fiction published in the 1960's and
'70's. Borges writes tales which explore an idealistic
Eden of art replete with t)pe tricks and games of verbal
play which many critics identify with the age of Barth
and Pynchon in the United states, not with the world
between the wars in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Since Borges was creating ludic fiction long before
some of its contemporary exponents had yet put pen to
paper, and because, as Tony Tanner points out, his
influence on the literature of today is an important
2
and a pervasive one, it is appropriate for this study 
to examine Borges's work and the precedents it establishes 
It is impossible to discuss traditional literary devices
3
such as character and plot with reference to Borges.
It is futile to dilate on social issues which the stories
2 Tony Tanner, Ctty o : A Study OjJ AmcKtcan
ftctton tn the Mtd-Twentteth CentuAy (London: Jonathan
Cape, 1971), p. 39.
3 In his use of Isidro Parodi and numerous other 
characters, we are reminded of what has been called
"a ccû.ic-strip concept of character, frequently 
involving nomenclature which gives rise inevit.%bly 
to caricature and parody." See Robert S. Ryf,
"Character and Imagination in the Experimental Novel," 
hiodcAn Ftatton Studt&s, Volume 20, Number 3 (Autumn 
1974), -o. 319.
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might project. Such projections, when they exist, are 
ratcer turnac inward toward a verbal structure of 
irony and parody than they are thrust outward toward 
a realistic comprehension of the external world.
There are myths and fables in Borges which strangely 
detail patterns of human behaviour and individual 
action, but the myths exist less as Jungian archetypes 
for the way men interact and form society than as 
brief treatises about the way men create the world 
and digest experience. T)|ius the stories are much 
closer to epistemology than to a didactic orthodoxy.
The intense mythic quality of "The Aleph," for example, 
is more a vehicle for the idealistic ethos of the self- 
refracting literary imagination than it is a parable 
for a lost and forbidding actuality. The key to 
Borges is not the symbols he creates but rather the 
symbols which he destroys in the labyrinthine tricks 
of the verbal game, for to create a symbol qua symbol 
is to lose transcendence before it. To be Borges 
is to affirm again and again the dominance of the 
mind over any created images.
To posit a superiority of mind over reality and 
matter is to formulate a belief in the creative energy 
of man and to corroborate the vast potential of man 
to create the world in which he lives. The ideal 
realm is absorbed in Borges by the Edenic. Such an 
artistic drive propels man into the role of a new Adam
whose consciousness contains the Edenic Aleph, the 
paradisiac vision of all things made palpable. Borges's 
fiction is a paean to the infinite variability of man's 
finite constructions; it is a realization of the Edenic 
wonder produced by a finite being caught in time and 
space and trapped by decay and death. As the author 
himself confirms, "The other tendency is to presuppose 
(and to verify) that the number of fables or metaphors 
of which men's imagination is capable is limited, but 
that these few inventions can be all things for all 
men, like the Apostle."^ With this statement, Borges 
raises men to the level of gods as he postulates an 
infinitely renewable creative potential. As the Aleph 
is the beginning and the end, so also is the imagined 
universe of fiction at once the means and the goal.
The paradise of the tale confirms man's slouching 
towards Bethlehem in the ephemeral glory of the verbal 
garden.
The Edenic quest of fiction delineates a central 
preoccupation of Borges's idealist point of view.
This issue is clarified by the propensity of the writer 
to explore the methods of language and thought. Words 
and language define the reality examined by the artist, 
and for him the transcendent fact is then that the
4 Jorge Luis Borges, OtheA I J 9 i 7 - 1 9 52,
trans, Ruth L.C. Simms (London: Souvenir Press, 1973), 
p. 139. Future references to this edition will carry the 
abbreviation 07, and will appear in parentheses.
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tools of language become merged with this reality.
No less than for Nabokov, the fiction of Borges is 
largely the story of his love affair with language and 
with books. The approach to the garden comes through 
the library. One of Borges's earliest memories is 
that, ot a child looking from the room of books into a 
sur-“bat:hed garden: "What is certain is that I was
brought up in a garden, behind lanceolated iron railings,
5
and in a library of unlimited English books." For 
this writer the universe of words is not a separate 
reality or a secret escape; it is the central, stable, 
and most secure fact of life, of being a man in the world. 
The preponderant power of the mind and of art cannot 
be overestimated. The central adjunct of Borges's life 
is the written word and the echoeing thought. As Borges 
himself has acknowledged, "If I were asked to name the 
chief event in my life, I should say my father's library. 
In fact, I sometimes think I have never strayed outside 
that library.”  ^ What is particularly Edenic about the 
artistic imagination of Borges is his ability in fiction 
to recapture the bright world of childhood with its
5 Quoted by John Sturrock in PapeA The
'Ideal Fa étions oi Jo Age Lul6 BoAge^ (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977), p. 17,
6 Borges, "An Autobiographical Essay," in The 
Aleph ar.d OtkeA StoAleé 7 9 33-7 969, p. 209. Future 
reference--: will indicate this collection of short 
stories by the abbreviation A, and will be noted in 
parentheses.
infinite promise and delight, for his magical fantasies, 
whether they be horrendous, gay, bleak, mysterious, or 
frightening, all equally attest to the primal capacity 
Gf raan to create a world through the play with words.
It is important to establish the connection of the
garden with literature for Borges, and further significant
that this conjunction comes through the perceived
freedom of childhood. As a child one knows an inherent
sense of wonder and magic, a belief in fantasy and in
the limitless possibilities for creating one's own
universe. Childhood is the aleph in the life of man
in the same way that fiction is the focus of all points
in the created world of aesthetic reflection. Barrenechea
has noted that the town of Adrogue, where Borges spent
much of his childhood, continues, like the garden, to be
an image of fictional fulfillment and freedom: "Adrogue
appears from time to time in his poems, essays, or
stories with a magic which restores the lost days of
scenting honeysuckle or eucalyptus, or is useful in
contaminating with unreality some of the stories which
are populated with statues, useless fountains, rhombic
glass doors in yellow, red, and green; it is the
unreality of childhood remembrances which memory shifts
7
and fantasy elaborates,"
7 Ana Maria Barrenechea, BoAge^ the LabyAtnth 
hiakeA, ed„ and trans. Robert Lima (New York: New
York University Press, 19<?5) , pp. 3-4.
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For Borges, the book and the garden are identical. 
Fiction becomes a paradise and art is the fruit of 
Eden, Borges initially thought this fruit prohibitive. 
Not until his illness with its threatening possibility 
of intellectual loss did he feel bold enough or 
satisfactorily motivated to write fiction. For Borges 
to write fiction is to enlper "the paradise of the tale,'" 
the primal garden of delight. Fiction was literally 
a salvation from the perils of destruction. It. was a 
strong and necessary reaffirmation of the Adamic talent 
of creating an autonomous entity beyond the individual 
and his temporal limitations. We have Borges's own 
account of this experience:
I know that the least perishable part 
of my literary production is the narrative, 
yet for many years I did not dare to write 
stories. I thought that the paradise of 
the tale was forbidden to me. One day, I 
suffered an accident. I was in a sanitarium 
where I was operated upon. I did not know 
whether I had left that era, a time I cannot 
recall without horror, a period of fever, 
insomnia, and extreme insecurity. I did 
not know whether I still maintained intact 
my intellectual integrity, and so I resolved 
to perform an experiment. If after the 
operation and the extremely long convalescence 
I tried to write a poem or any essay and 
failed, I would know that I had lost that 
intellectual integrity. Thus, I decided upon 
another approach, I said to myself: "I
am going to write a story and if I cannot 
do so it does not matter because I have not 
written one before. In any case, it will 
be a first attempt". Then, I began to write 
a story —  "Pierre Menard, Author of the 
Qjx-ijote" —  which turned out rather well; 
this was followed by others, such as "The 
Writing of the God," and I discovered that 
I had not lost my intellectual integrity
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and that I could now write stories. I 
have written many since.&
Thus did the freedom and vitality of an Eden regained 
present themselves to Borges. The stories subsequent 
to "Pierre Menard" verify the author's faith in "the 
paradise of the tale" and demonstrate the cogency of 
his Adamic vision, of an unwavering belief in the 
ultimacy of language and the narrative pattern. Art, 
especially fiction, holds the secret of "the unimaginable 
universe . " Like the Aleph, which "is one of the points 
in space that contains all other points," literature 
transcends the feeble vision of finite experience and 
encompasses the whole world through an artistic eternity. 
The glimpse of eternity comes by way of the aesthetic 
achievement fleetingly attained by the mortal individual. 
Even Carlos Argentine Daneri, minor ungifted poet that 
he is, connects the supreme vision of "the unimaginable 
universe" with the art of poetry. He sees the Aleph 
as "the world itself," as "the only place on earth 
where all places are -- seen from every angle, each 
standing clear, without any confusion or blending."
He continues, "I kept the discovery to myself and 
went back every chance I got. As a child, I did not 
foresee that this privilege was granted me so that later 
I could write the poem" (A pp. 28, 23).
8 Quoted by Barrenechea, p. 152.
The character Borges disputes the Aleph of Daneri, 
because for Borges "the unimaginable universe" can only 
be attained through the Adamic perfection of his love 
for the dear Beatrix, a Beatriz not unlike the Beatrice 
of Dante's poetic inspiration or Petrarch's Laura, Poe's 
Annabel, or Nabokov's Lolita. The Eden of art is a 
recapitulation in the poetic garden of a perfect, 
immortal love. It is at the altar of invention that 
Borges lays the Edenic love quest. He quotes the remark, 
made to him by a disappointed journalist looking for a 
"real” Aleph in the streets of Buenos Aires, that "the 
entire thing is your own invention." Borges the 
artificer expresses the freedom of creation as the 
triumph of the Whitmanesqpe Adam in "the setting down 
of a limited catalog of things" (A p. 264).
Art for Borges becomes the constant renewal of the 
dream of the garden through the structures of literary 
creations embodied not only in the short story but also 
in poetry and essays. The book possesses the fullness 
of a universal dream paradise possessed of a transcendent, 
palpable reality. As Irby has commented "the world is 
a book and the book is a world, and both are labyrinthine 
and enclose enigmas designed to be understood and 
participated in by m a n . I n  "The Library of Babel,"
9 James E. Irby, "Introduction," in LabyA.in-tk6 : 
Selected StoAte6 and OtheA WAttlng-ô by Jorge Luis Borges, 
ed. Yates and Irby (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1970),
p. 19. Future references to this edition will appear in 
parentheses with the abbreviation L.
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Borges himself has asserted, "It does not seem unlikely
to me that there is a total book on some shelf of the
universe" (L, p. 84). The entrance to the garden is
ti/O opening of a book, made real by the palpability of
the metaphors employed. And as the author speculates,
"It may be that universal history is the history of a
handful of metaphors" (L, p, 224). This quest for the
realm "beyond the here and now" is how Borges has
described his early efforts at poetry. It is well
illustrated by one of his early verses;
The garden's grillwork gate 
opens with the ease of a page 
in a much thumbed book, 
and, once inside, our eyes 
have no need to dwell on objects 
already fixed and exact in memory.
Here habits and minds and the private language
all families invent
are everyday things to me.
What necessity is there to speak 
or pretend to be someone else?
The whole house knows me,
they're aware of my worries and weakness.
This is the best that can happen
what Heaven perhaps will grant us:
not to be wondered at or required to succeed
but simply to be let in
as part of an undeniable Reality,
like stones of the road, like trees (A, p. 226).
The freedom of nothing being alien to oneself, of 
"simply being let in," describes the power of words to 
articulate the "undeniable^ Reality" of a mental universe. 
Borges returns again and again to the book, the library, 
the mind, because such embody for him the intimacy and 
eternity of primal life, of the original garden existence 
enjoyed by the symbolic first family of man. The mental
;journey of fiction is the search and attainment of such 
restored Eden. Borges's essay "The Flower of: Coleridge" 
skilfully elucidates this point. Here the flower is 
taken as a metaphor of fictional invention, as being 
both method and goal. The article goes on to describe 
James’s unfinished novel, 7ke. the Pa^t, as an
Edenic narrative in which the hero returns to the 
particular day of the eighteenth century when a painting 
he admires was put on canvas. "In Tkt Senée the Pa^t,” 
Borges tells us, "the nexus between the real and the 
imaginative (between present and past) is not a flower 
... but a picture." The power of mind is the essential 
resource of man to create his particular Eden. The 
author of "The Aleph" delights in this story, significantly, 
because "the cause follows the effect, the reason for the 
journey is one of the consequences of the journey" (1, 
p. 12), The dynamic Eden of art creates and sustains 
the aesthetic pursuit even as it arises from it.
One is reminded of tlje anfractuosities of Borges's 
tales by the complexity of this Jamesian narrative. For 
instance, in "The Garden of Forking Paths," Dr. Yu Tsun 
imagines "a future as irrevocable as the past" (L, 
p. 47). He thinks of an idealist universe where the 
future determines the pasf as much as the past is 
coloured by the present, for the underlying assumption 
is that it is all in the mind of the observer or agent 
of a particular mortal destiny, that is, in the mental
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conceptualization of the individual. One learns of 
the infinite labyrinthine book of Ts'ui Pen, which Yu 
Tsun misperceives as "an indeterminate heap of 
contradictory drafts," incomprehensible to him because 
"in the third chapter the hero dies, in the fourth he 
is alive" (L, p. ,50). Unable to imagine a past 
dictated by its future, Yu Tsun cannot grasp the idealist 
perfection of his ancestor's infinite book. Such is the 
quintessential issue in Borges. This is stated, with 
an ostensibly effortless fineness, in "Pierre Menard, 
Author of the Qai.xot(L, " in which the twentieth-century 
mind sees a startling new Qjxx.xot(L and creates through 
the same words a new reality. Literature is conceived 
as the re-creation of a universal spirit, as the 
exchange of new forms for old in Edenic progression 
and renewal.
This idea reminds one of that notion of Valery"s 
quoted by Borges in "The Flower of Coleridge." The 
reader learns that "around 1938 Paul Valery wrote that 
the history of literature should not be the history 
of the authors ..., but rather the history of the Spirit 
as the producer or consumer of literature." The 
Hegelian echo of this idealistic Eden is clear: man
re-forms life and literature by the dictates of his 
mental striving toward an Adamic equilibrium. Borges 
is taken with this idea, with the flowering of; art 
as a final goal. He quotes Coleridge on the floral
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garden metaphor and then adds his own exegesis:
"If a man could pass through Paradise in 
a dream, and have a flower presented to him 
as a pledge that his soul had really been 
there, and if he found that flower in his 
hand when he awoke -- AyI -- and what then?"
I wonder what my reader thinks of that 
imagining. To me it is perfect. It seems 
quite impossible to use it as the basis of 
other inventions, for it has the integrity 
and the unity of a ad que.m, a
final goal. And of course it is just that; 
in the sphere of literature as in others, 
every act is the culmination of an infinite 
series of causes and the cause of an infinite 
series of effects. Behind Coleridge's idea 
is the general and ancient idea of the 
generations of lovers who begged for a 
flower as a token (01, pp. 10-11).
Continuing this discussion in a commentary on 
Wells's The. Txme. Machine., Borges introduces the following 
thought about an idealist Eden, that "the gods ... will 
discover that the same chess pieces they were playing 
with before are lying on the grass of a new meadow"
(01, p. 11). This artistfc garden of mind is perhaps 
explored best in "The Garden of Forking Paths," which 
unites the motifs of games and play with a literary 
Eden. Like many of Borges’s stories, this one is a 
fantastical melange of mental structures, chimerical 
imaginings, and the hard, suspenseful data of detective 
fiction. Borges himself, clearly, would like his 
story to admit of all possibilities, of an infinite 
progression and regression. Nevertheless, what is 
obvious is the supreme fiction of the tale, its 
conspiring to erect a complex pattern attaining
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meaning solely within the mind of man. The garden, 
which is a labyrinth of infinite possibilities and 
perpetual turnings, finds expression in the ultimate 
lexical artifice, in the baffling novel of Ts'ui Pen, 
a fiction designed to be uniquely determined by the 
mind of each reader.
Just as the book follows the complex architecture 
of a formal labyrinth, so"also do the final free hours 
of the protagnoist Dr. Yu Tsun. The mystery of his 
escape and ultimate detection by Richard Madden focuses 
the external construct of the plot in a seemingly 
coherent, straightforward fashion. Yet the unlikely, 
ponderous coincidences are such that any assumption 
of uncomplicated, readily perceptible narration must 
be abandoned by the reader forthwith. In spite of 
the complexity and oneiric aura of the story, it begins 
with indisputable factual information. Borges is fond 
of commencing his narratives in this manner. A 
historical source, Liddell Hart's Won.td
U/at 1, is cited to provide the truth of historical 
reference. The inherent ^rony is that it matters 
not at all whether this device of "the true story" 
has any corroboration in the annals of recorded 
history. For the author, it is a game, a toying 
with the s^nnpathy and belief of his audience.
Borges's use of this device ironically counterpoises 
against itself the inadequacy of a single r e a l i t y  to
■}
describe or explain human experience, in the same
v’-riy that the perpetual patternings of art, like the
labyrinth and the mirror, defy any ultimate
transcription. The only adequate reflection of
r.i rcnal events is their perception by the consciousness;
of the individual, in the mental flowering of infinite
PCSnability. This, for Borges, is the basic reality
and the central freedom of the human experience. As
Tanner has commented about the fictional universe of
Borges, "It is another example of freedom from accepted
reality pictures ... In this fantastic land it would
seem that the potency of mind over matter is everywhere
evident —  perception variously subsumed under imagination
and dreams seem, like Nabokov's artistic electricity,
10
to sustain the world."
Borges adumbrates the freedom of consciousness 
as the chief mental tool in the ideational garden.
The metaphor of the garden sustains itself throughout 
"The Garden of Forking Paths" as the central motif 
employed to sanction the untouchable realm of mind.
Indeed, Dr. Yu Tsun disputes the initial awareness 
of his imminent capture and impending death by the 
thought of his origin as a child in the primordial 
garden: "In spite of my dead father, in spite of
having been a child in a symmetrical garden of Hai Feng,
10 Tanner, p. 44.
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was I —  now —  going to die?" (L, p. 45) Yu Tsun 
is a man of limited imagination; originally he could 
not comprehend the meaning of his ancestor's labyrinthine 
book, Stephen Albert must point it out to him, must 
explain the significance of a mental continuity erected 
outside time. Yet even Yu Tsun possesses an instinctive 
awareness of the importance of the garden, of its hopeful 
potential symbolically to "defeat the ravages of mortal 
man and especially his own mortality. He realizes the 
fundamental urgency of the phrase "to imagine," even 
if his application is restricted to a specific category 
of experience. "Th^ author an at^ocTou^ undeA,takÂ,ng 
he tells us, ought to tmagtne. that he. ha6 at^ e.adtf 
acùompttéhed tt, ought to upon htm.&e.ti a £utuA.e.
a6 tH.n.(L\Joc.abte. a6 the. pa^t" (L, p. 47).
The main distinction between Yu Tsun and his 
ancestor, the great novelist Ts'ui Pen, is that the 
latter imagines not one "irrevocable future" but 
rather a multifarious category of "various futures"
(L, p. 50). Thus the protagonist lacks the full vision 
of the artistic garden. This is the lesson revealed 
to him by Stephen Albert before Yu Tsun commits his 
own "atrocious undertaking" of murder. The reader, 
then, views Yu Tsun rather in the same light in which 
Borges described his friend Macedonio in "An 
Autobiographical Essay": "I look back on him now,
however, as an Adam bewildered by the Garden of Eden"
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(A, p. 230). For in The, Ga/iden foAktng Paths, Yu
Tsun finds confusion rather than the transcendent
elucidation of the Edenic consciousness. He is unmindful
of the basic cogency and relevance of lis perceptions
as he instinctively, fugaciously, encounters the garden:
The instructions to turn always to the left 
reminded me that such was the common procedure 
for discovering the central point of certain 
labyrinths. I have some understanding of 
labyrinths: not for nothing am I the great
grandson of that Ts'ui Pen who was governor 
of Yunnan and who renounced worldly power 
in order to write a novel that might be even 
more populous than the Hung Lu Meng and to 
construct a labyrinth in which all men would 
become lost. Thirteen years he dedicated 
to these heterogeneous tasks, but the hand 
of a stranger murdered him -- and his novel 
was incoherent and no one found the labyrinth. 
Beneath English trees I meditated on that 
lost maze; I imagined it inviolate and 
perfect at the secret crest of a mountain;
I imagined it erased by rice fields or 
beneath the water; I imagined it infinite, 
no longer composed of octagonal kiosks and 
returning paths, but of rivers and provinces 
and kingdoms ... I thought of a labyrinth 
of labyrinths, of one sinuous spreading 
labyrinth that would encompass the past 
and the future and in some way involve 
the stars. Absorbed in these illusory 
images, I forgot my destiny of one pursued 
(L, pp. 47-8).
Totally involved with the consciousness of a created 
"labyrinth of labyrinths," Yu Tsun evades the trammels 
of reality, if only for one transcendent moment. He 
feels like a new Adam in the garden, a free man. This 
sense of freedom in the fiction of Borges symbolizes 
a central dynamic of art. It manifests the ability 
of the artifice to withstand the erosion of reality, 
to elude the defeat of time and space, to assert a
unique infinity of mind. Momentarily, Yu Tsun compels 
infinity, the infinity of fiction, to play for him, to 
release him from entrapment. The endless possibility 
of art to lead man to this sense of mental perpetuity 
is thus the driving force of Ts'ui Pen's novel and 
likewise an instrumental guide to Borges's own theory 
of fiction, for Borges's aim is "one sinuous labyrinth 
that would encompass the past and the future and in 
some way involve the stars." As Wheelock has argued:
"To dispense with the accepted verities and create 
fictions out of other fictions is to think freely in thg; 
most radical sense. It is to start from, and return 
to, the primordial home ground of myth in forming and 
re-forming one's ideas of the world.
Yu Tsun is confused in that he cannot accept his 
illusory vision of the labyrinth as a reality, as part 
of a free consciousness. For him the "illusion" is 
delightful and compelling, but tinged with the ultimacy 
of delusion. But the paradox is, again, that despite 
his reservations and scepticism, the labyrinth carries 
him further along, toward the infinity of the garden, 
toward the free aesthetic form perceived as the pure 
bliss of music articulated by Schopenhauer. As Borges 
has stressed in his essay "Avatars of the Tortoise";
11 Carter Wheelock, The !^ijtkmaknA: A Staay o^
and ScfmboZ In the. Sko^t Sto^ites Jo^gd Luts 
Bofiges (Austin; University of Texas Press, 1969),
p. 68.
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"Art —  always —  requires visible unrealities" (L,
p. 242). This asseveration finds confirmation in the
experience of Yu Tsun, who is momentarily transformed
by the visible unreality of the garden;
I felt myself to be, for an unknown period 
of time, an abstract perceiver of the world. 
The vague, living countryside, the moon, the 
remains of the day worked on me, as well as 
the slope of the road which eliminated any 
possibility of weariness. The afternoon was 
intimate, infinite. The road descended and 
forked among the now confused meadows. A 
high-pitched, almost syllabic music approached 
and receded in the shifting of the wind, 
dimmed by leaves and distance. I thought 
that a man can be an enemy of other men, 
of the moments of other men, but not of a 
country: not of fireflies, words, gardens,
streams of water, sunsets. Thus I arrived 
before a tall, rusty gate. Between the iron 
bars I made out a poplar grove and a pavilion. 
I understood suddenly two things, the first 
trivial, the second almost unbelievable; the 
music came from the pavilion, and the music 
was Chinese. For precisely that reason I had 
openly accepted it without paying it any heed, 
I do not remember whether there was a bell or 
whether I knocked with my hand. The sparkling 
of the music continued (L, p. 48).
Upon reaching the house, Yu Tsun is greeted by 
Stephen Albert, whose first question bears directly 
on the fiction's central $ssue: "You no doubt wish to
see the garden?" (1, p. 49) The garden motif becomes 
omnipresent. The particular context of the story offers 
an elucidation for the noticeable dominance of this 
image, an eludication which brilliantly demonstrates 
the Adamic quest of the fiction, Yu Tsun is on the 
run. He is being pursued by the relentless drive of 
his enemy. Captain Richard Madden. What the protagonist,
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seüXü is salvation from time, a respite from the impending 
doom of his entrapment and capture. He searches 
feverishly, desperately, for a possible route of escape, 
for an extenuation of his ineluctable fate. Yu Tsun 
plunges into the English countryside to elude the 
confinement of the city and to assert an autonomy which 
he knows will be short-lived. He finds what he seeks, 
which is precisely that freedom of the garden offered 
to him by Albert and delineated originally by the art
of his great-grandfather, Ts'ui Pen, in his novel The.
GaAdeyi Fo^ktng Paths, For Borges, as for the Chinese 
novelist of his story, to be lost in the labyrinthine 
garden of art is to regain a primal freedom of consciousness 
and to know the Adamic wonder of "various futures."
By the power of the literary creation, man returns 
to the primal, mythical freedom of the garden, just as 
for Yu Tsun the experience is a return to the freedom
of his own protective childhood. The path to the
library containing the fiction of Ts'ui Pen reminds the 
hero of his own childhood Eden, which is linked to the 
wonder of the books in his family's library. The 
careful reader cannot but be impressed with the parallel 
of this spiritual adventure of the protagonist and that 
of Borges’s own experience as a child in the family 
library. In both recollections, the freedom, beauty, 
and Edunic expansion of mind are clear. It is<in 
Stephen Albert's library that Yu Tsun remembers the
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richness of the imagined paradise of childhood;
The damp path zigzagged like tnoro L f 
my childhood. We came to a library ov 
Eastern and Western books. I recognized 
bound in yellow silk several volumes of the 
Lost Encyclopaedia, edited by the Third 
Emperor of the Luminous Dynasty but never 
printed. The record on the phonograph 
revolved next to a bronze phoenix. I also 
recall a aost vase and another,
many centuries older, of that shade of blue 
which our craftsmen copied from the potters 
of Persia ... (L, p. 49)
The treasures of this library and the astonishing 
presence of a lost garden signify for Yu Tsun the 
elemental if ephemeral renewal of his Adamic quest.
Art is, like the flower of Coleridge, "a final goal," 
and "the culmination of an infinite series of causes" 
{01, p. 11). To recognize a primal past is to become 
a new Adam and to admit the possibility of "innumerable 
futures" (L, p. 53). To posit an artistic Eden is to 
acknowledge an infinite spirit and mind; it is to see 
"the absolute space that had been a liberation for 
Bruno," and to perceive "that an Aristotle was merely 
the wreckage of Adam, and Athens, the rudiments of 
Paradise" {01, p. 8). To locate an Eden in words and 
in art is to extend oneself toward infinity, toward a 
truly Adamic expansion of consciousness. And as 
Cassirer has shown, "In Bruno's doctrine infinity no 
longer means a mere negation or limitation. On the 
contrary, it means the immeasurable and inexhaustible 
abundance of reality and the unrestricted power of the 
human intellect." He continues that:
i it
It is in this sense that Bruno understands 
and interprets the Copernican doctrine.
ThJ.s doctrine, according to Bruno, was the 
first and decisive step toward man's self- 
liberation. Man no longer lives in the world 
as a prisoner enclosed within the narrow walls 
of a finite physical universe. He can 
traverse the air and ]preak through all the 
imaginary boundaries of the celestial spheres 
which have been erected by a false metaphysics 
and cosmology. The infinite universe sets no 
limits to human reason; on the contrary, it i^ i 
the great, incentive of human reason. The 
human intellect becomes aware of its own 
infinity through measuring its powers by the 
infinite universe.
The retreat from the world by the illustrious 
Ts'ui Pen was a journey out of time toward infinity.
It is worth noting that Ts'ui Pen was "learned in 
astronomy, in astrology and in the tireless interpretation 
of the canonical books, chess player, famous poet and 
calligrapher," and that "he abandoned all this in order 
to compose a book and a maze" (f, p. 49). The game 
motif is significant for this story and for the larger 
realm of Borges's fiction as it articulates one of the 
special constituents of the artistic Eden; that is, 
as it heralds the role of free play in the garden,
A prerogative of art is the sense of endless play in 
the primal paradise which it alone is able to forge 
within the realm of the postlapsarian adult consciousness. 
Borges is a serious artist and a central part of his
12 Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Intn.oduetton
to a PhtZos 0 pky o^ HwTian CuZtuH.0, (New Haven”: 'Yale University 
Press, 1944), p. 15.
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intense seriousness is his quest for free play, which
may be defined for our context in the words of Kant as
"purposiveness without a purpose." Many of Borges's
central characters share the author's capacity for
riddles, tricks, games and play. Borges, like Nabokov
and Barth, is preeminently a gamesman,
Wheelock notes, "It has been said and resaid that
to Borges literature is only a game that men play; not
as the Dadaists played it, with desperate frivolity,
but somewhat as Mallarmé saw it: 'a solemn, regulated,
13
and significant game,'" Yu Tsun and his ancestor 
Ts'ui Pen are gamesmen too, players in the labyrinth 
of art, in the puzzle of T h e  Gccaden OjJ P o K k t n g  P a t h s .  
Moreover, both "The Garden of Forking Paths," short 
story, and the Chinese novel of the same name involve 
the mystery of a game and the anticipation of a 
solution. The infinite realm of human consciousness 
is asserted by the aesthetic act as man steps outside 
time, as did Ts'ui Pen, and as he renounces the finite 
world for the garden of play and the games of the 
artistic Eden. It is Stephen Albert who discovers 
that T he  G a a d e n  F o A k t n g  P a t h s and the novel are 
synonymous. He thus re-creates the Edenic garden as 
he solves the puzzle of the labyrinth and the book:
13 Wheelock, The. Mythmake,^, p. 12.
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'Here is Ts'ui Pen's labyrinth,' he 
/Albert? said,.indicating a tall lacquered 
desk.
'An ivory labyrinth!’ I /Yu Tsun? 
exclaimed, 'A minimum labyrinth.'
'A labyrinth of symbols,' he corrected.
'An invisible labyrinth of time. To me, 
a barbarous Englishman, has been entrusted 
the revelation of this diaphanous mystery. 
After more than a hundred years, the details 
are irretrievable; but it is not hard to 
conjecture what happened. Ts'ui Pen must 
have said once:" I am wttkdAaMtng to w^ite 
a beak. And another time: I am ivttkd-iaiotng
to COns tn.uct a tabyatnth. Every one imagined 
two works; to no one did it occur that the 
book and the maze were one and the same thing. 
The Pavilion of Limpid Solitude stood in the 
centre of a garden that was perhaps intricate; 
that circumstance could have suggested to the 
heirs a physical labyrinth. Ts'ui Pen died; 
no one in the vast territories that were his 
came upon the labyrinth; the confusion of the 
novel suggests to me that tt was the maze.
Two circumstances gave me the correct solution 
of the problem. One: the curious legend that
Ts'ui Pen had planned to create a labyrinth 
which would be strictly infinite. The other: 
a fragment of a letter I discovered.'
Albert rose .... He faced me and in his 
hands he held a sheet of paper that had once 
been crimson, but was now pink and tenuous 
and cross-sectioned .... I read, 
uncomprehendingly and with fervour, these 
words written w/th a minute brush by a man 
of my blood: I leave to the various ^atuKes
(not to all] my garden o{, ioKklng paths ...
(L, p. 50).
The infinity inherent in "the garden of forking 
paths" is articulated by Albert as the limitless 
possibility of the literary creation, what Borges 
has called the "infinite world of literature" {01, 
p. 13). The fictional Eden of words rests Irke the 
dream of a primordial past. It is the portrayal of
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the only chance of modern man to attempt "a new 
refutation of time." Albert explains to Yu Tsun that 
" ' T/ie Ga'iden Forking Paths is an enormous riddle, 
or parable, whose theme is time,'" and that in his 
solving of the riddle he has re-established "'the 
primordial organization'" (L, p. 53). He is talking 
di :ectly about the unravelling of the chaos of the 
manuscript, but the statement applies equally to the 
function of art as it uncovers a lost Eden. Borges 
himself has affirmed, "In the course of a life dedicated 
to literature and, occasionally, to metaphysical 
p,;.rplexity, I have perceived or sensed a refutation 
of rime, which I myself disbelieve, but which comes 
to visit me at night and in the weary dawns with the 
illusory force of an axiom. That refutation is in all 
my books ... " (01, p. 172). He perceives each work 
of literature to be an attempt at the infinite, in the 
same terms that Albert discusses this potential of 
imagination in the book of Ts'ui Pen. Borges, the 
fictionalist, the fabricator of labyrinths, continues 
that "the real moment of ecstasy and the possible 
insinuation of eternity which that night so generously 
bestowed on me will be crystallized in the avowed 
irresolution of these pages" (01, p. 180). Each work 
of literature represents another challenge to the prison 
of time.
The problem of time \s said to have obsessed the
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creator of the labyrinth and the book. The solution 
devised by Ts'ui Pen to escape or transcend the limits 
of temporal reality crucially involves the Adamic 
structure of art as a vehicle to evade time. To 
recapture a lost Eden is to assert the power of a past 
still present and continually available; it is to deny 
time, to annul its erosion. As the mind reclaims an 
infinite past it is thereby capable also of uniting 
consciousness with the creation of an infinite future, 
wich the Emersonian expansion of universal possibility. 
To make time nugatory through the immortality of art 
establishes a freedom reminiscent of paradise. As the 
artist and the reader take on t)jie role of Adam they 
predicate the infinite richness of creation.
Borges has pondered that "the first instant of 
time coincides with the instant of the Creation, as 
St. Augustine says; that first instant tolerates not 
only an infinite future, but an infinite past ....
Adam appears and his teeth and his skeleton are those 
of a man of thirty-three; Adam appears (writes Edmund 
Gosse) and he has a navel ..." (01, p. 24). Time 
extends infinitely, back and beyond. The metaphor 
of the Adamic myth in literature is predicated on the 
value of a mythical past to be reasserted in the 
present and to reiterate itself in the future. The 
creation of literature comes to us, then, as ah 
elemental postulate about the continuum of perpetual
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time, that is, about the flow of human consciousness 
toward infinity, toward freedom. This is what the 
character Albert clarifies as the secret answer to the 
labyrinthine garden of fiction:
'Before unearthing this letter, I had 
questioned myself about the wayo in which 
a book can be infinite. X o c u i d  think of 
nothing other than a cyclic volume, a circular 
one, A book whose last page was identical 
with the first, a book which had the possibility 
of continuing indefinitely .... In the midst 
of this perplexity, I received from Oxford 
the manuscript you have examined, I lingered, 
naturally, on the sentence: I leave -to the
■jah.tous lvituin.es ' [not to all) my gan.deyi o &
{,on.ktng paths. Almost instantly, I understood: 
"the garden of forking paths" was the chaotic 
novel; the phrase "the various futures (not 
to all)" suggested to me the forking in time, 
not in space. A broad rereading of the work 
confirmed the theory. In all fictional works, 
each time a man is confronted with several 
alternatives, he; chooses one and eliminates 
the others; in the fiction of Ts'ui Pen, he 
chooses —  simultaneously —  all of them.
He createsf in this way, diverse futures, 
diverse times which themselves also proliferate 
and fork. Here, then, is the explanation of 
the novel's contradictions ...' (1, p. 50-1)
The words "he cn.eates" are emphasized. This emphasis 
on man's creative ability is a pervasive element in 
Borges's fiction, and one of great importance. The 
motif of creation joins with the garden metaphor to 
elucidate the role of man as a new Adam, an agent who 
fabricates himself and the world through the process 
of thought and the vehicle of art, for this new Eden 
is primarily an idealist realm. Freedom thus becomes 
an adjunct of the mind of man, just as the discovery 
of "haontn" in "Tlbn, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" signifies
ü. "promised freedom" (L, p. 38) for the inmates of the 
state prison. Whether Yu Tsun's experience in "The 
Garden of Forking Paths" is part of a dream, of a 
"cenuous nightmare" (L, p. 54) or whether it is a 
"real" journey to the village of Ashgrove does not 
matter. The chimera of a fiction depicts a state of 
mind which for the protagonist is the only possibility.
As in "The Secret Miracle," where Hladik imagines himself 
spared from the firing squad, and lives an extra year in 
his mind, producing his artistic masterpiece, the prime 
reality by which men live in Borges's fiction is a 
self-referential epistemology.
As the reader observes in the story of Tlon, the 
far-reaching perceptions of imagination are the very 
tools which create the world. The play of man in the 
game of fiction is far removed from the trivial; it 
is rather a life-sustaining attribute. Such is the 
experience of Yu Tsun and of Jaromir Hladik. The 
artifices of fiction, magic, the dream, and the game 
ensure a temporary yet vital glimpse at the paradise 
of the mind, for to imagine a new or alternate reality, 
man must become his own creator. Rodriguez-Monegal 
alludes to this notion in his analysis of Borges's 
poem "Adam Cast Forth." He tells us, "Borges slips 
in the hypothesis that perhaps Adam has also dreamed 
his God; perhaps the Garden 'was nothing but a dtiagic
3J7
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fantasy/of the God I dreamed.’" Both the dream and 
the game of fiction guarantee man an essential freedom 
over his own fate. The power to think and to create 
retains the essence of the liberation of the garden.
As Hegel has explained, "For thinking means that, in 
the other, one meets with one's self. It means a 
liberation, which is not the flight of abstraction, but 
consists in that which is 'actual having itself not as
15something else, but as its own being and creation ..."
The infinity of fiction, its intrinsic ability 
to create endless permutations and patterns, articulates 
the fundamental freedom of fictional play, in which 
nothing is alien to man because it is all part of his 
creation. The book is not to be perceived as a means 
of evading the responsibilities of the external world; 
it is discerned as an independent, self-defining goal.
In his essay "On the Cult of Books," Borges adumbrates 
the "marvelous consequences" leading "to the concept 
of the book as an end in itself . " He goes on to say 
that, "According to Mallarmé, the world exists for a 
book; according to Bloy, we are the versicles or words 
or letters of a magic book, and that incessant book is
14 Emir Rodriguez-Monegal, "Symbols in Borges* 
Work," Modern f t c t t o n  S t u d i e s , Volume 19, No. 3 (Autumn 
1973), p. 331.
15 G.W.F. Hegel, HegeV s Logic, Being Part One 
of the Eyicyctopaedla o{^  The P h i lo s o p h ic a l  Sciences  
(1830), trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1975), p. 222.
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the only thing in the world: or rather, it is the
world" {01, pp. 118, 120). This is how one comes
to understand the meaning of the idealist realm of
Tlon. The narrator tells us "that the men of this
plar.et conceive the universe as a series of mental
processes ..." (I, p. 33) , Such is another way of
saying that men have become their own gods, the
artificers of an entire world. The mind generates a
pattern which becomes infinite:
The literature of this hemisphere (like 
Meinong's subsistent world) abounds in ideal 
objects, which are convoked and dissolved in 
a moment, according to poetic needs. At 
times they are determined by mere simultaneity. 
There are objects composed of two terms, one
of visual and another of auditory character:
the colour of the rising sun and the far-away 
cry of a bird. There are objects of many 
terms: the sun and the water on a swimmer's
chest, the vague tremulous rose colour we 
see with our eyes closed, the sensation of 
being carried along by a river and also by 
sleep. These second-degree objects can be 
combined with others; through the use of 
certain abbreviations, the process is 
practically infinite. There are famous 
poems made up of one enormous word. This 
word forms a poetic object created by the 
author. The fact that no one believes in 
the reality of nouns paradoxically causes 
their number to be unending. The languages 
of Tlbn's northern hemisphere contain all 
the nouns of the Indo-European languages 
—  and many others as well (L, p. 33).
The people of Tlon play with words in much the same 
way that the author plays with the variations and 
endless possibilities of language. Describing the 
grammar of Tlon, Borges advances not only the ludic 
realm of the universe of Ifqbar, but furthermore ^ he
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articulates the fundamental premises of the games he 
himself indulges in. Borges, like Nabokov, has created 
a fictional world through a conscious and deliberate 
playing with words. As a man standing between two 
mirrors which face each other can see his image go on 
forever, so also the artist poised between the two 
idealist realms of mind and book probes an endless 
potential for expression. “ The mirror is an often- 
repeated image in "Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius," and 
may be understood as a metaphor for the fertility of 
the idealist realm. The art of fiction is a mirror of 
the patterns of mind given form through words. The 
narrator ascertains this metaphor when he states, "I 
owe the discovery of Uqbar to the conjunction of a 
mirror and an encyclopedia," (L, p. 27). Mirrors are 
prohibited in the idealist land of Uqbar since they 
multiply the visible universe; this is heresy because 
it is a denial of the planet's Aialson d'etn-c as an 
adjunct of mind. But for Borges the ironic idealist, 
mirrors perfectly detail the infinite illusion of the 
aesthetic Eden of art, and present this milieu as an 
endless source of play.
The "reality" of Tlon is that it does not exist in 
material or spacial terms, but rather as a product of 
consciousness in the minds of its creators. Yet there 
is an intractable, coersive quality about Tito’and we 
feel the oppressiveness of the aesthetic idealism it
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affirms. The narrator is critical. He avers, "We 
discovered ... that mirrors have something monstrous about 
them" (L, p, 27). The prohibitions in Tlon assert an 
inflexible, uncreative dogmatism. The mirror motif 
icself confers this. Gass has demonstrated that 
"We must remember that mirrors reflect us quite 
indifferently: they accept anything, and if these
characters [in Borges as well as in Nabokov] are followed 
by puddles, polished steel, and shadowing walls, the 
characters themselves are mirrors. They contain images, 
they do not see. Two pure mirrors, facing one another, 
draw a b l a n k . T h e  mirror image can also be seen as one 
of profound sterility, for mirrors in themselves are 
empty; they offer nothing and absorb nothing.
Emptiness and oppressiveness confront the reader as 
larger, more troubling features of the literary universe 
of Borges. There is no room for growth or development 
in his stories. The challenges offered are perhaps those 
of the trivial, short-lived game. Certainly they do not 
spring from the fully human encounter, Borges's ludic 
realm involves mirrors, coins, labyrinths, mysterious 
syiTibols, and fantastic realms. Inanimate objects control 
much of the author's attention. Men and women rarely come 
across as vital human beings, and social contexts are 
exchanged for mythic symbols, Rodriguez Monegal argues
16 William H. Gass, fiction and the flguAies oi ilie 
(Boston: Nonpareil Books, 1971), p. 115.
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that although Borges conceived "Tlbn, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius"
during the totalitarian political prologue to World War Two,
the meaning of the story turns ultimately inward. He
notes that Borges "concentrates on the adventure of the
17discovery of texts about. Utopia." Although the author 
makes explicit reference to the totalitarian qualities 
apparent in Orbis Tertius (his metaphor for earth), he 
does not suggest any commitment to action. As Steiner 
remarks, "The space of action in which a Borges figure 
.coves is mythical but never social. Where a setting 
of loccile or historical circumstance intrudes, it does 
so in free-floating bits, exactly as in a dream. Hence 
the weird, cool emptiness which breathes from many
18Borges texts as from a sudden window on the night.""
Borges acknowledges the entrapment of the idealistic 
framework of Tlbn. The narrator clearly delineates its 
monstrous quality, the element of force and dehumanization 
of the prescribed gamesmanship. He points out the 
"inhuman laws" and admits, "Tlbn is surely a labyrinth 
destined to be deciphered by men." He continues, 
describing Tlbn's debilitating influence: "The contact
and the habit of Tlbn have disintegrated this world.
17 Emir Rodriguez Monegal, JoKQd Luis BoAcges: A 
LltdAiCL/Ly BlogAiapky (New York; E.P. Dutton, 1978), p. 334.
18 Steiner, €xtAOiteKH.ltoAiloit, p. 41.
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Enchanted by its rigour, humanity forgets over and 
over again that it is a rigour of chess masters, not 
cf angels." (L, p, 42). However, after the delivery 
o ’ uhis statement and the plenary awareness it confers, 
the narrator still retreats or returns to the remote 
r cege of art. The fate of the world is ineluctable from 
taas writer's perspective. His response mimicks that of 
Candide; he will cultivate his own garden. His solace will 
be aesthetic play: "The world will be Tlbn. I pay no
attention to all this and go on revising, in the still 
days at the Adrogué hotel, an uncertain Quevedian 
translation (which I do not intend to publish) of 
Browne's Un.n BualIclZ" (I, p. 43). The lack of publication 
or distribution of the scholarship reinforces the 
quality of nonutilitarian aesthetic play and it also 
emphasizes the inherent solipsism and self-reflection 
such a pursuit entails. Monegal offers a cogent summary:
The search for an article in an encyclopedia 
has ended with the discovery that the world 
is being taken over by the encyclopedia. The 
limits between fiction and reality have been 
erased. In reaction, the narrator resigns 
himself to a remote corner of a remote country, 
devoting himself entirely to a useless 
occupation: the translation of a book, written
by an English baroque writer, about funeral 
inscriptions. By relentless artifice, Borges 
has created in "Tlbn, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" 
more than a mirror to reality: he has created
a mirror to the writing of fiction as well.
The story finally reflects only itself.19
19 Monegal, op.c.lt, , pp. 337-38.
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Borges's art seeks to unite itself with the 
imagination of each reader through the games of the 
magus. The universe of Tlon and of Borges's fiction 
assumes a controlling power of mind, so that all time and 
space —  past, present, and future -- become just so many 
arbitrary designations in the individual consciousness. 
The Edenic possibilities of this idealist art may be 
perceived through the metaphor of "hKonlAi'^  in Tlbn.
The narrator explains that "the methodical fabrication 
of hAidnln. . , . has performed prodigious services ... It 
has made possible the interrogation and even the 
modification of the past, which is now no less plastic 
and docile than the future" (1, p. 38). Like the 
inhabitants of Uqbar, the writer of fiction also 
possesses the infinite malleability of time and space.
He, too, creates the universe in which he and his 
audience live. Borges sounds fairly ebullient when 
he avers that "the fact is that every writer c,n.eates 
his own precursors. His work modifies our conception 
of the past, as it will modify the future" (L, p. 236). 
The art of fiction synthesizes idealism with freedom 
in the creation of a verbal Eden by which to view the 
world, perhaps, indeed, to change it. For the idealist, 
a change in consciousness is tantamount to a change in 
the external world.
The corollaries between Borges and the philosophy 
of idealism are numerous and consequential. Idealism
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postulates a world view with which Borges has expressed 
admiration, and toward which he has demonstrated a 
propinquity of thought, although he removes himself 
from close alignment by a wall of irony and by games 
of paradoxical reversal. This attitude shares much 
with the paradoxical reversal of the following statement, 
made by the narrator of "The Immortal": "We accept
reality easily, perhaps because we intuit that nothing 
is real" (L, p. 143). The mental sphere transforms 
reality into a comprehensible structure; the noetic 
pursuit registers and records meaning. As men in the 
world we are like Hladik, hero of "The Secret Miracle":
"He had no document but his memory," The verbal Eden 
performs a "secret miracle" for man. In its infinite 
extension, the art of fiction overcomes death in a 
manner comparable to that of the mind of Hladik:
"The physical universe came to a halt." And as it 
does so, the hero reaches this point of illumination:
"He had asked God for a whole year to finish his work;
His omnipotence had granted it. God had worked a 
secret miracle for him; German lead would kill him at 
the set hour, but in his mind a year would go by between 
the order and its execution" (L, p. 124). Art releases 
man from temporality to a natural world of freedom.
The Edenic myth of fiction may be taken as part 
of the particular theory of fiction which Borges embraces, 
as an important element o^ ; his a/is poetlca. Inherent
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in the stories and essays are clear and penetrating
analyses of what fiction is about and how its processes
operate. The stories are often explicit commentaries
on the circular journey of art. Josipovici has noted about
Pror.ot; what is equally trpe for Borges: " ... the
labyrinth along which he has travelled is in effect
h 1 own body, since he is not an object in the world
but the limits of his world. But it is also the book
ne has written, for the travelling did not come first
and the writing after; rather, the writing wai> the
travelling." Josipovici continues:
Having made his work, the author is now 
both the book and outside the book. Outside 
not in any space-occupying place, ... but 
outside by virtue of the fact that he madz 
the book. And the reader too can stand out 
there, with him, because, experiencing the 
limits of his own world, he too is momentarily 
freed of his imprisonment within it. But let 
us be clear as to what is involved. It is only
so long as the book is being read, so long,
that is, as the human imagination is travelling 
along the arteries of the labyrinth, that we are 
aware of the boundaries, and therefore of 
what lies beyond them ... Closed, the book 
becomes an object among many in the room.
Open, and read, it draws the reader into 
tracing the contours of his own labyrinth and 
allows him to experience himself not as an 
object in the world but as the limits of his 
world. And, mysteriously, to recognise this 
is to be freed of these limits and to experience
a joy as great as that which floods through us
when, looking at long last, with Dante, into 
the eyes of God, we sense the entire universe 
bound up into one volume and understand what 
it is to be a m a n . 20
20 Gabriel Josipovici, The, Won,Zd and the, Booki  
C‘'uay ol  i\iode,/Ln T t c t t o n , Second Edition (London; 
Macmillan, 1979), pp. 308-309.
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If: "For Bernard Shaw," Borges tells us that "a
book is the dialogue with the reader, and the peculiar
accent he gives to its voice, and the changing and
durable images it leaves in his memory. That dialogue
is infinite," Such is the dialectic of the verbal
paradise; it is eternally read anew in man's image
and likeness. Borges adds that "One literature differs
from another, either before or after it, not so much
because of the text as for the manner in which it is
read" (01, pp. 63-4). It is in this sense that we may
apply the metaphor of "Pierre Menard." Literature is
Edenic because it allows the reader, as it did originally
the artist, the freedom tp probe a new world. Hegel
realized this transcendence of thought when he wrote
that by its exercise "the mind is then in its own home-
element and therefore free; for freedom means that the
other thing with which you deal is a second self —  so
that you never leave your own ground but give the law 
21to yourself." Such freedom is at the core of the 
dialectical pattern of fiction. As in Tlon, in the 
aesthetic theory of Borges, readers are free to "invent 
authors" and to re-create fictions reflected in the 
mirrors of their own minds, for "a book which does 
not contain its counterbook is considered incomplete"
(L, p. 37). The "dialectical game" is a concerted free
21 Hegel, Logta, p. 39.
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world, a garden of play achieved by author and audience. 
The fantastical games of fiction share common ground 
with the idealist artificers of Tlon, as the following 
passage indicates:
This monism or complete idealism 
invalidates all science. If we explain 
(or judge) a fact, we connect it with another; 
such linking, in Tlon, is a later state of the 
subject which cannot affect or illuminate the 
previous state„_ Every mental state is 
irreducible: the mere fact of naming it
—  i.e., of classifying it —  implies a 
falsification. From which it can be 
deduced that there are no sciences on 
Tlon, not even reasoning. The paradoxical 
truth is that they do exist, and in almost 
uncountable number .... The fact that 
every philosophy is by definition a dialectical 
game, a FktZoé opkte de6 AZ6 Ob, has caused 
them to multiply. There is an abundance of 
incredible systems of pleasing design or
sensational type. The metaphysicians of
Tlc3n do not seek for the truth or even for 
verisimilitude, but rather for the astounding. 
They judge that metaphysics is a branch of 
fantastic literature (L, p. 34).
The particular dialectical games of Borges's 
carefully crafted inventions postulate an Eden of mind 
where man plays with the fantastical structures of
fiction. The aesthetic process is timeless, in this
sense being like "one of the schools of Tlon /that/ 
goes so far as to negate time: it reasons that the
present is indefinite, that the future has no reality 
Gtrer chan as a present hope, that the past has no 
reality other than as a present memory" (L, p. 34).
For Borges, this means abandoning oneself to the 
eurhythmy of form, to the challi^nge of ludic structures ?
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.... We could generalize, and infer that 
atT forms possess virtue in themselves and 
not in a conjectural "content". That would 
support the theory of Benedetto Croce; in 
1877 Pater had already stated that all the 
arts aspire to resemble music, which is pure 
form. Music, states of happiness, mythology, 
faces molded by time, certain twilights and 
certain places all. these are trying to 
tell us something, or have told us something 
we should not have missed, or are about to 
tell us something; that imminence of a 
revelation that is not yet produced is, 
perhaps, the aesthetic reality ("The Wall 
and the Books, "'”01, p. 5).
The aesthetic reality of Borges involves games, 
labyrinths, mirrors, false turnings, duplications, and 
tricks of distortion and perception. The reader is 
asked to participate not only in the construction of 
a fiction; he is also drawn into an agonistic dialogue 
with the author and asked,, metaphorically, to take his 
turn at the game board, and at the same time, warned 
to be careful of the delusions of this anamorphic art. 
"Death and the Compass," with its aura of a scholarly 
detective story, is a good example of the gaming between 
characters and between Borges and his readers. It is 
interesting to note that Borges has maintained an 
avidity for crime drama, that, as he says in his 
"Autobiographical Essay," he has written several 
detective novels and stories in collaboration with 
Adolfo Bioy-Casares. In one of these they originated 
the figure of Isidro Parodi, a detective bathed in 
the full irony of being confined to a gaol cell. The 
games with Parodi illustrate another instance of
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idealist emphasis, albeit parodie, with the mind of the 
character asserting a freedom denied his body isolated 
behind bars. The game secures the artistic garden of 
play in its constant, ineluctable attention to the 
transcendent ability of consciousness to fabricate its
unique realm, and to do so indefinitely. As Navarro
ha a noted :
Borges' persona is a totally playful 
character. He ifiever takes anyone or anything 
"seriously”. The books he fictionalizes are 
not the kind that deal with pressing social 
problems, and the heavy passions that weave 
his plots hatred, envy, lust, etc. -- are 
in the final analysis all transposed into 
cerebral games,j "I had imagined the fight 
as a chaos of steel, instead, I was able to
follow it, or almost follow it /rnconclusiveness/,
as though it were a game of chess" ("The Meeting," 
dG, p. 181). This playfulness on the part of 
Borges' persona indicates the mood we the readers 
must adopt in order to approach his fiction 
correctly, Borges' persona wants our minds to 
play with his, nothing more. The endlessness 
of the universe cannot possibly be discerned 
if the mind remains riveted to finite human 
matters. The Borgian discoverer thrives on 
the sport of discovering for its own s a k e . 22
Like Shih Huang Ti, the hero of "The Wall and the 
Books," Borges proposes the founding of "an immortal 
dynasty" enclosed within the perimeters of the fictional 
garden. He, too, wishes "to re-create the beginning of 
time" through games and play in the primal paradise of 
words (01, p. 4). The delight in the formal elements
22 Carlos Navarro, ''The Endlessness in Borges' 
Fiction," Mode.^n Ftatton Studte,^i, Volume 19/ N'fe. 3 (Autumn 
1973), pp. 400-1.
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of language, in the trices and magic of fiction, 
preponderates over the search for meaning, for, co use 
Borges's quotation from Cartaphilus, "'When the end 
draws near ... there no longer remain any remembered 
images; only words remain'" (L, p. 149).
Borges makes little distinction between form and 
content; his games are formalist exercises which engage 
the reader in dialogue. The ludic universe of Borges 
evokes not the troublesome solipsism of Nabokov but 
it is seriously limited by an acute self-referentiality. 
Although realizing and articulating the tenebrous, 
dead-end potential of running the labyrinth and the 
oppression such an endeavour may create, the author yet 
reaches toward the structure of aesthetic play, the 
rhythm of language, the challenge of the game,
Steiner, though an admirer of Borges, offers this 
caveat: "The concentrated strangeness of Borges"
repertoire makes for a certain preciousness, & rococo 
élabora cion that can be spellbinding but also airless. 
Horj than once, the pale lights and ivory forms of 
his invention move away from the active disarray cr 
life.'''””'" To this a critic of "the myth of the 
postmodernist breakthrough" would counter: "The comic
force of characters like 'Funes the Memorious' and of 
solxpsis'cic worlds such as those of 'Tlon, Uqbar,
2J Steiner, , p. 43.
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Orbis Tertius* lies in t^e crucial fact that Borges, 
for all his imaginative sympathy, is not Funes, 
is not an inhabitant of Tlon, and is thus able to 
view the unreality of their worlds as a predicament." 
Graff sees Borges's self-reflexive fiction as a 
critical response to "the historical crisis which 
brought it a b o u t . T h e  assumption is that the 
audience will act with the author in critical 
rejoinder to the visible unrealities and inhuman 
distortions of postlapsarian existence. Such response 
will be found in the infinite dialectic of the 
Adamic quest, in the belief that consciousness can 
create a new world, that participation in the 
process of art will compel attention and confer 
freedom.
24 Gerald Graff, Lttt/iata/LQ. Agatn^t 
Lttd/ioiKy tn VioddKn Soctdty (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 56-7.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Robert Coover and Gaines of the Mind:
Fiction as the Supreme Reality
The fiction of Robert Coover offers perhaps the most 
sustained and compelling example to date of ludic fiction. 
Within the group of novels discussed thus far, Thd
B a ^ d b a Z t  I n c , ,  J ,  Hcnn.y U a u g k ,
Ptop. is the closest to absolute play. Nearly all the 
••action" of the book consists of pure imagined acts in 
tho mind of J. Henry Waugh. Reality is minor and of ;üuch 
subsidiary interest that very little attention is focused 
beyond the mental horizons of Henry's life. His material 
existence and place in the world intrude remarkably 
little in a novel of nearly two hundred and fifty pages; 
A,i.ene-v-e:r- they do assert themselves, the reader Is jolted 
j -adlhional grounding in reality or in an established 
’ - -, framework is almost entirely abient, incrc
.rot It. rt. f ;î ectloïi of anything beyond -the gamer and.
.. t/.c .ai,x.jLia. Coover ‘ s determination on this point 
. . --.r.tiriogent as Waugh* s is obsessional, 
b'hit IS absent is any picture of a macrocosrair 
world beyond the game, such as -the broad social backdrop 
in Tkd iUigiU and or the playing against traditional
novels end fictional techniques, as in Ada and the 
fictions of John Barth, particularly Tkd Sot-W&ed 
Factor, There are no serious, scholarly, philosophical
digressions in the manner of musings which dominate the 
short stores of Borges. In fact, an artistic insistence 
centres nearly every word and idea on the game itself 
Pure play controls the fiction and overwhelms the 
reader. The refuge of Eden is literally a game of 
words. Everything is refracted through the game and the 
mind of its creator. The stark and sometimes tedious 
fact of this fiction is that nothing happens and a world 
is thought. The idea is the supreme reality. And the 
rest of the world is safely ignored, A clue to the 
aesthetic orientation of Coover against any form of 
artistic utility and toward play is provided on the 
frontispiece of the novel,. It is a quotation from Kant's 
CA-tt-lqud oi Judgcmant: '''It is here not at all requisite 
to prove that such an aA^ckdtypa^ is possibles,
but only that we are led to the Idea of it
Indeed, Coover's work delineates an idealistic 
theory of art in which play becomes both process and 
product of a new Eden, an Eden of words, a paradisiac 
realm of freedom in the mind. The aesthetic principles 
of play posit a transcendent landscape; they bring 
man away from the chaos of the urban jungle into an 
Edenic sanctuary of untrammelled consciousness.
Thought is then free to create life and to make man 
fully human as it releases him from the alienation of 
labour in the postlapsarian world. If work riTthe 
modern world is stultifying, then the Adamic quest
^ 5 4
for being truly at home with oneself involves the
freedom of play. This is what Henry feels every time
he leaves the office and journeys home to the world of
mind —  "Once in the elevator, going down, he was able
to forget about work altogether. He was headed for
home, returning to his league and all its players, to
the Book and tonight's big story, and there weren't
• 1
any Horace Zifferblatts there". Henry is only fully 
alive and himself when he is at play creating his o\-m 
world. This passage and others remind us that Coover 
is in full agreement with Schiller when the latter 
avers that
man only plays when he is in the fullest 
sense of the word a human being, and he is 
only fully a human being when he plays.
This proposition, which at the moment may 
sound like a paradox, will take on both 
weight and depth of meaning once we have 
got as far as applying it to the twofold 
earnestness of duty and destiny. It will,
I promise you, prove capable of bearing 
the whole edifice of the art of the beautiful, 
and of the still more difficult art of living. 
But it is, after all, only in philosophy that 
the proposition is unexpected; it was long 
ago alive and operative in the art and in 
the feeling of the Greeks, the most 
distinguished exponents of both; only they 
transferred to Olympus what was meant to 
be realized on earth. Guided by the truth 
of that same proposition, they banished 
from the brow of the blessed gods all the 
earnestness and effort which furrow the 
cheeks of mortals, no less than the empty 
pleasures which preserve the smoothness of
■
1 Robert Coover, The ctatton,
Inc,, J, HcnAy ijJaagk, Pnop, (New York: New American
Library, 1968), p. 44. Subsequent references are to this 
edition and will appear in parentheses.
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a vacuous face; freed those ever-contented 
beings from the bonds inseparable from every 
purpose, every duty, every care, and made 
idleness and indifferency the enviable 
portion of divinity merely a more human 
name for the freest, most sublime state of 
being. Both the material constraint of 
natural laws and the spiritual constraint 
of moral laws were resolved in their higher 
concept of Necessity, which embraced both 
worlds.at once; and it was only out of the 
perfect union of those two necessities that 
for them true Freedom could p r o c e e d . 2
For the hero of USA to be fully human and to be 
free means to create a vivid world of beauty and play 
through the games of fiction. Henry Waugh is a citizen 
of a depressing society conceived by Coover as the 
tenebrous realm of the contemporary American scene.
He is as much a victim of late capitalism as anyone.
He is jostled to work on a crowded bus filled with 
unsmiling faces, and when he gets to the office he 
is jolted anew by the supervision of an officious boss. 
At work he does not have a minute when he is wholly 
human or free; he is there simply to fulfill the demands 
and needs of someone else, which are imposed on him.
All the other workers proceed like drones in a beehive, 
but Henry has the idea of regaining himself through 
the artful play of a self-created universe. This means 
he is abnormal in the context of his society. He sets 
out for the world of mind, the terrain of Coover's
2 Friedrich Schiller, On the, Ad^thdttc F due.-z  t l o n  ojJ 
Uan, tn a ojJ Le.tte.^é, ed. and trans. Elizabeth
M. Wilkinson e,t at, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1 9 6 7 ) ,  pp. 1 0 7 - 9 .
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ludic fiction. For him, as for Huck Finn, the merits 
of civilized society are not worth the oppression they 
entail. The path Waugh takes leads him away from the 
alienated labour of the accountancy firm of Dunkelmann, 
2auber & Zifferblatt, and toward the Adamic play of a 
golden age of games.
Baseball is the central game and dominant motif 
of this novel, and from that premise alone there are 
certarn ineluctable corollaries to be drawn. The most 
important of these is that baseball is the native 
American game and as such it reflects many representative 
ideas of the society which enshrines it. The rituals 
a nation are involved. Thus it provides a core ideology 
embraced by America about itself, and moreover, it 
supplies a host of game metaphors for life. Businessmen 
speak of "ballpark estimates," "teamwork," and "striking 
out" with a common and immediate understanding of the 
metaphors employed. If Coover is an American novelist 
writing about the national sport, it may fairly be 
assumed that he is also writing about the dreams and 
realities of the nation. Knowing the received opinions 
about the myth of the American Eden discussed in earlier 
chapters, we can see that this writer is also postulating 
the illusions of the American dream, in this instance 
by means of the device of the "all-American game".
Hence descriptions of the game take on the studied 
examination of reality, apd the reality demonstrates the
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false geography of the conceptualized American Eden,
Yet the destruction of a localized Eden allows the 
fullness of another Eden,, that play world of the mind.
Society creates an exiguity for man, and man creates, 
must create, everything for himself. What this moans 
that man becomes his own god, as Schiller explains 
it; as he creates the example of his own divinity, a 
self-contained universe o;f freedom and play, a garden 
(or ball park) of the absolute idea. Unlike anywhere 
else in society, in his a^ rt of play Waugh is a free 
agent and fully human. He controls this realm, it 
obsesses him but it does not coerce him like the 
imposed tasks of Horace Zifferblatt. Through his 
artistry and mastery of the game, Henry is agent and 
manager, pitcher and batter, hero and chorus, destroyer, 
creator, and sole proprietor and possessor of his mind 
and being. In short, he is free.
Freedom and play become symbiotic adjuncts in 
Coover's fiction. What he renders is an epic paean to 
play. The novel opens tn mddta.6 Kdi>, with a roll of y
the dice near the completion of a perfect game. The 
aura is one of intense excitement, with an air of 
imminent triumph and celebration. There is a sense of 
harmony and the mythic quality of "timeless gestures 
passed" (p. 3), Certainly Henry feels a happiness and 
a freedom from time and space, from the limitations of 
his physical confines, as he jovially basks in the
3  r j
imagined sun of the ball park, a sun placed there not 
by God but simply by force of mind. This prelapsarian 
state of contentment, oneness, and bliss is only felt 
by Henry when he is at play, when he momentarily regains 
the primal freedom of the Edenic experience, a state 
secured for him by the artistic pursuit. For Henry, as 
for Coover, artful play leads to the garden, it achieves 
immortality, and it even makes history; that is to say, 
it redeems the past and makes possible the future
as it fulfills the present, The opening passage of ÜBA 
is evocative of this magiçal force of the game as it 
emphasizes the freedom of the child’s world of play and 
the harmony of "the old days," of the golden age of 
unalienated being, wherein nothing is other or separate 
from the self, where there are no barriers but rather 
unqualified unity:
Bottom half of the seventh. Brock's boy 
had made it through another inning unscratched, 
one! two! three! Twenty-one down and just 
six outs to go! and Henry's heart was racing, 
he was sweating with relief and tension all at 
once, unable to sit, unable to think, tn there, 
Mtth them! Oh yes, boys, it was on! He was 
sure of it! More than just another ball game 
now: kt&toH.yî And Damon Rutherford was
making it. Ho ho! too good to be true!
And yes, the stands were charged with it, 
turned on, it was the old days all over again 
and with one voice they rent the air as the 
Haymaker Star Hamilton Craft spun himself 
right off his feet in a futile cut at Damon's 
third strike -- zing! whoosh! za’p! OUT.!
Henry laughed, watched the hometown Pioneer 
fans cheer the boy, cry out his name, then 
stretch —  not just stretch —  teap Lp for 
luck. He saw beers bought and drunk, hot 
dogs eaten, timeless gestures passed. Yes,
yes, they nodded, and crossed their fingers 
and knocked on wood and clapped their hands, 
and laughed how they were all caught up in 
it, witnessing it, how he was all caught up 
in it, this great ball game, event of the 
first order, tremendous moment; Rooktd 
pttakdA. Damon Rutkd^xio^d, {>on thd 
tndompan.abtd B^oak Ruthd^{^ond, two 
.Inntng^ OLLt^ > -- i^om a pd^iddt gamdi
Henry, licking his lips, dry from excitement, 
squinted at the sun high over the Pioneer 
Park ...
... his eye was on the game, on the great 
new Rookie pitcher Damon Rutherford, seeking 
this afternoon ^is sixth straight win ... and 
maybe more. Maybe; immortality (pp. 3-4).
Immediately, as soon as one picks up the book and 
starts to read, comes the realization that the fiction 
of the game is presented as the main fiction of the 
novel. In a basic sense, it is the novel, and this is 
reinforced by the fact that the hero does not stand 
apart from the action but rather is united with it.
He has the fresh exuberance of the child as he becomes 
"one of the boys". He takes on the personae of his 
characters as he not only conceives but executes the 
plays of the ball game. He is in the grandstand, on 
the pitcher's mound, behind home plate, and finally, 
there is the image of him sitting at his kitchen table 
behind a pile of papers. Rarely does reality interfere 
with the illusion of the game, yet when it does, it is 
felt fully as an intrusion, almost as an undefended 
digression, as when Henry goes outside to buy a pastrami 
sandwich at the neighbourhood delicatessen, or.when he 
uses the bathroom. For the reader as for Henry, the job
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at Siffarblatt's is a gross intrusion and an alien 
act. Thus quotidian reality, society, the external 
world, the laws of nature, form a subplot of easily 
disregarded import. They obtain little sense of 
actuality, for what is re&lly actualized in this fiction 
is thr ideal of play and freedom therein. Henry plays 
in order to re-conceive the world in his own image, so 
that nothing is external to himself. In doing so, the 
protagonist follows the route prescribed for aesthetic 
fulfillment and noted by Hegel in the following passage:
Now the fundamental conception to be 
stressed in relation to art for this whole 
sphere lies briefly in the following: Man,
on the particular and finite side of his needs, 
wishes, and aims, stands primarily not only in 
a ge.ndn.at relation to external nature, 
but more precisely in a relation of cic pendence.. 
This relativity and lack of freedom is 
repugnant to the ideal, and man can become 
an object for art only if he is first freed 
from this labour and distress, and has cast 
off this ddpdnddncd ... In these cases he 
must work out his necessary satisfaction by 
his own activity; he must take possession 
of things in nature, arrange them, form 
them, strip off every hindrance by his own 
self-won skilfulness, and in such a way 
that the external world is changed into a 
means whereby he can realize himself in 
accordance with all his aims ...
From the ideal ground of art the distress 
of life must be banished. In so far as 
possession and affluence afford a situation 
in which poverty and labour vanish, not 
merely momentarily but entirely, they are 
therefore not only not anaesthetic, but 
they rather coincide with the Ideal ...
For the genuine ideal consists not only in 
man's being in general lifted above the grim 
seriousness of dependence on thesd #kternal 
circumstances, but in his standing in the 
midst of a superfluity which permits him
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to play freely and cheerfully with the 
means put at his disposal by nature.3
To play freely is for Henry the diametrical opposite
of engaging in alienated labour. Coover sets up a pair 
of antinomic motifs, play and work, which challenge and 
eludicate each other in t^e course of the narrative.
Indeed, as the two forces clash and play against themselves, 
they present an opposition of striking thematic import.
When at play with his art, Henry is like Damon, whom he
describes as fully integrated and wholly unalienated, 
that is, as "His own man, yet at home in the world, 
part of it, involved, every inch of him a participant, 
maybe that was all it was: his total involvement, his
oneness with the ÜBA. Henry mused, fingering the dice"
(p. 9). And when he fingers the dice and makes his 
plays which propel the game forward, this is how Henry 
feels as well. He is in possession of himself and is 
wholly self-determining; in his Eden of play he does 
not have to obey the extraneous demands of a scowling 
boss and an intrusive time clock. He sees that work 
inhibits freedom, it denies play, it trivializes the 
ludic impulse, and on a more concrete level, it 
proscribes enjoyment.
To Henry, work becomes an octopus threatening to
3 G.W.F. Hegel, •* Ldctun.d6 on FZne.
A/it, trans, by T.M. Knox, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1975), Volume I, pp. 256-7.
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overtake his life unless he pursues the exciting, 
compelling dynamic of the game. It is true that the 
game dominates his working and sleeping hours, but 
Coover * s protagonist would rather be impelled by play 
than coerced by work which he does not even enjoy. 
According to Cooyer, work means people are alien to 
themselves, that they forfeit control over their own 
existence. It means that'people cannot go out for a 
bit of entertainment because the ritual of getting up 
early for work forbids it; "The bar was nearly empty, 
not surprising; Tuesday, a working night, only six or 
seven customers, faces all familiar, mostly old-timers 
on relief" (p. 21). Work means labouring by the sweat 
of one's brow against the desires and needs of the self; 
it entails the denial of self in support of the mechanism 
of production. On the other hand, play commits one to a 
golden land, to an Eden of mind. It is, like "the record 
book was, above all, a catalogue of possibilities ..."
Play and the game present the potential "to do something, 
no matter how small a thing, with absolute unqualified 
utterly unsurpassable pdAi^e'ctton! " (p. 23). Sex and 
play, freedom, fantasy, and imagination, all are 
antithetical to work. Essentially, work is antithetical 
to Henry's humanity as it defines the power of limitation:
Oh, that's a game, Henry1 Tk&t'a really a
gfiddt old game.I
So that was how and why it was that
Henry showed up that Wendesday at the offices of
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Dunkelmann, Zaujper & Zifferblatt, Licensed 
Tax & General Accountants, Specializing in 
Small Firms, Bookkeeping Services & Systems, 
Payrolls & Payroll Taxes, Monthly, Quarterly 
& Annual Audits, Enter Without Knocking, 
somewhat after the lunch hour, and there 
was just no doubt that the third-named and 
last-surviving of the firm's partners, Mr.
Horace (n) Zifferblatt, Fiduciary Expert 
and Adjutant of Minor Industry, had his dander 
up. Of course, he had his reasons. Zifferblatt 
was a militant clock-watcher, and Henry’s 
record of late had been none too good. And 
then there'd been that disturbance back during 
the last pennant scramble when Henry, distracted, 
worrying about injuries on the Keystone pitching 
staff, had posted to the general and subsidiary 
ledgers of one firm the journal entries of 
another. Whole quarter's worth. So: might
as well expect the worst. Still, in spite 
of his lifelong reverence for hard work and 
dependability, and that letting-the-team-down 
guilt he'd always suffered after such lapses, 
today he found jfie just didn't care. No,
Henry walked today in a perfect vault of 
well-being, crystalline and impenetrable, 
and there was nothing the wrath of Zifferblatt 
could do to crack it (p. 35).
The power of play elevates Henry into a new world
and it gives him an enlightened, a superior, consciousness.
Thus he enters a universe freed from the manipulation of
the marketplace and its mechanical coercion. Men when
they work are like robots and in the process of labour
they deny themselves and their needs. The picture
Coover draws is close to the one of repression and
alienation described by Marcuse ;
For the vast majority of the population, the 
scope and mode of satisfaction are determined 
by their own labor; but their labor is work 
for an apparatus which they do not control, 
which operates as an independent pow,er to 
which individuals must submit if want
to live. And it becomes the more alien the 
more specialized the division of labor
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becomes. Men do not live their own lives 
but perform pre-established functions.
While they work, they do not fulfill their 
own needs and faculties but work in 
aZtdnatton -. .
Yet the dialectical process and the strength of contradiction 
guarantee that the concept of labour must imply the notion 
of freedom and play. To stand outside the garden is to 
know the true essence of the potential within. As Marcuse 
continues :
However, progressive alienation itself 
increases the potential of freedom: the more
external to the individual the necessary labor 
becomes, the less does it involve him in the 
realm of necessity. Relieved from the 
requirements of domination, the quantitative 
reduction in lapor time and energy leads to 
a qualitative change in the human existence: 
the free rather than the labor time determines 
its content. The expanding realm of freedom 
becomes truly a realm of play -- of the free 
play of individual faculties. Thus liberated, 
they will generate new forms of realization and 
of discovering the world, which in turn will 
reshape the realm of necessity, the struggle
for existence.3
Hence for Coover's protagonist, art is the antipode 
conjured and predicated by the burden of labour. It is 
important to note how the metaphors of work and play 
interchange with and transform each other in Henry's 
mind. Since his language is dependent on the words and 
framework of play, he sees alienated work as bad.
4 Herbert Marcuse, and CtvZZtzatton’ A
PkttoéopktdaZ lnqutn,y tnto Fn.dud (New York: Vintage,
1962), p. 41.
5 îbtd,, pp. 203-4.
unsuccessful, unhappy play, and then, again within the 
boundaries of his own mind, he converts the bad play 
tntî.) a more joyful part uf his game. Thus he borrows 
proper nu-ne'- from the working world and transfers them 
to the context of the game. And even while under the 
compuitton of the accountancy job, "His mind kept 
ÛI ifting back to his kitchen table". Free play means 
*‘tne perfect game. The bpy with the magic arm" (p. 43) , 
The only way the nugatory state of contemporary society 
becomes real and acceptable to Henry is when he removes 
it to h.is ludic realm, that is, when he converts the 
external world to a creation of mind, as Hegel suggested:
The rain tumbled like gentle applause 
on his umbrella. Under it he walked, skirting 
the puddles, dry in the deluge, as though 
glassed in under a peaked black dome.
Hunched-up cars pushed through the streets 
like angry defeated ballplayers jockeying 
through crowds on their way to the showers. 
Henry waited at a corner for a red light. 
Offices emptied out, filling the streets.
A policeman in a slicker stood stoically in 
the thick of the traffic, blowing his whistle 
and jerking his arms like a base coacn 
urging a runner on. The light changed to 
green and Henry crossed over to his bus stop. 
Green. Slicker. Cop. Copper Greene. /Might 
try it. Have to jot it down when he got home.
Everywhere he looked he saw names. His 
head was full of them. Bus stop. Whistle- 
stop. Whistlestop Busby, second base.
Simple as that. Over a storefront across the 
street: Thornton's. He'd been lookina for
a name to go with Shadwell, and maybe that 
was it. Thornton Shadwell. Tim's boy.
Pitcher like the old man? Probably. Bu“./ 
a lefty. Will he play for the StongtV No. 
Unless the old man gets sacked thib’%ear.
His Keystones were in a slump. Manager of 
the Year last year, in trouble this. Life
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was fast and brutal. More likely, Mel 
Trench's Excelsiors will grab young Shadwell 
up. Outstanding prospect (p. 46).
Not only are the images of work transferred to 
and enlivened by play. Through play, they become the 
stuff of fiction, the material of art. Work itself is 
examined and pushed to a higher realm when it is 
conceived outside the bounds of alienation. Significantly, 
Henry refers to his world "of play as his "work'’ - - 
everyone thinks he is "moonlighting" in order to make 
mors money, that he has greedily taken on a second job 
in the evening. Yet Henry is not working in the present 
lonua that makes work a correlate of divorce from the 
self. His "work" is that of unalienated labour and 
hence it is play. The difference between the two terms 
is thus clarified, as both involve, through this 
dialectical synthesis, seriousness, freedom, and the 
integration of the individual with what is external 
to himself. Work becomes play as it proceeds away 
from utility and finite constraint toward the realm 
of the infinite and the unlimited, that is, as it 
moves toward freedom. It ië in this sense that one 
can truly speak of the work of art as play. The 
l_:oit.ations of the postlapsarian workaday world propel 
man toward the far reaches of a progressive transformation 
in the Edenic realm of mind. The concrete finiteness 
of labour necessitates the Adamic quest for '£i%edom 
and the infinite, away from the confines of work and the
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lA'.rs of our limiting physical nature. Such is the.
progress of man toward art ant. ii„ support of a higher
lever of civilization. Ay Schiller explains in, man
moves aw....y from utility and d3cermir.ate action
{alienated labour) coward the Bderiic sphere of beauty,
C'..f m.'cy, and freedom:
By means of aesthetic culture, therefore, 
the personal worth of a man, or hi5 dignity, 
inasmuch as this can depend solely upon 
himself, remains completely indeterminate; 
and nothing more is achieved by it than tiiat 
he is henceforth enabled by the grace o:c
Mature to make of himself what he will .
that the freedom to be what he ought to oe 
is completely restored to him.
But precisely thereby something Infinite 
is achieved. For as soon as we recall that 
it was precisely of this freedom that, hc- 
was deprived by the one-sided constraint 
of nature in the field of sensation a/,d by 
the exclusive authority of reason in the 
realm of though^, then we are bound to 
consider the powder which is restored to 
him in the aesthetic mode as the highest 
of all bounties,r as the gift of humanity 
itself. True, he possesses this humanity 
in potentta before every determinate condition 
into which he can conceivably enter. But 
he loses it in practice with every determinate 
condition /utilitarian production or lanou-'C/ 
into which he does enter. And if he is to 
pass into a condition of an opposite nature,, 
this humanity must be restored to him h 
time anew through the life of the aestl.etic ^
The heart of humanity and of aesthetics c-.v.n'-.ves on 
the paracvise of play, and as such it. is forever 
distinguishable from alienated labour. As Kant f...:r:aly 
suggests, "We look on the former /art/ as scuxetliing
Schiller, up. e/a», p. 147.
which could only prove final (be a success) as play,
i.e. an occupation which M s  agreeable on its own account;
but on the second handicraft/ as labour, i.e. a business,
which on its own account is disagreeable (drudgery), and
is only attractive by means of what it results in {e.g.
the pay), and which is consequently capable of being
7a, compulsory imposition." In art man can discover a 
unique source of freedom,"play, and immense creative 
potential
Thus Henry develops into the agent of his ov;n 
divinity and of infinite possibility, like "one of 
the new breed of radical Caseyites, heretical sect. 
attempting to bring back the golden age ..., celebrate 
the mystery of Casey's uniqueness; his essential 
freedom, God active in man ..." (p. 222) It is in 
such a manner that the life of the UBA can be rejuvenated, 
that the excitement and wonder of the game can be 
recaptured after the death of Damon, the slump of 
interest, and the imposition of new mechanical devices 
by Chancellor Penn McCaffpee. The promise of the 
aesthetic experience signifies continual rebirth and 
renewal through the transforming power of artful play 
and the revolutionary force of mind. Despite the 
imposition of marketplace ethics, cost-benefit analysis^
7 Immanuel Kant, T/ie CKtttqud Uj{  ^ trans,
James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1952, rpt. 1.973) , p. 164,
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"distribution functions," and television monitors -- 
machines in the garden - as if "Fenn had somehow 
forgot the game was baseball" (p. 146), the spontané ...us 
enthusiasm of the game is recovered by Henry as he 
G;'tj tr the statistical breakdowns and settles into pure 
play. The idea qf baseball and the aesthetic moment of 
..•..w:nry‘c original creation are then free to assert 
it 2:3.0elves anew and to impel the ludic cycle forward.
Eden is maintained, "alive in the sun," with boys, 
crowds, cheers, and a timeless vibrancy (p. 242).
To achieve an idealistic Eden of art, an important 
distinction must be made between the games and play of 
art and those games and play which involve no aesthetic 
goal but only the reward of immediate sensuous enjoyment. 
The actual game of baseball is finite and it propels 
no one toward a ludic paradise. The quintessence of the 
Edenic moment is located pather in the creative capacity 
of mind and the transforming strength of the idea. The 
mind is properly and uniquely the realm of the icfinitejf 
it is the power of mind alone which creates art .cid 
life. Hence the fertile ground of play remains the 
territory of the ideal, that is, of the mind. What 
the mind and art postulate is the idea of the game, 
the concept itself. Not only does the mind identify 
the harmony of play; it, moreover, contains it, Coover 
elucidates this issue when, he has Henry decla/Ste that 
tne actual game of baseball boras him, that he never
vvanted to be a professional ballplayer, that he never 
fellows real games, and t]p.at the most interesting part 
of baseball happened over one hundred years ago when
the game was being conceived;




"’Oh, sometimes I like to read about it. 
But the real action was over a century ago. 
It's a bore now."
"You don't go to games, real ones?"
"Not for years now. The first game 1 
saw, Lou, the league's best pitcher that 
year threw a three-hit shutout. His own 
team got only four hits, but three were in 
one inning, and they won, 2-to-O, Fantastic 
game. And I nearly fell asleep. I kept 
going back for a while. There were things 
about the games I liked. The crowds, for 
example. I felt like I was part of something 
there, you know, like in church, except It 
was more ieat than any church, and I joined 
in in the score-keeping, the hollering, the 
eating of hot dogs and drinking of Cokes 
and beer, and for a while I even had t’ue 
funny idea that ball stadiums and nor 
European churches were the real American 
holy places." Formulas for energy 
configurations where city boys came to 
see their country origins dramatized, some 
old lost fabric of unity ... act that raver 
quite came off, "But I would leave a uame.v 
elbowing out with all the others, and feel 
a kind of fear $hat I could sc misuse my 
life; what was the matter with me, I
could spend unhappy hours at a ball park, 
leave, and yet come back again? Then, a 
couple days later, at home, I would pick 
up my scoreboard. Suddenly, what was dead 
had life, what was wearisome became ptlrring, 
beautiful, unbelievably real ..."
"But why did you stop ...?"
"I found out the scorecards were enough.
I didn't need the games" (pp. 165-5).
The imposition of form upon the idea of baseball 
in the mind of Henry generates the basis of the creative 
act. When Henry takes up the scorecard and conceives 
rules, histories, social events, and laws of play for 
the ludic notion in a self-contained mental activity 
and in words and language^ then it may truly be said 
that he is playing in the aesthetic sense. The freedom 
of this artistic play is controlled by formal laws and 
rules of the game, in the same way that poetry, even 
free verse, develops according.to certain technical 
guidelines. For Henry, the game in his mind contains 
the "proper response to the immortal lust for sentiment 
and pattern" (p. 230). It makes him, like one of his 
characters, a "Research Specialist in the Etiology of 
Homo Ludens" (p. 233). Significantly, the last chapter 
of the novel emphasizes the need for pattern, although 
not in the manner of intransigence or mindless allegiance 
to rules. It is the gamesplayer Raspberry Schultz who 
talks of "'legend, I mean the pattern of it, the long 
history, it seems somehow, you know, a folk truth, a 
radical truth, all those passed-down-mythical — '”; 
and he further avers, "'I don't know if there's really 
a rocord-keeper up there or not, Paunch. But even if 
t h e m  weren't, I think we'd have to play the came as 
though there were" (p. 233, p. 239).
In this context we can recall the apposite
caveat of Kant, that "It is not amiss, however, to
rex.Jnd the reader of this: that in all free arts
something of a compulsory character is still required.
Or. as it is called, a , without which the
f i.h:, which in art must be free, and which alone gives
1 fe to the work, would be bodyless and evanescent
e.g. in the poetic art there must be correctness and
8wealth of language, likewise prosody and metre),"
Schiller makes a similar though more detailed distinction 
about the nature of aesthetic play. This distinction 
bears similarity to that of Coover, when the author 
nac hecry discriminate, aip in the passage quoted above, 
between the physical play of actual baseball and the 
higher play of the creative mind. Schiller observes:
Like the bodily organs in man, his 
imagination, too, has its free movement 
and its material play, an activity in whichy 
without any reference to form, it simply 
delights in its own absolute and unfettered 
power. Inasmuch as form does not yet enter 
this fantasy play at all, its whole charm 
residing in a free association of images, 
such play —  although the prerogative of 
man alone —  belongs merely to his animal 
life, and simply affords evidence of his 
liberation from all external physical 
compulsion, without as yet warranting the 
inference that there is any autonomous 
shaping power within him. From this play 
of freely associated ideas, which is still 
of a wholly material kind, and to be 
explained by purely natural laws, the 
imagination, in its attempt at a free form, 
finally makes the leap to aesthetic^play.
8 Kant, cp, cZt., p,, 164.
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A leap it must be called, since a complecely 
new power now goes into action; for here, 
for the first time, mind takes a hand as 
lawgiver in the operations of blind instinct, 
subjects the arbitrary activity of the 
imagination to its own immutable and eternal 
unity, introduces its own autonomy into the 
transient, and its own infinity into the life 
of sense.9
For Coover, to be moved by a spontaneous flow of 
freedom and spiritual energy is requisite for the artistic 
process, yet without the formal structure such a dynamic 
is meaningless. Ideally, art involves the "free 
association of images," but as Schiller suggests, it 
cannot stop there. Play, to be aesthetic, must also 
include the negative freedom of self-imposed laws and 
the rigours of a self-evolved form. The player, or 
artist, may very well act, "not because it's a rule 
of the game, but because he feels drawn" (p. 241). 
Nevertheless, beyond the playful instinct and the 
aesthetic idea, there is phe mind which controls and 
imposes form and pattern,, Ludic fiction, like the 
game proposed by Casey, is empty, static, and impassive 
without a formal framework to support it. For aesthetic 
play to be free it must be conditioned by its own set of 
rules, issued from within, yet flexible and universal.
Eden cannot be ascribed to an amorphous condition of 
confusion and chaos:
Casey, in his writings, has spoken of 
a "rising above the rules,” an abandonment 
of all conceptualizations, including^bcore-
9 Schiller, op, p. 209.
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keepers, empires, Gods in any dress, in 
the heat of total mystic immersion in that 
essence that includes God and him equally.
Of course, some say he never wrote it, it's 
all apocryphal, inventions of Monday and 
his Universalists, distorted by redactions 
without number, but no matter, the idea 
itself remains. What it leads to, though, 
is inaction, a terrible passivity ... (p. 240)
If on the one hand, there is the destructive, 
artless anarchy of Casey's position, and on the other, 
the oppressive restrictions of Zifferblatt's iron laws, 
then what Henry must do is steer a course clear of both 
impediments, a path leading to a new world order of 
self-governing freedom. What Henry learns from Lou 
marks a renewal of the game, for Lou imposes a sort of 
organized innocence on Henry's elaborately codified 
ludic structure. Lou retains the enthusiasm of the 
beginner, of a traveller fresh upon a strange new land. 
He enlivens the game by taking more chances than Henry 
and by not playing by the rules. Henry's problem stems 
from the external mechanisms —  the machines in the 
garden of play —  which he has imposed, inflexibly 
and obsessively, on the free flow of play. By ascribing 
functions and a narrow purposiveness onto the ludic 
structure, Henry nearly strips it of its play element.
By allowing characters like Fenn McCaffree to take 
over, Henry lets the game develop into the alienated 
process of a business, and as such the game loses the 
essence of play and becomes an object of utility,
Henryks notion of games and play is in danger of
bec'onirg ,l;!.ke Z if f erblatt ' s idea of work —  hard, ary„ 
and devoid of freedom, truly a false Eden and non-aesthetic 
The nemesis of the ludic realm is in minds like that of 
aifferblatt, where everything translates into a cost- 
related material with a desiccated utility;
"Well, then, accept a little advice, 
my friend. Accounting like baseball is an 
art and a science and a rough competitive 
business. Some make it and some don't.
The ones who make it keep their heads up, 
their eyes open, their minds on their job, 
and pull their part without belly-aching..
Wages are based on pe^^oAmance,, Mr. Waucn, 
and what we want around her at DZ&Z is 
pA,o nat^ Î " He paced the room, getting
worked up. "What we expect, we give. This 
is the Ame/itcan way, Mr. Waugh 1 Why, old 
Marty Dunkelmann here never quit till the 
moment he diedl! I can still remember how 
I came to the office that morning and found 
him in here, bolt upright in his chair, 
eyes rolled back, and one finger on an error 
in a column of accounts receivable. He'd 
showed me that mistake just the night before, 
the only one I ’ve made in fifty years oi: 
accounting; we were partners but we expected 
just as much out of each other as we did 
from any employee; he must've died while I 
was walking out the door! I'd been sitting 
right where you —  Waugh! Mt, Waugkl (flakt 
up! (pp. 138-9)
In his more obsessive moments, Henry edges 
precariously close to Zifferblatt's point of view, 
to a utility-inspired purge of the Edenic landscape 
of games and play. Damon Rutherford, Henry's 
tgj and an obvious Adamic figure in his youthful 
great promise, is destroyed by Henry's allegiance to 
the rules of the game, to the "Extraordinary Occurrences 
Chart"L And it is the rule-inspired death of Damon 
nearly causes the destruction of the game for
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Henry, as it "cuts him off from any sense of wonder or 
mystery, makes life nothing more than getting by with 
the least pain possible, and somehow ... such a life 
seems less than human" {p. 2^0). To lose aesthetic 
play is CO lose one’s humanity. What Henry decides 
to do is to save .the game by killing off Casey, the 
killer of Damon, and thus, symbolically, his position 
of anarchy. This is how Henry restores the paradise 
of play, the "sandy diamond, green grass, ballplayers 
under the sun, stadium of fans ..." (p. 201)
The antithesis of the aesthetic Eden of ludic 
fiction establishes itself as the straining force of 
utility, of an end or goal in the real world. Clearly, 
for Coover, the aesthetic purpose is achieved intrinsically, 
within itself and on its own terms, according to the 
freedom of self-imposed form. This is why the "teamwork" 
adumbrated by Zifferblatt proves so false and ludicrous.
It also explains why the profit-making notions and 
production jargon have no meaning for the game in Henry''s 
mind, and lead only to its near disintegration. In this 
context we can understand the emptiness of the American 
Eden as it is articulated by Zifferblatt and as it 
forms a central motif of the novel. This America is 
a false Eden because it is based not on the concepts 
of artful play, freedom, and a new relationship with 
the world and with nature, but rather on the Aivival 
ü :; t.i.e fittest and the strangulation ideology of
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destructive competition. Hence the contemporary 
America described by Coover wholly loses the concept 
of an expansive new world, particularly when we watch 
unhappy workers jostle each other in crowded buses, 
push at lunch counters, and rush away from work as 
soon as they are allowed. Henry's observations of his 
fellow workers recall the deadly alienation of a 
similar description in Thi Wa&te Land:
Unreal City,
Under the brown fog of a winter dawn,
A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many,
I had not thought death had undone so many. 
Sighs, short and infrequent, were exhaled.
And each man fixed his eyes before his feet.^O
The external world offers no anodyne and contemporary
society no relief. Waugh's peers undergo an analogous
ritual of customary and ineluctable bleakness;
The bus was jammed, they had to stand. 
People jostled, rammed them moistly toward 
the rear. Rain drummed on the roof. If 
skyscrapers were penis-prisons, what were 
the buses? the efferent tubes? The driver 
barked orders. Passengers protested at the 
shoving. Lou was the biggest in sight, so 
everybody turned their darkest looks on him.
A woman complained about getting elbowed, 
and though it wasn't Lou's fault, he tipped 
his hat in apology, dripping water from the 
brim onto the evehing paper of a man sitting 
next to them. The paper spoke blackly of 
bombs, births, wars, weddings, infiltrations, 
and social events. "You know, Lou," Henry 
said, "you can take history or leave it, 
but if you take it you have to accept certain 
assumptions or ground rules about wha- 
in and what's left out" (p. 49).
■'
10 T.s. Eliot, The Wa^te Layid, in SeZected ?oem.& 
(London: Faber, 1954), lines 60-65.
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What is left out of reality and the utilitarian 
thrust of society is the essential freedom and play 
achieved by art. In this sense the importance of artistic 
play and illusion is realized. The order of 6 ctnbounce^ 
of illusion, is a primary aspect of Schiller's aesthetic 
theory, and it is also a. dominant part of the ludic 
concept of the contemporary novel* The notion elucidates 
the particular propensity of Coover in USA for the 
epistemoiogy of mind and the values of illusion over 
the concreteness of reality, and will perhaps lend 
perspicuity to the Modernist movement against verisimilitude 
in fiction. The contemporary writers of ludic fiction 
share a common preoccupation with semblance, with the 
pure play of illusion as a final goal in itself without 
reference to the external world and the ethos of 
utility.. The meaning of semblance is tied to the 
necessity of form, pattern, and design in allowing 
aesthetic play to occur. Schiller employs the term 
"Schein" as the distinguishing element which separates 
aesthetic works and phenomena from all things non~aesthetic. 
Although the word contains à certain ambiguity in German, 
"Schein" is used by Schiller "as a master-concept in his 
aesthetic 'system'" and ’"to distinguish art from reality". 
Moreover, for Schiller, '^ 'SaheZn only ha6 existence in the 
world of forms, Ideas, or 's h a d e s ' S e m b l a n c e  nas
11 Wilkinson and Willoughby, "Schein" entry in 
''Glossary," On the €duc.atZon Mum, p. 328*
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nothing in common with utility or the external world, 
and it shares much with Kant's observation, "That the 
dalignt in an object on account of which we call it 
beautiful is incapable of resting on the representation 
of its utility". The idea of semblance also recalls 
Kant's famous dictum of purposiveness without a purpose, 
that "BeauZt/ is the form of {^ZnaZZty in an object, so 
far as perceived in it a p a \ t  ^Kom t h e  K e p ^ e 6 e n t a t t o n  
£>■< an end".
The dichotomy between illusion and reality which is 
noticeable in Coover's fiction becomes central to his 
idea of aesthetic play, then, as it contains and develops 
the germ of semblance. There is a discordance when 
Henry merges either his life into art or art into life. 
The harmony of aesthetic play is disturbed when practical 
matters intrude, such as when the fabulous, driving 
exci'cenent of the game withers into the bleak, sterile 
image of the kitchen table and a stack of papers; or 
when Henry's characters are engaging in debate and then, 
^.uddenr/, Lou Engel appears.. The Eden of mind exists in 
: and in ideas; i i s  not translatable into 
,t^-.ality. Per does life exist for art, as the extreme 
, ..stt.'..:i.cism of a Wilde would have it* What the ideas 
O'" I'udLo fiction and of semblance assure are discrete
1 ' Kant, Cn.tttqiie o{\ Judgement, p. 69, pr 80
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regions for life and art, existing separately yet with 
immaneat harmony. This realization is central to 
Henry's sanity and to the strength of Coover's work:
Some people would look on his game, Henry 
realized, as a kind of running away. Lou, 
tor instance, could not understand why he 
didn't see more movies or visit museums or 
join an interesting club or something, and 
though he could accept the idea of taking 
'':)n outside work for extra money, he'd probably 
be astonished to learn about the game. But 
descending in the building elevator, urethra 
of his world prison, dropping dejectedly into 
a kind of private sinkhole, having to return 
to all that commitment and all that emptiness, 
Henry was aware that you could see it both 
ways: Roth's skylighting problems were,
in a way, a diversion for him from his own. 
Sometimes, true, in the heat of a pepnant
chase, for example, his daytime job could
be a nuisance, but over the long haul he 
needed that balance, that rhythmic shift 
from house to house, and he knew that total 
one-sided participation in the league would 
soon grow even more oppressive than his job 
at Dunkelmann, Zauber & Zifferblatt (pp. 14 0-1).
What the Adamic quest in fiction does is to preserve 
the essence of free play as an autonomous entity, as an
eternal moment. As such it bears a close relationship
to 6 embZance, with its divorce from the external world 
and its emphasis on the pattern of mind and the creative 
force of the unencumbered idea, the idea that defines 
itself on its own terms and plays freely without any 
reference to a conformance or a reconditioning of 
external reality. Art signals the freedom and great 
release from the constraints of time, space, and utility. 
The Eden of play pursued by Henry can defy the %cowl 
of Zifferblatt, the bleak faces on the city bus, the
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rain outside, and the glare of neon lights. The 
concept of semblance predicates that art is an idealistic 
reaXiu of mind, which plays freely, evolving from and for 
itself* Longer clarifies this point when she writes:
Schiller was the first thinker who saw 
what really makes "Schein," or semblance, 
important for art: the fact that, ic liberates
perception —  and with it, the wer of 
conception from all practical purposes, 
and lets the mi%d dwell on the sheer appearance 
of things. The function of artistic illusion 
is not "make-believe," as many philosophers 
and psychologists assume, but the very opposite, 
disengagement from belief -- the contemplation 
of sensory qualities without their usual 
meanings of "Here's that chair," "That's 
my telephone," "These figures ought bo add 
up to the bank's statement," etc. The 
knowledge that what is before us has no 
practical significance in the world is what 
enables us to give attention to its appearance 
as such.13
Play in the garden eschews practical considerations, 
didactic messages, and any theory of utility. This is 
why Henry conceives his game as the antithesis of 
purposive labour and speculates about Lou's surprise 
at the non-paid, anti-lucrative nature of his ludic 
passion. For always the question in postlapsarian 
society is what function an object performs or how much 
it costs or what it is worth. Henry rejects this.
The value of marketplace exchange does not enter into 
his paradise of play. For him, the aesthetic moment 
reaches beyond the selling price. Not finance bur the 
mental realm controls the game of baseball for, the
Susanne K. Langer, BeeZZng and Von.m: A 7 h.eoA.y
developed from ?kZZo6opky Zn a Neu) Key (New 
Scribner's, 1953), p. 49.
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protagonist. He resists the impulse to make a profit
from the practical value of his creation. To save
th:? game means to obviate the imposed machinery of
professional management types like Fenn McCaffree,
ov.d also to maintain the Eden of mind as its own
c tinct activity. The semblance of aesthetic play
iece.rmines its adamant orientation toward form and.
beauty_ As Schiller explains, "The beautiful is to
be neither mere life, nor mere form, but livino form,
i.e., beauty; for it imposes upon man the double law
of absolute formality and absolute reality .., With
beauty man shall only play, and it is with beauty only
14that he shall play". The freedom of art requires 
the universal acceptance of the importance of play 
which engenders a supreme fiction:
He ^enry7 smiled wryly, savoring the 
irony of it. Might save the game at that.
How would they see it? Pretty peculiar.
He trembled. Chill. Felt his forehead.
Didn't seem hot., Clammy, if anything.
No, it's too crazy. He reached again for 
the night's scoresheet, but again hesitated 
.... He penned in York's and Wilson's home 
runs on the scoresheet, watched Royce Ingram 
pick out a bat cind stride menacingly to the 
plate. Now, stop and think, he cautioned 
himself. Do you really want to save it? 
Wouldn't it be better just to drop it now, 
burn it, go on to something else, gee 
working regularly again, back into the 
swing of things,, see movies, maybe copyright 
that Intermonop game and try to market ic, 
or do some traveling, read books ... (pp. 200-1)
14 Schiller, op. eZt,, p. 107
Henr? discovers that the semblance of play creates 
±\:b aa>Lio/i that the innate ludic pattern cf the
game represents its meaning- When Lou asks, "'Where's 
the playing board?,'" Henry's answer points to the 
idealism of aesthetic play, an idealism which, of 
course, eschews the external world: "'Well, you sort
of have to imagine it,' Henry said. 'I used to have 
a mock-up of a ball park, but it only got in the 
way'" (p. 181). The closer the game approaches the 
semblance conferred by artistic awareness, and the 
further it moves from actual dice-throwing towara 
pare play idealized in the mind, the closer Henry 
comes to an Eden of words. The chronicle of the game 
takes on greater significance as words, images, and 
language combine, forming the literary endeavour born 
of play. Again, the writings of Schiller offer insight 
into the role of man in his form-imposing creative 
power: "To the extent that he imparts form to matter,
and for precisely as long as he imparts it, he is 
immune to its effects; for spirit cannot be injured 
by anything except that which robs it of its freedom, 
and man gives evidence of his freedom precisely by
15
giving form to that which is formless." Henry 
realises that true freedom occurs when play is
15 Schiller, On t h e  A e s t k e t Z c .  E d a e a t Z o n  'o(\ Uan  
p. 185.
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u X i l x r y T h u s  the Adamic .autonomy of the fictionax 
realm is assured through the power of words and ideas 
to predicate a new world. Henry is free to "play wiin 
ail these problems," the "joyful problems of the creative 
involvement. Zifferblatt and the ethos of harsh utility 
now become irrelevant matters of the past. He jokes 
in song that he is "all washed up" after being fired 
from the accountancy firm, but he knows the oppcsire 
to be true, that he loses nothing and gains the? -.esthetic 
capability. He feels free, autonomous, and in control 
of his own life:
"Ok yeak, I'm aZt waaked up, boij-i,,
I goz the axe. I got the ache6
Not really, though. After Lou had called, 
Henry had phoned an employment agency wnere 
he was registered, told them he was semi­
retired and wanted half-time work, starting 
after Christmas. They asked for an updating 
of his record, but told him there might be
part-time work for an accountant there in
the agency itself after the first of the year.
And meanwhile, he had a drawerful of checks
he'd never cashed. So old Ziff, ho, ho, he 
sent to hell (p. 213).
For Schiller, semblance comes to mean the pluy- 
drive, or SpteZtKteb, of art, which is achieved in the
free, formal arrangement of the poetic or fictional
act. Coover, like his protagonist, posits the ludic 
realm of art as a free process and an immortal state, 
beyond death, beyond postlapsarian utility. Art 
retrieves the Golden Age, it lets one sport .xrU; ^ an
Eden of words in full defiance of mortality and decay.
Hence the individual deaths within the UBA do not
matter; Henry need not cry or despair over Damon's 
demise, for the game will continue, mutatZ^ maZandZs, 
in an infinite ludic cycle of sun, green grass, exci,..ed 
crowds, and full Edenic renewal.
In this context, we perceive the importance of the 
"Golden Age" motif as it recurs in the novel, and of 
the sun images. Most especially, the dominance of the 
symbolic import of youth takes on extra meaning from 
the viewpoint of the Edenic myth. The word "boy" is 
omnipresent. Its ubiquitous quality captures Schiller’s 
notion of the infinity of semblance, since the terms 
"boy" and "youth" predicate an Edenic continuity of the 
immortality of art and also connote the essential 
innocence and enthusiasm of the ludic world. Art is 
Edenic because within it man achieves the freedom and 
expansive potential of the child in the garden, freed 
from the cares and toil of mundane reality. Fiction 
recaptures the youthful play of man in the primal 
garden* Through the play of art, man is at one with 
himself and the outside universe, a free continuous 
being with nothing alien to’himself. Thus the triumph 
of the aesthetic Eden is that the supreme fiction 
becomes for those who play in the Adamic garden, the 
"Supreme Reality". Schiller adumbrates this point 
with characteristic cogency:
If, then, in one respect the aesthetic 
mode of the psyche is to be regarded as 
Nought —  once, that is, we have an eye
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to particular and definite effects —  it is 
in another respect to be looked upon as a 
state of Supreme Reality, once we have due 
regard to the absence of all limitation and 
to the sum total of the powers which are 
conjointly active within it. One cannot, 
then, say that those people are wrong either 
who declare the aesthetic state to be the 
most fruitful of all in respect of knowledge 
and morality. They are entirely right; for 
a disposition of the psyche which contains 
within it the whole of human nature, must 
necessarily contain within it Zn potzntZa 
every individual manifestation of it too; 
and a disposition of the psyche which removes 
all limitations from the totality of human 
nature must necessarily remove them from 
every individual manifestation of it as 
well. Precisely on this account, because 
it takes under its protection no single 
one of man's faculties to the exclusion of 
the others, it favours each and all of them 
without distinction; and it favours no 
single one more than another for the simple 
reason that it is the ground of possibility 
of them all. Every other way of exercising 
its functions endows the psyche with some 
special aptitude —  but only at the cost 
of some special limitation; the aesthetic 
alone leads to the absence of all limication. 
Every other state into which we can enter 
refers us back to a preceding one, and 
requires for its termination a subsequent 
one; the aesthetic alone is a whole in 
itself, since it comprises within itself 
all the conditions of both its origin and 
its continuance. Here alone do we feel 
reft out of time, and our human nature 
expresses itself with a purity and integrity, 
as though it had as yet suffered no impairment 
through the intervention of external forces.
The Edenic myth constitutes, as Schiller outlines 
for his own argument, both the origin and the continuance 
of the aesthetic, as man achieves completion by playing 
freely in ludic fiction. The Adamic quest of the game
16 Schiller, op, cZZ,, p. 151.
coîûeb to symbolize the continuity of history, the 
b?.issful harnony of the pastoral, the freedom of the 
prlraoJ world, the transcendent power of the mind, and 
tha txmelessness of play. The novel opens with the 
perfect sport, a hitless, errorless ball game, which 
Henry labels as the route to immortality. Throughout 
the book, the perfect game retains an Arcadian significance, 
as the elusive Eden for which the players strive "The 
perfect game had already sunk away into a kind of 
ui:believable golden age, long lost, forever inaccessible" 
i ' P . 9<' :] s Not attainable in reality, the perfect game is
yet th.v bright star for which the players slouch towards
Bethlehem, the illusion of fulfillment that covertly 
lurks as the hope of every game.
The fineness of aesthetic attainment merges with
prelapsarian grace in the perfect game which neralds 
the rediscovered sense of promise for humanity. The 
perfect game is an epiphany, a rare moment of being, 
that fallen man mostly only dreams of, but which arc 
can recall in its "catalogue of possibilities". Henry 
is ecstatic as he exclaims, "’No, but think of it„
Hettie, to do a thing so perfectly that, even if the 
damn world lasted forever, nobody could ever do it 
better (p. 23) The paradisiac moment of the
perfect game articulates the wonder and harmony of the 
paradigmatic aesthetic Eden, when time stops and all 
men play in the organic uiriity of the natural setting.
What one does not forget is that the mind is the sole
agent of this new world:
Top of the ninth.
This was it.,
Odds against him, of course. Had to 
remember that; be prepared for the lucky 
hit that really wouldn’t be lucky at all, 
but merely in the course of things. 
Exceedingly rare, no-hitters; much mere 
so, perfect gamqs. How many in history?
two, three. And a Rookie: no, it had
never been done„ In seventeen matchless 
years, his dad had pitched only two no­
hitters, never had a perfect game. Henry 
paced the kitchen, drinking beer, trying 
to calm himself, to prepare himself, but 
he couldn’t get it out of his head: Zt
on!
The afternoon sun waned, cast a golden 
glint off the mowed grass that haloed the 
infield. No sound in the stands now: 
breathless. Of course, no matter what 
happened, even if he lost the game, they'd 
cheer him, fabulous game regardless; yes, 
they'd love him,, they'd let him know it 
... but still they wanted it. Oh yes, how 
they wanted it 1 Damon warmed up, throwing 
loosely to catcher Ingram. Henry watched 
him, felt the boy's inner excitement, shook 
his head in amazement at his outer serenity. 
"Nothing like this before." Yes, there was 
a soft murmur pulsing through the stands: 
nothing like it, electrifying, new, a new 
thing, happening here and now! ... (p. 11)
Henry calls this event the "history-making ball 
ga.me" (p. 12) , and clearly for him, the perfect game 
marks the renewal of the past history of fallen man in 
the timeless garden. Henry gives each of his players 
elaborate histories and interconnected personal 
relationships. For example, he is able to gi'% Lou 
a fully detailed background on Archie Moon, and Moon
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is not one of his more prominent characters. To 
establish continuity in securing Schiller's idea of 
the. whole man brought forward and nurtured by the 
semblance of play in art, this challenge forms a 
Generally important goal of Henry's game. Through 
the history of the prelapsarian past, he hopes tc 
engender a move beyond mere recollection to the artistic 
synthesis. Thus the golden age of baseball, :he Brock 
Rutherford Era, "was moAe than history, it was, it was: 
fulfillment!" (p. 66) It was art.
The achievement of the game means that man can 
play anew and that by so doing he reaches a new world, 
a pastoral harmony of the original garden. In aesthetic 
play, Henry and his characters "fleet the time carelessly, 
as they did in the golden world," in a manner somewhat 
similar to that enjoyed by Shakespeare's players in the 
Forest of Arden. This pastoral, however, is largely 
an Eden of mind, yet the basic images recall the poetic 
paradise of a free and eternal world. The numerous 
songs in UBA remind the reader of the madrigals of the 
medieval pastoral, albeit in a much coarser fashion.
They are imbued with a wistful longing for the golden 
age, for "the happy sunny da-hays of old" (p. 99].
Yet the alienation of urban life means that the 
contemporary postlapsarian individual is physically 
removed from the green garden. Henry comments,
"Funny thing about both country music and baseball
with its 'village greens’: they weren't really country,
not since they got their new names anyway, but urban.
Kid stuff, dreams of heroism and innocence, staged by 
pros and turned into big business" (p. 36). Therefore 
the idea itself fulfills the Edenic dream by virtue of 
the mind's creative power. Words and language generate 
the new Eden, and as Henry has learned, names, i.e., 
ideas expressed in prose, “seem to predicate realityv. 
Perhaps in this context the obvious pastoral connotations 
of the various names of the different ball teams are 
comprehended —  there are the Haymakers, the Rubes, the 
Pioneers, and the Pastimers. Henry calls Brock, 
remembering him as the young boy who had come to the 
city for the game, "just a kid off the farm" (p. 8). 
Furthermore, it is apparent that the vitality of the 
game owes much to its illusions of primal, pastoral 
play maintained by a nostalgic imagination and posited 
as a central idea of the controlling mind of the 
artist.
It is exactly such a controlling mind which assumes 
that "Play remains as an attitude of freedom from 
subordination to an end imposed by external necessity". 
Aesthetic play denies necessity as it creates an eternal
17 John Dewey, kh.t a/s Expe/iZence (New York: Putnam,
1958), p. 279. In Chapter XII of this work, Dewey 
presents an interesting and useful discussioÊ^^f the 
theory of art as play.
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moment. The centre of the game’s import in Barney 
(i.e., Henry's) history is seen in "the Rutherford- 
Casey event as the culminating moment, revolving toward 
rhe New Day ... to a moral and philosophical concern 
with the very nature of man and society ..." The 
history moves away from time toward the idea of semblance 
through aesthetic play —  "’What we want in this 
Association is participation —  not in real time 
bur in éZgnZiZeant timel*" (pp. 216-7) The mind 
creates history. This is the freedom of the mind 
effecting a present of ludic fulfillment through a 
mythical past by assuming an Adamic future which will 
live vividly out of time. Cuss McCamish hails the 
new Eden when he exclaims, "'we've been born in a 
wondrous world, borne to a wondrous pass!'" If, as 
he continues, "'We are mere ideas,'" then through "the 
immortal lust for ... pattern" (p. 230), we are also 
eternal by virtue of the secure infinity of man in 
art. The aesthetic moment lasts forever, not for one 
man, but for all men, and through ludic fiction and 
the game's play, it can endlessly be recaptured:
But on the kitchen table, everything 
was in order, just as he had left it.
Scorecard of the game, final entries scrawled 
a little excitedly perhaps. The dice still 
showed Hard John Horvath's grounder to third.
In a sense, it was still that moment, and 
if he wanted to savor it or if he got 
occupied with something else, it cqu^ld go 
on being that moment for weeks. Arid'-then, 
when things got going again, would the 
players have any awareness of how time Lad 
stopped? No ... but they might wonder how
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all the details of that moment had got. so 
firmly etched in their minds (p. 52).
Art takes precedence over the ephemeral products
of utility, for art alone exists out of time and is
able palpably to seize the quest for the immortal.
Through the aesthetic Eden, man reaches the ideal of
freedom, for as Santayana has noted, "the ideal means
that environment in which our faculties would find
their freest employment, and their most congenial 
18world". Man takes the world into himself, he 
subsumes the idea in semblance by giving it a verbal 
structure and a poetic arrangement,
Henry realizes that for play to be significant, 
it must seek the universal and the eternal: "To be
good, a chess player, too, had to convert his field 
to the entire universe, himself the ruler of that 
private enclosure —  though from a pawn's-eye view, 
of course, it wasn't an enclosure at all, but, infinitely, 
all there was" (p. 156). The world of ludic fiction 
becomes for artist and reader alike both microcosm 
and macrocosm, particular object of perception and 
expression, and the vehicle of the infinite, of the 
universal, as well. Aesthetic play assures that the 
artist is neither confined by the particular nor confused
18 George Santayana, The Sen-6 e oi Beauty, Betng 
ayi Outttne oi Ae^thette Theory (New York: DoV&r,
1955), p. 160.
by the universal. Schiller tells us how the artist
must disdain utility as he strives for the eternai Ideal
Free alike from the futile busyness which 
would fain set its mark upon the fleeting 
moment, and frcti the impatient spirit of 
enthusiasm which applies the measure of the 
Absolute to the sorry products of Time, 
let him leave the sphere of the actual to 
the intellect, which is at home there, 
whilst he strives to produce the Ideal out 
of the union of what is possible with what 
is necessary. Let him express this ideal 
both in semblance and in truth, set the 
stamp of it upon the play of his imagination 
as upon the seriousness of his conduct, let 
him express it in all sensuous and spiritual 
forms, and silently project it into the 
infinity of time.^^
That fiction should basically consist of the world
generated by the mind of the artist is not surprising,
for as Croce has established, "works of art exist only
20in the minds that create or recreate them", Ludic 
fiction does indeed put forward a position of idealism. 
It sees the mind as superior to and beyond the domain 
of reality. Furthermore, art must go beyond reality 
if it is ever to be created at all; it must have a 
given autonomy before it can properly exist. Even the 
utilitarian ideology of Fenn McCaffree acknowledged 
the importance of Edenic play and the fiction it brings 
forward :
19 Schiller, On tka Ae^tketZc Education oi Maw, 
pp. 57-9.
20 Benedetto Croce, "Aesthetics," in ?kZto6opkZes 
oi kn.t and Beauty: Selected Readings tn Aehtketta» izom 
VtaXo to HetdeggeK, ed. Albert Hofstadter et at (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 567.
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Fenn watched their faces. There they 
were, men turned into boys, whelmed by awe 
and adolescent wistfulness. In a way, Sandy 
did them a disservice, provided them with 
dreams and legends that blocked off their 
perception of the truth. But what was the 
truth? Men needed these rituals, after all, 
that was part of the truth, too, and certainly 
the Association benefited by them. Men's 
minds being what they generally were, it was 
the only way to get to most of them .... (p- 103)
Yet Fenn is still mired in an abyss of utilitarian 
comparison and general contempt. The underlying reason 
he permits the Edenic spirit and harmony enjoyed by the 
players is because it is profitable in economic terms, 
not because it related to an ultimate freedom of 
humanity. This is the way many philistines view art; 
they reduce it to a function of crass purposiveness.
But such utilitarian purposiveness disregards aesthetic 
semblance as it limits art to an item of trade in the 
marketplace, to a commodity of exchange. Art ranks 
beyond such paltry considerations, for as Kant, asseverates, 
"there must be no question of anything but pure aesthetic 
judgements. Consequently examples are not to be selected 
from such beautiful or sublime objects as presuppose the 
concept of an end. For then the finality would be 
either teleological, or b^sed upon mere sensations of
an object ... and so, in the first case, not aesthetic,
21and, in the second, not merely formal". Either one 
assumes the intrinsic value and autonomy of the aesthetic
21 Kant, CH.ZtZqae oi Judgement, p. 121.
urdeaYour, or he ceases to speak of art.
Since for Coover art and fiction are forms oi mind,
they cannot be judged by the criteria of the external
world of utility. To do so would be as if Henry had
elevated Horace (n) Zifferblatt to the position of
arbiter and critic of his game. Of course, Zifferblatt
would be a deficient and incompetent judge. What
E'inzy as artist instinctively understands is that he.
mast transcend the trammels of reality if he is to
attain an active role in the creation of the free Sdenic
realm. The triumph of the mind and of aesthetic play
is that they are not limited by reality, for it is not
reality which creates consciousness but rather
consciousness that engenders reality. Schiller explains
the active creative power of the mental Eden and of the
Adamic quest in contemporary ludic fiction:
Inasmuch as need of reality and attachment 
to the actual are merely consequences of 
some deficiency, then indifference to reality 
and interest in semblance may be regarded as 
a genuine enlargement of humanity and a 
decisive step towards culture. In the first 
place, this affords evidence of outward 
freedom: for as long as necessity dictates,
and need drives, imagination remains tiea to 
reality with powerful bonds; only when wants 
are stilled does it develop its unlimited 
potential. But it affords evidence, too, 
of inner freedom, since it makes us aware 
of a power which is able to move of its 
own accord, independently of any material 
stimulus from without, and which is 
sufficiently in control of energy to hold 
at arm's length the importunate pressure 
of matter. The reality of things is"the 
work of things themselves; the semblance 
of things is the work of man; and
C7
a nature which delights in semblance is no 
longer taking pleasure in what it receives, 
but in what it does.
It goes without saying that the only 
kind of semblance I am here concerned with 
is aesthetic semblance (which we distinguish 
froïïi actuality and truth) and not logical 
semblance semblance, therefore, which
we love just because it is semblance, and 
not because we take it to be something 
better. Only the first is play, whereas 
the latter is mere deception. To attach 
value to semblance of the first kind can 
never be prejudicial to truth, because one 
is never in danger of substituting it for 
truth, which is after all the only way in 
which truth can ever be impaired. To despise 
it, is to despise the fine arts altogether, 
the very essence of which is s e m b l a n c e . 22
To deny the separate world of art and its intrinsic
value is to reject the aesthetic semblance of fictional
play put forward by the mind of the artist and participated
in by the reader. To plunge art into the external world,
of postlapsarian utility is to destroy its reason for
being, for the loss of the game and of the world of
play equals the loss of paradise, of the pure value of
the creative mind, a creative mind nourished not only
by individual consciousness but by the universal myths
and heritage of all mankind. As Croce has noted:
Those who in thei past have denied the 
absoluteness of the aesthetic judgment 
... denied in effect the quality, reality 
and autonomy of art. It has been asked 
whether a knowledge of the history of the 
time ... is necessary for the aesthetic 
judgment of the art of that time; it certainly 
is, because ... poetic creation presupposes
22 Schiller, On the. EducatÀ.on o{
p .  1 9 3 .
all th€; other creations (passions, feelings, 
customs, etc.) of the given historical 
moment ... what v;e call contemporary arv: 
and history really belong to the past as 
much as those of more distant ages, and must 
like them, be re-created in the present, 
in the mind ...
.., there is nothing to do but ... to 
treat works of art not in relation to social 
history (i.e., not as a function of social 
needs) but as each a world in itself,into 
which from time to. time the whole of history 
is concentrated, transfigured and imaginatively 
transcended in the individuality of the poetic 
work, which is a creation, not a reflection, 
a monument, not a document.23
What the Adamic quest emphasises is the importance 
of trie human mind, of man's creative consciousness, of 
tne innate puissance of the Ideal, and of a golden age 
of mental freedom honoured by the stories and rituals 
of the Edenic myth but crushed by the destructive 
u t i l i t y  of coeval society. Edenic fiction is a protest 
against the harsh limitations of postlapsarian confinement. 
Thus this ludic art surveys the full, unlimited universe 
as the mind gives meaning to it. Fiction remains like 
Henry's "Official Archives," a Whitmanesque catalogue 
of the possible, of the infinity of the mind's freedom: 
"Into the Book went the whole UBA, everything from 
statistics to journalistic dispatches, from seasonal 
analyses to general baseball theory. Everything, in 
short, worth keeping" (p. 55). Like Henry's archives, 
the paradise of the tale does not deny the world, it 
contains it. Coover, through Waugh, has compiled an
23 Croce, op. ctt., p. 575-6.
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autonomous fictional universe; in doing so he articulates 
the pattern of his own mind. But, moreover, he also 
explores the potential of all minds, that is, the unlimited 




Thomas Pynchon: Eden versus Entropy
If Edenic art is a protest against the harsh 
confinements of the postlapsarian world, then one can 
well argue that the works of Thomas Pynchon present 
the broadest survey yet of the Adamic quest., Thera 
exists a major dialectical contradiction in calling 
the tenebrous novels of Pynchon "Edenic," and it is 
this very contradiction which makes such fiction a 
challenge to the reader, for the author posits a 
universe in which the ludic impulse is entropy's 
last obstacle. Games and play, song and dance, 
cinematic techniques and laughter, are constant 
preoccupations and essential elements of the Pynchon 
This is palpably true even in the dark 
pages of G^iavZty^ ^ Rutabow. Language functions as 
the plaything of the author, and readers exist for 
requisite manipulation in the maze of words. And 
the Minotaur being stalked in this fiction of play 
is the disintegrative force of entropy. Art serves 
as perhaps the last factor which can deny death and 
overcome the loss of time, space, and energy. Man's 
Nabokovian vestige of having only "words to play 
with" is not a full anodyne for Pynchon, but it is 
the only one possible, and it stands as a sort of 
literary Maxwell's Demon reversing time and decay.
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The novel V., Pynchon's first, develops a series 
of labyrinthine quests for the person and meaning of 
the symbol "V" and as such it is its own perfect 
image for literary creation. The symbol "V" comes 
to mean so much that finally it denies effect and 
discovery and beçomes only process. To realize the 
game and to play it means that one joins an Edenic 
eiact, the postlapsarian heretical Preterite, or those 
who are saved because they are damned, as William 
Slothrcop of RalnboLO postulated.^ Adam
after the Fall, Oedipa Maas after her Tupperware 
Party, can attain freedom and eternity only through 
the word. For Pynchon, the word is wholly literary 
play, and play, not finality or meaning, is the 
central experience of art. In fact, the ludic 
arrangement of his novels is such that the traditional 
quest for meaning on the part of audience and critic 
is deliberately foiled. The ludic process of the 
fiction is its meaning. Art may be "a transcendent 
puzzle that could lead ... to some moment of light . 
Levine emphasizes the contradictory challenges of 
Pynchon's play with words:
But no myth, no multiplication of 
intellectual possibilities can quite do 
justice to the energizing experience of
m2
1 Thomas Pynchon, Gbavtty'a RaZnbouf (EBndon: 
Pan Books, 1975), p. 554, Future references are to 
this edition and will appear in parentheses,
2 JbZd., p. 454.
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sustaining uncertainty. The full significance 
of Pynchon's fiction is in its styles, in its 
language, since the language is called upon 
to sustain the uncertainty it is structured 
to deny, to imply what cannot be articulated 
in language. Pynchon denies resolution into 
myth by wandering among all the available 
myths, from those of the Greeks to those of 
modern science,, technology, film, comic books, 
radio. Verbal ,^ nd mythic virtuosity is not, 
in Pynchon, show-off obscuring of what might 
be made clear, but, in a way, what the books 
are about; and like almost everything else in 
Pynchon's world, virtuosity is both a threat 
and a possibility.3
If one pursues the dictum of Schiller that man is 
only fully human when he plays, it can readily be seen 
that this applies dynamically to the fictional figures 
which Pynchon creates, and of course, to the language 
upon which all is predicated. Oedipa Maas, perhaps the 
best drawn and most convincingly human of these characters, 
does not achieve any sense of herself or her environment 
until she foregoes the quotidian occupation of suburban 
housewife and becomes involved in the serious literary 
games forming the core of Tfie. Crying 0 |$ Lot 49, games 
which begin with the misspelling of a word, and continue 
into a detailed literary quest.^ Oedipa reaches some 
degree of self-knowledge and human freedom as she 
pieces together the puzzle of Pierce Inverarity, his 
ludic bequest to her.
3 George Levine, "Risking the Moment: Anarchy and
Possibility in Pynchon's Fiction," in Mtnd^u^Pte.a6a^^^ :
Eééayé on Thomas Pynchon, ed, by Levine et (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1976) p. 114.
4 Thomas Pynchon, The C^ytng ol Lot 49 (New York:
Bantam, 1967), p. 30. All references are to this edition
and will appear in parentheses.
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This study will focus attention on Oedipa Maas and 
The CAgXng o j( Lot 49, not only because this character 
and. fiction offer Pynchon's most controlled technique 
and his most coherent ludic structure. One seizes 
upon this novel because in it the author powerfully 
delineates what it means to be fully human, to play 
in the world of art. Oedipa is, after all, a heroine 
patterned after Schiller's own dictum. She transcends 
her urban nightmare of contemporary California as 
successfully as J. Henry Waugh does his, and like him, 
she creates her own aesthetic paradise in words and 
through the literary quest. In addition, Oedipa is a 
greater figure than Waugh because in her compassion and 
love for humanity she leaves behind the narrowness of 
solipsism.
There is a clear basis for contradiction in an 
Edenic conception of Lot 49, for on the surface little 
seems Edenic. Oedipa is an unhappy housewife locked 
in a stultifying suburban existence. She lives with a 
chronically depressed disc jockey husband who is just 
as chronically and predictably unfaithful to her, and 
she regularly visits a fascist psychiatrist who would 
like to use her as a guinea pig in his drug experiments. 
Although little of Oedipa's life before her naming as 
executrix is delineated, the reader readily perceives 
that life as an aimless, routinely suffering^Bne. And 
it may fairly be assumed from the larger pattern of
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Pynchon's fiction that the protagonist's nugatory 
existence represents the far vaster plight of the 
universal consciousness of contemporary America.
There is much evidence in the novel to proclaim 
a dearth of freedom and a, depth of despair, a rendezvous 
with entropy lurking around the corner of the American 
scene. Thus what Pynchon does is to mark out a 
territory of despair and conflict. Then, dialectically, 
he produces a landscape of Eden created by the fertility 
of words and by ideal play. In this mental landscape, 
man is the actor, no longer the acted upon; he becomes 
his own god as he patterns a new world from the ashes 
of the old. As Pynchon tells us, "There may be no 
gods, but there is a pattern; names by themselves may 
have no magic, but the act of naming, the physical 
utterance, obeys the pattern" (GR, p. 322).
Like his mentor Nabokov, Pynchon sardonically 
portrays people in contemporary American society as 
they grope to pattern a new world. Oedipa is as 
typical of the American of the 1960's as Lolita is 
characteristic of the girl-child and the society of 
the 19 50's. The Edenic quest for Oedipa crucially 
involves a new epistemology, a changed relationship 
with coeval society. Pynchon's ironic comedy examines 
the problems and confusions of life at the edge of 
this culture and enters more closely into the life 
of the mind in society. Dickstein alludes to the
preponderance of the mind, to "the belief that old 
molds can be broken and recast, a sense that realicy
5
can be reshaped by the creative will". In this 
respect Tanner notes that "The possible existence of 
The Tristero is ... associated with the possible 
existence of 'transcendent' meaning, almost equivalent 
to a redemptive vision of another America behind the 
material concretions of the land. The Tristero is also 
associated with that yearning for diversity, a world 
of unprogrammed possibilities, so persistent in American 
literature",^ Pynchon's ludic realm partakes of the 
vision of the American Eden, an idea transplanted from 
the metaphors of geography to the more fertile regions 
of the mind. As Poirier has written:
This is a distinctly American vision, 
and Pynchon is the epitome of an American 
writer out of the great classics of the 
nineteenth century -- Hawthorne, Emerson, 
and Melville especially. The vision is 
not, as has been argued so often, one of 
cultural deprivation, but rather of cultural 
inundation, of being swamped, swept up, 
counted in before you could count yourself 
out, pursued by every bookish aspect of 
life even as you try to get lost in a 
wilderness, in a randomness where you 
might hope to find your true self./
5 Morris Dickstein, Qateii Eden (New York: 
Basic Books, 1977), p. 99.
6 Tony Tanner, Ctty Wo^dé (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1976), p. 178.
7 Richard Poirier, "'The Importance of Thomas 
Pynchon," in HlndiuZ ?Zea4>u.^e6, op. ett., p. 29.
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The barren landscape and the new quest begin on 
the first page of the novel. Pynchon is laconic and 
most effectively ironical in his description of the 
American scene of the 1960's. The "Tupperware party" 
presents a plenary evocation of banality in suburbia, 
as does the phrase "too much kirsch in the fondue". 
Apparently Oedipa is a middle or upper middle class, 
childless housewife for whom nothing is either productive 
or necessary, and whose only commitment is toward 
preparing a cocktail for her husband after he comes 
home from work. She is a woman who does no work outside 
the home and who hence can attain virtually no relationship 
with the external world. Oedipa is a postlapsarian Eve 
merely subsisting, and her daily life reveals its 
emptiness. Yet here, too, a contradiction is involved, 
for there is an undeniable Edenic lyricism in these 
descriptive phrases, particularly in the bird, sunrise, 
and music motifs:
One summer afternoon Mrs Oedipa Maas 
came home from a Tupperware party whose 
hostess had put perhaps too much kirsch in 
the fondue to find that she, Oedipa, had 
been named executor, or she supposed 
executrix, of the estate of one Pierce 
Inverarity, a California real estate mogul 
who had once lost two million dollars in 
his spare time but still had assets numerous 
and tangled enough to make the job of 
sorting it all out more than honorary.
Oedipa stood in the living room, stared 
at by the greenish dead eye of the TV 
tube, spoke the name of God, tried to 
feel as drunk as possible. But thi& did 
not work. She thought of a hotel room 
in Mazatlan whose door had just been
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slammed, it seemed forever, waking up two 
hundred birds down in the lobby; a sunrise 
over the library slope at Cornell University 
that nobody out on it had seen because the 
slope faces west; a dry, disconsolate tune 
from the fourth movement of the Bartok 
Concerto for Orchestra; a whitewashed bust 
of Jay Gould that Pierce kept over the bed 
on a shelf so narrow for it she'd always 
had the hovering fear it would someday 
topple,on them. Was that how he'd died, 
she wondered, among dreams, crushed by the 
only ikon in the house? That only made 
her laugh, out loud and helpless: You're
so sick, Oedipa', she told herself, or the 
room, which knew (pp. 1-2).
Oedipa has no freedom in the true Hegelian sense 
because for her everything is alien to the self; she 
lives in a world of perceived .externality of people 
and objects. She has attained no unity, not even an 
inner harmony. Hence she must jettison her present 
life, which is the course of action the play of the 
fiction fulfills. The novel traces the search for 
unity and freedom through Oedipa's quest for meaning 
in the Tristero, in Pierce's will, and in literary 
puzzles. These elements cause Oedipa to project a 
world, to forge a new, original, and systematic 
concord out of the panic and chaos of her milieu.
The development of play in the fiction, play both 
in the mind and in the external world, parallels the 
movement toward freedom and hope for the human 
condition.
Pynchon does not let the reader forget that 
Oedipa*s Edenic quest is the reader's own. This is
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made explicit by the device of the play within the play 
of the novel, Randolph Driblette’s production of 
Wharfinger's The CouAie^'6 TAagedy. Oedipa's floundering 
in tne maze of that Jacobean drama documents the process 
of art which deliberately involves the compelling 
mysteries of a game for which there are no answers, 
in which meaning contains the germ of aesthetic play 
and little else. From the very beginning of the story 
the reader identifies with Oedipa, for the tricks and 
games which envelop the heroine do not fail to enclose 
the audience as well. Pynchon is the magus, functioning 
as the transcendent author, the magician of the word, 
as do likewise Pierce Inverarity and the anonymous 
masters of the Tristero. For the reader as for Oedipa, 
it seems as if the more knowledge and involvement one 
has in the literary game, the more the confusion, the 
greater the contradiction, and the more complex the 
Adamic universe. Freedom for Pynchon, as for Borges, 
connotes often arduous movement through a labyrinth.
For Oedipa, the sewers of the W.A.S.T.E. system 
are such a labryinth. Yet before she can enter this 
maze, there are ritual games to be played» Significantly, 
the major games of the fiction are centrally literary 
ones. If there is power, there is not much subtlety 
in Pynchon's initial use of the Edenic myth in art.
An early game, and a notably key one, is the mptel 
scene in which Oedipa first meets the lawyer Metzger.
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Her arrival at the Echo Courts Motel heralds the start 
of an encounter with the gaudy Eden of southern 
California. The motel offers refuge. It is an oasis 
set against a nightmare of urban chaos and decay, one 
reminiscent of the middle America of LoZtta and the 
alienated work world of The UnZveK^>aZ Ba^ ebaZt A6 6oc.Za.tZon. 
Thus before entering the ludic ambience, the reader and 
protagonist alike must pass through the requisite 
depiction of post-capitalist alienation, the exploitative 
world of arch-capitalist Inverarity which yet 
dialectically makes possible the ludic realm as a 
counteraction against it. The vision of the industrial 
menace is a puissant one as it cries out its oppression. 
This occurs strikingly in the first three pages of 
Chapter Two; here there are passages so replete with 
implication and allusion that one is tempted to quote 
them in full. On the top of a hill, Oedipa sits in 
her car and gazes down upon a neighbourhood of 
identical yet somehow pleasant and well-tended homes.
She senses a concord in the pattern. This scene 
shares a notable similarity with an already quoted 
passage in Chapter Thirty-six (pp. 279-80) of LoZZta.
Here also a Wordsworthian unity and freedom come to 
mind. They are attained transiently and then denied 
in the more powerful oppression of civilization as 
we know it in modern cities :
San Narciso lay further south, near
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L.A. Like many named places in California 
it: was less an, identifiable city than a 
grouping of concepts ,.. She drove into 
San Narciso on a Sunday,, in a rented Impala. 
Nothing was happening. She looked down a 
slope, needing to squint for the sunlight, 
onto a vast sprawl of houses which had 
grown up all together, like a well-tended 
crop, from the dull biown earth; and she 
thought of the time she'd opened a transistor 
radio to replace a battery and seen her first 
printed circuit. The ordered swirl of houses 
and streets, from this high angle, sprang at 
her now with the same unexpected, astonishing 
clarity as the circuit card had. Though she 
knew even less about radios than about 
Southern Californians, there were to both 
outward patterns a hieroglyphic sense of 
concealed meaning, of an intent to communicate. 
There'd seemed no limit to what the printed 
circuit could have told her (if she had triad 
to find out); so in her first minute of San 
Narciso, a revelation also trembled just past 
the threshold of her understanding. Smog 
hung all round the horizon, the sun on the 
bright beige countryside was painful; she 
and the Chevy seemed parked at the centre
of an odd, religious instant. As if, on
some other frequency, or out of the eye 
of some whirlwind rotating too slow for ner 
heated skin even to feel the centrifugal 
coolness of, words were being spoken (pp. 12-13)
Oedipa's instant of spiritual unity in this passage 
anticipates the fuller, less vague, and more challenging 
.ludic landscape which, unknown to her, lies ahead. It
is tile ordered play of art and the structured games of
.fiction whrch expand this me ment of being and give form 
to It. Like Waugh's baseball game, Oedipa's ludic 
creations annihilate all that is alien to the self;
LÏ. jy over Ox ne im the oppressive limitations of the 
postlapsarian world. If "she left Kinneret with'
CO idea she was moving toward anything new" (p. 12),
Oedipa nevertheless prepares herself for a new
consciousness and a new vision. During her journey
she passes the Yoyodyne plant with its barbed wire
fences; she glides by dark factory windows and closed
office buildings. Her new sensitivity renders this
Sunday scene in its total bleakness and horror. The
interesting though obvious fact is that this is a
scene which Oedipa would have witnessed many times
before. Yet now, involved in the beginning of a ludic
mystery, she absorbs the essence of the world around
her, perhaps for the first time. The exigencies of
an Adamic vision compel the protagonist to rush past
the haunting panorama of a civilization in its death
throes, to escape into an Eden of art, ultimately to
re-create a freer world through the play of mind:
To her left appeared a prolonged scatter 
of wide, pink buildings, surrounded by 
miles of fence topped with barbed wire and 
interrupted now and then by guard towers: 
soon an entrance whizzed by, two sixty-foot 
missiles on either side and the name YOYODYNE 
lettered conservatively on each nose cone ...
Barbed wire again gave way to the familiap 
parade of more beige, prefab, cinderblock 
office machine distributors, sealant makers, 
bottled gas works, fastener factories, 
warehouses, and whatever. Sunday had sent 
them all into silence and paralysis, all 
but an occasional real estate office or 
truck stop. Oedipa resolved to pull in at 
the next motel she saw, however ugly, 
stillness and four walls having at some 
point become preferable to this illusion 
of speed, freedom, wind in your hair, 
unreeling landscape —  it wasn't. Hhat 
the road really was, she fancied, was this 
hypodermic needle, inserted somewhere
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ahead into the vein of a freeway, a vein 
nourishing the mainliner L.A., keeping 
it happy, coherent, protected from pain, 
or whatever passes, with a city, for pain.
But were Oedipa some single melted crystal 
of urban horse, L.A,, really, would be no 
less turned on for her absence (p. 14).
Thus despairing over che controlled chaos of the 
modern culture, a chaos wherein the individual human 
being figures for nothing, Oedipa pulls into the Echo 
Courts Motel, There she Is accosted by the Paranoids, 
by Metzger, and by the ironies of a California Eden, 
symbolized by the seedy display of a metal, painted 
nynnph. Only Pynchon could ridicule —  yet maintain —  
this startling notion of a completely plastic, bizarre, 
and distorted Eden. Here irony is in full action a_nd 
the joke of an Eden of art arising from the crass core 
of a mindless wasteland totally incapable of aiding 
any aesthetic paradise looms as large as the metal 
nymph. One is once again reminded of Nabokov and of 
LotZta, for the metal nymph in the motel is as 
inadequate a symbol of Eve S-S is the ill-mannered and 
annoying child who in reality is Lolita, not at all 
the angel of Humbert's dreams, not even for one second. 
And yet the paradox, the overwhelming contradiction, 
is that Lolita succeeds in her role as the perfect 
:i},/mphet because of "the secret of durable pigments," 
that is, the full lyricism of the poet's art; in 
much the same way Pynchon succeeds in buildings the 
ludic structure of Lot 49 because he uses irony as a
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piece of the puzzle which augments his Edenic vision 
precisely through contradicting it. This occurs by 
getting the reader to reject, boldly and completely, 
the author's false Eden and then subsequently forcing 
the reader to call back, to retract, his negation.
It is a calculated chess move on the part of the author.
We are caught in the artfully constructed web of nis 
words, and by being caught we are able to see connections 
ve might otherwise have ignored. Humour abounds and 
behind humour and irony lurks the machine in the 
garden :
Still, when she got a look at the next 
motel, she hesitated a second. A representation 
in painted sheet metal of a nymph holding a 
white blossom towered thirty feet into the 
air; the sign, lit up despite the sun, said 
"Echo Courts," The face of the nymph was 
much like Oedipa's, which didn't startle 
her so much as a concealed blower system 
that kept the nymph's gauze chiton in constant 
agitation, revealing enormous vermilion- 
tipped breasts and long pink thighs at each 
flap. She was smiling a lipsticked and 
public smile, not quite a hooker's but 
nowhere near that of any nymph pining away 
with love either. Oedipa pulled into the 
lot, got out and stood for a moment in the 
hot sun and the dead-still air, watching 
the artificial windstorm overhead toss 
gauze in five-foot excursions. Remembering 
her idea about a slow whirlwind, words she 
couldn't hear.
The room would be good enough for the 
time she had to stay. Its door opened on 
a long courtyard with a swimming pool, whose 
surface that day was flat, brilliant with 
sunlight. At the far end stood a fountain, 
with another nymph. Nothing moved 14-15).
Oedipa's entry into this blatantly false Eden
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signals the beginning of her ludic initiation. An 
essential trick of the author is to arouse attention 
while simultaneously mocking the worthiness of such 
attention, like the feints of a furtive card play.
Finally as joke gives way to meaning, the gaming 
temporarily subsides, and the reader is left to ponder 
ambiguities and to probe aesthetic allusions. For 
eiiample, the harmonious dance of the deaf-mutes suggests 
obviously amusing connotations, yet when Pynchon finishes 
with that scene he leaves his audience with an awareness 
of the power of mind to create its own universe. The 
deaf-mutes have internalized the music they cannot hear, 
they have captured the melodies in their minds, and for 
them the harmonies are no less real. If anything, the 
eurhythmy increases by the mind's power to contain it; 
no one bumps into anyone, people are amazingly in step. 
Hence the original joke and silliness become a crescive 
metaphor stretching beyond the immediate context in which 
they are utilized. The reader soon is initiated into 
this gaming ritual, and its effect is to extend meaning 
through ironic contrast. The deaf-mute sequence retains 
particular importance as a paean to the self-created 
achievement of the Edenic harmony and unity of art, for 
the deaf-mutes, unlike the confused Oedipa at this time, 
have attained a dialectical vision as their minds 
postulate the paradise of music they can never" hear:
Back in the hotel she found the lobby 
full of deaf-mute delegates in party hats,
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copied in crepe paper after the fur Chinese 
communist jobs made popular during the Korean 
conflict. They were every one of them drunk, 
and a few of the men grabbed her, thinking to 
bring her along to a party in the grand 
ballroom. She tried to struggle out of the 
silent, gesturing swarm, but was too weak.
Her legs ached, her mouth tasted horrible.
They swept her onto the ballroom ... Each 
couple on the floor danced whatever was in 
the fellow's head: tango, two-step, bossa
nova, slop. But how long, Oedipa thought, 
could it go on before collrsions became a 
serious hindrance? There would have to be 
collisions. The only alternative was some 
unthinkable order of music, many rhythms, 
dll keys at once, a choreography in which 
each couple meshed easy, predestined.
Something they all heard with an extra sense 
atrophied in herself. She followed her 
partner's lead, limp in the young mute's 
clasp, waiting for the collisions to begin.  ^
But none came. She was danced for half an 
hour before, by mysterious consensus, 
everybody took a break, without having 
felt any touch but the touch of her partner. 
Jesus Arrabal would have called it an 
anarchist miracle. Oedipa, with no name for 
it, was only demoralized. She curtsied and 
fled (p. 97).
Perfect harmony to inaudible music presents us with 
an analogy to the life of the mind, to the full range 
of human consciousness. The brief vision of the mental 
Eden comes to the reader and to Oedipa many times in the 
course of the novel. The motif of projecting a world is 
a ubiquitous one. It is not, however, a solipsistic 
or hermetic preoccupation because society is considered 
no less than the individual and his relationship to it. 
The whole notion of the "anarchist miracle" and of the 
V?.A.S.T.E. system is a fundamentally social concept. 
Unlike Barth and the Nabokov of Ada, Pynchon weaves his
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jokes and pians into a significantly social pattern with
fairly explicit meaning. As Dickstein has noted about
Pynchon's works and others from the 1960's, "In their
inventiveness and plasticity these books are the fictional
8equivalent of utopian thinking." Harris also comments 
that "Pynchon's novel, in fact, is like Catah~2Z in that 
it is finally a radical protest novel. Built into the 
structure of the novel is, an alternative to the present 
political and economic system in America ,.. Pynchon
9
seems to desire a radical freedom ..." The legacy
which Oedipa is left to Inherit is an America without
boundaries, the myth of a, new world realized in the mind
and through the word. The vision of the fiction brings
the freedom of dancing whatever is in one's head. This
is what Oedipa realizes at the end of the novel, the
embrace of a virgin land, a new Eden, "as if there could
be no barriers between herself and the rest of the land"
(p. 133). Pynchon projects the freedom of mind as
"some fraction of the truth's numinous beauty," a pure
freedom which begins in the aesthetic creation and is
wholly one with it, but which ultimately will encompass
society and the disinherited:
What was left to inherit? That America coded 
in Inverarity's testament, whose was that?
She thought of other, immobilized freight 
cars, where the kids sat on the floor planking
8 Dickstein, Gate6 oi Eden, p. 99.
9 Charles B, Harris, Contempo/ia/iy Ame^Zean '^ovc■ZZ■&t6 
oi the Ab6uA.d (New Haven, Conn.: College and University
Press, 1971), p. 98.
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and sang back, happy as fat, whatever came 
over the mother's pocket radio; of other 
squatters who stretched canvas for lean-tos 
behind smiling billboards all along the 
highways, or slept in junkyards in the 
stripped shells of wrecked Plymouths, or 
even, daring, spent the night up some pole 
in a lineman's tent like caterpillars, 
swung among a web of telephone wires, living 
in the very copper rigging and secular 
miracle of communication, untroubled by the 
dumb voltages flickering their miles, the 
night long, in the thousands of unheard 
messages. She remembered drifters she had 
listened to, Americans speaking their language 
carefully, scholarly, as if they were in exile 
from somewhere else invisible yet congruent 
with the cheered land she lived in; and 
walkers along the roads at night, zooming in 
and out of your headlights without looking 
up, too far from any town to have a real 
destination. And the voices before and after 
the dead man's that had phoned at random 
during the darkest, slowest hours, searching 
ceaseless among the dial's ten million 
possibilities for that magical Other who 
would reveal herself out of the roar of 
relays, monotone litanies of insult, filth, 
fantasy, love whose brute repetition must 
someday call into being the trigger for the 
unnamable act, the recognition, the Word 
(pp. 135-6).
Hence the game for Pynchon serves the meaning of the 
word. The two are joined so closely, however, as to be 
inseparable. While the game and the play of the novel 
seemingly move freely, the author maintains as tight and 
disciplined a control over form as did the masters of the 
great nineteenth-century realist novel. The ironic 
comedy and its black humour belie the pattern and order 
secured by the aesthetic magus. The play is not random 
and it never leaves the watchful eye of its creator. 
Pynchon eliminates anarchy and entropy from his verbal 
Eden. The CfiyZng oi Lot 49 surveys the ludic realm as
it works against absurdity and meaninglessness. Harris 
is wrong when he posits Lot 49 as an absurdist novel, 
and he himself is bound to acknowledge as much when he 
admits that this fiction "seems to protest absurdity 
rather than present it".'^^ Pynchon's paradise of words 
turns absurdity ^nd entropy against themselves.
Ultimately there is no absurdity in the chorus of 
Pynchon's carefully articulated symbols. As Slade 
has commented :
Structurally, Pynchon's second novel is 
his finest, written as if to answer critics 
who charged I/, with formlessness. The.
C^yZng oi Lot 49 is a tightly plotted, 
symmetrical narrative of great compactness, 
enhanced by the author's light tone and 
feeling for American popular culture. His 
attention to symmetry, Alfred Kazin has said, 
sets Pynchon above most "absurdists". To 
call Pynchon an absurdist is to misconstrue 
him, particularly with reference to a book 
so carefully predicated on logic.H
If the author is a transcendent magus —  and 
Pynchon surely fills this role in all his novels —  
nonetheless his games are highly structured ones designed 
to probe meaning, not to float unattended into the air. 
This awareness brings the almost vaudevillian playfulness 
of the first encounter between Oedipa and Metzger into 
perspective. A tyro in the world of artifice and 
literary games, despite having had a magus-like lover.
10 Ibtd,, p. 99.
11 Joseph W. Slade, Thomas Pynchon (New Yorks 
Warner, 1974), p. 125.
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a. bathetic role-playing husband, and a cleverly 
manipulative psychiatrist, Oedipa learns the rules of 
' r , .jaiVu. swiftly. Moreover, as her continuing quest 
/a.r the Tristero demonstrates, she cannot settle for 
p.*. without poetry or meaning. Like Van and Ada of 
i xio eponymous novel, like Ambrose in "Lost in the 
Funhouae," Oedipa must learn the tricks of play and the 
manoeuvres of the game before the paradisiac garden 
can be revealed from the dank marshes of frivolity.
She has to become something of a magus-manipuiator 
herself to transform ordinary play into aesthetic play.
Upon meeting Metzger, Oedipa is onto his line, 
his customary tricks of virile persuasiveness, A 
veritable Adam standing near the fountain of this 
plastic California Eden, Metzger opens his relationship 
with Oedipa on a first move, as if on an imaginary 
chess board. At the door of her motel room, Metzger 
laments the exploitative ruin of his childhood as an 
actor. Oedipa is almost but not quite trapped in 
Metzger's putatively sad, sympathetic cry. But she 
stops herself in time, and instead responds to the 
game being played: "'And how often,' Oedipa inquired,
now aware it was all words, 'has that line of approach 
worked for you. Baby Igor?'" (p. 17) With this 
dismissal of his original game stroke, Oedipa turns 
her attention to the movie on television, but what 
appears on the screen is not relief from the .game
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but a continuation of it through the old film in which 
Metzger stars as Baby Igor., The game, which Oedipa 
suspects is one of seduction, keeps on going, and by 
implication it becomes more allusively aesthetic as 
it encompasses the story and songs of the movie
Even in its paltriness, CcLAkZe^ed represents the 
endless anfractuosities of art, although it is only 
sentimental rubbish. The movie itself stands as a 
symbol of a fictional Eden. In the midst of his 
artful metaphors, Pynchon of course maintains irony 
and laughter and the scene is one of high comedy, with 
Oedipa and Metzger playing off each other. Squeezed 
carefully among silliness and jokes, however, is the 
covert metaphor of Eden. That Oedipa can posit so 
many alternative interpretations of character and 
action for the film Cci6k.ieh.ed and that a thirty-year-old 
movie can still excite the viewer, mean that the 
imaginative paradise of art is endlessly renewable.
Once engendered, fiction lives in the mind forever. 
Metzger articulates the endless possibilities of art, 
its ambiguities, and finally its eternal quality as 
a preserved vision. The movie is Edenic because it 
is free from entropy, light never fades it, time 
cannot erase its power and multiplicity of meaning:
"But our beauty lies," explained Metzger, 
"in this extended capacity for convolution.
A lawyer in a courtroom, in front of any
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jury, becomes an actor, right? Raymond 
Burr is an actor, impersonating a lawyer, 
who in front of a jury becomes an actor- 
Me, I'm a former actor who became a lawyer. 
They've done the pilot film of a TV series, 
in fact, based loosely on my career, starring
my friend Manny Di Presso, a one-time lawyer
who quit his firm to become an actor. Who in 
this pilot plays me, an actor become a lawyer 
reverting periodically to being an actor. The 
film is in an air-conditioned vault at one of 
the Hollywood studios, light can't fatigue it, 
it can be repeated endlessly" (p. 20).
Almost slyly, tucked" away in a clever spiel, Pynchon 
has made his Nabokovian bid for the eternizing commitment 
of art- The false chimera of value in sentimental 
Hollywood child movies, despite its hard irony, 
paradoxically establishes a pattern for the fictive 
art in this novel. As she partakes in the story of
Baby Igor, Oedipa, too, is reluctantly drawn into the
plot, ostensibly predictable as it is. She has a 
desire to grasp the ludic challenge which Metzger offers 
her. Without much deliberation, she bets on the outcome 
of the film and enters into the game of sexual chase as 
well. She loses time absorbed in the Eden of play:
"She looked at her watch, but it had stopped" (p. 20)•
The aesthetic garden may be a seedy motel room
and the art object not worthy of the name, yet the 
value of the paradise of mind created by the act of 
this fiction is such that Pynchon's bete of
entropy is negated in temporary triumph. The players 
are free from time and its destructiveness.
The nemesis of postlapsarian man is this inevitable
.L.-struc;tion, represented by entropy. In Oedipa* s 
motel room this concept attarns active presence by 
means of an explosive can of hair spray: "The c.r; hit
tho floor, something broke, and with a great outs\.rye 
of pressure the stuff commenced atomizing, propelling 
the can swiftly about the bathroom" (p. 23). Metzger 
and Oedipa duck and hide, scrambling close to the floor 
as the menace careens around them. Yet when the can 
stops flying and things quiet down, what remains after 
the potentially destructive scene are the durable 
pigments of art, even if here ironically taken in the 
form of a third-rate adventure film. This statement is 
ironically underscored by the awe-struck admiration 
of the Paranoids rock group and their teenage confreres, 
who view Oedipa's games with unalloyed attention and 
keen responsiveness. Throughout the fiction it is the 
Eden of play which fortifies the characters against the 
surge of entropy. This is the role of the search for 
the Tristero and the W.A.S.T.E, system.
As Olderman adumbrates in an otherwise
unenlightening study, "Tristero compels her to seek
her own deliverance; it leads her to understand 'che
12range of her alternatives ..." In the passage from 
Lot 49 considered here, it is the Eden of play, the
12 Raymond M. Olderman, Zo^ yoyid tho, Land:
Tkc AmcAfcûLH MoveZ Zn Zkt (New Haven,
Conn*: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 146.
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agonistic game with Metzger, to which the heroine Oedipa 
Maas returns in refuge against the tyranny of entropy.
The fictional paradise generates "some state of minimum 
grace," and what the narrator of GKCLvlty^ ^ RaZnbou) 
delineates for Slothrop also has meaning for Oedipa and 
all players in the verbal garden, readers included:
"... that by riding each branch the proper distance, 
ÏT.owii.g when to transfer, keeping some state of minimum 
grace though it might often look like he's headed the 
wrong way, this network of all plots may yet carry him 
to freedom" (GR, p. 603).
Entropy is overcome -- at the very least temporarily 
held back —  by absorption in the ludic gambit. This is, 
foremost, the method of Pierce Inverarity, the one he 
used while alive and the course to which he subjects 
Oedipa and others after his demise. Inverarity is a 
quintessential magus-figure, very much like Conchis in 
The M&gua. He controls characters through the prolific 
manifestation of compulsive games and puzzles, through 
the construction of the labyrinth. The first fairly 
eerie and sufficiently weird event occurs when Pierce, 
Oedipa‘s former lover, telephones her in the middle of 
the night and does Lamont Cranston imitations. Oedipa 
is surprised by the quiet ambiguity of Pierce's manoeuvre 
at the time (p. 3). Later she reflects on the event as 
if it were one of the cards in "a conjurer's deck" (p. 2). 
This early move establishes a key pattern for the play
-a 2Vs /
•CO follow, one which Oedipa^ Metzger, and ail those 
connected with the Tristero and the Wharfinger drama 
are bound to be engaged in. Even before Oedipa consents 
to be a player, the ineluctable game has begun, and at 
once she is fully entranced by the ludic quest. She 
finds it is a quest which somehow defies the entropy of 
Prerce ' s death and which ordains power, almost, from the 
grave ;
Oedipa had been named also to execute the will 
in a codicil dated a year ago. She tried to 
think back to whether anything unusual had 
happened around then. Through the rest of the 
afternoon, through her trip to the market in 
downtown Kinneret-Among-The-Pines to buy 
ricotta and listen to the Muzak (today she 
came through the bead-curtained entrance 
around bar 4 of the Fort Wayne Settecento 
Ensemble's variorum recording of the Vivaldi 
Kazoo Concerto, Boyd Beaver, soloist); then 
through the sunned gathering of her marjoram 
and sweet basil from the hero garden, reading 
of book reviews in the latest 
kmtfiZdOiYif into the layering of a lasagna, 
garlicking of a bread, tearing up of romaine 
leaves, eventually, oven on, into the mixing 
of the twilight's whiskey sours against the 
arrival of her husband, Wendell (".Mucho'')
Maas from work, she wondered, wondered, 
shuffling back through a fat deckful of 
days which seemed (wouldn't she be first 
to admit it?) more or less identical, or 
all pointing the same way subtly like a 
conjurer's deck, any odd one readily clear 
to a trained eye (p. 2).
If we stop here in this long excerpt, we can 
observe several interesting motifs and nuances, which 
become more audible and obvious as the novel continues. 
Already on page two the heroine is involved :’a t.he 
first stage of what promises to be an elaborate.
425
sinuous game. She is caught in the trap, already in 
a defensive position, yet still grasping for clues 
as to what her position should be, why she should have 
one at all, A trick of Pynchon's ludic paradise revolves 
around obtaining commitment for the game before the
player or reader knows the nature of the game. One is
inevitably pulled inward before he gets a chance to 
look down at his own hand", let alone to guess what is 
hidden in anyone else's. In the herb garden of marjoram
and sweet basil, Oedipa creates a fantasy world and the
mild inkling of a mental paradise replete with ideas such 
as those "in the latest Sc.ZiiYitZ{^ Z(i. AmeAtcaw." There is 
song, the sun shines, and most of all, there is the game. 
Pynchon*s joking tone conditions the reader to expect 
slyness and tricks, such as when the narrator tells us 
that Oedipa went shopping to listen to what all readers 
realize are the grating sounds of Muzak. The irony 
continues as one reads the inanity of "the Fort Wayne 
Settecento Ensemble's variorum recording of the Vivaldi 
Kazoo Concerto, Boyd Beaver, soloist". The phrases 
"deckful of days" and "a conjurer's deck" further 
thrust forward both Inverarity's and Pynchon's magician­
like roles. As Pynchon's Doppelganger or playful 
shadow. Pierce represents the writer as magus; and of 
course, his performing the Lamont Cranston imitation, 
Lamont Cranston having played "The Shadow" on .S . 
radio for many years, serves to verify this point.
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Pierce plays with words and toys with roles and ideas
in a way typifying that of the novelist. As the above
quotation continues, so also does the ludic interaction:
It took her till the middle of Huntley and 
Brinkley to remember that last year at three 
or so one morning there had come this long­
distance call, from where she would never 
know (unless now he'd left a diary) by a 
voice beginning in heavy Slavic tones as 
second secretary at the Transylvanian Consulate, 
looking for an escaped bat; modulated to comic- 
Negro, then on Into hostile Pachuco dialect, 
full of chingas and maricones; then a Gestapo 
officer asking her in shrieks did she have 
relatives in Germany and finally his Lamont 
Cranston voice, the one he'd talked in all 
the way down to Mazatlan, "Pierce, please," 
she'd managed to get in, "I thought we 
h a d  — "
"But Margo," earnestly, "I've just come 
from Commissioner Weston, and that old man in 
the fun house was murdered by the same blowgun 
that killed Professor Quackenbush," or 
something.
"For God's sake," she said. Mucho had 
rolled over and was looking at her,
"Why don't you hang up on him," Mucho 
suggested, sensibly.
"I heard that," Pierce said. "I think 
it's time Wendell Maas had a little visit 
from The Shadow," Silence, positive and 
thorough, fell. So it was the last of his 
voices she ever heard. Lamont Cranston.
That phone line could have pointed any 
direction, been any length .... (pp. 2-3)
Indeed, play and fantasy dominate the opening of 
Lot 49, Obvious manipulation enters the scene; the 
magus plays, perhaps, with an unfair advantage. After 
all, the author, like Pierce, does control everything.
As a manifestation of this godlike creative power, the
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character of Dr. Hilarius offers some insights.
Hilaries makes faces and this face-making technique 
reminds one of the smiling face in Tke Magu6, the 
ancient smile on a sun god which articulates primal 
freedom. Hilarius becomes destructively entangled 
in role-playing and paranoid fears. At the beginning 
of the novel, however, he echoes a certain ironic 
playfulness utilized by Pynchon to act against entropy.
He significantly reminds Oedipa of Pierce doing an 
imitation of "a Gestapo officer," and the figure of 
a psychiatrist gives free rein to the author's satire 
on the fraudulence of that profession. The scene of 
Dr. Hilarius's 3 A.M. telephone call renders a very 
amusing temporary smile of freedom on a situation of 
otherwise potential ang-&t.
The freedom of aesthetic play is that which the 
attorney Roseman tries to attain through his own literary 
endeavour, his running game of fantasy with the writers 
of the Perry Mason television show. Since his job and 
his innate talents cannot yield the glamour and success 
of Perry Mason, Roseman conducts a continuous exchange 
in his mind and on paper, wherein his creative powers 
triumph over those of the television hero. Fictxon 
for him is a tool of Ede;n,ic fulfillment. Roseman, too, 
has only words to play with, and it is words which 
convey him to the threshold of freedom, or what in his 
life comes closest to its attainment. Words and
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fictions offer the "endless repetitions" of primal 
bliss otherwise unobtainable in the cosmic rush toward 
entropy.
The direction of a new paradise leads to an erotic
Eden, a sexual garden of delights, sensual hedonism as
well as verbal pleasure. We have already adumbrated
how Nabokov uses sexual emancipation and uninhibitedness
to clarify the Edenic possibilities of his art; the
passion of lovers comes to symbolize the author’s love
affair with language. Pynchon, while applying an irony
perhaps more pervasive than Nabokov's, seeks also to
postulate fictional freedom through sexual play. This
pattern can be entropie, as it is for Mucho Maas and
for Tyrone Slothrop in G^avZty' ^ RaZnboco, but for
Oedipa as for Roger Mexico, it presents a fascinating
search for freedom and for a sense of self. Hegel
has called this the "concrete concept of freedom,"
and noted that "Freedom in this sense, however, we
already possess in the form of feeling —  in friendship
and love, for instance. Here we are not inherently
one-sided; we restrict ourselves gladly in relating
ourselves to another, but in this restriction know
13ourselves as ourselves."
13 G.W.F. Hegel, HegeZ'-à PhZZo^opky oi RZgkZ, 
trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1952, reprinted, 1976), p. 228. •
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The polymorphous perversity of human sexuality
symbolizes for Pynchon nothing if not the multifarious
variations of the mind's creative potential. As
Marcuse has explained with reference to the Sympo^Zam,
pleasure in a beautiful body leads logically to pleasure
in a beautiful mind: "Out of this truly polymorphous
sexuality arises the desire for that which animates
the desired body: the psyche and its various manifestations
There is an unbroken ascent in erotic fulfillment from the
corporeal love of one to that of the others, to the love
of beautiful work and play ..., and ultimately to the love
14 ■of beautiful knowledge ..." Thus Oedipa's layering of
her clothes in the game of seduction with Metzger may be
seen to represent the endless ambiguities of words and the
self's creative power. Her clothes are like a fictional
Joseph’s coat of a thousand luminous colours. The more
that is stripped away, the more remains. The mind
of the artist and of man in general is constantly self-
generating. The labyrinth is also involved, for
uncovering meaning is an endless task in the moves of
a game. The ludic process itself is the solution:
Oedipa then sat five minutes watching the 
tube, forgetting she was supposed to ask 
questions. Metzger took his trousers off, 
earnestly. The father seemed to be up 
before a court-martial, now.
"So," she said, "an early reel. This 
is where he gets cashiered, ha, ha."
14 Herbert Marcuse, and CZvZtZzaZZom A




"Maybe it's a flashback," Metzger said.
"Or maybe he gets it twice." Oedipa removed 
a bracelet. So it went: the succession of
film fragments on the tube, the progressive 
removal of clothing that seemed to bring her 
no nearer nudity, the boozing, the tireless 
shivaree of voices and guitars from out by 
the pool. Now and then a commercial would 
come in, each time Metzger would say,
"Inverarity's," or "Big block of shares," 
and later settled foi: nodding and smiling.
Oedipa would scowl back, growing more and 
more certain, while a headache began to 
flower behind her eyes, that they among 
all possible combinations of new lovers 
had found a way to make time itself slow 
down (pp. 25-6).
Sexuality provides a key nexus in the fiction, in 
the main story and in the dramatic subplot. Not only 
is the scene at Echo Courts one of overt and sometimes 
kinky sexual behaviour, but everywhere Oedipa goes in 
her tortuous search, she encounters new, different, 
and often strange sexual games, and these sexual 
happenings tend to connect with the mysterious Tristero.
As Oedipa receives a newsless letter from her estranged 
husband, she is forced to reflect on the form of the 
missive not its contents. Mucho carefully does not 
detail any of his Humbert-Humbert-like sexual behaviour, 
so the message in the letter is a bit of a sham, but on 
the outside of the envelope Oedipa notices a misprint 
in the cancellation stamp -- "REPORT ALL OBSCENE MAIL 
TO YOUR POTSMASTER" (p. 30). Having then to desert 
tho Echo Courts due to the voyeurism of Miles and his 
group, Oedipa goes with Metzger to a local bâi called 
"The Scope". There a fellow named Fallopian inadvertently
introduces them to the private postal service. Moreover, 
it is at the pub that Oedipa first sees the W.A.S.T.E. 
symbol, the muted postal horn, which hides among graffiti 
and "lipsticked obscenities" in the ladies' washroom. 
Again the innuendo and terms of reference are sexual —  
"’Interested in sophisticated fun? You, hubby, girl 
friends. The more the merrier. Get in touch with Kirby, 
through WASTE only. Box 7391, L.A.’" (p. 34)
Because the restrictions of sexuality in society 
reflect a panoply of limitations, indeed because they 
mirror the discontents of a civilization, even the 
freedom of sexual language carries one closer to the 
aesthetic Eden. Sexual metaphors and erotic signs 
become omnipresent as Oedipa's ludic initiation commences 
in earnest. The literary guest becomes almost as 
poignant and as central as the search for a lost lover 
or a prelapsarian world. The world is all before 
Oedipa if only she can learn to create it:
So began, for Oedipa, the languid, 
sinister blooming of The Tristero. Or 
rather, her attendance at some unique 
performance, prolonged as if it were the 
last of the night, something a little 
extra for whoever'd stayed this late. As 
if the breakaway gowns, net bras, jeweled 
garters and G-strings of historical 
figuration that would fall away were 
layered dense as Oedipa's own streetclothes 
in that game with Metzger in front of the 
Baby Igor movie; as if a plunge toward dawn 
indefinite black hours long would indeed be 
necessary before The Tristero could be 
revealed in its terrible nakedness. ’Would 
its smile, then, be coy, and would it flirt 
away harmlessly backstage, say good night
4 <:
with a Bourbon Street bow and leave her in 
peace? Or would it instead, the dance ended, 
come back down the runway, its luminous stare 
locked to Oedipa's smile, gone malign and 
pitiless; bend to her alone among the desolate 
rows of seats and begin to speak words she 
never wanted to hear? (p. 36)
The entire game of The Tristero is a systematic 
plunge into the ipaze of elaborate and involved connections, 
from sixteenth-century Europe to contemporary California, 
from Jacobean revenge drama to ludic fiction in one fell 
swoop. To find or to make connections is for Pynchon 
to deny entropy and in the negative pattern of his art, 
to nullify entropy means an attainment of prelapsarian 
bliss and constancy. The very game of positing and 
forging connections, then, is {^ acto evidence of
establishing the terrain of Edenic literature. The 
connections may not reveal answers. Kazin argues that 
"In Thomas Pynchon's 1/. and T/ie C/iyZng Lot 49 the 
protagonist is History itself -- History as a mystification, 
perhaps deliberate] that operates as a whirligig".
The puzzle entices precisely because it offers this 
mystifying engagement, not final solutions. The verbal 
Eden stands as Pynchon*s formulation of the relationship 
with nature and society that Emerson had first posited 
for the new world of America. What the purveyors of 
the Thurn and Taxis brought to the virgin continent 
hence comes to mean the transcendent epistemology of 
idealism, a self-generating life of the mind beyond
15 Alfred Kazin, BJitght Book Lt^ e.: Anm^tcan
UovtZt6t^ and Ston.ytQ,Zto,K.6 /^com Hzmtngtoay to UattdK 
(New York: Dell Publishing, 1974), p. 275.
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entropy. Art is the Maxwell's Demon, and the man who 
plays is the inventor of a new territory. As Driblette 
avers ;
"You know where that play exists, not in 
that file cabinet, not in any paperback you're 
looking for, but a hand emerged from the
veil of shower-steam to indicate his suspended 
head -- "in here. That's what I'm for. To 
give the spirit flesh. The words, who cares? 
They're rote noises to hold line bashes with, 
to get past the bone barriers around an actor's 
memory, right? 'But the reality is in 
head. Mine. I'm the projector at the 
planetarium, all the closed little universe 
visible in the circle of that stage is coming 
out of my mouth, eyes, sometimes other 
orifices also" (p. 56).
Indeed, for Pynchon each reader is "the projector
at the. planetarium," each individual follows the
keyncce of the author as he creates, in words but more
essentially through ideas, himself and his world. As
mentioned in Chapter One, Hegel tells us, "The universal
need for art ... is man's rational need to lift the
inner and outer world into his spiritual consciousness
as an object in which he recognizes again his own self".^^
As Hegel adds in his LogZc, analysis turns the concrete
into the abstract, that "once more we see ... that the
17truth of things lies in thought". To play in art is 
freely to pattern one's consciousness and for Pynchon 
the essential thing is to play.
16 G.W.F. Hegel, Htget'4 A&6the,tZc^: on
FZn::. Act, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxforc University
Press, 1975), Volume I, pp. 31-2.
. 17 G.W.F, Hegel, Logtc, Being Part One of
the €ntijctopcie.dZci The, FhA,t o.& ophZcal ScZiznczà (18 30) 
trans. William Wallace, foreword by JIN.Findlay (Oxford 
Oxford University Press, 1975; rpt. 1978), p. 63,
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Thus does the author mock interpretation. Like 
the classical magician, once he knows we are onto a 
trick, he changes the game. Hence we have the explanation 
for Oedipa's and often the reader's frustration at trying 
to unravel a permanently and purposively tied-up ball of 
string. When ripped apart, the pieces of string do not 
connect, they cease to exist. The playwright Driblette 
may be speaking for the author when he asseverates the 
following to Oedipa after the performance of The.
T KciQzdy :
"The only residue in fact would be things 
Wharfinger didn't lie about. Perhaps 
Squamuglia and Faggio, if they ever existed. 
Perhaps the Thurn and Taxis mail system.
Stamp collectors tell me it did exist.
Perhaps the other, also. The Adversary.
But they would be traces, fossils. Dead, 
mineral, without value or potential,
"You could fall in love with me, you 
can talk to my shrink, you can hide a tape 
recorder in my bedroom, see what I talk 
about from wherever I am when I sleep. You 
want to do that? You can put together clues, 
develop a thesis, or several, about why 
characters reacted to the Trystero possibility 
the way they did, why the assassins came on, 
why the black costumes. You could waste your 
life that way and never touched /sic/ the truth.. 
I gave them life. That's it." He fell 
silent. The shower splashed (p. 56),
There is an obvious gratuity to much of Pynchon's 
magus-like behaviour, and this overindulgence in fun 
and games for their own sake destroys part of the very 
real achievement of the author's Eden of words. It 
trivializes. For instance, puns and wisecracks abound 
and it often seems as if Pynchon is drafting a comedy
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routine rather than a work of fiction. It is hard to 
take entropy as a serious concern when it is followed 
by a quick joke. The real sufferings and conflicts are 
diminished by the lampoons of the writer. Fragmentation 
and incongruence may occur as situations appear more 
laughable than cogent. Imbued with puns on Station 
"KCUF" ("fuck" spelled backwards), on Genghis Cohen, on 
men named "Koteks" and "Fallopian", can the story of 
Oedipa's quest be taken a,ny more seriously than the 
newspaper comics? Humour undermines ang^t and tension, 
and even humour itself, such as in the nose-picking 
contest described on page thirty-one, often does not 
go very far. Moreover, Pynchon's parodies are the 
author's self-gratifying constructs; they appear intended 
to generate little response from the reader, who may feel 
he is intruding on a private joke. A severe and trenchant 
critic has argued:
Even his parodies are often contrivances. 
They are not reductive because they draw upon 
material that is usually self-parodying. They 
are not close enough to the works they mimic 
to be analytical, and they do not, as Joyce's 
parodies do, show us the relation of literary 
language to its content. Nor, despite Pynchon*s 
closeness to Nabokov, do they succeed in 
shutting us off from the comfortable referents 
to experience that we bring to the reading of 
a book, thus compelling us, as Nabokov does so 
often, to respond simply to the artifice, to 
build up a series of emotional and critical 
relationships to something that we know is 
involuted and unrealistic —  to force us into 
relativism. Pynchon pulls in and out of parody 
and half-hearted realism too often to achieve 
the polished surface of Nabokov's best novels; 
Pynchon('s) parodies seem to be there 
largely to satisfy the novelist's
■
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pleasure in constructing them. They are 
usually simply.elaborate amusements.^®
One finds that the elaborate search for the meaning 
of a Jacobean revenge drama, the hunt for connections 
between the Thurn and Taxis mail system and W.A.S.T.E., 
the layering of parody upon parody, exhaust themselves 
and die in a sort of solipsistic strangulation long 
before the fiction ends. Oedipa seems to mirror the 
silliness of the reader in her hardy perseverance.
The quest is one of nullity. This is the most serious 
and problematic charge against Pynchon's art. His 
irony denies meaning rather than augmenting it, just 
as his manipulation of the audience often discourages 
interest instead of increasing it through conflict and 
tension. As Leverenz has noted about a similar though 
more complex quandary facing the reader of G^iavZty* & 
UaZnbGiv: "The book was an act of calculated hostility
against my own need to find out what it was about.
In fact, that was what it was about. Anything organized, 
including narrative or interpretation, signified 
co-optation by waste-making forces. Abandon all system^;, 
ye Bliceros who enter here, and joyfully accept the 
anarchic redemptive rainbow of waste, death, and poor
18 Roger B. Henkle, "Pynchon's Tapestries on the 
Western Wall," in Pynchon,, ed, by Edward Mendelson 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, 1978),
p. 111. -"''4
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preterite anonymity.Leverenz has established the 
■ingor o:, vn.;..' reader who feels he has been toyed with.
MO'.v does one exculpate the author for these excesses, 
for his gratuitous manipulation of our attention? Does 
one? Is |the fiction an aimless chase leading up a 
dead-end road painted in California psychedelic, with 
signs pointing nowhere?
To answer this, one first must state that Pynchon 
clearly knows the manner of his prose fully lends itself 
to such criticism, and he plunges ahead in the face of 
it. His method ineluctably contains his aim. His 
satiric mode reflects the mind of his time; his biting 
social critique and nightmare vision are no less real 
and frightening for the comedic digressions in them.
The plight of a sorely fragmented society is perhaps 
best illustrated by tangential fragmentations in an 
otherwise controlled verbal structure. The calm, 
uninterrupted flow of smooth narration will not suffice 
when entropy is lurking at the back door and nuclear 
fission at the front. Without contradiction there can 
be no progress, and Pynchon artfully patterns his ludic 
world with such ironic reversals as postlapsarian man 
is bound to encounter. This continual conflict shows
19 David Leverenz, "On Trying to Read G^avZty* 6 
RaZnboi/jf in on Thomas Pynckoyi,
ed. by George Levine and David Leverenz (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1976), pp. 230-1.
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the urgency of the life of the mind as the play of 
words and power of self-creation contradict the 
Oiiuiipresence of entropy. The humanity of the ludic 
epistemology is the progress which Pynchon offers.
As Kegel explains about the life of the mind in the 
Log.ic:
Seeing that there is in it no transition, or 
presupposition, ,and in general no specific 
character other than what is fluid and 
transparent, the Absolute Idea is for itself 
the pure form of the notion, which contemplâtes 
its contents as its own self. It is iis own 
content, in so far as it ideally distinguishes 
itself from itself, and the one of the two 
things distinguished is a self-identity in 
which however is. contained the totality of 
the form as the system of terms describing 
its content ..,
To speak of the absolute idea may suggest 
the conception that we are at length reaching 
the right thing and the sum of the whole 
matter ... The interest lies in the whole 
movement. When a man traces up the steps of 
his life, the end may appear to him very 
restricted: but in it the whole de.au^6u6
vZtaz is comprehended. So, too, the content 
of the absolute idea is the whole breadth 
of ground which has passed under our view 
up to this point. Last of all comes the 
discovery that the whole evolution is what 
constitutes the content and the interest ...20
The reader is not forgotten in Pynchon*s solipsism; 
the reader is the essential player, and he, too, becomes 
a creative Adam through the strength of the fiction to 
absorb him and even to frustrate him. The solo 
harmonious orchestration belongs to Pynchon, but the
20 Hegel, LogZc, pp. 292-3
music is for our ears. This is how Oedipa sees Pierce;
this is the function of the magus. Pynchon knows the
pitfalls of his medium. Finally, his sensitivity to
this endemic problem of ludic fiction engages the reader
rather than alienating him because always the tricks
are played for the reader, not against him. Like the
broad universe it is, Pynchon's fiction can contain our
objections and then he can negate them with the skill
of the smiling magus. What this fiction, like all
fictions, comes down to is words and a creator. As
Oedipa sees it near the book's conclusion, the ludic
encounter with words brings the "secret richness and
concealed density of dream," even if its power may
plunge one toward the abyss of pain or the paradise of
mind. Indeed, "a plot has been mounted" against all
of us who read novels;
It's unavoidable, isn't it? Every access 
route to the Tristero can be traced also 
back to the Inverarity estate ,..
Meaning what? That Bortz, along with 
Metzger, Cohen, Driblette, Koteks, the 
tattooed sailor in San Francisco, the 
W.A.S.T.E. carriers she'd seen —  that all 
of them were Pierce Inverarity's men?
Bought? Or loyal, for free, for fun, to 
some grandiose practical joke he'd cooked 
up, all for her embarrassment, or terrorizing, 
or moral improvement?
Change you name to Miles, Dean, Serge, 
and/or Leonard, baby, she advised her 
reflection in the half-light of that 
afternoon's vanity mirror. Either w'ay, 
they' ll call it, paranoia. They. Lirher ' 
you have stumbled indeed, without, the aid 
of LSD or other indole alkaloids, onto a
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richness and concealed density of dream; onto 
a network by which X number of Americans are 
truly communicating whilst reserving their 
lies, recitations of routine, arid betrayals 
of spiritual poverty, for the official 
government delivery system; maybe even onto 
a real alternative to the exitlessness, to 
the absence of surprise to life, that harrows 
the head of everybody American you know, and 
you too, sweetie. Or you are hallucinating 
it. Or a plot has been mounted against you, 
so expensive and elaborate, involving items 
like the forging of stamps and ancient books 
... in a way either too secret or too involved 
... so labyrinthine that it must have meaning 
beyond just a practical joke. Or you are 
fantasying some such plot, in which case you 
are a nut, Oedipa, out of your skull (pp. 127-8)
We may take this passage to be Pynchon *s own reply 
albeit only a partial reply, to our debate. This is 
the defense offered by the author for his flaunting of 
literary convenances. Indeed, as we have said, the lud^c 
aesthetic does present the game as a metaphor for the 
"secret richness and concealed density of dream," of a 
lost prelapsarian world as it also projects to the 
reader "a plot (which literally) has been mounted against 
you" (p. 128) . The plot of fiction is against one 
insofar as it presents a move like a chess move, which 
demands a response and perhaps a counter-response from 
the reader. And the Edenic art of the contemporary 
novel is explicitly "so labyrinthine that it must have 
meaning beyond just a practical joke" (p. 128). The 
Eden of words is primarily the contradictory protest- 
escape by which the aesthetic universe forms an 
authentic new world of mind as "a real alternative to
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the exitlessness, to the absence of surprise to life 
that harrows the head of everybody American you 
know" (p. 128).
For Nabokov, for Barth, for Coover, for Pynchon, 
fiction offers the only real alternative to the 
emptiness of a barren continent, a civilization which 
never fulfilled its first bright promise, for American 
fiction gives Europe the new Eden its geography never 
could yield. This essence of freedom in the play of 
mind does for the individual reader what Oedipa's 
search does for her; it reveals one's true humanity as 
one abandons time, space, and mundane reality for the 
aesthetic game. By means of the fictional process, 
we re-enter the primal garden and there we mould a 
dialectic borne of the child's wisdom and the energy 
of the gods. Oedipa's dreamlike encounter with the 
circle of children in Golden Gate Park poignantly 
delineates the nature of the verbal Eden, the primordial 
paradise brought to vital memory through art. Again, 
the motif parallels Nabokov's image of the concord 
of children at play in LoZZta:
At some indefinite passage in night's 
sonorous score, it also came to her that 
she would be safe, that something, perhaps 
only her linearly fading drunkenness, would 
protect her. The city was hers, as, made 
up and sleeked so with the customary words 
and images ... it had not been before: 
she had safe-passage tonight ... The repetition 
of symbols was to be enough, without'trauma 
as well perhaps to attenuate it or even jar 
it altogether loose from her memory. Skz 
iA)cu meant to ^emembe^. She faced that
possibility as she might the toy street from 
a high balcony, roller-coaster ride, feeding­
time among the beasts in a zoo —  any death-wish 
that can be consummated by some minimum gesture. 
She touched the edge of its voluptuous field 
... She tested it, shivering; I am meant to 
remember. Each clue that comes is Zuppo4>ed 
to have its own clarity, its fine chances tor 
permanence. But then she wondered if the 
gemlike "clues" were only some kind of 
compensation. To make up for her having lost 
the direct, epileptic Word, the cry that 
might abolish the night.
In Golden Gate Park she came on a circle 
of children in their nightclothes, who told 
her they were dreaming the gathering. But 
that the dream was really no different from 
being awake, because in the mornings when 
they got up they felt tired, as if they'd 
been up most of the night. When their 
mothers thought, they were out playing they 
were really curled in cupboards of neighbors' 
houses, in platforms up in trees, in secretly- 
hollowed nests inside hedges, sleeping, making 
up for these hours. The night was empty of 
all terror for them, they had inside their 
circle an imaginary fire, and needed nothing 
but their own unpenetrated sense of community 
(pp. 86-7).
The important strength of Lot 49 is that it takes
Schiller's dictum—  "Man is only fully a human being 
21when he plays" —  further than do the other novelists 
in this study. It is necessary to remember that Schiller 
himself and Hegel as well talk about nothing but man in 
society. For them man is the unity of the individual 
and the social world. As Wilkinson and Willoughby 
eludicate for us; "And when at the end we come to 
Schiller's vision of an Aesthetic State we find there
21 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aeâthettc Eduaatton 
o{\ Man: Jn a o£ Lette^6, ed. by Elizabeth M.
Wilkinson et at (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967),
p. 107.
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no select company of aesthetes lost in idle contemplation
of music and statuary ... but a community of people ,..
going about their ordinary affairs — - but with a different
quality in their attitude both to the job in hand and to 
22each other". The notion of the hermetic artist would
merit instant rejection and this marks Pynchon's
utranapoint as well. Oedipa is fully human because she
is attempting to play in society, not in the isolation
of an enclosed tower. She resembles Schiller's ideal
man: "Once he does begin to enjoy through the eye,
and seeing acquires for him a value of its own, he is
already aesthetically free and the play-drive has
23scarfed to develop". Oedipa grows in humanity as 
she plays, as she forges a fictive Eden and moves toward 
the aesthetic ideal.
If the genre of ludic fiction possesses one 
outstanding weakness, aside from its easy potential to 
decline into amusing trivia, it is the paucity of 
character delineation. One thinks especially of Barth, 
the later Nabokov, and Pynchon in I/, and G^avZty* ^
RalnboiA), where some characters are one-dimensional 
symbols or two-dimensional props, and project no 
individuality and exiguous, humanity. Characters in 
ludic fiction often have all the life of mechanical
22 Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby, 
"Introduction," in On the keztketZc EducatZcn oi Man, Jn 
a oi by Friedrich Schiller (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1967), p. xi.
23 Schiller, op* cZt* , p. 195.
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chess pieces moved heavily by the authorial magus. 
Several of the minor characters in Lot 49 share this 
trait, yet the figure of Oedipa herself does not 
partake of such limitations, and It is her singular 
questing presence which dominates the work. Oedipa 
may begin as a fairly self-centred housewife and a 
''Young Republican" as well, but Pynchon carefully 
adumbrates and emphasizes"those qualities which prepare 
her for the game, and which, following Schiller's 
context, insure her humanity. Oedipa is endowed with 
the magnanimity and kindness of a Cordelia; most of 
all, she possesses that heroine's capacity for Icve.
On page three the reader gets an inkling of Oedipa*s 
nature. She has just received the startling news that 
her former lover had died and named her the executrix 
of his estate. She waits for her husband Mucho to 
return home from the radio station and longs to unburden 
herself to him. She wants solace but instead she gives 
it :
She felt exposed, finessed, put down. She 
had never executed a will in her life, didn't 
know where to begin, didn't know how to tell 
the law firm in L.A. that she didn't know 
where to begin,
"Mucho, baby," she cried in an access 
of helplessness.
Mucho Maas, home, bounded through the 
screen door. "Today was another defeat," 
he began.
"Let me tell you," she also began. But 
let Mucho go first.
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Ke was a disc jockey who worked further 
along the Peninsula and suffered regular 
crises of conscience about his profession,,
"I don't believe in any of it, Oed," he could 
usually get out. "I try, I truly can * t ," 
way down there, further down perhaps than 
she could reach,r so that such times often 
brought her near panic. It might have been 
the sight of her so about to lose control 
that seemed to bring him back up (pp. 3-4).
In the middle of a self-absorbed narcissistic 
culture, Oedipa surfaces as an Eve of brightness, as 
a redem.ptress. She herself, as a symbol of the Edenic 
possibilities of fiction, becomes the sort of anarchist 
miracle which Jesus Arrabal foresees as a revolutionary 
redemptive force. Oedipa"s unmitigated empathy and her 
relentless humanity act as a powerful counterbalance 
to the all-consuming entropy which Pynchon projects* 
Oedipa's tender humanity expands in direct ratio to 
her involvement in the ludic tension of the fictive 
quest. The author exposes these positive qualities, 
this generosity of spirit,, as the attributes of a 
human growth which parallels, as Schiller has written, 
the aesthetic commitment. One learns of Oedipa“s 
forgiveness of Mucho's embarrassing and hurtful 
infidelities with adolescent girls, of her absorption 
with his ang^t* As Slade points out, "She had mentioned 
Mucho's proclivities to him once, but softened by the 
tenderness with which she accepts his obsessions and 
which is her dominant characteristic, she decided not
2 4
to reproach him again". Oedipa's capacity for love
24 Slade, Thomas Pynchon, p. 155.
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and understanding merits potable delineation from Pynchon.
He concentrates on her compassion for the sorrows of
a postlapsarian people, for the preterite of contemporary
iVir.erica, the sick, the poor, the helpless, and the lonely.
Levine comments about Pynchon that "we ignore too ... his
most astonishing and overwhelming power, to imagine love
out of the wastes of a world full of people helpless to 
25love". Oedipa encapsulâtes this capacity for love 
which transcends entropy. The most explicit scene, and 
perhaps the most moving and compelling, is the protagonist's 
meecing with the dying sailor and her union with him —  
the author's pieta. We may recall that this scene is a 
direct result of the Edenic quest, of Oedipa's play, and 
it recognizes the achievement of her humanity, a triumph 
over entropy, and the force of love:
"Give me a cigarette, Ramirez," the sailo]: 
said. "I know you got one."
Would it be today? "Ramirez," she cried.
The arthritic looked around on his rusty 
neck. "He's going to die," she said.
"Who isn't?" said Ramirez.
She remembered John Nefastis, talking 
about his Machine, and massive destructions 
of information. So when this mattress flared 
up around the sailor, in his Viking's funeral; 
the stored, coded years of uselessness, early 
death, self-harrowing, the sure decay of hope, 
the set of all men who had slept on it, 
whatever their lives had been, would truly 
cease to be, forever, when the mattress burned.
She stared at it in wonder. It was as if she 
had just discovered the irreversible process.
It astonished her to think that so much could 
be lost, even the quantity of hallucination
25 George Levine, "Risking the Moment", p. 118.
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belonging just to the sailor that the world 
would bear no further trace of. She knew, 
because she had held him, that he suffered 
DT's. Behind t],ie initials was a metaphor,, 
a delirium tremens, a trembling unfurrowing 
of the mind's plowshare. The saint whose 
water can light lamps, the clairvoyant whose 
lapse in recall is the breath of God, the 
true paranoid for whom all is organized in 
spheres joyful or threatening about the 
central pulse of himself, the dreamer whose 
puns probe ancient fetid shafts and tunnels 
of truth all act in the same special relevance 
to the word, or whatever it is the word is 
there, buffering, to protect us from. The 
act of metaphor then was a thrust at truth 
and a lie, depending where you were: inside,
safe, or outside, lost (p. 95).
The word exists to buffer and to protect man from 
the sorrowful plight of an entropie universe. Through 
Oedipa, Pynchon embraces the verbal paradise as the 
appropriate, perhaps the only, human response against 
entropy. The dying sailor has some connection to the 
W.A.S.T.E, system; through it he hopes to get one last 
letter to the wife he hasn't seen in many years.
Directly due to her involvement in the ludic quest,
Oedipa comes to this man and embraces him: "Exhausted,
hardly knowing what she was doing, she came the last 
three steps and sat, took the man in her arms, actually 
held him, gazing out of her smudged eyes down the 
stairs, back into the morning" (p. 93) . CaH,Zta6 is a 
virtue Oedipa learns through play. The power of 
endowing a separate world in the mind renders postlapsarian 
man a -new Adam in the promised land of the self-created 
Eden and concomitantly it renders him more fully a
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human being.
The alternate communication system of W.A.S.T.E. 
signifies the viability of verbal play to effect an 
independent world of mind, and even to posit the 
possibility of an anarchist miracle. The W.A.S.T.E. 
system is a small, important voice against the oppression 
i the exploitive weapons factory at Yoyodyne, against 
the requisite sameness of "individuals in alienating 
jobs, and in addition, a protest against the nugatory 
illusions of the failed American dream, Oedipa finds 
herself haunted by the intuition that "there were 
revelations in progress all around her" (p. 28). Her 
feeling relates directly to the symbol of the muted 
postal horn and its explicit potential —  "Shalt I 
p/iojtct a lOOAtd?" (pp. 59, 63). The concept of 
projecting a world contains the essence of the ludic 
experience of contemporary fiction and outlines the 
basic quest which Oedipa forges. As she probes into 
the silent mysteries of the W.A.S.T.E. network, she 
comes upon the proposition of a new American Eden, 
an epistemological paradise where the mind proposes 
the changed relationship with the universe, Emerson's 
vision as the game of words:
Last night, she might have wondered what 
undergrounds apart from the couple she knew 
of communicated by WASTE system. By sunrise 
she could legitimately ask what undergrounds 
didn't. If miracles were, as Jesus Arrabal 
had postulated years ago on the beach at 
Mazatlan, intrusions into this world from 
another, a kiss of cosmic pool balls, then
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so must be each of the night's post horns.
For here were God knew how many citizens, 
deliberately choosing not to communicate 
by U.S. Mail. It was not an act of treason, 
nor possibly even of defiance. But it was a 
calculated withdrawal, from the life of the 
Republic, from its machinery. Whatever else 
was being denied them out of hate, indifference 
to the power of their vote, loopholes, simple 
ignorance, this withdrawal was their own, 
iinpublicized, private. Since they could not 
have withdrawn into a vacuum (could they?), 
there had to exist the separate, silent, 
unsuspected world (p. 92).
The words of fiction present man with a concrete
chance to alter his relationship with the universe, to
create a new society through the revelations of the ludic
paradise. Borges tells us that German idealism influenced
the transcendentalists, that much of their hope and energy
they inherited from Hegel!. "Emerson reiterated that there
is no being who is not a microcosm, a minuscule universe.
The soul of the individual is identified with the soul
of the world; physical laws are mingled with moral laws.
If God is in every soul, all external authority disappears.
All that each man needs is his own profound and secret
divinity." If Matthiessen argued that Emerson's age
71"could be called more widely 'the age of Hegel,'"" 
it is possible for us to argue that contemporary fiction 
in the age of Nabokov and Pynchon is no less strongly 
influenced by the concepts of idealism, Man has only
2 6 Jorge Luis Borges, An I n t r o d u c t i o n  to American 
L i te r a tu re , (New York: Schocken, 1973), p. 25.
27 P.O. Matthiessen, American Renaissance: A r t
and Expression I n  th e  Age Emerson and (JUhltman (Oxford 
Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 54.
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words to play with and through the aesthetic consciousness 
he can actively transform, his mind, and hence in the»
Hegelian sense, he can remake the world by means of a 
revolution in thought. When Pynchon unifies the notion 
of a new America with the power of mind, he echoes 
Whitman, who "declared that 'only Hegel is fit for 
America,' since in his system 'the human soul stands 
in the centre, and all the universes minister to
0 g
it.,'""" Once men have played in the verbal garden, they
have tasted the freedom of a new consciousness, where,
as Schiller indicates, they are "free alike of the compulsion
to infringe the freedom of others in order to assert their 
2 9own." Through his mind, man controls the universe.
No longer in the aesthetic state will the coercion of 
the workaday world compel men to live in poverty and 
alienation :
In the midst of the fearful kingdom of 
forces, and in the midst of the sacred kingdom 
of laws, the aesthetic impulse to form is at 
work, unnoticed, on the building of a third 
joyous kingdom of play and of semblance, in 
which man is relieved of the shackles of 
circumstance, and released from all that 
might be called constraint, alike in the 
physical and in the moral sphere.
If in the dynamic State of rights it is 
as force that one man encounters another, 
and imposes limits upon his activities; if 
in the ethical State of duties Man sets 
himself over against man with all the 
majesty of the law^ , and puts a curb upon 
his desires: in those circles where conduct
is governed by beauty, in the aesthetic
28 Ibid., p. 525.
29 Schiller, op. cit., p. 219.
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State, none may appear to the other except £is 
form, or confront him except as an object of 
free play. To bestow freedom by means of 
freedom is the fundamental law of this kingdom.
The dynamic State can merely make society 
possible, by letting one nature be curbed by 
another; the ethical State can merely make it 
(morally) necessary, by subjecting the individual 
will to the general? the aesthetic State alone 
can make it real, because it consummates the 
will of the whole through the nature of the 
individual.3 0
It is the image of piay, of the ludic dream, which 
motivates Oedipa to transcend the wasteland of contemporary 
America. She sees the dying sailor, the poor people who 
trade in their cars as if the pieces of metal are the 
last vestiges of their hope for America and for themselves. 
She witnesses the disaffected and alienated workers from 
the Yoyodyne weapons factory. She watches her husband gp 
crazy and is held hostage by her psychiatrist. She 
laments Driblette's suicidal walk into the sea. It is 
for all the forgotten and disaffected that her quest 
proceeds, and in this sense she is radically different, 
frorci the protagonists of the other fictions in this 
study. Against the self “-absorption of Humbert and 
Waugh, Oedipa stands poignantly united with the angst 
of her world, of the people outside her suburban 
home. She, even more than Mucho, knows the torments 
of the entropie vision and shares his metonymic survey 
of the disaffected;
30 Schiller, op, clt., p. 215.
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Yet at least he had believed in the 
cars. Maybe to excess: how could he not,
seeing people poorer than him come in, Negro, 
Mexican, cracker, a parade seven days a week, 
bringing the most godawful of trade-ins: 
motorized metal extensions of themselves, 
of their families and what their whole lives 
must be like, out there so naked for anybody, 
a stranger like himself, to look at, frame 
cockeyed, rusty underneath, fender repainted 
in a shade just off enough to depress the 
value, if not Mucho himself, inside smelling 
hopelessly of children, supermarket booze, 
two, sometimes three generations of cigarette 
smokers, or only of dust —  and when the cars 
were swept out you had to look at the actual 
residue of these lives, and there was no way 
of telling what things had been truly refused 
(when so little he supposed came by that out 
of fear most of it had to be taken and kept) 
and what had simply (perhaps tragically) been 
lost: clipped coupons promising savings of
5 or lOf, trading stamps, pink flyers 
advertising specials at the markets, butts, 
tooth-shy combs, help-wanted ads. Yellow 
Pages torn from the phone book, rags of old 
underwear or dresses that already were period 
costumes, for wiping your own breath off the 
inside of a windshield with so you could see 
whatever it was, a movie, a woman or car you 
coveted, a cop who might pull you over just 
for drill, all the bits and pieces coated 
uniformly, like a salad of despair, in a gray 
dressing of condensed exhaust, dust, body 
wastes —  it made him sick to look, but he 
had to look (pp. 4-5).
Oedipa is searching for a brave new world, though 
her experience is without the ebullience of Miranda's.
Yet the journey she forges, that Pierce forces her to 
engage in, brings her to the invention of a new 
American Eden, as glorious as Miranda's island paradise.
This Eden is the word and the revolutionary consciousness
it confers. Oedipa finds freedom, "As if there could be
- 'À
no barriers between herself and the rest of the land" (p. 133)
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She finds a unity; now there is nothing alien to the
self; "There was the true continuity, San Narciso had
no boundaries. No one knew yet how to draw them. She
had. dedicated herself, weeks ago, to making sense of
what Inverarity had left behind, never suspecting that
the legacy was America " (p. 134). If Oedipa attains
freedom and harmony by inventing America through the
play of the mind in art, through the aesthetic state,
she follows the gaming pattern of those revolutionaries
in the W.A.S.T.E. system, those who, like her, rebel
against the compulsion of capitalist society. Pynchon
argues for an aesthetic state no less than Schiller.
The Eden of art is that condition in which "Beauty
alone makes the whole world happy, and each and every
being forgets its limitations while under its spell".
Moreover, "no privilege, no autocracy of any kind, is
tolerated where taste rules, and the realm of aesthetic
semblance extends its sway ... Here, therefore, in the
realm of Aesthetic Semblance, we find that ideal of
31equality fulfilled ..." Mike Fallopian articulates 
the importance of the creative impulse as an assertion 
of freedom in society:
"Sure this Koteks is part of some 
underground," he told her a few days later, 
"an underground of the unbalanced, possibly, 
but then how can you blame them for being 
maybe a little bitter? Look what's happening
31 Schiller, op, d t , , pp. 217-9.
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to them. In school they got brainwashed, 
like all of us, into believing the Myth of 
the American Inventor -- Morse and his 
telegraph. Bell and his telephone, Edison 
and his light bulb, Tom Swift and his this 
or that. Only one man per invention. Then 
when they grew up they found they haid to sign 
over all their rights to a monster like 
Yoyodyne; got stuck on some 'project' or 
'task force' or 'team' and started being 
ground into anonymity. Nobody wanted them 
to invent —  only perform their little role 
in a design ritual, already set down for them 
in some procedures handbook ..."
Metzger, who’d come along to The Scope 
that evening, wanted to argue. "You're 
so right-wing you're left-wing," he protested. 
"How can you be against a corporation that 
wants a worker to waive his patent rignts.
That sounds like the surplus value theory 
to me, fella, and you sound like a Marxist."
As they got drunker this typical Southern 
California dialogue degenerated further.
Oedipa sat alone and gloomy. She'd decided 
to come tonight to The Scope not only because 
of the encounter with Stanley Koteks, but 
also because of other revelations ... (pp. 63-4).
Although Pynchon's irony belies the zealous 
potential of this passage, particularly when the 
narrator calls the exchange between Fallopian and 
Metzger "this typical Southern California dialogue," 
both a cogency and a seriousness emerge. One cannot 
fail to recognize the urgency of the rhetoric when 
viewed in the context of the entire novel. The 
projection of the ludic realm is thus in many ways a 
response to the defects of contemporary society and its 
inevitable alienation. As> Schiller and Hegel adumbrate, 
the rational conclusion to the contradictory protest of 
Adamic literature brings the potential of a changed man
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back into the promise of a changed society wherein the
individual is his own agent, as Hegel describes he must
3 2be.” Finally, it is not the gods or the magus who is 
the ultimate creator; it is man. As Oedipa awaits the 
crying of lot 49, she is bathed in sunlight; the 
"puppet-master" auctioneer only looks and smiles on her„ 
Pynchon does not reveal any solutions to his puzzle 
beyond the mind of the protagonist. The gifted hands 
of the magus become our own. Hence if we create the 
world in which we live, then in a very real sense verbal 
play yields the whole world into our hands.
32 G.W.F. Hegel, A e s t h e t i c s , Volume I, p. 226.
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